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Abstract 
JESUS, TRANSCENDENCE AND GENEROSITY 
Reading the Christologies of Hans Frei and Dietrich Bonhoeffer Together  
 
 Tim R. Boniface 
In contemporary scholarship, both Hans Frei (1922–1988) and Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
(1906–1945) are drawn upon by various scholars seeking to articulate a way between 
extremes such as fundamentalism, exclusivism or conservatism on one hand, and 
secularism, pluralism or liberalism on the other. This thesis argues that reading the 
Christologies of both theologians together towards a theology of the transcendence of 
Jesus points towards a robust answer to this question of a ‘middle way’ on which they 
are both put to use. Focussing on their remarkably similar Christological responses to 
what William Placher calls the domestication of transcendence, this thesis argues that 
Frei and Bonhoeffer complement and supplement one another’s work towards a 
theology of the transcendence of Jesus that is grounded in his unsubstitutable history-
like identity as the crucified and risen one; and that this kind of theology is at the heart 
of what makes for what Frei calls a ‘generous orthodoxy’—i.e. a way between the 
various extremes mentioned above. After reading Frei and Bonhoeffer towards this 
end, the conclusion also suggests that such a theology derived from their Christologies 
should be supplemented with a more particular pneumatology, by virtue of which one 
is able to fully emphasise the broad generosity of God at the heart of a theology of 
Jesus’ transcendence. 
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Chapter 1. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis brings together work by Hans W. Frei (1922–1988) and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (1906–1945) on the question of the transcendence of Jesus, in relation to 
the contemporary attempt to counter both extreme theological closed-ness on one 
hand, and vacuous, non-descriptive openness on the other. In contemporary English 
language scholarship, both Frei and Bonhoeffer are drawn upon independently in the 
search for a ‘middle way’ between positions variously characterised as 
fundamentalism, exclusivism or conservatism on one side; and secularism, pluralism 
or liberalism on the other. I will argue that, beyond their important individual 
contributions, when Frei and Bonhoeffer are read together their work points towards 
a robust approach to this question of a ‘middle way’, based specifically upon an 
account of Jesus’ transcendence.  
 
Engaging in this reading of Frei and Bonhoeffer also exposes a surprising lack of 
comparative work on the two. Not only are they currently being used in the same 
way, but their equally Christocentric works also contain significant parallels and 
potential for each to complement the other—more than can be brought to the surface 
in this project. Therefore, this thesis also advocates more explicitly comparative work 
on the two. 
 
In the discussion of the ‘middle way’ referred to above, scholars draw upon many 
different elements of Frei or Bonhoeffer’s theology, and vary also in the terms used to 
describe the path that a middle way has to navigate. To provide a few examples 
regarding Bonhoeffer, Christiane Tietz argues that, on account of a “strong” orthodox 
Christological ontology, he is able to evidence a theology congenial to pluralism while 
focussed on the exclusivity of Christ.1 Jennifer McBride suggests that a Christological 
model of repentance drawn from Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran Christology points towards a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Christiane Tietz, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Strong Christology in the Context of Religious Pluralism’, in Clifford 
Green and Guy Carter (eds.), Interpreting Bonhoeffer: Historical Perspectives, Emerging Issues (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2013), 189, 195–196.  
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form of public witness that is “simultaneously non-triumphal and faithful”.2 In 2009, 
following the 2008 International Bonhoeffer Congress, a whole volume was devoted 
to exploring how Bonhoeffer’s theology offers a “way between fundamentalism and 
secularism”, wherein, for example, Michael DeJonge suggests that Bonhoeffer’s 
“negotiation of oppositional pairs” maps a path between 
fundamentalism/sectarianism and secularism;3 Jens Zimmerman highlights how 
Bonhoeffer’s “Christological, incarnational humanism” illuminates “a religious 
alternative beyond secularism and fundamentalism” (or what he also calls “religious 
and secularist fundamentalisms”);4 and Philip Ziegler looks to the theological 
(especially eschatological) “character” of the “theme of secularity” in Bonhoeffer’s 
later writings, and finds there a promising way to counter fundamentalist or secular 
extremes.5 Elsewhere, Tom Greggs reads Bonhoeffer together with Barth, towards 
replacing “a dangerous vicious cycle of mutually reinforcing fundamentalisms with a 
virtuous cycle of more particularist but open expressions of faith.”6 In a more 
explicitly philosophical vein, Paul Janz draws upon Bonhoeffer as part of his attempt 
to articulate an alternative to both reductionism (the reduction of the transcendent to 
the immanent) and positivism (a theology of revelation utterly immune to rationale 
enquiry) concentrating particularly on Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being.7  
 
Frei lends himself even more directly to this question, using the phrase “generous 
orthodoxy” to point to his desire to articulate something resembling “a voice between 
liberalism and fundamentalism”.8 The promise of this phrase has been recognised 
both specifically by contemporary Frei scholars and more generally by popular 
theology. Jason Springs outlines a contemporary set of dichotomies characterised by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Jennifer M. McBride, The Church for the World: A Theology of Public Witness (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 9. 
3 Michael P. DeJonge, ‘Between Fundamentalism and Secularism: Bonhoeffer’s Negotiation of 
Oppositional Pairs in Ethics and its Precedent in Act and Being’, in John DeGruchy, Stephen Plant, 
Christiane Tietz (eds.), Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A Way Between Fundamentalism and Secularism 
(München: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 2009), 75. 
4 Jens Zimmerman, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christian Humanism in Philosophical and Theological 
Context’, in DeGruchy et al, Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today, 369. 
5 Philip G. Ziegler, ‘Eschatology and Secularity in the Late Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in 
DeGruchy et al, Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today, 126. 
6 Tom Greggs, Theology Against Religion: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and Barth (London: T&T 
Clark, 2011), 10. 
7 Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 3–5. 
8 Hans Frei, ‘Response to “Narrative Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal”’, in Hans Frei, Theology and 
Narrative, edited by George Hunsinger and William Placher (Oxford, OUP, 1993), 208. 
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the “distinctive and uncompromising” on one side, and those positions “so reserved 
and open-handed as to invite questions about what makes them theological at all” on 
the other. He suggests that Frei’s work—especially the technical philosophical 
implications of its cultural linguistic, Wittgensteinian dimension—offers “a wealth of 
resources with which to chart a path through these apparent dichotomies.”9 David 
Ford emphasises both a “diffidence” and “definiteness” in Frei’s work, linking it with 
Hardy’s concept of an Anglican “transcendent middle … a more satisfactory and 
higher level appropriation of Christian truth than that attained by either ‘liberals’ or 
‘conservatives’”, that allows for “contrast without either competition or loss of 
integrity.”10 Paul Schwartzentruber argues that Frei promotes a “hermeneutics of 
modesty” that makes for a theologically grounded co-existence of confidence and 
reserve in relation to the identity of Jesus, 11 and more generally, ‘Postliberal’ theology 
overall, for which Frei is understood to be a founding influence, seeks to generously 
inhabit particularity and flexibility.12 Beyond the academic communities, Brian 
McLaren takes up the phrase ‘generous orthodoxy’ to express a theological middle 
way associated with the U.S. emerging church movement.13  
 
My own purpose is less to explain how Frei and Bonhoeffer might be employed to 
critique one particular set of extremes, and more to demonstrate how bringing them 
together on the question of Jesus’ transcendence points towards a fruitful engagement 
with this ‘middle way’ question in its broad form. Therefore, wishing to steer clear of 
sociological analysis and specific critique of ‘fundamentalism’, ‘evangelicalism’, 
‘sectarianism’, ‘liberalism’ or ‘secularism’ per se, I take up David Ford’s description of 
“closed” and “wide open” religion,14 which I use to refer to these various options for 
framing the ‘middle way’ question. Ford uses “closed” to point to “theologies with a 
heavy investment in telling members exactly what to believe and what to do, and in 
limiting any scope for questioning and exploring”; and “wide open” to describe 
theologies that are “so … fluid, vague, or fragmented that they seem to lack the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Jason A. Springs, Toward A Generous Orthodoxy: Prospects for Hans Frei’s Postliberal Theology (Oxford: OUP, 
2010), 23. 
10 David F. Ford, ‘Hans Frei and the Future of Theology’, Modern Theology (8, 1992), 204. 
11 Ronald T. Michener, Postliberal Theology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 9. 
12 Paul Schwartzentruber, ‘The Modesty of Hermeneutics: The Theological Reserves of Hans Frei, 
Modern Theology (8, 1992), 181–195.  
13 Brian D. McLaren, A Generous Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 28.  
14 David F. Ford, The Future of Christian Theology (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 70. 
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capacity to make definite affirmations … [and] … endlessly interrogative and 
experimental without ever being able to come to conclusions or to offer nourishing 
theological food for ordinary people.”15 These descriptions help us think in terms of 
characteristics rather than specific definitions, such that we might condense them to 
refer to extreme characteristics of ‘arrogance’ and ‘banality’, characteristics which one 
can expect the church to want to avoid. 
 
The theological projects of both Frei and Bonhoeffer rest on a firm and explicitly 
confessional Christological basis. Each articulates Christology in a way that testifies to 
their markedly similar convictions, regarding the problems presented to Christology 
by the heritage of the Enlightenment, and also showing the determination that any 
critical response to this heritage must be adequately grounded in the historical. Both 
eschew simplistic notions of divine revelation, yet are equally committed to 
articulating the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the one in whom God acted and 
continues to act, in and for the world.  
 
However, despite the close similarities in the way their theologies are grounded and 
put to use, there is little comparative work on Frei and Bonhoeffer together. Stephen 
Plant’s PhD thesis, for example, briefly examines Frei’s hermeneutics in relation to 
Bonhoeffer’s use of scripture in Ethics,16 but beyond that kind of brief undertaking, 
there is little explicit comparison, even when the two theologians are both drawn upon 
in a single work. Christopher Holmes’ Ethics in the Presence of Christ, for example, which 
clearly draws on the Christological convictions of both Frei and Bonhoeffer, stops 
short of commenting explicitly upon the fit between the two theologians.17 Bonhoeffer 
and Frei are both of great importance to two prominent contemporary theological 
voices—David Ford again, and Stanley Hauerwas—but neither concentrate on an 
explicit conversation between the two.18  These theologians have their own good !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Ibid. 
16 Stephen Plant, Uses of the Bible in the Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, PhD thesis (Cambridge University: UK, 
1993), 109–111. 
17 Christopher R. J. Holmes, Ethics in the Presence of Christ (London: T&T Clark, 2012). 
18 See, for example, David Ford, Shaping Theology: Engagements in a Religious and Secular World (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007). Ford’s essays engage consistently with both figures. On Frei in Ford see Tom Greggs, 
Rachel Muers, Simeon Zahl, ‘Introduction’, in Greggs, Muers and Zahl (eds.), The Vocation of Theology 
Today: A Festschrift for David Ford (Oregon: Cascade: 2013), 5–6. Notably, in ‘Hans Frei and the Future of 
Theology’, Ford coins the phrase “polyphonous future” to describe the way Frei’s theology was 
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reasons for not concentrating on the details of a Frei-Bonhoeffer comparison, so my 
describing the lack is not a criticism, but more an observation that there is work to be 
done. Perhaps most tantalising is that Frei himself alludes to Bonhoeffer once in an 
essay on transcendence in German theology, but casually aligns him with the 
secularisation movement in a way discredited by most contemporary scholarship.19 
On the basis of this overall lack therefore, this thesis illuminates a connection waiting 
to be made, rather than forcing together two theologians with less than obvious 
association.  
 
Synopsis 
 
I aim to show that the question of the transcendence of Jesus, developed especially in 
response to post-Enlightenment epistemology, lies at the heart of what makes both 
Frei and Bonhoeffer promising for the pursuit of this ‘middle way’. After a general 
outline of the question of Christological transcendence, I present a reading of Frei, 
and then of Bonhoeffer, that allows their work to mutually inform and develop one 
another’s Christology towards an account of the paradoxical transcendence of Jesus, 
at the heart of which is his scandalous historical particularity. In general I set out Frei 
and Bonhoeffer’s work chronologically, as this allows for their similarities to be 
consistently perceived as they develop in the career of each theologian. 
 
For the purpose of outlining a general discussion about transcendence and modernity, 
chapter 2 begins by drawing on William Placher’s thesis about the ‘domestication of 
transcendence’ from the seventeenth century onwards. Placher describes how a 
general turn to univocity in the seventeenth century domesticated God’s 
transcendence by constructing theological frameworks within the limits of a post-
Enlightenment concept of universal rationality, and latterly how antipathy towards !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“hospitable to many different methods, philosophies, church, anthropologies, cultures, periods, etc.” 
Ford, ‘Hans Frei’, 207. Regarding Hauerwas, Frei taught Hauerwas and remains for him a consistent 
reference point throughout many of his works (though not in an uncritical fashion), see especially 
Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (London: SCM, 1984), xxi, xxv; and 
Hauerwas, ‘The Church as God’s new language’, in Garrett Green, Scriptural Authority and Narrative 
Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987). On Bonhoeffer’s influence, see especially Stanley Hauerwas, 
Performing the Faith: Bonhoeffer and the Practice of Nonviolence (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2004), chs. 2 and 3. 
19 Hans W. Frei, ‘German Theology: Transcendence and Secularity’, in Charles E. McClelland and 
Steven P. Scher (eds.), Postwar German Culture (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974), 105. See below, chapter 
7. 
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that ‘domesticated’ version of God’s transcendence—in which God is all too easily 
identified with an overbearing ruler—leads to transcendence per se being rejected or 
radically reconfigured to the detriment of theology. Having supplemented Placher’s 
thesis with brief attention to postmodern theologians of transcendence, I turn 
explicitly to considering what is at play in the discussion of Jesus’ transcendence in 
particular, and conclude by drawing upon Ray S. Anderson’s somewhat neglected 
work Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God, which, by articulating the incarnation 
as the “axiomatic penetration of God’s transcendence in the world”20 highlights the 
centrality of Jesus’ historical particularity for a discussion of his transcendence. 
 
Chapter 3 then introduces Frei in relation to this domestication of transcendence, and 
then specifically the transcendence of Jesus Christ: first with regard to Frei’s doctoral 
dissertation on Barth’s doctrine of revelation, then his critical engagement with the 
hermeneutics of the modern era (especially in The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative) and finally 
his Christological response to that (especially in The Identity of Jesus Christ). Following 
Mike Higton, I note that, evident in Frei’s critique of Barth’s ‘epistemological 
monophysitism’ and his exposure of the captivity of hermeneutics to a dichotomy 
between faith and history, is his concern to do justice to the integrity of historicity 
whilst avoiding domesticating God ‘inside’ the categories of historical criticism and 
universal reason. Frei does this by contrasting a ‘pre-critical’ hermeneutic, in which 
historicity and figural (or typological) readings of scripture mutually support one 
another, with the hermeneutical tendencies that developed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Frei’s constructive Christology, which emerges in response to 
these dichotomising tendencies, focusses upon the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus as 
rendered in the gospel narratives that narrate his identity in a wholly ‘history-like’ 
way, despite the fact that they push against or break the categories of post-
Enlightenment historical criticism.  At the heart of this Christology—beginning as it 
does from Jesus identity rather than his meaning or presence—is a union of 
transcendence with historical particularity: Jesus wholly-other-ness must be articulated 
at the level of what Frei calls his unsubstitutable identity. This approach to Jesus’ 
transcendence, developed in the context of Frei’s Anselmian ‘faith seeking 
understanding’, points towards a consistent confidence and humility in Christian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Ray S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God: A Christological Critique (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1975), 107. 
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witness—speaking concretely and particularly about the identity of Jesus Christ who 
cannot be resolved into categories of human epistemology, and yet encounters us in 
history. Taking cues from Frei’s brief pneumatological conclusion to The Identity of 
Jesus Christ, this chapter also introduces the suggestion (expanded in chapter 8) that a 
theology of the Holy Spirit supplements and strengthens the account of the 
transcendence of Jesus derived from Frei’s work.  
 
Chapter 4 begins by elucidating Frei’s later cultural-linguistic focus upon the 
hermeneutical praxis of the Christian community, to describe how that community is 
‘normed’ by the unsubstitutable transcendent person of Jesus Christ. In essays from 
the 1980s, Frei argues for the priority of a narrative reading of the Gospels, based not 
only upon features of the texts themselves, but upon how they are used by the 
community of faith. The hermeneutical priority of the unsubstitutable identity of 
Jesus, which Frei calls the sensus literalis, emerges from a complex interaction between 
community and text—an interaction that ultimately points to the activity of God in 
Christ upon the community.  By supplementing Frei’s work with Richard Bauckham’s 
exploration of the category of testimony, we arrive at a rich account of the 
transcendence of Jesus in relation to the historically particular community of faith—
where, once more, historical particularity is inseparable from Jesus’ ‘beyond-ness’ and 
‘ungraspability’. Again, this chapter includes the suggestion that pneumatology is a 
necessary supplement to the account of Jesus’ unsubstitutable transcendence being 
derived from Frei’s work. Finally, we turn to Frei’s Types of Christian Theology, wherein 
the connection between the unsubstitutable transcendence of Jesus and a robustly 
flexible Christian theology is made most explicit, particularly in relation to how Frei 
understands the praxis of Christian theology to relate to other external academic 
disciplines and general categories of understanding. Overall, Frei refuses to 
compromise either on the particularity of Jesus, or on the incapacity of the general 
categories favoured by post-Enlightenment thought to contain or define Jesus. His 
particularity and his transcendence are, somehow, effectively one and the same.  
 
Chapter 5 does for Bonhoeffer what part of chapter 3 did for Frei—i.e. positions him 
in relation to Placher’s narrative of the domestication of transcendence, thus enabling 
! 8 
the overlap between the two theologians to begin to emerge.21 Firstly, in Bonhoeffer’s 
doctoral dissertation, Sanctorum Communio, he protests against modernity’s exaltation of 
the ‘I’ as the ground of all epistemology, arguing instead that human beings receive 
their personhood from outside of themselves—in relation to others with whom we are 
in community, and ultimately in relation to God. He understands the church 
community as having its ground in the transcendent act of God in Christ, actualised 
by the work of the Holy Spirit who makes the church ‘Christ existing as community’. 
Writing, like Frei, from the perspective of ‘faith seeking understanding’, Bonhoeffer 
rejects any ecclesiology that fails to locate the church’s identity in the free activity of 
God’s historical act in Christ. Secondly, Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being demonstrates more 
explicitly his rejection of modernist epistemologies that imply the capability of human 
beings to place themselves into truth, and from there he elucidates the seeds of his 
own Christological theology of revelation. Notably, here Bonhoeffer relates to Barth’s 
work in much the same way as Frei does—appreciating the turn away from 
modernism’s domesticated transcendence, whilst at the same time critiquing the lack 
of real historical grounding in Barth’s work. As Michael DeJonge in particular has 
shown, Bonhoeffer emphasises person as the key concept for a theology of revelation, 
accounting as it does for the contingent historicity of God’s free act in Christ.  
Constructively, this chapter suggests that when Frei’s concept of ‘unsubstitutability’ is 
drafted in to supplement Bonhoeffer’s somewhat theoretical suggestions in Act and 
Being, the latter’s concern to articulate Jesus’ transcendence at the level of historical 
particularity is illuminated and strengthened.  
 
Chapter 6 concentrates on the maturation of Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis (theology of 
the cross) in his Christology lectures of 1933, arguing that this can constitute his most 
significant contribution to the account of Jesus’ transcendence derived from Frei’s 
work. In comparison with Kierkegaard, in whose work the historicity of Christ’s 
incognito somewhat falls by the way, Bonhoeffer elucidates a Lutheran theologia crucis 
that recognises the inseparability of the scandal of the crucified and risen Christ and 
his historical particularity. Bonhoeffer develops this point from a very similar !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Whereas both Frei’s critique of domesticated transcendence and his constructive Christological 
response are described in the same chapter (3) a whole chapter is devoted to the first aspect in 
Bonhoeffer. This is due to the extent of the material, and because the constructive Christology of 
Bonhoeffer’s that I wish to concentrate on takes its more mature shape in his slightly later works, 
lending itself to extensive treatment in a separate chapter. 
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terminological basis as Frei’s—i.e. focus upon the ‘who’ in Christology—but 
modifying Frei, he expounds this ‘who’ with startling attention to the identity of Christ 
as the one hidden in the humiliation of sinful flesh, whose identity as the risen one 
present now in word, sacrament and in community can never be detached from this 
scandalous hiddenness. I argue that if Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis is read with Frei’s 
notion of unsubstitutability in mind, then not only is the coherence between Jesus’ 
transcendence and his particularity better emphasised, but also Bonhoeffer’s focus 
upon the ‘difficulty’ of the transcendent Christ who is pro me supplements Frei’s 
Christology significantly towards a richer theology of Jesus’ transcendence. Where 
Frei’s brief allusion to Kierkegaard’s notion of Jesus’ ‘incognito’ is tantalisingly 
underdeveloped, Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis reflects upon the scandal of Jesus’ 
historically particular incognito as the crucified and risen one. Here we encounter 
how Jesus’ transcendence has the structure of an unsubstitutable paradox that makes 
for a humble and flexible approach to theology. 
 
Chapter 7 elucidates how Bonhoeffer’s Ethics, and his theological letters from prison, 
serve to deepen reflection upon the coherence of Jesus’ scandalous particularity with 
his transcendence, and in particular help to articulate how this kind of account makes 
for a way between extreme theological open-ness or closed-ness. Bonhoeffer’s 
Christological participatory ontology in Ethics expounds the scandalous identity of 
Jesus Christ on a cosmic scale, envisioning ethical activity as participation in the 
reality of God’s reconciliation with the world in the incarnate, crucified and risen one. 
Participation in this Christ-reality (Christuswirklichkeit) is never abstract, but a wholly 
‘worldly’ affair, precisely because God’s reconciling activity is itself ‘worldly’ as well as 
transcendent. When supplemented with Frei’s concept of unsubstitutability, and also 
the latter’s understanding of figural reading, Bonhoeffer’s realist Christological 
ontology offers a powerful portrait of the all-embracing transcendence of the 
particular Jesus, in union with whom Christians are called to live responsibly towards 
the other. As well as the continuing suggestion that a theologia crucis is an important 
way in which Bonhoeffer supplements Frei, here Bonhoeffer’s notions of ultimacy and 
penultimacy also serve to ontologically contextualise Frei’s understanding of the 
relationship of theology to other external disciplines. Bonhoeffer’s Christological 
ontology can therefore help to articulate what Frei calls a generous orthodoxy—i.e. a 
way between wide-open and closed religion—rooted in the coherence of historicity 
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and transcendence. In his letters from prison, Bonhoeffer returns explicitly to the 
theme of domesticated transcendence, critiquing the modernist obsession with God as 
a religious stop-gap in a way that chimes harmoniously with Frei’s criticism of the 
subjection of Christology to general categories. Reflecting again their shared concern 
to avoid what Frei calls Barth’s epistemological monophysitism (and what Bonhoeffer 
in the letters calls “a positivism of revelation”)22 Bonhoeffer calls for an explicitly 
‘worldly’ Christianity that is anything but a rejection of God’s transcendence, but 
rather is the call for Christians to perceive afresh God’s paradoxical strength in the 
weakness of Jesus’ cross. Here, again, the truly transcendent God is Jesus Christ the 
unsubstitutable God-man for others, whose transcendence can only be explicated at 
the level of his scandalous historical particularity—i.e. as the crucified God-man. 
Once more, the confidence of Christian faith in witnessing to this particular figure as 
the one in whom God acts for our redemption, is in union with the incapacity of 
Christians to grasp or define him.  
 
The concluding chapter first of all outlines three key overlaps between Frei and 
Bonhoeffer, and four key ways in which one strengthens or develops the concepts 
found in the other. I contend that on the basis of these points, a theology of the 
transcendence of Jesus derived from both Frei and Bonhoeffer is ‘thicker’ than one 
could derive from either theologian alone, and makes for a more theologically robust 
example of how Christology contributes to the potential for a way between wide-open 
and closed Christian theology. Both theologians point to the possibility of concrete, 
‘worldly’ witness to the unsubstitutable person of Jesus, whose paradoxically 
scandalous historical particularity renders him out of the grasp of human beings, yet 
in whose being divinely pro nobis we find our possibility of life in God’s reality. 
Secondly, my conclusion takes up the suggestions in chapters 3 and 4 that Frei’s 
theology would benefit from pneumatological development, and recognises that whilst 
Bonhoeffer writes more on the Holy Spirit, this is underdeveloped as regards his 
theologia crucis. Drawing on Eugene Rogers and John V. Taylor in particular, I show 
how a more explicit articulation of the pneumatological dimension of the 
transcendence of Christ highlights the boundlessly generous activity of God in 
bestowing the identity of Christ by the Spirit without the loss of historical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 LPP, 373. 
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particularity, and calls Christians to participation in the work of the Spirit, which is 
the theological locale for what Frei calls ‘generous orthodoxy’. In the final section, I 
offer a figural reading of John 20:19–23 to show how Jesus’ unsubstitutable and 
paradoxical transcendence is his being-towards-us as the wounded and risen one, who 
dismantles the domesticating epistemological structures and calls us to witness beyond 
them in the power of the Spirit. Finally, relating to the question of a middle way, this 
thesis is presented as a call to theological self-awareness—i.e. awareness that extreme 
open-ness or closed-ness in a Christian community might well be linked to its 
Christological presuppositions. 
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Chapter 2. 
 
THE DOMESTICATION OF TRANSCENDENCE  
AND CHRISTOLOGY 
 
Having suggested that a theology of Jesus’ transcendence is an effective focal point for 
discussing Frei and Bonhoeffer’s contribution to the question of a ‘middle way’ 
between what Ford calls wide-open and closed religion, here I briefly present some 
background to questions of transcendence and Christology as both theologians inherit 
and respond to them. For this, I turn initially to William Placher’s book The 
Domestication of Transcendence (1997) which argues that an epistemological shift that he 
locates in the seventeenth century led to a failure to think theologically concerning 
“the mystery, the wholly otherness of God”,1 and that the subsequent way in which 
that otherness was misconstrued affects how the concept of transcendence is thought 
about today. Having laid out Placher’s thesis and described some other examples of 
how modern and postmodern thinking about transcendence reflects this 
‘domestication’, I will ask after the specifically Christological issues illuminated by this 
issue, and use that summary as the point of departure for the reading of Frei and 
Bonhoeffer that follows. 
 
 I  
 
Modernity’s Problem of Transcendence 
 
In The Domestication of Transcendence, William Placher (1948–2008) outlines how the 
seeds of modernist epistemology which developed in the seventeenth century shaped 
the idea that God’s ‘transcendence’ is something about God that a human being could 
master or define within categories of universal reason.2 This contrasts starkly, he says, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God Went Wrong 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996), 6. 
2 Placher is by no means unique in identifying an epistemological shift—primarily, as we shall see, with 
regard to univocity—that fatally problematises the relationship between God and the world. 
Prominently, ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ traces the problem back even further than Placher to Duns Scotus.  
See John Milbank and Simon Oliver, ‘Radical Orthodoxy’, in Rupert Shortt (ed.), God’s Advocates: 
Christian Thinkers in Conversation (London: DLT, 2005), 111. However, as Catherine Pickstock has 
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with the way most pre-modern theologians understood theological language to be a 
partial expression of God who is ultimately mysterious and beyond them.   
 
In the seventeenth century philosophers and theologians increasingly thought 
they could talk clearly about God … Rather than explaining how all categories 
break down when applied to God, they set the stage for talking about 
transcendence as one of the definable properties God possesses—a quality we 
could understand and that many writers today could then come to find deeply 
unattractive. In that sense, transcendence gets domesticated, and theology suffered as a 
result.3 
 
Placher’s argument can be summarised in three stages: firstly, that prior to the 
seventeenth century, most theologians knew theology to be a partial business, where 
one is always up against that which is not graspable by human reason nor wholly 
expressible in human language; secondly, that from the seventeenth century onwards, 
this notion of God’s otherness was effectively reversed by being reduced to something 
human beings can grasp about God—i.e. God’s transcendence—on the basis of 
universal reason; and thirdly, that contemporary theologians who find transcendence 
a distasteful concept confuse this domesticated transcendence with what is often 
labeled ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’ theism, and consequently ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’ 
theologies are tarnished with a modernist brush and rejected out of hand. However, 
suggests Placher, the idea of the transcendence of God as it was conceived pre-
seventeenth century, which was much more nuanced than what developed later, need 
not be rejected according to that which contemporary theologians object to. Let us 
consider these three stages in a little more detail. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
pointed out, even Radical Orthodoxy itself can be seen as an Anglophone highlighting of a theme 
common in late twentieth century continental thought, of which, for example, Pickstock cites over 
fifteen examples in one footnote. See Catherine Pickstock, ‘Duns Scotus: his historical and 
contemporary significance’, Modern Theology, (21, 2005), 569–570, n.2. I therefore recognise that Placher 
too reflects an Anglo-American—in his case, post-liberal—example of this wider genealogical approach 
to the problem of transcendence. His argument effectively plays a contextualising role for this thesis 
because he attends concisely and clearly to the ‘modernist’ dimension that underpins much of that to 
which Frei and Bonhoeffer pay attention. What is more, his phrase ‘domesticated transcendence’ 
appropriately encapsulates much of that to which Frei and Bonhoeffer object.  
3 Placher, Domestication, 7. 
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i) Pre-modern theological reserve 
 
Firstly, Placher introduces three pre-modern theologians from across the confessional 
spectrum—Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John 
Calvin (1509–1564)—and argues that each of them encapsulated in their theology 
what we might call a conceptual reserve. That is, despite their divergences, these three 
theologians recognised human incapacity in theology, understanding that their 
concepts could not fully express the one about whom they were thinking, writing and 
speaking. 
 
All three agree that human reason and human efforts cannot make it to God, 
that thus whatever relation we have with God depends on God’s gracious 
initiative, to which we must be related in faith that never fully understands.4 
 
One can also draw attention to Anselm (1033—1109) whose expression “faith seeking 
understanding”5 is typical of this confessional—or what we might call ‘faith-based’—
orientation. In Anselm’s theology, God “gives understanding to faith”,6 that God may 
be understood to exist in such a way that is profitable for the person of faith, whose 
‘understanding’ of God is ultimately geared towards a desire for and love of God.7  
Anselm says to God, “let me seek you in desiring you; let me desire you in seeking 
you. Let me find you in loving you; let me love you in finding you.”8 
 
Reflecting this Anselmian orientation, Placher emphasises that pre-modern Christian 
theologians aimed, in the context of the life of faith, to further inspire and facilitate 
thinking about what it means to worship and serve God. As Boyer and Hall explain, 
“rational exploration [in theology] is certainly possible, and yet is pursued in the light !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 In brief, Placher highlights Aquinas’ five ways as statements of reason in the context of faith, and 
Aquinas’ notion of analogical religious language; Luther’s theologia crucis as that which upsets human 
understanding of divinity, thus making room for faith; and Calvin’s anti-speculative rhetoric designed 
to direct his audience towards faith. Thus, “in their different ways, all three emphasized how little we 
can understand about God, and how inadequate our language is for talk about God.” Placher, 
Domestication, 67–68. 
5 St. Anselm, Proslogion: with the replies of Gaunilo and Anselm, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 2001), 2. 
6 Anselm, Proslogion, 7. 
7 On God giving knowledge of Godself, Placher comments, “When Jüngel (or Karl Barth) says that in 
revelation God is the unconditional subject, they mean there is nothing about God we can know 
whether God wants us to or not.” Placher, Domestication, 186. 
8 Anselm, Proslogion, 6. 
!! 15 
of a deeper or denser or more complex substantiality than reason is familiar with.”9 
Putting this in the language of Christian praxis, they say that, ideally, “the reason 
Christians want to understand the mystery of God is not merely that they may set the 
metaphysical record straight, but that they may live and worship well”.10  
 
Furthermore, in each of the three theologians Placher highlights, a confessional 
context also means an explicitly dynamic Trinitarian dimension. Aquinas, he says, 
saw that “the relations that matter in knowing and loving God are not to an abstract 
‘God’, but to and through the Trinitarian Persons”;11 Luther saw that the elusiveness 
of the doctrine of the Trinity “served him as a way of pointing to the God of grace 
known in faith”;12 while Calvin, for example, conceived of soteriology in Trinitarian 
terms: “it is only in Christ and through the Spirit that we appropriate knowledge of 
God or God’s salvific work”.13 These openly Trinitarian approaches avoid monistic 
reductionism—treating God as one object to be examined, in the same way one might 
examine a rock, or an apple14—and therefore shy away from the idea that God can be 
wholly defined.  
 
Overall, Placher can say that God is ‘transcendent’ for Aquinas, Luther and Calvin, 
not because God has the qualities by which the property of ‘transcendence’ can be 
reasonably defined, but because God is beyond total definition, by virtue of just 
being—‘simply’, in Aquinas’ terms—God.15 Indeed, the idea of defining God’s 
‘properties’, as one might define the redness of an apple or the hardness of a rock, 
performs an illegitimate objectification of the divine—making God into an object 
beyond which there are general categories in relation to which God can be defined. 
‘Transcendence’ therefore, can only really refer to the incapacity of theological !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Steven D. Boyer and Christopher A. Hall, The Mystery of God: Theology for Knowing the Unknowable 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 11. 
10 Boyer and Hall, Mystery, xvii. 
11 Placher, Domestication, 166. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Placher, Domestication, 166–167. 
14 Placher, Domestication, 68. 
15 As Aquinas argues, God is divinely simple, not having characteristics or properties in a same way that 
a particular person shows the properties of the more general category ‘personhood’, but rather being 
“the same as His essence or nature”. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 1a.3.3 (trans. Fathers of the 
English Dominical Province, Second Edition, 1920). Attributes of God, in Aquinas’ understanding, are 
simply God being God, not general attributes that God accidentally possesses, for God is “in no way 
composite.” Aquinas, Summa, 1a.3.7.  
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language to contain that which it describes. As Elders puts it in relation to Aquinas, 
God “is not one particular thing standing over and against other beings … but 
transcends them in his otherness and divine eminence.”16 God transcends not because 
God ‘is transcendent’ per se, but simply because God is God—Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit.   
 
ii)  The seventeenth century  
 
The second stage of Placher’s narrative describes how this epistemological humility or 
conceptual reserve shrunk into the background in the seventeenth century, “to be 
replaced by claims for more univocal language and tighter arguments.”17 In 
particular, Catholic interpreters of Aquinas (especially Cajetan and Suarez)18 and 
Protestant interpreters of Luther (especially Quenstedt) began to approach theological 
language univocally—as if words about God and human beings referred in the same 
way to the same things. For example, divine wisdom and human wisdom were now 
understood as degrees of one concept—‘wisdom’—with divine wisdom being a much 
greater, and human wisdom a lesser, instance of that.  Crucially, this posits a general 
category beyond God, defining God by something more generic and more 
fundamental—i.e. ‘being’ or ‘reason’. Theologians whose conceptually nuanced 
theology left space for the otherness or ‘beyondness’ of God were thereby 
misinterpreted—i.e. read under the presumption of univocity—and for Placher this is 
the true beginning of the domestication of transcendence. The kind of beyondness 
that God may possess comes to be understood in terms of space or power—to put it 
crudely, God being very far away or very much more powerful.19 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Leo Elders, The Philosophical Theology of St Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 169. 
17 Placher, Domestication, 71. 
18 Placher briefly contrasts David Burrell’s description of the way analogy functioned formally for 
Aquinas, with the work of Cardinal Cajetan, who interpreted Aquinas’ approach to religious language 
through the principle of ‘the analogy of proper proportionality’ (see David Burrell, Aquinas: God and 
Action (London: University of Scranton Press, 2008), 63–77; and Ralph McInerny, The Logic of Analogy: 
An Interpretation of St Thomas (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 3) wherein language about God 
referred meaningfully because of an analogous ratio between language about, say, humanity’s goodness 
and God’s goodness. The goodnesses may be unlike, inferred Cajetan, but the way goodness is 
understood to pertain to both God and humanity is the same. For a critique of this reading of Aquinas 
and its contemporary influence, see Victor Salas, ‘The Ontology of Analogy in Aquinas’, The Heythrop 
Journal (50, 2009), 635–647.   
19 Placher, Domestication, 111. 
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The issue is not merely a linguistic one, as if the only problem is a misunderstanding 
concerning language. The linguistic collapse is a problem on account of what it 
implies metaphysically—not just that God can be spoken of like an object within the 
world, but to all intents and purposes is one. To utilise the metaphor of domestication 
a little further, God is ‘brought inside’ the universe. 
 
Beginning with problematic interpretations of Aquinas and Luther in particular, this 
univocity fuels and characterises the rationalist philosophical epistemology that fed 
into the seventeenth century beginnings of the Enlightenment.20 When René 
Descartes (1596–1650) developed an epistemology grounded in the self—‘I think 
therefore I am’—the theological consequence was that thought about God began with 
thought about ‘I’.  Similarly, Placher describes the determination of Leibniz to 
account for the “simple qualities”21 of God, which can be understood by, and used as 
a basis for, clear reasoning. For Leibniz and Descartes, Placher summarises, 
 
[w]e can recognise the finitude and imperfection of the created world only 
because we even now have clear and distinct ideas of God’s infinity and 
perfection, so that we can recognize failures to measure up to them.22 
 
With the location of truth in universally accessible reason, and the individual thinking 
subject as locus of the quest for truth, God therefore is thought about as an object that 
is subject to an individual’s ‘clear and distinct ideas’. In contrast to pre-modern 
Trinitarianism, Placher also notes how this objectification of God finds its fit in 
something much more like Deism—God as the monistic distant first cause—rather 
than in the doctrine of the dynamic loving Trinity who is the Creator, Sustainer and 
Redeemer of the world. Isaac Newton’s cosmology, for example, bears the hallmarks 
of this kind of deistic thinking. To Newton (1642 – 1727) “God was first and foremost !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Noting Livingstone’s warning that ‘modernity’ and ‘enlightenment’ should not be collapsed together 
or used interchangeably, we can nevertheless observe that the modern emphasis upon “the freedom of 
individual persons and groups to choose, analyze, test, and question” characterises the epistemological 
process that characterised the enlightenment, even if ‘modernity’ also refers to “the spirit, feelings, and 
values of various Romanticisms, with the ideas and sensibility we find in Wordsworth and Coleridge … 
in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.” James C. Livingstone, Modern Christian Thought: The Enlightenment and The 
Nineteenth Century (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 3. I will therefore proceed, throughout this thesis, to 
speak of enlightenment and post-enlightenment epistemology as being ‘modern’, whilst understanding 
that the ‘modern’ can also refer beyond the enlightenment. 
21 Placher, Domestication, 86. 
22 Placher, Domestication, 86–87. 
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the kosmokrator, ruler over everything,”23 and as such, functioned as “a methodological 
guarantee of the rationality and intelligibility of the world.”24 Theological language 
thus becomes overtly monistic, focusing upon God as the primary object in the 
universe.  
 
We must take care not to sideline the historical-political issues at play too, as if all that 
was occurring was a decontextualised intellectual shift. Rather, in the context of the 
protests against authorities who appeared to utilise theological frameworks to subject 
and abuse populations, the enlightenment not only nurtured the view that ideas about 
God needed to be subjected to reasonable, egalitarian enquiry, but also advocated a 
general ‘civilised’ religion over against complex doctrines like Trinitarianism that were 
perceived, to put it crudely, to fuel religious wars.!David Hopper describes it like this: 
 
That the population of Germany fell from sixteen million to less than six 
million over the course of the religiously inspired Thirty Years War (1618 – 
1648) has to be reckoned as a major spiritual-intellectual trauma with long-
term historical after-effects. Numbers of informed and thoughtful people were 
led, on the basis of historical experience, to identify religion as a source of 
earthly suffering and destruction and then, on that basis, to envision a different 
sort of earthly future.25  
 
However, as Cavanaugh has argued, this narrative itself betrays a crude 
characterisation of generic ‘religion’ as a cause of war, to which modernist liberal 
democracy has the solution in the form of the nation state. Cavanaugh does not 
attempt to excuse religions of their violence, but identifies the “myth of religious 
violence” as a modern phenomenon that “is itself an ideological accompaniment to 
shifts in Western configurations of power, especially the transfer of lethal loyalty to the 
emergent state.”26 Even today, he argues, the myth that all ‘religion’ is violent in 
comparison to an enlightened secularism underlies a contemporary hostility to public 
religion, and funds a crude dichotomy between theocracy and secularism.27 Quite !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination: from the middle ages to the seventeenth century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 90. 
24 Funkenstein, Theology, 193. 
25 David Hopper, Divine Transcendence and the Culture of Change (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 46–47. 
26 William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict 
(Oxford: OUP, 2009), 11. 
27 Cavanaugh, The Myth, 14. 
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simply, we might say, the myth of religious violence requires the domestication of God, 
inside the boundaries of the nation state. 
 
In this case, then, blame for the domestication of transcendence may well be laid at 
the feet of abusers of power and stokers of violent discord—‘religious’ and ‘secular’—
as much as the intellectual revolutionaries. Whatever the case though, Placher’s point 
remains: something crucial about what it means to think theologically (something that 
did not overtly propagate violence and discord) was lost in the seventeenth century, 
and this loss would affect theological thinking for hundreds of years to come.  
 
 iii) Contemporary distaste for transcendence 
 
The third stage of Placher’s argument moves to the present day, drawing attention to 
what Cumin calls a “distaste for divine transcendence”,28 whereby contemporary 
theologians protest against the idea of God’s transcendence because they understand 
this to fuel the idea of an overbearing divine Other—virtually synonymous with the 
image of a dominant human ruler—“defined in terms of absolute power and 
ultimately inconsistent with Christian affirmations about God’s love and tender 
care.”29 Such theological objections to transcendence go hand in hand with an 
emphasis upon immanence as a more meaningful way of speaking about God. A picture 
of God’s closeness to human beings and love for them is contrasted with the severity of 
‘traditional’ transcendence.   
 
The critique of the view of transcendence conceived of in terms of power rings true, 
for example, in relation to Newton (see above), who thought of God’s power in terms 
of God’s potentia absoluta—an absolute power “taken in abstracto and without reference 
to the orders of nature and grace he has actually willed … to establish.”30 This God, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Paul Cumin, Christ at the Crux: The Mediation of God and Creation in Christological Perspective (Oregon: 
Pickwick, 2014), ix. 
29 Placher, Domestication, 8.  
30 Francis Oakley, ‘The Absolute and Ordained Power of God and King in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries: Philosophy, Science, Politics, and Law’, Journal of the History of Ideas (59, 1998), 
669-690. Sourced from 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_the_history_of_ideas/v059/59.4oakley.html. 
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says Soskice, is “a master and ruler of the world that he inhabits as supreme being.”31 
Such notions of pure absolute power mastering the universe connect to “the violence 
concomitant in totalizing metanarratives… large-scale stories about an all powerful 
protagonist with the world and its inhabitants as only passive props”,32 thereby 
rendering transcendence ultimately objectionable.  
 
However, although this assessment is on target when it comes to Newtonian 
metaphysics, Placher wants to emphasise that it is not an appropriate criticism of the 
pre-modern theologians.  The notion of overbearing divine transcendence is much 
more applicable to the domesticated transcendence of the seventeenth century than it is 
to pre-modern theology. Rejecting the idea of God as a divine dictator is quite proper, 
but theologians are, 
 
wrong to blame ‘the Christian tradition’ or ‘classical Christian theism’ for the 
faults they identify. The principle object of their complaint came to dominate 
the Christian understanding of divine transcendence only in the seventeenth 
century.33  
 
Ironically then, this ‘principle object of complaint’—the monistic, overbearing, 
patriarchal ‘object’ at the pinnacle of the world—represents both the impact of the 
enlightenment on theological thinking, and also the kind of authoritarianism from 
which enlightenment thinkers sought emancipation. The Enlightenment narrative of 
individual emancipation through universal reason claimed to offer freedom from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Janet Martin Soskice, ‘Naming God: A Study in Faith and Reason’, in Paul J. Griffiths and 
Reinhardt Hütter (eds.), Reason and the Reasons of Faith (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 253. 
32 Cumin, Christ, ix–x. 
33 Placher, Domestication, 215. Rainer Mayer manifests this misdirected critique of ‘classical theism’, 
saying  “the traditional concept of god’s transcendence has been influenced by Aristotelian and 
Thomistic metaphysics of being and by the mythology of classical antiquity. The metaphysics of being 
depicts a God as the Supreme Being; his qualities are the values and qualities of mankind projected into 
the infinite.” Rainer Mayer, ‘Christology: The Genuine Form of Transcendence’, in A. J. Klassen, A 
Bonhoeffer Legacy: Essays in Understanding (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 180. See also Jürgen 
Moltmann, who, for example, expresses opposition to what he believes is the monistic approach of a 
classical theologian like Aquinas, confirming Placher’s thesis that ‘classical theism’ is being scapegoated 
for being the origin of what is in fact an enlightenment theology. For example, in his Trinitarian 
theology, Moltmann allows for only two possible readings of Aquinas’ five ways: either a modernist 
approach exemplified by Vatican I (1871), or according to what he calls a “Greek concept of a cosmos 
which is hierarchical in order, graduated into different strata of being” Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity 
and the Kingdom of God, trans. Kohl (London: SCM, 1981), 10–11. Neither reading allows for the 
conceptual openness that Placher observes in Aquinas. 
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God who limits and dictates; yet this view of God is precisely the result of the 
subjection of theological thinking to modern epistemology itself.34 When God’s 
transcendence is thought through within the confines of what human beings know 
about power and ruling, with the individual at the centre, it is no wonder the result is 
objectionable. Without an epistemological approach that allows God to be ultimately 
indefinable, transcendence can imply for many that God is a human dictator writ 
large.  
 
Therefore, although the Enlightenment was narrated as emancipatory—and indeed 
the drive for emancipation from monarchic and ecclesiastical authoritarianism was 
real and meaningful enough—the intellectual model that drove the enlightenment 
meant that “the beneficiaries of the Enlightenment … wanted to know in order to 
control.”35 Divine transcendence, falsely construed as oppressive, gives way to human 
control, falsely construed as liberating. As Williams explains, the Enlightenment 
therefore sets up a false choice “between coercive universal rationalism and pre-
critical authority”.36 (Universal rationalism is coercive because “when decision makers 
have determined what is rational, they are bound sooner or later to regard opposition 
as irrational and so without legitimacy. They will embark on a coercive political 
pedagogy, to make citizens rational.”)37 If this is the choice we think we have, 
Williams suggests, “it may well be time to ask if the argument has been properly set 
out in the first place.”38 As Gunton puts it, “[t]he modern servitude of the immanent 
is a mark of our alienation from what which makes us what we are. [It] … depends 
upon the mistake of failing to recognize the fact that freedom requires otherness.” 39 
 
Conceptually open and doxologically orientated theology allows talk of God’s 
transcendence to refer to a beyondness and mystery that allows us real freedom in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 “The modern world is wrong in so far as it conceives of otherness as necessarily heteronomous, 
believing that a God standing against us in judgement and grace is an offence to independence and 
freedom … that is precisely modernity’s error … because it generates by reflex, by the workings of its own 
inner logic, a repetition of that which it sought to escape.” Colin Gunton, The One The Three and The 
Many: God, Creation and The Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 37. 
35 Colin J. D. Greene, Christology in Cultural Perspective: Marking Out the Horizons (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000), 74. 
36 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury, 2012),123.  
37 Williams, Faith, 113. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Gunton, The One, 37. 
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relation to God who is wholly other, because it points to the freedom of God from our 
control or grasp, and therefore the utter freedom and gratuity of God’s love for the 
world. In Kathryn Tanner’s terms, affirming of the “radical” otherness of God from 
creation allows for a proper concept of “non-competitive relation between creatures 
and God”, such that God’s transcendence means anything but the limiting of human 
freedom by an overbearing Other.40  
 
God, from beyond this plane of created reality, brings about the whole plane of 
creaturely being and activity in its goodness. The creature’s receiving from 
God does not then require its passivity in the world: God’s activity as the giver 
of ourselves need not come at the expense of our own activity. Instead, the 
creature receives from God its very activity as a good.41 
 
The travesty of the domestication of transcendence is that it threatens to mute this 
message of the world’s given-ness by God, construing God’s transcendence as that 
which threatens our freedom, rather than that which makes for our lives as 
creatures—i.e. the freedom of the loving Creator.42  
 
Some post-modern theologians also display this ‘distaste’ for what is wrongly 
perceived as classical theism’s approach to transcendence. For example, introducing a 
volume of postmodern essays on transcendence, Caputo and Scanlon register an 
acceptance among contributors to the volume that the classical idea of transcendence 
either needs to be replaced by an “ultra-transcendence”,43 or refigured in a “secular 
theology [which] allows God to quit God’s traditional transcendence and to empty 
Godself without remainder into the world, into the Spirit of love and the affirmation 
of the body”.44 They judge transcendence as traditionally conceived as “a classically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis, Fortress, 
2001), 2. 
41 Tanner, Jesus, Humanity, 4. 
42 See also David Kelsey’s comments emphasis upon “God’s hospitable generosity, creatively relating to 
us, free of creatures in creating and attentively delighting in them in their otherness to God, self-
committed to that which is created”. Kelsey follows Tanner’s thrust towards non-competition, 
contrasting this with the traditionally conceived opposition between transcendence and immanence 
(terms laden with a sense of either God’s “opposition” to, or “identity” with the world). David H. 
Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, vol 1. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2009), 175. 
43 John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, ‘Introduction’ in Caputo and Scanlon (eds.), Transcendence 
and Beyond: A Postmodern Enquiry (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2007), 3. 
44 Ibid.  
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patriarchal model, representing a top-down, hierarchical, even imperial way to 
conceive the relationship of the divine to the human, and which has served, by 
unhappy extension, as a model of the relation of the masculine to the feminine and of 
the human to the nonhuman.”45 Again, rejection of these things is credible, but the 
post-modern solutions are themselves all too often little more than examples of 
domesticated transcendence. 
 
David Wood, for example, offers a refigured ‘secular’ transcendence, criticising 
traditionally spatial or topological language concerning the transcendent. In particular 
he views traditional approaches as ethically and politically problematic, fuelling 
binaries such as “inside/outside, self/other, us/them, friend/enemy – and hence 
immanent and transcendent”.46 He reconceives transcendence as the immanent 
experience of limit, wherein the meaningfulness of transcendence is in the response 
that such experience of limit provokes.  He rejects the idea that human beings 
encounter limit by ‘God turning up’,47 preferring instead to speak of an experience 
whereby “one can come to see oneself as addressed by the experience in which [the 
good, love, freedom] becomes apparent.”48  
 
James P. Mackey rejects the idea of God beyond or outside space-time and of creatio ex 
nihilo (creation out of nothing) believing they imply divine overbearingness and distant 
authoritarianism.49 Instead, he describes a universe wherein transcendence is the 
activity of continual forming and shaping from within—a bringing about “new forms 
of things or of processes in which they engage and from which they result.”50  Thus 
people can, 
 
detect within all this pullulating and pulsating universe a unified and unifying 
power … [and] may well claim that they are in the presence of the traces of a 
being which, as the constant creative source of cosmic or universal reality, can 
be deemed divine.51 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Caputo and Scanlon, ‘Introduction’, 4. 
46 David Wood, ‘Topologies of Transcendence’, in Caputo and Scanlon, Transcendence, 71. 
47 Wood, ‘Topologies’, 181. 
48 Ibid. 
49 James P. Mackey, ‘Transcendent Immanence and Evolutionary Creation’, in Caputo and Scanlon, 
Transcendence, 95. 
50 Mackey, ‘Transcendent’, 94. 
51 Ibid.  
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He calls this a “pragmatist model of revelation and knowledge … [that] yields a model 
of morality as cooperative envisaging-of and attempting better being, more fulfilled 
life and existence for all inevitably interlinked creative creatures,”52 implying that this 
is a welcome alternative to traditional views that engender an unsavoury morality of 
‘power-over’ rather than ‘operation-within’.53 
 
Jean Luc Marion offers an example of ‘ultra-transcendence’, criticising traditional 
terms like omnipotence and omniscience because they define God according to 
possibility. In other words, saying ‘God can do anything that is possible’ limits God 
according to the conception of possibility. Marion swiftly criticises Aquinas for 
defining God’s possibility (or what is possible for God) within the boundaries of non-
contradiction.54 Marion suggests that true ‘incapacity’ in relation to thinking about 
God takes the form of a “triple impossibility—impossibility with regard to intuition; 
impossibility with regard to concept; and impossibility, therefore, with regard to 
experiencing the slightest phenomenon.”55 Despite this total lack, though, the 
question of God is both possible to ask and is asked by human beings; and is therefore 
a question about the possibility of the impossible. God “lets himself be defined by 
impossibility as such”,56 insofar as God is the One for whom “there is no possibility of 
impossibility.”57  Marion therefore speaks of “radical possibility”, whereby God 
originates, or gives, possibility out of impossibility.58 Aware that saying ‘God makes the 
impossible possible’ could produce limitless nonsense, Marion concludes that the 
boundary to this kind of thinking is God’s will—not what God ‘can’ do, but what God 
wants to do. God’s desire is the truly impossible for humanity—the forgiveness of sins, 
and the reconciliation of humanity with God.59 Conceiving God as the one who is 
impossible for humanity and who does the radically impossible, expresses, for Marion, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Mackey, ‘Transcendent’, 95. 
53 See also Harvey Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective (London: 
SCM, 1966), 76–77. 
54 Jean Luc Marion, ‘The Impossible for Man—God’, in Caputo and Scanlon, Transcendence, 30. 
55 Marion, ‘The Impossible’, 24. 
56 Marion, ‘The Impossible’, 25. 
57 Marion, ‘The Impossible’, 27–28. 
58 Marion, ‘The Impossible’, 31. E.g. the Annunciation—where, for Marion, God’s word announces 
not that which can be conceived of as possible, but a contradictory impossibility—i.e. virgin pregnancy. 
59 Matthew 9:1-8. 
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a “radical and non-metaphysical transcendence”60 reconceived along the lines of God 
who is love: “God’s transcendence manifests itself in charity, and only thus does 
transcendence reveal itself to be worthy of God.”61 
 
There seems no reason not to accept the substance of Marion’s proposal that we 
should conceive God’s transcendence along the lines of divine love beyond the 
possibilities of humanity. Nevertheless, Placher’s thesis calls into question the 
implication that this necessarily dispenses with a ‘classical’ notion of transcendence. 
Marion is asking for ‘possibility’ to be thought of according to epistemological and 
metaphysical ‘incapacity’ in human thinking; but according to Placher that is exactly 
what Aquinas (whom Marion critiques) is saying too. If ‘non-contradiction’ implied 
not the containing of divinity within reason, but rather the inner consistency of God 
according to God’s nature, we could accept Marion’s proposal without fundamentally 
opposing ‘classical’ thinking. 62  
 
Therefore, despite ostensibly rejecting the reduction of everything to a grand 
narrative, and the insistence upon the importance of a ‘turn to the other’ for ethics 
and theology,63 postmodernity displays very similar characteristics to modernity as 
regards the discussion of transcendence. Individualism is, paradoxically, the grand 
narrative to which all is reduced. What Greene calls the pluralistic “consumer 
metanarrative of endless satisfaction or peak experiences”64 shatters the universal 
human subject into millions of pieces, each with their own narrative of fulfillment, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Marion, ‘The Impossible’, 38. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Marion’s treatment of Aquinas is the subject of discussions elsewhere, especially as regards a critique 
of Aquinas (in Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991)) that Marion later recants.  See, e.g. Wayne J. Hankey. ‘Theoria versus Poesis: 
Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John Milbank, Jean Luc Marion and John 
Zizioulas’, Modern Theology (15, 1999), 389. Marion’s article on transcendence referred to above, 
however, occurs long after these discussions, presenting its own issues. This places the article in curious 
relation to Marion’s overall thinking about Aquinas, but for the purposes of this chapter, the point 
above functions adequately in isolation from the wider discussion, which can be pursued elsewhere.  
63 See David Tracy, ‘Theology and the Many Faces of Postmodernity’, Theology Today (51, 1994), 111. 
64 Greene, Christology, 383. Gerard Loughlin offers a similar diagnosis, that secular postmodernity is 
really only “paganized modernity” announcing human emancipation in the “spaces of the shopping 
mall, or in the mazes and caverns of textualism”. Gerard Loughlin, Telling God’s story: Bible, Church and 
narrative theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 25. He does, however, suggest that properly conceived 
Christian theology is “postmodern” in a true sense, insofar as it is not “founded upon anything other 
than the performance of its story.” Loughlin, Telling, 21. 
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ironically grounded in the belief that buying mass produced items somehow secures 
that individuality. In this intellectual environment, transcendence is again something 
definable, a ‘quality’ to be analysed, with God thereby ‘put in place’.  
 
The [postmodern] metanarrative is constructed upon two residual premises of 
modernity, one that individual freedom is the ultimate value of worth, two that 
in order to encourage the former, religion should continue to be marginalised 
and privatized. In the process, transcendence becomes a totally this-worldly 
experience encouraged and promoted by the post-modern philosophies of 
libidinal flow and extension, where the human being is no more than an 
avatar of desire and ecstasy.65  
 
Overall, the postmodern redefinitions of transcendence espoused by Caputo and 
others, say Gregor and Zimmerman, end up ‘closing the door’ on (i.e. domesticating) 
“the biblical God whose address occurred incarnationally and thus ontologically, and 
whose self-revelation invites a relational participation.”66 Placher therefore wants us to 
realise that we need not choose simply between an objectionable ‘classical’ model on 
one hand, and the rejection of transcendence altogether on the other, for to do so is to 
accept the options falsely set out according to the enlightenment’s domesticating 
terms.  
 
Overall, following the approach epitomised by pre-modern thinkers, Placher therefore 
wants to think of transcendence as describing total otherness yet also relationality, 
rather than a distant and/or over-bearing patriarch, and of course, these aspects come 
into focus much more sharply as we being to speak explicitly about Christology. 
Christology, says Placher, does not “dodge”67 the question of transcendence, but in 
fact locates it in a far more particularised, and—to use the Pauline terminology taken 
up by Luther and subsequently Bonhoeffer—offensive form. At this stage we move 
beyond the contents of Placher’s argument in The Domestication of Transcendence, towards 
the more specific question about Jesus’ transcendence on which Frei and Bonhoeffer 
will be put to use. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Greene, Christology, 383. 
66 Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmerman, ‘Introduction’, in Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmerman (eds.), 
Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 13. 
67 Placher, Domestication, 193. 
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II 
 
Domesticated Transcendence and Christology 
 
i) Why think about Jesus’ transcendence? 
 
Discussing Jesus’ transcendence is more complicated than just replacing ‘God’ in the 
narrative above with ‘Jesus’. In the case of the incarnation of God in the man Jesus of 
Nazareth, talk of other-ness has also to deal with the like-ness on which, for example, 
a central argument of the book of Hebrews hinges.68 Christians proclaim that Jesus 
Christ, who “dwelt among us”,69 “in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius”,70 is 
Jesus Christ who is “seated at [God’s] right hand in the heavenly places, far above all 
rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name”.71 The likeness 
to which Hebrews 2:11 refers is introduced against the explicit backdrop of Jesus 
Christ’s identity as “the reflection of God’s glory and the exact imprint of God’s very 
being, [who] sustains everything by his powerful word.”72 Historical dwelling-amongst 
and heavenly exaltation-above therefore relate to the same subject—Jesus of 
Nazareth. Christological talk of the ‘mysterious’ and ‘wholly other’—even if conceived 
in what Placher would call more pre-modern terms—becomes more complex, 
because Christology simultaneously describes a becoming like us at the heart of what 
it means to speak of God’s activity in Christ.73 One cannot avoid the historical, and 
although the historical is something we generally think of as immediate to us rather 
than other than us, one cannot emphasise transcendence at the expense of Jesus’ 
historical likeness to us. 
 
It is not the case, however, that Jesus mitigates a general divine transcendence by 
being ‘immanent’; neither is it the case that God was distant and removed from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 E.g. Hebrews 2:17. 
69 John 1:14. 
70 Luke 3:1. 
71 Ephesians 1:20. 
72 Hebrews 1:3. 
73 E.g. “one basic and persuasive conviction about the conditions for salvation was then that, to have 
healed and saved us/me, Jesus must be truly and fully human. This conclusion, current from the time 
of Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen in the second and third centuries, received its classical formulation 
from Gregory of Nazianzus in the fourth century: ‘the unassumed is the unhealed’ (Epistola, 101.32).” 
Gerald O’Collins, Christology: A Biblical, Historical and Systematic Study of Jesus (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 160. 
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world and then came close, nor that ‘immanence’ is somehow a more correct 
conception of God, over and against the idea that God is transcendent. Downplaying 
transcendence in the question of Jesus’ identity effectively denies any meaningfulness 
to saying that the divine Logos became flesh,74 and such a denial eradicates any real 
continuity between the second person of the Trinity and Jesus of Nazareth. If 
otherness is key to how we speak about God, then sidelining otherness when speaking 
about Jesus Christ calls into question whether we are thinking about incarnation at all. 
Language about Jesus’ transcendence therefore involves considering the particularly 
historical in union with the divine—not in an abstract sense, but in relation to the 
particular narrative of Jesus of Nazareth. For someone historical to be called 
transcendent certainly complicates matters, but the reasons for pursuing this line of 
thought are unavoidable. 
 
If one agrees with Placher that transcendence can and should be conceived in such a 
way that yields a conceptual openness to theology whilst enabling the praxis of 
worship, then the question of Jesus’ transcendence becomes about more than holding 
together distance/otherness and closeness/likeness, but about how, in the midst of 
such a holding-together, we can also develop openness and humility in relationship to 
Jesus. Jesus is specific and particular, but is beyond us and cannot be grasped by us—
and recognising this yields a conceptual humility. Placher’s thesis thus starts us off on 
the right foot for thinking about Christology—and his critique of modern thinking 
about God can be supplemented with comments about the effect of modernity on 
Christology in particular. Quite simply, thinking about Jesus’ transcendence is 
unavoidable, and promises to be fruitful. 
 
ii) Christology and the domestication of transcendence 
 
Colin Greene explicitly draws attention to the gulf between, on one hand, the 
orthodox Christology of God’s union with humanity through the incarnation, and on 
the other, the Deistic, monistic theology of the Enlightenment, which essentially 
conceived of Jesus as an exemplary human being. For a typical Enlightenment thinker 
like David Hume (1711–1776) Chalcedonian ‘two natures Christology’ is just 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 John 1:14. 
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“another illegitimate violation of the limits of human reason”.75 This means that very 
little remains except “a preference for a Jesus who was basically a moral educator.”76 
Christology therefore merely extends a monistic doctrine of God; it “degenerated into 
a Jesuology that was exemplarist, rationalistic, anti-supernatural and thoroughly 
moralistic.”77  
 
This Christological reductionism arguably reaches a peak in the nineteenth century 
with the ‘quests’ for the historical Jesus, and the assumption that the way to get to the 
heart of the identity of Jesus was to deploy as fully as possible the tools of historical 
criticism, distinguishing in the process the idea of ‘Jesus as he truly was’ from what 
was/is known as the ‘Christ of faith’.78 Albert Schweitzer (1875–1965) wrote in 1906 
that Christology “had first to be shattered before men could once more go out in 
quest of the historical Jesus … That the historic Jesus is something different from the 
Jesus Christ of the doctrine of the two Natures seems to us now self-evident.”79 The 
narrative of emancipation from ecclesial authority and dogma is clearly evidenced in 
this aspect of the historical Jesus movement: if Jesus was meaningful for Western 
religious life, then his meaningfulness must be discerned critically, without recourse to 
the dogmatic pronouncements of ecclesial authority, but rather by virtue of critical 
reason and historical investigation—subjecting the narratives about him to scientific 
rationalism so as to determine their factuality. The quest aimed to “bring [Jesus] 
straight into our time as a Teacher and Saviour”80 and in doing so, loose “the bands 
by which he had been riveted for centuries to the stony rocks of ecclesiastical 
doctrine.”81  
 
However, the project to make Jesus ‘contemporary’ meant, of course, making him 
accessible to reason, and therefore the perceived ‘bringing’ of Jesus into contemporary 
life so that the figure witnessed to in the New Testament might be meaningfully !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Greene, Christology, 83. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Greene, Christology, 96-97. 
78 The title of Philip Pullman’s 2010 novel, The Good Man Jesus and the Scoundrel Christ (Edinburgh: 
Cannongate, 2010) indicates just how potent this dichotomy remains today.  
79 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede, Third 
edition (London: SCM, 1954), 4. 
80 Schweitzer, Quest, 397. 
81 Ibid. 
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encountered achieved anything but that—for in fact it re-molded Jesus to fit inside the 
prevailing epistemological framework. The coming of God the Son into history, as 
history’s telos, was turned back on itself, for historical criticism defined Jesus to the 
extent that language about his divinity was virtually meaningless except as a reference 
to exemplary teaching and spirituality, resulting from his paradigmatic connection to 
a monistic deity. In the hands of the quests, Jesus is rid of any aspect of transcendence, 
of being beyond human epistemology.  In Stephen Sykes’ words, this Christology fails 
by losing the real difference of Jesus, for “[a]ny account which does not distinguish 
him from the rest of humanity is not credible as Christology”.82 Like Descartes’ God, 
this Jesus is little more than an object for analysis. Christology conducted under the 
tents of modernity, therefore, 
 
replicates … the futile search for absolute foundations, as demonstrated in the 
endless search for the elusive historical Jesus, and renders the discourse of 
salvation nothing more than a carbon copy of the rhetoric of socio-political 
emancipation. Hence, inadvertently and almost imperceptible, Christianity 
capitulates to the cultural aspirations and mores of modernity.83 
 
In historical Jesus scholarship, Christology becomes a mere screen onto which human 
beings project their own account of their salvation, improvement, or emancipation. It 
is the religious equivalent of trying to pull oneself up by ones own bootstraps—a 
secular Pelagianism, as it were. The transcendence, or the absolute difference of Jesus, is 
absent in this kind of thinking. 
 
These issues continue into the twentieth century. For example, John Macquarrie 
(1919–2007) reduces Christology to exemplarist anthropology by arguing for a 
modern redefinition of the terms of incarnation from the question of how God 
becomes man, to the question, “‘how does a man become God?’ or ‘How does a 
human life embody or manifest divine life?’”84 Macquarrie seeks to counterbalance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Stephen Sykes, ‘The Theology of the Humanity of Christ’, in S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton (eds.), 
Christ, Faith and History: Cambridge Studies in Christology (Cambridge: CUP, 1972), 66. 
83 See Greene, Christology, 276. 
84 John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 1990), 360. Macquarrie also prefers a 
narrative whereby the difference between Jesus Christ and the Old Testament prophets (in terms of 
embodying the revelation of God) is one of degree rather than kind; i.e. Jesus is a fuller (perhaps the 
fullest) embodiment of the human capacity to bear the divine. Macquarrie does not think that human 
beings can do this without divine activity towards them (see also John Macquarrie, In Search of Deity: An 
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transcendence with the incarnation, which is conceived as immanence. Incarnation, 
he seems to think, is about transcendence being overcome. This makes holding on to 
language about the transcendence of Jesus highly problematic, because if the 
incarnation overcomes God’s transcendence, then we are liable to think of 
transcendence as something which Jesus somehow compensates for, and therefore 
does not exhibit in relation to us.  
 
So far, having considered how Placher’s thesis translates into Christology, we have 
focussed upon the impact of modernist thinking on the question of Jesus’ 
transcendence; but it is also important to recognise that whilst the enlightenment does 
indeed illuminate that question in a particularly revealing light (and that this is the 
light in which Frei and Bonhoeffer approach to question) the tendency for socio-
political ‘domestication’ of Jesus is by no means limited to that period. The questions 
and problems surrounding the articulation of Jesus’ transcendence are not solely a 
result of the Enlightenment, but concern, as I have written above, the very tensions to 
which the New Testament introduces us. 
 
For example, the tendency to shape Jesus for political or socio-economic purposes was 
evident in early political Christology too. Greene describes how the conception of the 
Emperor as the representative of Christ’s authority on earth was itself inextricably 
(albeit problematically) linked to the patristic cosmic or logos Christology. The 
Emperor was perceived “as a copy or image of the divine logos who rules in the 
heavenly spheres … God the Father, King of the universe, has conferred authority on 
Jesus the representative of his kingship on earth, [and] that authority has now been 
transferred to Jesus’ vice-regent the emperor.”85 The result is a politically expedient 
imperial Christology, that fails to take account of the challenging shape of Jesus’ 
historical life, and also fails to adequately recognise God’s transcendence. The line 
which joins God-in-Christ’s authority and human authority is implied to be one of 
absolute likeness—or in the terms we began with, of univocity.86 The kind of power 
God has can be conferred as-is on the Emperor.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Essay In Dialectical Theism (London: SCM, 1984), 233) but nevertheless the implication remains that the 
transcendence of God and the existence of Jesus Christ are separate—the one being quite the opposite 
of the other.  
85 Greene, Christology, 48. 
86 Again, see e.g., Ephesians 1:20-21.  
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Greene contends that the reason for this collapse of Christ and Emperor is the 
concentration upon “the divine exalted Christ to the virtual exclusion of the historical 
Jesus”,87 an exclusion which leads to the failure to recognise the inconsistency of 
eliding the life of Jesus of Nazareth with imperial power. (Consider the exclusion, for 
example, of Jesus’ own socio-political critique of power, and his solidarity with the 
poor.) Alongside this, however, is also the failure to think through what it means to say 
Christ transcends as both divine and human, or to attend to the fact that human beings 
cannot bear his transcendent authority. The problem Greene highlights is not 
irrevocably solved by emphasising that Jesus lived a radically sacrificial life (as vital as 
that is).88 Merely writing a historical, political Jesus into the heavens does not exhaust 
the question, for it still leaves the door open for univocity as regards the relationship 
between Jesus Christ and other human persons. Whilst metaphors such as the church 
as the ‘body of Christ’ and ‘meeting Christ in the other’ can reflect the depth of a 
Christian’s and a Christian community’s contemporaneous identification with Jesus 
Christ, we are always required to take seriously the true ‘otherness’ of God-in-Christ 
as the one beyond us. Without transcendence (that is, otherness/beyond-ness) in 
Christology, the proclamation of Christ’s universal significance struggles for meaning, 
except along the lines of imposing one human narrative over all others—whether this 
is the ironic error of the Enlightenment as described above, an imperial Emperor cult 
with a Christological gloss, or some other socio-political manifesto.  
 
Overall therefore, the problematic tendency to domesticate Jesus inside our own 
epistemological frameworks or socio-political structures/ideologies—especially as 
exemplified in the enlightenment and post-enlightenment periods—needs to be 
countered by addressing the question of his transcendence in his historical 
particularity.  
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Greene, Christology, 61. 
88 Greene, Christology, 49. 
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iii) Christological transcendence and historicity 
 
In Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God (1975) Ray S. Anderson insists that the 
question of Christological transcendence should not be viewed as one branch of the 
general ‘transcendence issue’, but is in fact the place where the question of God’s 
transcendence is most fully asked. To ask after Jesus’ transcendence, Anderson 
implies, is to attend to the point at which God’s transcendence is both axiomatically 
and climactically encountered in history—i.e. the incarnation of the divine Logos in the 
person Jesus of Nazareth.89 Rejecting the perception that transcendence pertains to 
distance rather than otherness, Anderson argues that true otherness—fundamentally 
the otherness of God—is encountered bodily and historically, and therefore the 
question of transcendence is asked in relation to God’s activity towards the world in 
history, not in relation to what which is beyond history.  
 
Speaking of personal relations, Anderson suggests that the only way I encounter the 
true other-ness of another person is by their spirit encountering me in the 
concreteness of historical bodily existence. By ‘spirit’ Anderson describes that aspect of 
the other person—one might call it their ‘person-ness’—that I cannot get to the 
bottom of; the “limit” that constitutes “the hiddenness of the other as self.”90 This 
limit is what must be “crossed” for there to be true encounter between myself and the 
other person, and that crossing happens when I am up against the other person in 
their concrete, bodily historicity.91 Their difference to me—i.e. their transcendence—
is encountered in the concrete. It is therefore wrong to understand the material, the 
bodily (or what one might summarise as the ‘immanent’) as that which needs to be 
transcended, for concrete historical existence is precisely the way that the true 
otherness of another—that which is wholly not ourselves, and which we cannot 
grasp—is really met.  
 
Concreteness as we think of it in terms of personal existence is not a limit, but 
is the act of transcendence itself. That is, it is spirit concretizing itself as action. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Ray S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God: A Christological Critique (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1975), 18. 
90 Anderson, Historical, 18. I am grateful to Rowan Williams for discussions around Anderson’s 
terminology of spirit and limit.  
91 Ibid. 
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So that, when we are ‘up against’ the concreteness of the other, we are not up 
against a symbol, or a barrier which must be ‘transcended’, but we are up 
against spirit itself.92 
 
Accepting that the transcendent aspects of personal relations secondarily reflect the 
primary transcendence of God, Anderson suggests that God’s wholly-other-ness is 
encountered in what can be called God’s “act of concretizing himself as Spirit with 
and in human existence”.93 Divine transcendence is the act by which God who is 
Spirit makes Godself encounter-able as wholly other in history. In summary, 
transcendence for Anderson is the divine act whereby the One wholly other than the 
world is towards the world in history. “[T]he transcendence of God is God’s placing of 
himself into concrete, historical relation to man as the limiting reality of man’s 
authentic existence.”94  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Anderson, Historical, 20. Readers of Bonhoeffer will already recognise echoes of Sanctorum Communio 
here. Portions of Anderson’s book are dedicated to exploring Bonhoeffer as a theologian of ‘historical 
transcendence’, and his work in this vein will be drawn upon later on, both critically and in support of 
my own thesis. 
93 Anderson, Historical, 123. Anderson can be difficult to pin down on his precise meaning of S/spirit. 
By continually emphasising the utter difference of God and world, he distances himself from Hegel’s 
notion of the Absolute Spirit that realises itself in history. Note, for example, Beiser’s summary of 
Hegel’s notion of divinity, which it would be impossible for Anderson to agree with: “[I]t is only 
through human activity and self-awareness that the divine fully realises itself. If there were no human 
self-awareness and activity, the divine would still exist, to be sure, yet it would remain, imperfect, 
potential, inchoate and indeterminate.” Frederick Beiser, Hegel (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 74. Of 
course, Anderson would agree that we cannot understand God without God’s interaction with and 
relation to human beings, but Hegel’s position as Beiser describes it wholly limits divine 
freedom/otherness in relation to human beings. For Anderson, God as Spirit is the ultimately un-like. 
As ‘spirit’, every other person is not me, but does exhibit other likenesses to me, most fundamentally in 
being a creature. God, however, is supremely other from the world, and as ‘Spirit’, God is not a 
universal for Anderson. Nevertheless, if, as Beiser says, Spirit for Hegel also involved something of “the 
self-consciousness of life”,93 then there is an affinity between them. Beiser, Hegel, 110. Anderson has 
written elsewhere that ‘spirit’ is “the experience of the self as ensouled body and embodied soul in 
relation to God” (Ray S. Anderson, On Being Human: Essays in Theological Anthropology, (Oregon: Wipf and 
Stock, 1991) 38.); and that “Spirit … might be considered the life of the soul (the person) as an 
orientation toward God, summoned forth by the divine Word and enabled by the divine Spirit.” 
Anderson, On Being, 212. Spirit is primarily identified with soul rather than body because “there is a 
precedence which the soul exercises with respect to the body [and therefore] the soul becomes the 
primary orientation of the spirit in this act of life.” Ibid. As Williams describes it, “‘Spirit’ for Anderson, 
is fundamentally action, free personal action”. Rowan D. Williams, ‘Review of Historical Transcendence 
and the Reality of God by Ray S. Anderson’, The Downside Review (94, 1976), 237. Overall then, in a 
manner akin to Hegel, Anderson understands Spirit as that which concretises itself. Yet unlike Hegel, 
Anderson’s emphasis is upon radical difference rather than on a universal absolute spirit. 
94 Anderson, Historical, 151.  
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The incarnation of God in Jesus Christ is the pinnacle of this divine act of 
transcendence towards the world.95 It is not just a way of thinking, nor a “timeless 
event which … serves as a regulative principle”,96 but is the “axiomatic penetration of 
God’s transcendence in the world”.97 In the particular historical existence of Jesus 
Christ, human beings come up against the wholly otherness of God that cannot be 
relativised/domesticated into their own frameworks. 
 
Anderson thus implies that the question of the transcendence of Jesus is not an 
‘optional extra’ to the question of divine transcendence per se, but simply is that 
question, enquiring as it does into the person in whom God’s transcendence is fully 
expressed and encountered. Anderson’s work therefore presses upon us the centrality 
of Jesus’ historical particularity for any attempt to respond to the domestication of 
transcendence, because the response to domestication is not to push away from 
history but towards it. Whilst, to my mind, the relationship between transcendence as 
otherness and transcendence as the act by which otherness is concretised requires further 
clarification in this work, Anderson illuminates compellingly the important connection 
between transcendence and historical particularity in Christology, which is precisely 
that element common to both Frei and Bonhoeffer that I will suggest is an effective 
locus for the question of a middle way between closed and wide-open theology.  
 
The following chapter will examine the particular way in which Hans Frei is a critic of 
what Placher calls the domestication of God’s transcendence, and will examine the 
Christological consequences of Frei’s response to this—in particular the implications 
that arise for his emphasis upon the historical particularity of Jesus as witnessed to in 
the gospel narratives. Before embarking on this move, I note that both Frei and 
Bonhoeffer share an appreciative yet critical engagement with Karl Barth, whose !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Anderson recognises that God’s act towards Israel prior to the incarnation exhibits the logic of 
historical transcendence, especially insofar as the concrete and particular acts of God towards Israel 
(e.g. Moses before the burning bush, or on Mt. Sinai) are the way Israel is called to know and respond 
to the universal God. The logic of Israel’s knowledge of and response to God is always from the 
particular to the universal, never vice versa. “[W]hen God speaks and acts he is there in the 
anthropomorphic event … this is not reversible … an anthropomorphic event does not of itself mean 
that God is there.” Anderson, Historical, 117. In the climax of the incarnation, God the Son, as human 
being, enacts wholly and perfectly the covenant response to God which humanity (specifically Israel) is 
called to make. 
96 Anderson, Historical, 107. 
97 Ibid. 
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theology is a crucial for the way both theologians develop their particular approaches 
to transcendence and Christology. From the perspective of Frei and Bonhoeffer, 
Barth’s own response to the domestication of transcendence, especially following the 
publication of the second edition of The Epistle to the Romans, shines an important light 
on the perceived errors of modernism in the form of a theology of revelation, whilst 
nevertheless—again from the perspective of both—failing to offer a proper elucidation 
of the historicity of Jesus Christ in relation to God’s transcendence. The following 
chapter therefore begins with Frei’s early response to Barth in relation to the problem 
of transcendence in revelation, before exploring Frei’s work concerning the modernist 
shift in the approach to biblical narrative, and his corresponding call for greater 
emphasis on the particular identity of Jesus Christ as rendered historically in the 
gospels. 
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Chapter 3. 
 
HANS FREI: TRANSCENDENCE, HERMENEUTICS AND 
CHRISTOLOGY 
 
Hans Frei was born in Breslau in 1922, to a secular Jewish family, but baptised 
Lutheran. With the rise of the Nazis Frei was sent to a Quaker school in England 
before his family emigrated to the U.S. in 1938. Needing a college place, Frei initially 
studied textiles in North Carolina (graduating in 1942) but on the advice of H. 
Richard Niebuhr, with whom he had been corresponding previously, enrolled to 
study theology at Yale Divinity School (graduating in 1945). After two years as pastor 
of a Baptist church in New Hampshire, he gravitated towards the Episcopalian 
church, returned to academic study at Yale in 1947 (“after a long internal struggle”)1 
and was ordained an Episcopalian priest in 1952. Frei completed his PhD in 1956 
under H. Richard Niebuhr, before beginning his academic career at Yale, where he 
remained as a highly valued and warmly regarded teacher and mentor until his 
unexpected and untimely death in September 1988.2 
  
In Placher’s terms, Frei was undoubtedly a critic of the domestication of 
transcendence (see chapter 2) and his response to that issue informs a Christology that 
emphasises the unity of the particularity with the transcendence of Jesus Christ. 
Understanding this unity in Frei’s theology will be important for a constructive 
comparison with Bonhoeffer. Placher’s narrative could be understood to derive 
secondarily from Frei (the former was a student of Frei’s in the 1970s), however Frei’s 
work is more focussed than The Domestication of Transcendence, deriving from close 
attention to the consequences of modernity’s epistemological shift for biblical exegesis, 
whereas Placher’s book offers a broader narrative from a few steps further back. 
Nelson rightly suggests that Placher’s work is the theological “analog” to Frei’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 William B. Placher, ‘Introduction’, in Hans W. Frei, Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, edited by 
George Hunsinger and William Placher (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 5. 
2 See George Hunsinger, ‘Forward’, in Hans W. Frei, Reading Faithfully (vol.1) Writings from the Archives: 
Theology and Hermeneutics, edited by Mike Higton and Mark Allan Bowald (Oregon: Cascade, 2015), vii. 
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exegetical project,3 but there is also a sense in which Placher contextualises Frei’s 
microanalysis. After a doctoral dissertation which directly addressed questions of 
revelation, epistemology and transcendence in Karl Barth’s break with liberalism, Frei 
concerned himself primarily with how post-critical hermeneutics were negatively 
shaped by the epistemological assumptions of modernity—those same assumptions 
that Placher suggests lead to the domestication of transcendence. Frei then elucidated 
the Christological consequences of that domestication, positing an alternative 
approach to the historical particularity of Jesus in the Gospels, centred upon the way 
Jesus’ identity is given in ‘realistic’ narrative form. Frei’s critical and constructive work 
therefore functions as a particularly detailed approach to the problem Placher 
highlights in general. 
 
This chapter begins by noting two aspects of Frei’s doctoral dissertation on Barth: his 
broad awareness of the domestication of transcendence in modernity, and his 
comments about Barth’s tendency to underplay Christological historicity in revelation. 
Thereafter, attention will be paid to two elements in Frei’s work crucial to the way he 
helps us think about the transcendence of Jesus: firstly, a displacement of the category 
of ‘factuality’ as the linchpin of all hermeneutics; and secondly, a nuanced emphasis 
upon the centrality of the historical particularity of Jesus’ identity. We will see that 
when the particular historicity of Jesus Christ as narrated in the gospels is insisted 
upon, but the temptation to make that insistence about factuality per se is resisted, 
historical particularity and transcendence cohere: the identity of Jesus as historically 
described ruptures categories of understanding. Jesus, in his historical particularity, 
transcends the attempt to grasp him, and this category-breaking historical 
particularity then constitutes a focus for a posture of theological humility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 “One way to understand Placher’s thesis … is to view it as a kind of theological analog to Frei’s work 
on the exegetical errors of the Enlightenment.” Derek Nelson, ‘The Vulnerable and Transcendent 
God: The Postliberal Theology of William Placher’, Dialog (44, 2005), 278. 
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I 
 
Frei, Barth and Transcendence  
 
Frei’s doctoral dissertation locates Barth’s ‘break’ with liberalism as beginning around 
1915, and climaxing with the publication of the second edition of The Epistle to the 
Romans (1922).4 Barth, says Frei, seeks to replace a “confidence in the immediacy and 
trans-noetic directness of the presence of God to human awareness or activity”,5 with 
an emphasis upon the total freedom of God in God’s revelation to and activity for 
humanity—a “qualitative distinction”6 between God and the world that we can call 
God’s transcendence. The novelty of Barth’s break with liberalism is its “rejection of 
immediate experience as the source of faith.”7 God remains transcendent—God’s 
word and act towards humanity being contingent upon God’s creative and 
redemptive freedom as One who is wholly other, rather than being bound by a 
human ‘religious’/epistemological capability that turns upon the univocity described 
by Placher.8 As the free Creator, God’s activity towards the world is the only grounds 
for human relationship to God.9  
 
Frei drew attention to Anselm’s influence upon Barth’s understanding of the relation 
of faith to this ontological discontinuity, as seen in Barth’s work, Anselm: Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum. The problem Barth faced was “how to elevate thought from the creature to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Hans W. Frei, The Doctrine of Revelation In The Thought of Karl Barth, 1909–1922: The Nature of Barth’s 
Break With Liberalism (Ann Abor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1956), iv. 
5 Frei, The Doctrine, 2. 
6 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Hoskins (Oxford: OUP, 1933), 39.  
7 Frei, The Doctrine, 65. “That the promises of the faithfulness of God have been fulfilled in Jesus the 
Christ is not, and never will be, a self-evident truth … because it is neither a cosmic happening within 
the natural order, nor even the most supreme event of our imaginings … Faith is the faithfulness of 
God, ever secreted in and beyond all human ideas and affirmations about Him, and beyond every 
positive religious achievement.” Barth, Romans, 98. 
8 “Our relation to God is ungodly. We suppose that we know what we are saying when we say ‘God’. We 
assign to Him the highest place in our world: and in so doing we place Him fundamentally on one line 
with ourselves and with things. We assume that we are able to arrange our relation to Him as we 
arrange our other relationships … Secretly we ourselves are the masters in this relationship.” Barth, 
Romans, 44. 
9 “The issue … is to see the originality of the infinite as the origin and goal of the finite, to see the path 
from the infinite to the finite, rather than the path from the finite to the infinite … if one sees the path 
from the infinite to the finite, one sees God in his relation to his creature. But this path, this view of 
God in his relation to his creature is possible only from God himself. It is a word that God alone 
speaks.” Frei, The Doctrine, 110–111.  
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the Creator other than by taking for granted their ‘religious’ togetherness or sundering 
faith and reason”.10 Barth understood that Anselm’s ontological rationale concerning 
the ‘necessity’ of God’s existence is fundamentally dissimilar to the epistemological 
attempts of Descartes or Leibniz to rationalise the existence of God. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, Anselm’s faith seeking understanding—‘fides quarens intellectum’—
contrasts with the character of enlightenment epistemology, and cultivates a profound 
‘posture of humility’ in theology.  
 
It is a question of the proof of faith by faith which was already established in 
itself without proof. And both—faith that is proved and faith that proves—
Anselm expressly understands not as presuppositions that can be achieved by 
man but as presuppositions that have been achieved by God, the former as 
divine donare and the latter as divine illuminare … God gave himself to him to 
know and he was able to know God … God gave himself as the object of his 
knowledge and God illumined him that he might know him as object.11 
 
God gives Godself to be known in faith—understood by Barth as a participation in the 
being of God, by God’s grace.12 Therefore, although “all theological thesis are 
inadequate to their object”,13 theology is not rendered meaningless. Rather, God in 
Godself is prior to the knowledge of God: 
 
The reality of the knowledge of God, Barth always contends, is based on God’s 
self-revelation: hence, where the Word of God is given effectively to men, they, 
through this Word, know God. This fundamental reality is absolutely basic: 
the very question of its possibility can be raised only on the grounds of, or 
posterior to, its actuality.14 
 
Christology, therefore, cannot investigate Jesus as the actualisation of human religious 
experience, but must attempt to articulate “the eternal ground for Jesus Christ’s 
incarnation within the objective ground of the relation of God to man.”15 Thus, “[i]n 
the act of incarnation and nowhere else do we see the concreteness of that God (and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Frei, The Doctrine, 193. 
11 Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum: Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his 
Theological Scheme (London: SCM, 1960), 170–171.  
12 Barth, Anselm, 17; Frei, The Doctrine, 194. 
13 Frei, The Doctrine, 196. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Frei, The Doctrine, 127. 
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of his relation to us) in whom lies the ground of the divine human-relationship”.16 
Jesus Christ is anything but an immanent mitigation of God’s transcendence, but 
rather, as Anderson argues, is the transcendent act of God within history.17  
 
Frei will carry these emphases forward into his later works. Knight points out the 
correlation between Barth’s “priority of ontology over epistemology” and the 
insistence on “the priority of the biblical narrative in theology” that Frei will develop 
in subsequent writings.18 Similarly, Campbell includes both Barth and Frei under the 
definition ‘Anselmian’, referring to Frei’s “appropriation of Barth’s Anselmian 
theology as a viable theological option, and his development of a distinctive 
theological position consistent with it.”19 Barth’s theology turns upon the 
undomesticated transcendence of God, and in a similar way, the critique of post-
enlightenment hermeneutics that Frei develops (as we will see below) leads to a 
constructive approach to reading the scriptural narratives which itself manifests a 
theologically grounded posture of humility.  
 
However, Frei is not uncritical of Barth, especially in terms of the Christological 
consequences of the “radical doctrine of the absolute transcendence of the divine over 
man and the world”,20 and on that basis he observes that Barth veers towards 
“epistemological monophysitism”—wherein the historical/personal aspect in 
Christology is underplayed because Barth does not want to infer knowledge of God 
from human history.21 This aspect of Frei’s thought is well recognised,22 but what is 
not articulated (understandably) is the commonality between Frei and Bonhoeffer that 
this critique illuminates—Bonhoeffer expressing similar concerns about the failure of 
Barth’s theology of revelation to properly integrate history (especially in Act and Being, 
and less fully but more infamously in Letters and Papers from Prison). Understanding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Frei, The Doctrine, 134. 
17 Ray S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975), 
107. 
18 John A. Knight, ‘The Barthian Heritage of Hans W. Frei’, Scottish Journal of Theology (61, 2008), 310. 
19 Charles L. Campbell, Preaching Jesus: New Directions for Homiletics in Hans Frei’s Postliberal Theology 
(Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 8. See also George Hunsinger, ‘Forward’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, vii. 
20 Hans W. Frei, ‘German Theology: Transcendence and Secularity’, in Charles E. McClelland and 
Steven P. Scher (eds.), Postwar German Culture (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974), 102. 
21 Frei, The Doctrine, 576. 
22 See especially Mike Higton, Christ, Providence and History: Hans W. Frei’s Public Theology (London: T&T 
Clark, 2004), 54–59. 
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Frei’s criticism of Barth is therefore important as we keep a comparison between Frei 
and Bonhoeffer on the horizon.  
 
That Frei would take up this stance in relation to Barth is not surprising given the 
influence of H. Richard Niebuhr. Seeking to temper the contingency of Barth’s 
theology of revelation with the sensibilities learned from Ernst Troeltsch’s historical 
relativism (see below) Niebuhr emphasised that, 
 
whatever it was that the church meant to say, whatever was revealed or 
manifested to it could be indicated only in connection with an historical person 
and events in the life of his community. The confession referred to history and 
was consciously made in history.23 
 
Along the same lines of Niebuhr’s approach to Barth, then, Frei suggests that Barth 
tends to “deprecate the content of the historical (in the critical-exegetical sense) 
knowledge of Jesus of Nazareth”24 by virtue of his insistence that revelation is never a 
continuous state of affairs within history, but always the act of God from without. Frei 
thinks this insistence could easily develop into a “tendency to systematize in a 
dangerous fashion the relation between revelation and historical knowledge.”25 Frei 
therefore puts the following question to Barth: 
 
Is this tendency towards systematization of the objectivity of revelation, and 
the grounding of the revelation-faith relationship in it, not actually detrimental 
to genuine objectivity, because it tends toward the transcendence of every 
concrete content in anthropology? … Does Christology mean that a genuine 
appreciation of creaturely conditions, to be set over against and in concert 
with Incarnation and redemption becomes an impossibility? 26 
 
In other words, if Jesus Christ is understood only in relation to the pure contingency 
of revelation and not in relation to the history towards and in which God acts, then 
Christology veers towards the ‘epistemologically monophysite’. As Frei put it in a later 
article,  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 23.  
24 Frei, The Doctrine, 576. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Frei, The Doctrine, 575–576. 
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As a human historical figure [Jesus] is simply ‘there’, but neither his life nor his 
teaching seems to have much connection with his personhood or with the 
historical-revelatory connection with us. The historical figure of Jesus is not 
significantly illuminated in ‘revelation’.27 
 
Mike Higton emphasises how a critical alternative to this monophysite tendency is a 
fundamental part of Frei’s work throughout his career. Frei, says Higton, utilises 
Barth’s fundamental theological orientations as regards the epistemological problems 
of the enlightenment, whilst offering a more nuanced approach to the place of 
historicity, particularly in Christology.28  
 
Frei’s critique of Barth must not be interpreted as a dilution of radical, transcendent 
Christocentrism. As Higton puts it, in relation to other theologians of his generation, 
Frei certainly “left Niebuhr’s classroom through the door marked ‘Barth’”.29 
Sonderegger agrees that affinity with Barth characterises Frei’s response to post-
enlightenment hermeneutical issues, and describes Frei’s own orientation as 
evidencing an appropriately “chastened”, but nevertheless “orthodox” form of 
monophysitism.30 Frei, she argues, does indeed give a rationale for historicity in 
Christology, but demonstrates the inseparability of the historical identity of Jesus 
Christ from his presence as “the One that simply is Jesus Christ, the Living Lord.”31 
Frei’s response to Barth is therefore not to soften the utter transcendence of Jesus 
Christ, but to notice that Barth’s own critical response to the problem of domesticated 
transcendence requires careful nuance, such that ‘chastened monophysitism’ is an 
appropriate corrective. 
 
Following Higton we recognise that Frei’s study of biblical exegesis, to which we now 
turn, has this nuanced understanding of Barth’s response to the domestication of 
transcendence in the background. Below, we will see how Frei resists the post-
enlightenment urge to subject the meaning of the gospel narratives in particular to 
broader categories of universal reason and historical criticism. To use Placher’s terms, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Hans W. Frei, ‘The Theology of Richard H. Niebuhr’, in Paul Ramsey (ed.), Faith and Ethics: The 
Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 106. 
28 Higton, Christ, 54–60. 
29 Higton, Christ, 25. 
30 Katherine Sonderegger, ‘Epistemological Monophysitism in Karl Barth and Hans Frei’, Pro Ecclesia 
(22, 2013), 260. 
31 Sonderegger, ‘Epistemological’, 262. 
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that ‘domesticates’ the meaning of those narratives. Frei recognises that if we read 
scripture as narrating the transcendent activity of God, then human categories of 
understanding must yield to the actual content of the narrative itself, with the 
expectation that those categories may be ruptured. Yet, also recognising a tendency 
towards epistemological monophysitism, he would stress that this narrative remains 
one of God’s activity in and towards the historical world, so that such a rupture in 
epistemological categories need not—indeed should not—endanger the place of 
historicity within a theology of revelation. In chapter 5 we will see the extent to which 
Bonhoeffer’s approach to Barth’s early theology has a very similar shape. 
 
II 
 
 Eclipse: Hermeneutics and Transcendence 
 
The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (hereafter Eclipse) itself lays the ground for Frei’s 
constructive Christological proposal that we will draw on for our account of Jesus’ 
transcendence. Post-publication, Frei described Eclipse as an attempt to “point out a 
category error… together with something of its background and its eventual 
ramifications.”32 That ‘category error’ is the confusion between two things: on one 
hand, the way the literal or realistic sense of a text coheres with its meaning; and on 
the other, the relation of that coherence to the category of historical factuality.33 By 
‘realistic’, Frei is referring to “the comparatively unadorned and meager biblical 
accounts, the comparatively unexalted and straightforward manner in which the 
divine or supernatural enters an ordinary world and ordinary experience, in contrast 
to a rightly proliferated, mysterious exaltation of the ordinary into unity with primal 
mystery.”34 From the late seventeenth century onwards, says Frei, the relationship 
between narrative and meaning was defined by the question of how a realistic, or 
‘history-like’ text coheres with rational observation of the known world—whether as 
factual report of a natural or supernatural occurrence, or as a myth alluding to a 
deeper truth accessible by universal reason—and the question of how that text’s 
meaning can be grasped universally and individually. This reduction of exegesis to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 61. 
33 Frei, Identity, p.60. 
34 Hans W. Frei, ‘Letter to Professor Ray L. Hart, January 12, 1976’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 18. 
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question of fact, making it a fundamentally “apologetical enterprise” geared towards 
articulating the factuality of Christianity,35 was itself a symptom of the problem of 
faith and history that characterised the modern period, and the rise of what Niebuhr 
calls “Culture Protestantism”—i.e. the theology characteristic of liberal Protestant 
thinkers.36 
 
Concerning that problem of faith and history, Gotthold Lessing (1729–1781) argued 
in 1777 that reports of past miraculous events in history could not possibly operate as 
satisfactory ‘proofs’ of Christianity’s truth, because they were not universally available 
to empirical examination. The ‘medium’ of historical testimony cannot bear the 
miraculous—seminally, the incarnation—for the reports are simply reports, which 
themselves are not enough to justify the apparent contradiction of reason involved in 
believing a miracle. The testimony is not the event, and therefore “no longer has any 
spirit or power, but has sunk to the level of human testimonies of spirit and power.”37 
Thus Lessing’s statement, “the accidental truths of history can never become the proof 
of necessary truths of reason.”38 Frei paraphrased Lessing thus: 
 
If I can’t experience it myself but have to take the word of others, what use is 
it? … If I had lived at the time of Christ—fine; or if I experience miracles done 
by believing Christians, and experience prophecy fulfillment now—fine. I 
would have subjugated my reason to him, or to claims made in his name, 
gladly.39 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 122. Frei later summarised, “the story of modern Christian 
theology (beginning with the end of the seventeenth century) is increasingly, indeed, almost exclusively 
that of anthropological and Christological apologetics”. Hans W. Frei, ‘Remarks in Connection with a 
Theological Proposal’, in Frei, Theology and Narrative, 27. 
36 In Christ and Culture, Niebuhr describes theologians who espouse this approach as “non-
revolutionaries who find no need for positing ‘cracks in time’—fall and incarnation and judgement and 
resurrection. In modern history this type is well known, since for generations it has been dominant in a 
large section of Protestantism. Inadequately defined by the use of such terms as ‘liberal’ and 
‘liberalism’, is [sic] is more aptly named Culture Protestantism, but appearances of the type have not 
been confided to the modern world nor to the church of the Reformation.” H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ 
and Culture (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 84. Frei also connects apologetics and Culture 
Protestantism in his dissertation, saying “[a]pologetics is nothing more than the technical expression of 
culture theology”. Frei, The Doctrine, 69. 
37 Gotthold Lessing, ‘On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power’, in Lessing’s Theological Writings, edited by 
Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1956), 52. 
38 Lessing, ‘Proof’, 53. 
39 Hans W. Frei, ‘The Formation of German Religious thought in the Passage from Enlightenment to 
Romanticism RS371b (YDS 13-199)’, in Hans W. Frei, Unpublished Pieces: Transcripts from the Yale Divinity 
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The implication is that truths attested to by history-like testimony must be verified and 
assented to by virtue of a broader and deeper category of understanding, and this 
means looking past the history-like narrative to that which is more universally—and 
less particularly—expressible in terms of general truths. Lamb calls this Lessing’s 
“radical empiricism”,40 for one’s own empirical reasoning sets the criteria for the 
meaningfulness of claims of religious truth.41   
 
Ernst Troeltsch (1865–1923) similarly insisted that Christian truth/doctrine must be 
articulated inside a ‘modern’ approach to history, by which he meant an 
understanding of the fundamental relativity of historical phenomena. Whilst, as 
Fulford describes, Troeltsch does not deny that events can be unique per se, he 
maintains that “[s]uch uniqueness … does not remove a phenomenon from the web 
of causal relations, nor is it inconsistent with some degree of similarity with other 
events: an event may be irreducibly individual without being wholly unlike any 
other.”42 Every event, says Troeltsch, is “a uniquely conditioned disclosure of life”,43 
but is such only relatively in relation to ‘life’ itself. A universal cannot be absolutely 
(that is, without possible supersession) derived from a particular, and Troeltsch 
therefore denies that the absoluteness of Christian faith can be based upon the 
metaphysical uniqueness of any historical event—especially the particular life of 
Jesus.44  
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School Archive, edited by Mike Higton (1998–2004, available at 
http://community.dur.ac.uk/mike.higton/transcripts/Freicomplete.pdf). 
40 William Lamb, Scripture: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 46. 
41 “[t]o jump with that historical truth to a quite different class of truths, and to demand of me that I 
should form all my metaphysical and moral ideas accordingly; to expect me to alter all my fundamental 
ideas of the nature of the Godhead because I cannot set any credible testimony against the resurrection 
of Christ; if that is not a μετάβασις εἰς άλλο γένος, then I do not know what Aristotle meant by his phrase.” 
Lessing, ‘Proof’, 54. ‘Aristotle’s phrase’ refers to the incommensurability between two levels of 
thinking—here, faith and history. 
42 Ben Fulford, Divine Eloquence and Human Transformation: Rethinking Scripture and History through Gregory of 
Nazianzus and Hans Frei (Fortress: Minneapolis, 2013), 20. 
43 Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions, trans. Reid (London: SCM, 
1972), 63. 
44 “[T]he identification of the Christian claim with the original, individual, historical figure who is the 
source of its religious orientation” should be “totally disregarded”, given that fact that “history itself has 
already annihilated them in principle.” Troelstch, Absoluteness, 158–159. 
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Most problematic of all … is the interpreting of Christianity as the absolute 
religion … not only because … no such demonstration is possible in historical 
terms, but above all because the impossibility of uniting a theoretically 
conceived universal principle with a concrete, individual, historical 
configuration becomes directly discernable at this point.45 
 
For Lessing and Troeltsch, the ultimate truth of Christianity must be demonstrated 
according to supra-historical ‘universal reason’, not according to a particular historical 
event. As such, the relationship between particular historical events and the ‘truths’ of 
Christianity is called into question, and the problem of faith and history arises.  
 
In Eclipse Frei implies that we should interrogate how this problem of faith and history 
is beholden to a pre-determined and de-limited conception of rationality, and in its 
place recover something of the character of pre-critical ‘narrative’ reading of 
scripture. If we do so, he maintains, the impasse between faith and history is recast in 
less problematic a light. Schner describes Frei’s agenda as “both a refusal and a 
retrieval within Christian theology. The retrieval is for something we used to do as 
Christians, and the refusal is of things we tend to prefer to do with the biblical text, 
but we ought not to do.”46 If we explicate this ‘refusal’ and ‘retrieval’ in terms of 
transcendence, then the understanding of transcendence which turns upon the 
domesticating characteristics laid out in the previous chapter is refused, and a concept 
of transcendence unlimited by rationalist epistemology, yet able to articulate the 
importance of historical particularity, is retrieved.  
 
To draw attention to the hermeneutical approach that was ‘eclipsed’ in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, Frei highlights two theologians who also feature in Placher’s 
thesis: Luther and Calvin. Without suggesting an unmediated recovery of their 
exegetical practices, Frei shows that key aspects of their approaches to scripture offer 
an alternative to the critical sundering of narrative and meaning that implies the 
incompatibility of faith and history.  Despite significant divergence in theological 
content, says Frei, Luther and Calvin’s exegetical practices witness jointly to the key 
characteristics of this pre-critical period.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Troeltsch, Absoluteness, 70. 
46 George P. Schner, ‘The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: Analysis and Critique’, Modern Theology (8, 
1992), 152. 
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First, they agreed upon the “self-interpreting” character of the Bible—“the literal 
sense of its words being their true meaning”.47 Technically, Frei calls this “the 
primacy of the grammatical sense”,48 highlighting that the reformers would have 
rejected any idea that the meaning of a text had to be found elsewhere than the text 
itself—i.e. in a deeper or separately deduced layer of significance.  
 
Secondly, Frei describes the assumption that the historical sense of the text cohered 
with the actual world that they themselves inhabited, meaning that the ‘history-
likeness’ of the text was a “natural concomitant of its making literal sense.”49 By 
‘history-likeness’ Frei means that the narratives themselves revolve around “the 
intercourse and destinies of ordinary and credible individuals rather than stylized or 
mythical hero figures, flawed or otherwise”,50 and he follows Erich Auerbach’s 
suggestion that, bar obvious genre exceptions, this history-likeness is “characteristic of 
the Bible.”51 The meaning of the text, therefore, is inseparable from its realism—the 
text being understood to yield a meaning that belongs in the kind of world we inhabit. 
  
Thirdly, pre-critical theologians practiced figural reading, wherein historically depicted 
characters and events are read as ‘figures’ or ‘types’ of God’s activity (ultimately in 
Jesus Christ) without those characters and events losing their own historical 
particularity. Here Frei is most indebted to Auerbach, whose own account of early 
Christian figural reading, notably laid out by John Dawson, sought to articulate how 
“the spiritual character of figural reading protected rather than subverted the 
historical reality of figural persons or events, because spirituality was ultimately a 
matter of the impact of the historical Jesus on historical human beings.”52 For 
Auerbach figural reading as practiced by the church fathers is not about discerning an 
abstracted meaning to which the figural relationship points (a “third thing that both !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Frei, Eclipse, 18–19. 
48 Frei, Eclipse, 19. 
49 Frei, Eclipse, 2. 
50 Frei, Eclipse, 14. Fulford describes “[t]he depiction of characters and circumstances by their mutual 
interactions through chronological sequence renders a world that resembles the historical world of 
which we have become aware, with its interweaving of actions and events in a complex, continuous 
causal web of contingencies.” Fulford, Divine Eloquence, 199. 
51 Frei, Eclipse, 15. 
52 John D. Dawson, Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 
83. 
! 49 
shared”).53 Rather, ‘meaning’ is “a statement about a relation”54—the actual 
relationship between the figure (e.g. Moses) and the fulfillment (Christ) both of which 
are historically particular. As Auerbach put it, for a theologian like Tertullian “Moses 
is no less historical and real because he is an umbra or figura of Christ, and Christ, the 
fulfillment, is not abstract idea, but also a historical reality.”55 Readers discern a 
relationship between historical persons and events that witnesses to God’s activity in 
the world according to God’s plan.56 Therefore, to say that one history-like narrative 
is figurative of another is not to suggest that the historical narrative really means 
something else, beyond its historicity. Rather, says Frei, 
 
In the service of the one temporally sequential reality the stories become 
figures of one another without losing their independent or self-contained 
status.  With regard to its own depicted time span, each narrative is literally 
descriptive; of the whole sequence and its coherence in theme as well as time, 
all of them together form one literal narrative, by means of earlier and later 
stories becoming figures one of the other.57 
 
Auerbach therefore illuminated for Frei the fact that figural reading belongs alongside 
the centrality of the history-likeness of the text, and indeed in a later essay Frei 
comments on the indispensability of the former for a Christian understanding of 
historicity.58 The scriptures could therefore be understood to depict “one cumulative 
story”59 that reaches its climax in Jesus, and also by which the exegetes themselves 
could understand the relation of their own historical existence to the activity of God in 
Christ. Where Auerbach, however, had described the Bible as a dominant agent that 
overtakes all other realities of its own accord, Frei focussed on the practice of figura as 
the means by which the church understood world history in relation to the Bible 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Dawson, Figural, 92. 
54 Dawson, Figural, 94. 
55 Erich Auerbach, ‘Figura’, in Erich Auerbach, Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (New York: 
Meridian, 1959), 34. 
56 Dawson, Figural, 87. 
57 Frei, Eclipse, 28. 
58 “[S]omething like [figural reading] is indispensible if we are going to give descriptive substance to the 
claim that history is the story of the providential governance of God the Father of Jesus Christ among 
humankind.” Hans W. Frei, ‘History, Salvation-History, and Typology’, in Hans W. Frei, Reading 
Faithfully, 157. 
59 Frei, Eclipse, 2. 
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stories.60 As in other pre-critical praxes Frei highlights, figural reading keeps the sense 
of a text and its historical reference together—not in such a way that sense and reference 
were “conceived to be in harmony with each other” but rather that, in the pre-critical 
period, “they had not even been generally distinct issues.”61 
 
However, this union of sense and reference begins to separate in the seventeenth 
century, following theologians like Spinoza (1634–1677) for whom scripture’s 
historical reference is subjugated to its aim of instructing human beings towards 
religious devotion;62 and Cocceius (1603–1669) for whom the text pointed away from 
itself towards supra-mundane stages of salvation history.63 As this separation became 
more pronounced into the eighteenth century, Frei says, the assumed unity of text and 
historical reference was severed, and figural reading was disenfranchised of its 
historicity. 
 
[S]imply by virtue of the question of the factuality of revelation as an 
independent, critical inquiry … the harmony of historical fact, literal sense and 
religious truth will at best have to be demonstrated; at worst, some explanation 
of the religious truth of the fact-like description will have to be given in the 
face of a negative verdict on its factual accuracy or veracity.64 
 
As the eighteenth century ran into the nineteenth, Frei notes a further shift in 
exegetical focus that did not overcome the previous severing of sense and reference, 
but which added a further level of complexity to the hermeneutical task. Now, 
hermeneutical and historical investigation was concerned not only with the 
relationship between the meaning of the text and its history-like referents, but, under 
the influence of the nineteenth century’s “romantic and idealistic revolution”,65 was 
also concerned with the consciousness behind the text, and the process by which the text 
comes into being. “[T]he focus of inquiry now becomes the unitary structure of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 See Gerard Loughlin, Telling God’s story: Bible, Church and narrative theology (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 
142. 
61 Frei, Eclipse, 56. 
62 Frei, Eclipse, 43–46. Re. Spinoza, see Jacob L. Goodson, Narrative Theology and the Hermeneutical Virtues: 
Humility, Patience, Prudence (London: Lexington, 2015), 62. 
63 Frei, Eclipse, 46–50. 
64 Frei, Eclipse, 56. 
65 Frei, Eclipse, 282. 
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understanding rather than the written text as such.”66 Here the fundamental post-
enlightenment category error retained its force, and is added to by these later 
developments. 
 
Frei therefore summarises his proposal in Eclipse as follows: 
 
All the more fascinating, in view of this hermeneutical revolution and its large 
effect on biblical stories, is the continuity of the fate of a narrative reading of 
biblical stories, continuity that remained unbroken from the days of Deism 
through the first third of the nineteenth century—unchanged by whatever else 
happened in biblical study. The realistic narrative reading of biblical stories, 
the gospels in particular, went into eclipse throughout the period.67 
 
Frei recognised that this hermeneutical ‘eclipse’ of the narrative reading of the gospels 
reflected the angst of Culture Protestantism concerning the relationship between 
revelation and history. Firstly, can universal revelation be intelligibly conceived as 
occurring in and towards the particular history and culture of Israel (“a tiny, rude, and 
isolated fraction of the human race”)?68 Secondly, can narratives of revelation be 
understood to refer in their own particular way to a general universal truth, or is the 
idea of divine revelation (which surely has to be universal) essentially meaningless? 
Thirdly, can the texts that authoritatively yield the content/meaning of this revelation 
be proved to be factual, or rational, or is some other articulation of the way they yield 
meaning necessary? In eighteenth century England, says Frei, these textual questions 
were primarily addressed by investigating the scriptures in relation to external 
evidence for their conformity to fact; and in Germany, the emphasis was on the 
internal questions of textual criticism, and how the texts could be seen to function 
rationally or coherently. The differences notwithstanding, the concept of revelation is 
subjugated to a post-enlightenment concept of universal reason, and faith in God’s 
activity towards world becomes defined by the need to explain such activity within 
rationalistic confines. That the texts can be witnessing to something for which the 
epistemological categories of Culture Protestantism are in some way inadequate is not 
a real possibility. Such exegetical practice therefore reflects the domestication of 
transcendence.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Frei, Eclipse, 323. 
67 Frei, Eclipse, 324. 
68 Frei, Eclipse, 52. 
! 52 
 
Frei divided the plethora of exegetical tendencies at the turn of the eighteenth century 
into two groups, which in turn can be subdivided. On the one hand, there were those 
who believed the subject matter of the text referred ostensively (meaning it describes a 
“state of affairs in the spatio-temporal world”)69 and on the other hand, those who 
believed it did not. Within the former category there are a three main subdivisions. 
First, a ‘supernaturalist’ approach argued for the factual credibility of miracle 
narratives as Divine activity within the historical world; second, a ‘naturalist’ 
approach sought a scientific (and concomitantly, non-supernatural) explanation at the 
root of the reports of miraculous occurrences (for example, freak weather patterns); 
and third, some simply argued that the ostensive reference of the text was an 
intentional deception by the evangelists.70 
 
Those who believed the subject matter of the text was not ostensive understood the 
texts as narratives that communicated deeper universal or moral truths, like myths or 
fables. This included the belief that the authors intended allegory, and thus 
deliberately wrote something other than what they meant to communicate; the belief 
that the authors meant exactly what they wrote, but that the pure universal meaning 
of whatever they wrote was “the advancement of a pure moral disposition in the inner 
man and its connection with the ideal realm of ends”;71 and finally the belief that the 
meaning of the text lies within the culturally and historically conditioned 
consciousness of the author as manifested in what they intended to write. Frei calls 
this latter option the ‘mythophile’ approach. Its adherents saw the meaning of the 
biblical texts neither in “the events to which they referred, nor in the ideas supposedly 
stated in them in narrative form, but in the consciousness they represented.”72  
 
One such mythophile, D. F. Strauss, epitomised for Frei the way a post-enlightenment 
conception of the impasse between Glaube and Wissenschaft eclipsed a narrative reading 
of the biblical texts. To Frei’s mind, Strauss articulated most incisively the problem 
that a rationalist approach to faith and history presents for hermeneutics in general, 
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and also, crucially for this thesis, with particular reference to the identity of Jesus (see 
chapter 1, re the ‘quests’ for the historical Jesus). Strauss both exemplified the kind of 
position Frei wanted to reject, and yet recognised something of the inescapability of 
the biblical texts’ history-likeness, therefore ironically supporting Frei’s determined 
resistance of a Barthian epistemological monophysitism. Let us consider Strauss for a 
moment.  
 
In an essay on Strauss, Frei pointed out that as far as Strauss was concerned, 
Christology—specifically the soteriological and epistemological status of Jesus—
“constituted the chief test” in the discussion of faith, history and hermeneutics.73 
Discussions of meaning and historical reference came to a head in the topic of the life 
and meaning of Jesus: “were the writings about him accurate, and did their factual 
truth or falsity constitute decisive evidence for or against the other, viz., doctrinal 
information about him?”74 
 
In The Life of Jesus Critically Examined (1835) Strauss argued that the doctrinal claims 
about Jesus’ divine-human identity cannot be grounded in historical fact, due to the 
incredibility of the miraculous and divine elements in the history-like gospel narratives 
about him. Against Schleiermacher—who in Strauss’ view produced a false hybrid 
between faith and history in his account of the historical Jesus’ God consciousness as 
the locus of the gospel—Strauss believed that the meaning of the gospel could not be 
at one with the history-like narratives of Jesus’ life. Instead, those narratives are ‘true’ 
only insofar as they non-ostensively manifest a central Christological ‘idea’. They do 
this through what Frei calls “unconscious folk poetizing”,75 expressing the true idea 
via the myth-making consciousness of their times, meaning that the gospels’ reference 
to ‘fact’ is inseparable from the mythical mindset of the authors: the socio-religiously 
shaped “thought world” of first century Messianic expectations, and shared by the 
‘historical’ Jesus himself.76 Strauss did not deny Jesus had existed, but believed that the 
texts about him referred not in a purely historical way, but derived their shape from a 
more universal—and supra-historical—concept of religious meaning.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Hans W. Frei, ‘David Friedrich Strauss’, in Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Patrick Sherry and Steven 
T. Katz (eds.), Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vol. 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), 219. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Frei, ‘Strauss’, 235. 
76 Frei, Eclipse, 235–236.  
! 54 
 
As opposite as this seems to Frei’s thinking, Strauss’ position was in part based upon a 
position about the history-likeness of the texts that Frei would agree with. The 
problem for Strauss, as Frei saw it, was that having perceived history-likeness, Strauss 
subjected it to a dichotomised view of faith and history. Firstly, Strauss recognised that 
the Jesus of the gospels cannot be split off such that some aspects of his historicity 
constitute the ‘divine’ meaning with the rest being incidental (such as he believed 
Schleiermacher to have done).77 Furthermore, unlike pagan myths, the scriptures 
envision the interaction of a transcendent deity with a historical world, and even the 
narrative of the incarnation is perceived not to crudely anthropomorphise God, but to 
point to something more nuanced.78 However, despite such insight, particularly into 
the nature of Jesus’ history-likeness in the gospels and the character of the biblical 
texts in general, Strauss concluded that the scriptures mean truthfully by mythical 
reference, because such an historical interaction between God and the world is simply 
“inadmissible from our point of view”.79 He performs what Frei calls “a reduction to 
the historical issue of fact vs. fiction, and to the corresponding hermeneutical issue of 
literal-ostensive vs. mythical meaning or subject matter.”80 Strauss’ own inability to 
see past the post-enlightenment dichotomy is ironically illustrated, says Frei, by the 
way he came tantalisingly close to appreciating the realistic narrative character of 
scripture, but finally fell back on the eighteenth century’s category error, simply not 
allowing for the possibility that divine revelation could be historically narrated. As 
Loughlin has it, theologians like Strauss “take the literal to be the historical” but “find 
the historical incredible.”81 
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77 “[A]n historical individual is that which appears of him … his internal nature is known by his words 
and actions, the condition of his age and nation are a part of his individuality.” Strauss, The Life of Jesus 
Critically Examined, trans. Eliot (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1898), 77. 
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Frei’s agreement with Strauss, therefore, is that the post-enlightenment perception of 
the problem of faith and history requires the ‘truth’ of Christianity to be relativised 
away from history, and the historical reference of the texts construed mythically. Yet, 
as Higton explains, unlike Strauss, Frei himself will not accept that assumption:  
 
[H]e refused to begin by asking how Christian faith could possibly fit into the 
constraining grid of historical Wissenschaft. Rather, he committed himself to 
finding the proper location within Christian faith for something like the 
historical world of Strauss and Troeltsch.82  
 
To Frei’s mind, the gospels’ history-likeness can just as much point away from, rather 
than towards, the problem of faith and history. Therefore, says Higton, 
 
Frei’s work can be seen, without too much distortion, as one long attempt to 
laugh at Strauss—not because he has found a way of ignoring him, but 
because he has learned to defeat Strauss with Strauss’ own tools.83 
 
Frei is not simply advocating intellectual nostalgia, as if the questions of the 
enlightenment simply need to be ignored. As Bonhoeffer had already put it, and as we 
shall see below, a theological response to the enlightenment in the form of such 
nostalgia is “only a counsel of despair, a sacrifice made only at the cost of intellectual 
integrity. It’s a dream to the tune of ‘Oh, if only I knew the road back, the long road 
to childhood’s land’.”84 Rather, in addition to the very obvious positive challenges the 
enlightenment posed to clericalism, authoritarianism, and autocracy, the 
hermeneutical question of faith and history as thrown up by post-enlightenment 
epistemology calls for a sophisticated answer that it is to Christianity’s advantage to 
articulate. We do Frei’s position a disservice if we make him purely nostalgic. 
Nevertheless, despite the validity of the questions posed by post-enlightenment 
epistemological assumptions, Frei’s alternative can only be articulated by standing 
apart from them. 
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82 Higton, Christ, 34–35. 
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question must be loved, then “laughed at”. Frei wants to talk about “what it might mean to laugh, but 
to laugh fairly and not sarcastically, and not in a fashion that might turn to gallows humour.” Hans W. 
Frei, Types of Christian Theology (Yale: Yale University Press, 1992), 11. 
84 LPP, 478.  
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Recall, then, the two elements of Frei’s thought outlined at the start of this chapter:  
Firstly, the post-critical hermeneutical category error outlined in Eclipse is 
symptomatic of a domesticated account of transcendence. Frei is critiquing the 
conceptually reductionist boundaries of a delimited concept of ‘universal reason’, by 
looking in considerable detail at the hermeneutical implications of such reductionism. 
In Garrett Green’s words, his approach “gives theologians some breathing room by 
allowing the literal sense of the text to come into focus without its becoming 
immediately confused with historical questions”.85 The ‘breathing room’ to which 
Green refers alludes spatially to the kind of posture of humility necessary for 
theological thought—a posture which in Frei’s context means resisting the attempt to 
hold meaning inside the boundaries of a post-enlightenment model of rationality, and 
that leaves room for practices like figural reading, where modernity does not. 
Sounding a different note to his approach to Barth in his doctoral thesis, Frei’s 
introduction to Eclipse suggests that Barth, in Church Dogmatics, demonstrates that kind 
of undomesticated approach to reading scripture.86 
 
Secondly, Frei exposes a disconnect between the historicity of Jesus and the meaning 
of the narratives about him. In seeking to correct such a skewed approach to 
Christology, he addresses a problem that must be overcome for a satisfactory account 
of Jesus’ transcendence. What Frei implies in Eclipse is that if the meaning of Jesus is 
not reduced to historical prove-ability but understood as at one with the history-like 
descriptions of him, then an account of his identity, including his unity with God and 
his transcendence, is anything but de-historicised, but instead is bound up entirely 
with his historical particularity. In other words, Frei seeks to articulate in detail what 
Anderson suggests more broadly: that the gospels describe the historical activity of 
God, who is wholly other, towards and in the world in Christ. This Frei seeks to 
articulate by recovering that which was eclipsed in the eighteenth and nineteenth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Garrett Green, ‘Fictional narrative and scriptural truth’, in Garrett Green (ed.), Scriptural Authority and 
Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 80. 
86 Barth, says Frei, “distinguishes historical from realistic reading of the theologically most significant 
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realistic form of the stories,” Frei, Eclipse, viii. Frei refers particularly to a portion of volume II of Church 
Dogmatics (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2: The Doctrine of God, trans. G. W. Bromily et al. (London, T & 
T Clark, 2004), 340–409) of which Higton provides a detailed summary, in the light of Frei’s 
comments. See Higton, Christ, 155–163. 
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centuries—i.e. the reading of the Gospels as texts whose meaning is at one with their 
realistic narrative.  
 
This focus on Christological historicity complements, of course, Frei’s dissatisfaction 
with Barth’s epistemological monophysitism. In The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei’s desire 
to avoid such an error coheres naturally with his protest against the sundering of 
narrative and meaning. In moving to examine this work, therefore, the shape of Frei’s 
constructive contribution to an account of Jesus’ transcendence begins to come into 
view. 
 
 
III  
 
Identity: Unsubstitutability and Transcendence 
 
The Identity of Jesus Christ (henceforth Identity) is grounded on Frei’s recovery of a pre-
critical approach to the biblical narrative qua narrative, as argued for in Eclipse, 
building a constructive Christological alternative to the hermeneutical category errors 
exposed in the former work.87 In addition, two other papers by Frei—‘Theological 
Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection’ (1966) and ‘Remarks in 
Connection with a Theological Proposal’ (1967)—address the same issues and thus 
will be drawn on to supplement this analysis. 
 
Frei’s Christological alternative can be described in two stages: firstly, that Christology 
must begin from the question of Jesus’ identity (i.e. who it is we are talking about) 
rather than his presence (i.e. what it means to say that someone who lived in first 
century Palestine is ‘present’ now). Whereas the latter question could proceed on quite 
abstract terms, Frei will argue that Jesus’ identity is yielded most meaningfully when !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Although The Identity of Jesus Christ was published in 1975—a year after Eclipse—the former was in fact 
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one reads the passion-resurrection sequences as realistic narratives whose meaning is 
one with their narrative descriptions. He suggests that reading these sequences on 
their own terms yields an ‘un-mythical’, history-like account of Jesus’ identity, and 
that this particular person—Jesus of Nazareth—is the meaning of the gospels, rather 
than a figure who points beyond himself to a deeper meaning. According to a reading 
of the gospels on their own terms, “[t]he place of the Christ figure” says Frei, “is 
preempted once and for all by Jesus of Nazareth”.88 He labels this Jesus’ 
“unsubstitutability”, in contrast to what Higton calls the “repeatability” that 
characterises a mythical Christology.89 The narrative ‘works’ in relation to this specific 
unsubstitutable person (the question of Jesus identity is “posed for us by the gospels 
themselves”)90 and in answer to Frei’s initial question, the identity of Jesus dictates 
what it means to speak of him as present, rather than vice versa. Whatever Christians 
might want to say about Jesus—including how they might figurally understand 
themselves to be fulfilled by him—has to be articulated with regard to this 
unsubstitutability.  
 
Secondly, the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus yielded in such a narrative reading 
transcends any kind of intellectual grasp, forcing a “scramble of our categories of 
understanding”,91 insofar as Jesus is narrated as the risen one whose identity is the 
manifestation of God’s activity towards the world. Despite the use of terms like 
‘narrative reading’, Frei’s approach to Christology in no way binds Jesus to the 
narratives about him, but vice versa, binds the narratives to the particular person.92 
The gospels, therefore, narrate Jesus’ transcendence.  
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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89 Frei, Identity, 115, 123, 164. Higton, Christ, 96. 
90 Higton, Christ, 6. 
91 Frei, ‘Remarks’, 32. 
92 Rather than seeing Frei’s work as comprising a “narrative theology”, says Callahan, “[i]t is better to 
represent Frei’s work as a depiction of the convergence between the gospel narratives and their 
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i) Identity and presence  
 
The way Christians talk of Jesus as present, Frei says, presupposes his specific identity. 
In contrast to the Bultmannian notion of Jesus’s presence to the community of 
believers being somehow ‘embodied’ in the kerygma about the cross and resurrection 
(a view that resembles Strauss’ ‘mythical’ position)93 Frei maintains that that any 
meaningful account of Jesus’ presence to Christian believers and in the Christian 
church, must be prefigured by, and remain inseparable from, his historical 
particularity.94 Frei highlights “a Christian belief that Jesus Christ is a 
contemporaneous person, here and now, just as he spans the ages,”95 and argues that 
this kind of belief arises at one with a robust account of the identity of the one who is 
believed to be present—for otherwise this belief in his presence would be grounded in 
an abstract concept of presence per se, which is not really presence at all. Frei dismisses 
the question of how Jesus is present (i.e. how someone being present two thousand 
years after their execution ‘fits’ epistemologically) in favour of the question of who it is 
in whose presence Christians believe. 
 
[I]f we begin with the often nagging and worrisome questions of how Christ is 
present to us and how we can believe in his presence, we shall get nowhere at 
all. It is far more important and fruitful to ask first, Who is Jesus Christ.96 
 
This identity-focussed approach to Jesus’ presence avoids the category error outlined 
in Eclipse, neither dismissing the realistic narrative feature of the Gospels, nor 
abstracting Jesus’ meaning from his person. Presence unattached to a specific identity 
is wholly un-history-like—you cannot meaningfully say ‘Louis Armstrong is/isn’t here’ 
unless you have a sense of who he is. Abstracting Jesus’s presence from his identity 
therefore affects the same kind of generalisation that occurs in the ‘non-
ostensive’/’mythical’ hermeneutical approach described in Eclipse, where Jesus 
represents a fundamental meaning or potential of common humanity—where his 
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particularity fades into the background behind the general religiousness he is supposed 
to embody.  
 
In contrast to this generalising approach to Christology, Frei looks to the passion-
resurrection accounts in the Gospels, arguing that the way Jesus’ identity is described 
there is more like a realistic/historical novel than a mythical narrative. As he 
explained in a later essay, realistic novels depict “the plausibility of character and 
situation in their interaction precisely by means of the singularity or unsubstitutability of 
both,”97 and in the passion-resurrection sequences in particular, Frei perceives the 
same coherence of unsubstitutable narrative and identity as regards Jesus. In these 
sequences, the person of Jesus gives the sequence its meaning and congruence, and 
therefore it is his identity that is the focus of the narrative, rather than his identity 
pointing to a meaning beyond itself, or to a more general question of how a person 
can be divine.  The specific comparison with fictional description also allows Frei to 
highlight the way the union of unsubstitutable narrative and meaning does not have to 
imply a reduction to factuality per se. As he wrote in a paper delivered in Princeton in 
1987, 
 
To say ‘like all good fictional description’ is not to deny Jesus’ historicity but to 
express great skepticism over the historian’s—rather than the novelist’s or the 
dramatist’s—capacity to generate a character portrait of him in which concrete, 
non-idealized, unified particularity is all-encompassing universal human being 
at the same time.98 
 
The coherence of historical particularity with universality therefore goes beyond the 
territory of factuality as perceived in the enlightenment. There is something unique 
about the relationship between identity and presence when it comes to this person, 
Jesus of Nazareth. With any other historical figure one can think of an identity 
without presence: it makes sense, for example to say ‘Louis Armstrong is not here’, 
when we agree who we are talking about and therefore agree on his absence. An 
account of Jesus’ identity derived from the Gospel narratives, however, makes talk of 
his presence uniquely necessary. To say ‘Jesus is not here’ somehow contradicts his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Hans W. Frei, ‘Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection’, in Hans 
W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 15. My italics. 
98 Hans W. Frei, ‘The Encounter of Jesus with the German Academy’, in Frei, Types of Christian Theology 
(Yale: Yale University Press, 1992), 135. 
! 61 
narrated identity as the crucified, risen and saving one. There is, says Frei, a “certain 
pattern in Jesus’ unique personal existence which provides the bond between the 
individuality of the Saviour and the cosmic scope of his activity.”99 This pattern may 
sunder the normal relationship between historical people and ‘presence’ after their 
death, but, says Frei, there is no getting away from that pattern being at the heart of 
the gospel narratives. There is a coherence of historical particularity and 
transcendence, and Jesus ‘unsubstitutability’ carries both. 
 
Therefore, by resisting the abstraction of Jesus presence from his identity, Frei’s 
concentration on ‘who’ rather than ‘how’ highlights the kind of theological posture 
that yields a nuanced account of Jesus’ transcendence. Where thinkers like Strauss 
close off the possibility of Jesus’ transcendence, Frei retains conceptual humility, 
because the specific history-like identity narrated in the gospels transcends 
epistemological categories. When Christian believers read the gospels on their own 
terms, “it is he who presents himself to us … we do not have the capacity within 
ourselves to hold the unity of his identity with his presence in our minds. If he is 
effectively rendered to us in this unity when we think of him, it is due to his powerful 
goodness.”100 In short, Frei’s prioritisation of ‘who’ as regards the identity of Jesus, is 
central to his relevance as a theologian of Jesus’ transcendence. 
 
To ask about any other man, ‘who is he?’ does not bring him into the 
questioners spatial presence … thinking of him does not constitute his 
presence. In the case of Jesus Christ, however, Christians claim that we cannot 
even think about him without his being present.101 
 
 
ii) Narrative reading 
 
With this clarification as regards presence and identity, Frei therefore turns to 
consider how the gospel narratives answer this ‘who’ question. He describes two ways 
of discerning how a narrative sequence yields a description of an identity without 
appealing to more general or universal categories behind the description itself. He is 
keen that any methods for discerning such identity description should be formal, not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 Frei, Identity, 116. See also Frei, Identity, 123. 
100 Frei, Identity, 76. 
101 Frei, Identity, 75–76. 
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imposing exterior categories on the narrative itself—for then the text would not be 
approached on its own terms, and furthermore, such an imposition would slip back 
into asking about Jesus under a set of categories abstracted from his person. Rather, as 
Frei puts it in ‘Theological Reflections’, “[t]he proper approach is to keep the tools of 
interpretive analysis as minimal and formal as possible, so that the character(s) and the 
narrative of events may emerge in their own right.”102 
 
The two schemes of interrogating the text as regards the ‘who’ of Jesus, are what Frei 
calls ‘intention-action description’ and ‘self-manifestation’ (the latter, in ‘Theological 
Reflections’, rendered as ‘ascriptive subject description’ or ‘subject manifest in 
difference description’). Following the way Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) had forcefully 
challenged another category error (Ryle’s term) in the philosophy of mind and body, 
both Frei’s schemes assume something Strauss maintained too—the union of inner 
and outer as regards a person’s identity. Ryle had challenged the Cartesian dualism 
which understood the mind as a totally ‘other’ element of a person than their body, 
located in inaccessible “insulated fields”.103 Instead he proposed that a person’s “overt 
acts and utterances” are not to be understood as ‘effects’ of one’s mind (as if a 
thought/intention and an action can be distinguished and allocated to different parts 
of a person) but rather that intention and action are related in a continuum.104 Frei 
therefore concentrates on the outer activity and manifestation of a person as an 
authentic means of being attentive to their whole character—specifically, in this case, 
the character of Jesus as narrated in the passion-resurrection sequences.105 
 
Frei is not reducing the complexity of the person of Jesus to only what he did, but is 
saying that the relationship between the two means that the latter is a meaningful way 
of describing the former. One cannot get to the bottom of Jesus’ identity by just 
looking at what he did; but at the same time, looking at what he did provides !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Frei, ‘Theological’, 1. 
103 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1949), 13. 
104 Ryle, Concept, 25. 
105 This emphasis upon the union of inner and outer also relates to Frei’s reading of H. Richard 
Niebuhr regarding the identity of Jesus. Niebuhr, suggests Frei, also recognised that, “[t]he unity of the 
person of Jesus Christ is embedded in and immediately present to his teaching and practice. It is the 
focus of unity in the teaching and acts of the Lord.” Niebuhr avoided the suggestion either that Jesus’ 
personhood is simply not up for analysis, or that it is to be found in some historical discernment of his 
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meaningful insight into who he was. Frei, says Placher, “was aware of the attacks on 
Ryle as a crypto-behaviourist who denied the reality of any human interiority, and … 
did not want to go that far, or indeed to tie himself to the details of any particular 
theory of personhood.”106 Frei’s approach is therefore distinguished from 
anthropology, for “the interaction of … inner and outer human being cannot be 
explained… But it can be described.”107 Following Springs’ clarification that Frei “simply 
sought tools for re-describing the content of the gospel narratives in the light of their 
particular form”,108 we therefore recognise that Frei is not denying any interiority per 
se, just that anything interior could be historically described except for in unity with 
the exterior. Activity and identity are not ontologically reducible to one another, but 
the gospel narratives give them together in such a way that we can describe identity 
via activity, even if that description cannot fully grasp the identity itself.109 Again, in 
his essay on Niebuhr, Frei qualifies that this approach to Christology need not imply 
that a “series of acts of moral virtues in teaching and active exemplification exhausts 
the significance of a person’s being”, but, 
 
Nevertheless, one can say that the being does not stand ineffably behind the 
series or the essence behind the phenomena, distinguished from them and only 
inferentially to be interpreted: rather, the being is concretely exhibited, 
embodied in the series of phenomena. Hence, the teaching and the acts of 
Jesus Christ, his moral virtues, are themselves the direct clue to his being.110 
 
a) Intention-action description 
 
Working under the assumption that the narratives of Jesus’ activity are a fitting 
description of his ‘whole’ person, not merely his ‘outer’ element, intention-action 
description is clearly an alternative to any search for ‘Jesus behind the text’, or what 
Frei in ‘Theological Reflections’ refers to as “subject-alienation description”, whereby 
“the significance of temporal, social events is … said to be their subject reference !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 Placher, ‘Introduction’, 12. 
107 Hans W. Frei, ‘Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal’, in Frei, Theology and Narrative, 
35.  
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109 “One can, I think, describe the passage of intention into action … and the unity and mutual 
dependence of intention and action without appealing to the ontological ground of that unity.” Frei, 
‘Remarks’, 37. 
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rather than their public character.”111 As Springs puts it, “the character’s actions do 
not represent his more essential identity. They embody his identity.”112 Notably, Frei 
proposes one qualifier to Ryle’s account—namely because strict adherence to the 
latter’s scheme does not take into account events external to a person’s own enacted 
intention as somehow impinging upon and contributing to the formation of their 
identity. Thus, we should approach the history-like narratives with the assumption 
that an account of Jesus’ identity is “given in the mysterious coincidence of his 
intentional action with circumstances partly initiated by him, partly devolving upon 
him”.113   
 
Frei focuses on three aspects of the passion-resurrection sequences that narrate a 
coherence of action and intention, and thereby yield a description of what Jesus is like: 
Jesus’s obedience; his power and powerlessness; and the identification of his intention 
and action with the intention and action of God.  
 
Firstly, by obedience, Frei does not mean an isolated quality that constitutes Jesus’ 
abstract personality nor a quality of which Jesus might instantiate a good example, 
precisely because obedience cannot be abstracted from someone (God) or something 
(a mission) being obeyed. As obvious as this might seem, it serves as a subtle insistence 
that there is no meaning to Jesus’ obedience in abstraction from his historical 
particularity. The history-like narrative is not pointing away from itself to a more 
general quality that floats free of Jesus himself. Obedience, in other words, is not just 
‘there’; it ‘happens’.  
 
Although Jesus’ obedience to a God-given mission is recognisable from early on in the 
gospel narrative (e.g. from Jesus’ baptism to his identification with the one who is 
anointed and sent in Isaiah 61) Frei focusses in particular upon the passion-
resurrection sequence (especially in Luke) because he believes it yields the kind of 
“sequence of cumulative, unbroken events” necessary to discern “a specific enactment 
of an intention”114—that is, the co-incidence of inner intention and outer action.  The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Frei, ‘Theological’, 24. 
112 Springs, Toward, 34.  
113 Frei, Identity, 138. 
114 Frei, Identity, 150. 
! 65 
passion-resurrection sequence is “literarily not of the type of a mythological tale. For 
surely in such tales, unsubstitutable personal identity developed in interaction with 
equally unsubstitutable transpiring does not constitute a significant theme.”115 Jesus’ 
obedience is described internally (in his prayer of submission to the will of his Father) 
and enacted outwardly (for example, in his refusal to call legions of angels to prevent 
his arrest) so that one can say his intention and action are inseparable.116 
Furthermore, insofar as Jesus is spoken of as the Saviour, his being the one who saves 
is inseparable from this particular narrative of enacted intention of obedience.  
 
The crucial transition point for the enactment of his obedience through the 
events is in the Garden and the subsequent arrest, Shortly before, in the upper 
room, he had spoken to his disciples of the cup they shared as the blood of the 
covenant, ‘poured out for many’ … This is the content or aim of his obedience 
to God, enacted in the events climaxing the Gospel story. To be obedient to 
God was to pour out his blood in behalf of men. Who, then, was Jesus? He was 
what he did, the man completely obedient to God in enacting the good of men 
on their behalf.117 
 
Secondly, Jesus’ enacted intentions witness to the unique and paradoxical relation 
between power and powerlessness that characterises his identity—a relation which 
includes both a paradoxical “coexistence” of power and powerlessness and also a 
“transition” from the one to the other.118 Jesus’ actions and words in the narrative 
point to his power in and over the circumstances where he is tried and executed, such 
that these events somehow constitute his obedience and enacted intention. In 
Placher’s words, here is an as “an odd inverse proportion”, for “the moment when it 
seems that Jesus can do nothing at all is the culmination of his work as savior of the 
world.”119 Frei highlights that Jesus’ corrupt trial witnesses to his identity as Messiah; 
that Jesus powerfully promises life in paradise as he dies as a condemned criminal; and 
that he is portrayed as having the initiative in ‘giving up his spirit’ to his Father. All 
these examples, says Frei, demonstrate how in his powerlessness on the way to the 
cross and on the cross, Jesus “is and remains powerful … constraining all acts and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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words, even those of his opponents, to testify to him.”120 Furthermore, the realistic 
narrative of the enacted intentions of Jesus “show us a picture of the actual transition 
from power to helplessness … held together through the experiences of the one 
undergoing it.” In other words, Jesus’ enacted intentions effect the transition from him 
being the one who willingly submits to his Father’s will in Gethsemane, to being the 
one apparently powerless on the cross. Frei puts it clearly in his ‘Theological 
Reflections’ essay, saying that “[t]he coexistence as well as the transition between 
power and powerlessness, of which we have spoken, are ordered by the single-minded 
intention of Jesus to enact the good of men on their behalf in obedience to God.”121 
 
This paradoxical aspect of Jesus’ identity as the one Christians call Saviour cannot be 
abstracted from the narratives about him. Onlookers who see one able to save others 
but not himself, are in fact witnesses to the way Jesus’ obedient powerlessness is 
paradoxically central to his saving efficacy.122 The coherence of Jesus’ apparent failure 
to save with his actual saving work does not float freely as a ‘theme’ in the narrative: 
power and powerlessness are held together only by the enacted intention by which we 
know what Jesus is like. 
 
Finally, as the narratives gather pace, Frei notes that a threefold coherence becomes 
apparent—that of the intentions and actions of Jesus, those of his captors and 
executioners, and those of God. That which is done to Jesus, and that which Jesus 
does, is more and more identified with God’s will and activity. For example, Jesus 
himself identifies Pilate’s ‘power’ over him as that which is bestowed by God.123 
Furthermore, “on the cross” says Frei, “the intention and action of Jesus are fully 
superseded by God’s”.124 In the climactic resurrection narratives, where the meaning 
of the narrative coheres wholly around the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus, the one 
who is risen, the resurrection itself is God’s mysterious action. God raises Jesus from 
the dead. Yet—and here is the essential feature of the narrative—“although God and 
God alone is the agent of the resurrection, it is not God but Jesus who appears”.125 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The enacted intentions of God are at one in the narrative with the historically 
particular figure of Jesus.  
 
The resurrection of Jesus therefore implies the coherence of his history-like identity 
with the identity of God in God’s activity towards and in the world (i.e. to recall 
Anderson’s emphasis, God’s transcendence). However, Frei notices the relatively 
diminished capacity of intention-action description at this point in the narrative, due 
to the mysterious character of resurrection. Not only is Jesus’ resurrection not his own 
action; but that action is not narrated at all. As Hauerwas notes, there are no 
narratives of the resurrection, only of Jesus the risen one.126 To put it another way, in 
the resurrection narratives it becomes much more difficult to say exactly what 
happened, but the narratives are clearly focusing upon who is manifest through 
whatever happened, and understand the happening only with reference to that who. 
Therefore, from this point onwards, Frei suggests that the way the narrative sequence 
renders Jesus’ identity is better drawn out by his second scheme of ‘subject-’ or ‘self-
manifestation’ description.  
 
b) Self-manifestation description 
 
Self-manifestation description rests on the same Ryle-ian rejection of an inner/outer 
dichotomy as does intention-action description. However, rather than describing how 
a person’s action is a meaningful way of getting at what they are like, Frei is 
concerned with how a person’s word and body—those things according to which they 
are manifest as an ‘I’—are meaningful ways of getting at the continuity of who they are 
in the history-like narrative. Although the ‘I’ remains elusive to a degree,127 Frei 
nevertheless suggests that there are times when a person’s speech is “literally his 
embodiment”; and that, whilst we often say ‘my body’, “the body is not merely a 
possession, but the intimate manifestation of myself”.128 Speech and body are sufficiently 
meaningful for describing who a person is, and therefore neither speech nor body 
need be alienated from someone’s identity. Furthermore, a person’s name also refers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
126 Stanley Hauerwas, Matthew (London: SCM, 2006), 246. 
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not to a meaning in alienation from who they are, but to their persistent existence as 
known by others according to how they manifest themselves.129 We can meaningfully 
refer, then, to name, body and speech to describe who a person is. Self-manifestation 
description is therefore about how Jesus’ name, body and speech function in the 
history-like narrative as descriptions of his identity. 
 
However, Frei is markedly slippery on the way he actually employs self-manifestation 
description. Higton points out how Frei’s own practice of applying this self-
manifestation scheme is at times obliquely related to the kind of scheme he describes, 
insofar as he concentrates less on how Jesus’ name, words and body generally testify to 
his continual identity, and more specifically on the way meanings and symbols—such 
as Son of God, Messiah, Kingdom of God—become inseparably identified with that 
particular name, words and body, and therefore with Jesus’ identity.  
 
Frei’s self-manifestation description turns out to be about how specifications of 
Jesus’ true identity are, in the Gospels, linked to his particularity: how they are 
deployed in such a way as to become manifestations of his identity rather than 
impositions upon it … Christ’s identification in the resurrection accounts has 
to do precisely with … the identity of a person with his or her flesh, the 
identity a person finds bestowed and revealed in a name, and the 
demonstration that a person can now be properly identified through 
descriptions hitherto generalized and external.130 
 
In other words, in identifying these “hitherto generalized and external descriptions” 
with Jesus’ name, utterance and flesh, the resurrection narrative renders his identity.  
Frei contrasts this with the nativity and ministry narratives. The nativity stories 
identify Jesus primarily in terms of the broader story of the people of Israel, especially 
in those aspects of the narrative that Matthew describes as happening to fulfill the 
prophets—e.g. the flight to Egypt. There, Jesus is identified “by means of the crucial 
turns in the people’s past … converging on him at once and identifying who he is 
because of all that he embodies.”131 From his baptism throughout the stories of his 
ministry, Jesus appears as more distinctly individual than in the nativity and infancy 
narratives, but even so continues to function somewhat symbolically as regards titular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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references (like ‘Son of God’, or ‘Lord’) that in turn identify him with the theme of the 
Kingdom of God. Frei thinks, for example, of the way Jesus answers the disciples of 
John who enquire of his identity by pointing to the signs of the Kingdom that 
surround his ministry. Here, in comparison to the nativity, “Jesus becomes more 
nearly an individual in his own right, and yet his identity is established by reference to 
the Kingdom of God.”132 
 
The resurrection story is even more different, however. Turning Bultmann’s 
terminology on its head, Frei says that in the resurrection story, the unsubstitutable 
figure of Jesus is the one who ‘demythologises’ the pattern of references to do with the 
Kingdom of God, messiah-ship, the Son of Man, the Saviour, and suchlike.133  “Jesus 
identifies the titles rather than they him.”134 Frei takes the phrase in Luke’s Emmaus 
narrative (that Jesus “interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning 
him”)135 as a paradigmatic description of how previously ambiguously referencing 
titles are now particularised and clarified in their reference to Jesus who was crucified 
and is risen.  In place of titles or themes, the narratives of Jesus’ body, speech and 
name now meaningfully manifest his particular unsubstitutable identity—an identity 
which defines the titles rather than vice versa. No longer can the titles refer to 
anything beyond Jesus himself. The theological upshot of this is that Jesus’ historicity 
is indispensible for understanding his cosmic significance—i.e. his significance not 
only as “the Christ of Israel”136 but also as the one in whom all things consist, and in 
whose death and resurrection God reconciles the world to Godself.137 
 
Of course, ‘history-like’ and ‘risen’ do not naturally cohere in the way we understand 
and experience the world, and the consequence of Frei’s narrative reading is in direct 
conflict with the modern perception of an impasse between faith and history. Frei, 
however, undercuts that impasse with an Anselmian Christological ontology. In a 
similar way to Anselm’s proposal that God cannot be meaningfully thought of as not 
existing, Frei says that although one cannot describe quite what it is for Jesus to be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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raised, one cannot think of Jesus as ‘not-raised’.138 A description of Jesus as not raised 
would simply not be a description of the Jesus narrated in the gospels, for there his 
resurrection is an irreducible aspect of his identity. The risen one is Jesus—that is how 
the history-like text identifies him. Resurrection is not an added extra, a kind of 
‘bonus feature’ for those who want to believe that kind of thing. Unlike the way in 
which eighteenth and nineteenth century hermeneutics abstracted meaning and 
factuality from the texts themselves, subjecting the text to the ‘fact question’ behind 
the text itself, here factuality arises at one with the narrative texts. Here history-
likeness and the question of historicity arrive together. As Frei makes clear in a 
recently published letter to Leander Keck, the resurrection narrative is a point at 
which history-likeness and the question of historical factuality cohere—most obviously 
in the fact that theologians and historians would agree that the resurrection is the kind 
of thing that could be falsified (by finding Jesus’ body) even if it cannot be reduced to 
factual truth.139 The narrative that Jesus is raised therefore dictates or encompasses 
the question of factuality, even though we do not know wholly what that means. In 
another letter, Frei says “what these stories refer to or how they refer remains a 
philosophical puzzle, but it has to be in a way congruent with their realistic, history-
like character.”140  Jesus as narrated in the gospels can only be thought of as factually 
resurrected.141  
 
Barth describes how Anselm’s ‘proof’ operates “in such a way that the object which it 
describes emerges as something completely independent of when men in actual fact 
conceive it or can conceive it”,142 and along the same logic, when asking ‘did the 
resurrection really happen?’ Frei emphasises that one can only dictate the negative (he 
is not not-raised) rather than the positive. “It is, rather, that, however impossible it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 Frei, Identity, 179; Anselm, Proslogion, 7–8. “Do I really need to point out the parallel between this 
procedure and Anselm’s argument in the Proslogion that God’s existence is necessarily implied in the 
proper definition of the concept ‘God’?” Hans W. Frei, ‘Historical Reference and the Gospels’, in Frei, 
Reading Faithfully, 97. 
139 Hans W. Frei, ‘Letter to Leander Keck, May 22, 1975’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 12. 
140 Hans W. Frei, ‘Letter to Gary Comstock, November 5, 1984, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 40. 
141 “Our argument is that to grasp what this identity, Jesus of Nazareth (which has been made directly 
accessible to us) is to believe that he has, in fact, been raised from the dead … He is the resurrection and 
the life. How can he be conceived as not resurrected?” Frei, Identity, 179. 
142 Barth, Anselm, 74. 
! 71 
may be to grasp the nature of the resurrection, it remains inconceivable that it should 
not have taken place.”143  
 
Frei clarifies this point even more in a response to C. F. H. Henry’s critique of his 
reference to truth, saying that whilst he was not denying the factuality of the 
resurrection, he remains unconvinced that a general category of ‘factuality’ can be 
used to speak of its ‘truth’ at all. 
 
If I am asked to use the language of factuality, then I would say, yes, in those 
terms, I have to speak of an empty tomb. In those terms I have to speak of a 
literal resurrection. But I think those terms are not privileged, theory-neutral, 
trans-cultural, an ingredient in the structure of the human mind and of reality 
always and everywhere for me, as I think they are for Dr. Henry. 144  
 
This is not because the resurrection is something other than factual (the “falsifiability” 
of it means that it is that at the very least)145 but because it is something more—
something in relation to which categorisation (in this case, under the term ‘factuality’) 
is inappropriate. To put it another way, if one were to think that by establishing the 
factuality of the resurrection according to categories of historical criticism and rational 
‘evidence’, one had therefore defined and proved it, then one would not be talking 
about the resurrection of Jesus. According to Anselm, God cannot be thought of as 
not existing; in Frei’s intention-action scheme of identity description, Jesus cannot be 
thought of as not raised.  
 
Frei has followed a rationale of exploring the gospel texts as history like texts that 
narrate the identity of Jesus of Nazareth, such that their meaning cannot be found in 
abstraction from him. Frei’s focus on historicity therefore yields anything but a 
domesticated Jesus, whose historical identity and activity remains within the 
boundaries of the enlightenment’s delimited rationality. Instead, the activity of Jesus 
as the one in whom the wholly other God is acting can only be described as regards 
historical particularity. Thus Frei’s work reflects that to which Anderson directs our 
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attention—that a proper account of Jesus’ transcendence directs us towards, not away 
from, history. 
 
iii) Transcendence, presence and the Spirit 
 
The risen Jesus transcends categories of historical criticism as history-like and as non-
mythical. A history-like description of Jesus forces statements beyond the explanatory 
powers of historical criticism or philosophical concepts (he is what God is doing; he is 
risen from the dead). By virtue of the coherence of Jesus’ historical activity with the 
activity of God, and the way the resurrection is the focal point of who Jesus is in the 
narratives, a reading of the passion-resurrection sequence that recognises the unity of 
narrative and meaning also recognises that precisely as historical, Jesus transcends. 
Christian ‘faith seeking understanding’ has no option but to articulate the 
transcendence of Jesus at the level of realistic narrative, his historical particularity 
being mysteriously coherent with the kind of divine activity in which Christians 
believe. As Frei later put it, “ordinary language and ordinary work or political or 
household experience is sufficient for the utterly odd, the disproportionate, the 
transcendent, the Kingdom of God, to be rendered verbally and proclaimed.”146 
 
The question of Jesus’ presence, which Frei determinedly subordinates at the outset of 
Identity, now becomes answerable in a specifically descriptive way, for Jesus’ identity as 
the risen one is what necessitates talk of his presence. In the same way that Jesus 
cannot be thought of as not-raised, he cannot be thought of as not-present. Precisely 
because he can only be thought of as the one “raised from the dead and manifest to be 
the redeemer”, says Frei, “he cannot not live. By virtue of his identity as the risen one, 
he ‘constrains’ the imagination to acknowledge him as present.”147  
 
Of course, this is not the way people are usually present to us. In a welcome step into 
pneumatology, Frei describes how Christians refer to the Holy Spirit to describe Jesus’ 
contemporaneous presence. Pentecost describes how, by virtue of the gift of the Holy 
Spirit, Jesus the risen one is present with his disciples as the presence of God.148 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
146 Frei, ‘Response’, 209. 
147 Frei, Identity, 182. 
148 Frei, Identity, 186. 
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Insofar as his presence is only meaningful as rendered in the realistic narratives about 
him, such contemporaneous presence by the Spirit, though different from a normal 
bodily presence in time and space, is nevertheless specific, not generalised, and in 
continuity with the history-like narratives.149 The Spirit also calls forth a response to 
the presence of Jesus, embodied in love and commitment to him and to one’s 
neighbor. Finally pneumatological language is employed to speak of the “public and 
communal form” of Christ’s presence through the church to the world, which is 
constituted by the Holy Spirit.150 
 
Nevertheless, this is anything but straightforward:  
 
In the New Testament, this indirectness both of Christ’s presence and of our 
grasp of it as mysterious, self-focussed presence is expressed in the stress … on 
that fact that Jesus had to withdraw from men before the Spirit would be 
bestowed on the community of believers.  Yet that bestowal, after this 
withdrawal, is nonetheless no other presence than that of Jesus Christ, a fact 
that believers find confirmed in the gifts of Word and Sacrament—the spatial 
and temporal bases of the presence of Jesus Christ.151 
 
Concerning the coherence between historicity and transcendence, Frei highlights that 
Jesus’ unsubstitutable presence by the Spirit is a presence experienced in 
‘indirectness’, both in terms of his absence, and of Word and Sacrament, themselves 
gifts and works of the Spirit.152 The narratives that culminate in the promise and the 
gift of the Holy Spirit do not envisage a sudden generalisation of Jesus’ identity, as if 
his name no longer refers to his specificity and particularity. Rather, it is precisely that 
specific identity that is given to the historical church, yet in such a way that stretches 
the ‘normal’ limits of spatio-temporal presence. In Frei’s theology, the transcendence 
of Jesus (his being divinely present beyond the limits of time and space) and the 
historicity of Jesus (his history-like identity) are viewed as one, ministered to Christians 
by the Spirit. The coherence of historicity and transcendence is not limited to 
reflections upon what is usually referred to as Jesus’ ‘earthly life’. It applies just as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Frei, Identity, 187. Elsewhere Frei writes, “In his eternal rule Jesus Christ maintains that solidarity 
with us that he established in the days of his flesh.” Hans W. Frei, ‘Of The Resurrection of Christ’, in 
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150 Frei, Identity, 188–189.  
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forcefully to all Christian relationship to him. Frei counters the domesticating aspect 
of modernist Christology—especially that of Culture Protestantism—in such a way 
that Jesus does not collapse into a universal ‘meaning’, but remains a particular 
transcendent person, even in the practice of figural reading. To counter the 
domestication of transcendence in terms of Christology, then, is to insist as forcefully 
as possible upon the historical particularity of Jesus as a crucial aspect of relationship 
to God in Christ by the Spirit.  
 
Frei’s introduction of pneumatology at this point (albeit an “abrupt” one)153 
strengthens his work considerably, but the extent to which the work of the Spirit is 
highlighted at this point casts into relief the extent to which the Spirit was not spoken 
of earlier. As Higton argues in an appendix to Christ, Providence and History, Frei does 
not collapse pneumatology into the discussion about the identity of Christ, but seeks to 
articulate how “Christian pneumatological claims … are indirectly supported and 
directly shaped by the Gospel’s depictions of Jesus’ identity.”154 Nevertheless, the lack 
of focus upon the Spirit as active from the incarnation through the whole ministry of 
Jesus is fairly ironic given Frei’s own explicit attention to Luke’s Gospel—itself rich in 
references to the Spirit’s activity from the conception of John the Baptist onwards.155 
Whilst the Pentecost narrative in Acts (of one authorship with Luke’s Gospel) 
describes a powerful new relationship with God the Holy Spirit, it should not be 
disconnected from the Luke’s narratives of the Spirit’s work from the conception of 
John and Jesus, and beyond. The one who is given at Pentecost—albeit in new 
relational terms—is the one whose activity characterises the way Luke tells the story of 
Jesus. Furthermore, as we shall consider again in the next chapter, the hermeneutical 
practice of figural reading requires a pneumatological dimension to account for the 
inspiration that Christians understand to be at play as they recognise, in their texts 
and in the ‘texts’ of their own lives, the pattern of God the Father revealed in 
Christ.156 
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A further irony is that Frei does not speak of the personal identity of the Spirit, despite 
having the conceptual tools with which to do so given his inquiry into the modes of 
identity description when it comes to Jesus in the Gospels. Eugene F. Rogers’ work 
fills in this gap by taking hold of Frei’s own methodology as regards Jesus’ identity and 
applying a similar mode of inquiry to pneumatology. Recognising a disconnect in 
Western theology between the Spirit and the historically particular—especially as far 
as body is concerned—Rogers proposes that attention be paid to “how the Spirit 
interacts with plot and circumstance in the Gospels”, and how the Spirit is specifically 
identified “in her interactions with Jesus”, specifically with Jesus’ body.157 
Emphasising the particularity of the Spirit in terms of her interactions with Jesus in 
the narrative does not make for Christomonism (i.e. a reduction of the 
pneumatological to the Christological) but rather emphasises Trinitarian 
indivisibility—i.e. that the Son and the Spirit act together.158  
 
Because the acts of the Trinity towards the world are indivisible, the only time 
one could distinguish the Spirit from the Son would be when the narratives 
give glimpses of their intratrinitarian interaction. That means that … the only 
interaction of the Spirit with plot and circumstance that could distinguish the 
Spirit from the Son, will be the Spirit’s interactions with the Son … 
Narratively, the Spirit is identified in her interactions with Jesus, and is so 
neither identical with him, nor apart from him: doctrinally, the Spirit alights, 
abides, or comes to rest on the Son.159 
 
It is important to highlight that the particular narratives about Jesus are often also 
pneumatological narratives. For one thing, it prevents talk of the Spirit being very 
much after-the-fact when it comes to the life of Jesus; and furthermore, it emphasises 
from within the narratives themselves that the ministry of the Holy Spirit to the 
church is indivisible from God’s work in Christ. Finally, following David Kelsey’s 
determination to put Frei’s work to use in a more explicitly Trinitarian context, this 
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kind of emphasis allows for a more openly articulated Trinitarian reflection grounded 
in the historical particularity of the Father’s sending of the Son and the Spirit.160 
 
Furthermore, if the work of the Spirit is not merely posterior to Christ’s activity, but is 
in union with God’s work in Christ, then the Spirit is also anterior to Christian faith in 
Jesus. This becomes apparent when we recognise that the Spirit is not only the one 
whose work Christians confess by virtue of their faith that Jesus is risen, but is also the 
one who makes for the initial faith that Jesus ‘cannot not be raised’. Frei states that 
Jesus can only be thought of as raised in the context of an already existent fides quaerens 
intellectum,161 and that already existent, already given faith is the work of the Holy Spirit 
who enables confession of the risen Jesus as Lord.162 The Spirit, as Loughlin puts it, is 
“the bringer of the Son to the people, and the bringer of the people to the Son.”163 
What in chapter 2 we called a ‘confessional context’ is therefore also a pneumatological 
context. This observation, derived from the shape of Frei’s own theology, helps to 
waylay any tendency to utterly subordinate pneumatology to Christology. Faith in the 
unsubstitutability of Jesus, and the presence of this Jesus with us now, are both the 
work of God the Holy Spirit. As we progress to a fuller articulation of the 
transcendence of Jesus, this emphasis will be important.  
 
 
IV 
 
Conclusion 
 
i) Summary 
 
The identity of Jesus is not “dissolved into our identity or presence”.164 Jesus as 
narrated in the gospel narratives remains the wholly other one, whose identity 
coincides with God’s, and thus even as the historical one remains the transcendent 
one who is present with us by the Spirit. Jesus “withdraw[s] from our grasp and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
160 Kelsey, Eccentric, vol 1., 442–446. 
161 Recall Barth’s notion of divine donare and illuminare. Barth, Anselm, 170–171. 
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turn[s] to us from his own presence”.165 Frei maintains Barth’s emphasis on the 
wholly-other-ness of God without implying epistemological monophysitism, and in 
doing so points towards how a Christology focussed upon Jesus’ particularity can give 
rise to a posture of humility based precisely on what it does proclaim—i.e. the identity 
of Jesus as the one who is crucified and risen. 
 
Two key building blocks in Frei’s contribution to an account of Jesus’ transcendence 
have now become clear. Firstly, he witnesses to a rationale for faith and history that 
refuses the category error outlined in Eclipse. As Higton explains, the “unprecedented 
and unparalleled” happenings at the heart of the Christian faith take place precisely as 
historical, for “what takes place in Jesus takes place in the world of contingency and 
complexity, of actions and interactions, of characters and circumstances”.166 God’s 
activity in Jesus Christ is historical, but it is “a miracle within history”, meaning that 
“history is freed from the intolerable burden of somehow being naturally the home of 
the absolute, and so is allowed to be itself again.”167 In losing its post-enlightenment 
status as guarantor of ‘factual truth’, history gains its status as the receptor of gracious 
divine activity. According to Frei’s logic then, that which is beyond the explanatory 
power of historical Wissenschaft, nevertheless has to be described in those historical 
terms, because those are the only terms fit for what is being described (Jesus as the one 
in whom God acts in and towards the world) even though those terms cannot contain 
what they describe.168  
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Secondly, Identity evidences how Jesus’ specific transcendence coheres with this 
approach to history as the locus of divine activity. The history-like unsubstitutability of 
the stories about Jesus are the way to speak of him as beyond us. As Schwartzentruber 
says, Frei’s formal schemes for identity description allow for the person of Jesus to 
disrupt the categories of historical enquiry, exhibiting a “hermeneutical modesty 
[that] is theologically substantive”.169 Frei’s schemes exhibit the “modesty of 
description rather than explanation”,170 and therefore witness to a theology of the 
transcendence of Jesus by their formal incapacity. In other words, the conceptual 
“scramble”171 that arises from the description of Jesus’ identity (e.g. that Jesus is the 
risen one) is to be understood as part of the theological point—that according to the 
meaningful descriptions of his particular history-likeness, Jesus transcends the world as 
the risen one. “The climax of the Gospel story is the full unity of the unsubstitutable 
individuality of Jesus with the presence of God.”172 
 
In summary, then, Frei’s response to the category error of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century hermeneutics yields a Christological rationale for the relationship between 
faith and history that in turn enables a positive assessment of what it means to say that 
Jesus is transcendent. Jesus’ transcendence is particular, for he transcends as the one 
who proceeds from the Father, who enacts the good of humanity on its behalf, is 
raised from the dead and is present to the church now, drawing that church into his 
likeness.  
 
Sonderegger is right, then, that Frei’s Christology is characterised by an “orthodox 
monophysitism”173—a determined emphasis on oneness as regards inner and outer, 
historical and transcendent. 
Here at last, in this one mysterious event, history and inwardness are one; 
exterior and interior are one; the Christ outside us and the Christ inside us are 
one: but one as Christ’s own unique possession. He holds and maintains his 
own identity—his Lordship—and turns toward us to endow us with his own !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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life. Out of two natures, one: but the One that simply is Jesus Christ, the living 
Lord.174 
In choosing the phrase “orthodox monophysitism”,175 Sonderegger highlights how 
Frei’s corrective of Barth does not emphasise the historicity of Jesus as a separate 
aspect of God’s revelation, but sees that historicity as given in and with the act of God 
towards the world in which God is wholly other. Through his tightly focussed critique 
of post-enlightenment hermeneutics, Frei’s negotiation of the question of faith and 
history by prioritising the narrative sense of scripture prevents an over-emphasis on 
the distinctness of the two natures of Christ, which though distinct can never be 
examined independently. 
 
Furthermore, the way in which Frei’s conceptually modest investigation yields such an 
orthodox point emphasises the concurrence of a particular Christology of the 
transcendence of Jesus with Christian modesty. To put it another way, particularity 
and doctrinal specificity in Christology make for conceptual humility. An account of 
the transcendence of Jesus therefore draws together elements of Frei’s work that make 
for his promise as a theologian who guides us in avoiding both the extremes of 
arrogance and banality. 
 
ii) Looking onwards: paying attention to the community 
 
Frei’s conclusion to Identity not only recognises a pneumatological but also an 
ecclesiological dimension, in that it is to the church that Jesus is present by the Spirit, 
and by the church the Lordship of Jesus is manifest to the world in a special way. Like 
Jesus himself, the church cannot be understood in a de-particularised vacuum, but is 
itself constituted “through the engagement of character and circumstance, and given 
in the narratives of that engagement.”176 Being a community with the Word and 
sacrament at its heart, the church structures its life according to the Biblical narratives 
(Word) that witness to the identification of Jesus with God; and according to the 
sacraments which are “the self-communication in physical form of one who is self-
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focussed to us who cannot know self-focussed presence except in physical form”.177 
The church is the context—the living community—in which faith that seeks 
understanding is grounded, articulated and developed, and therefore the locus of the 
anterior rationale for the kind of narrative reading that Frei proposes. The church, in 
short, is where this kind of reading makes sense. 
 
Furthermore, Frei recognises that the nature of the church’s confession of Jesus does 
not pan out into certainty as regards its future, or indeed the future completion of the 
world in Christ. The church’s own identity, as a “collective disciple” patterned after 
Jesus himself yet non-identical with him, is unfinished, and involves “an inevitable 
appeal to the undisclosed future”.178 Granted, the church understands its own 
identity, and indeed the progression of world history, figurally in relation to the 
identity of Christ, but this understanding operates as a “token and a pledge” of the 
summing up of all things in Christ, not as an “ideological clue to what must 
happen.”179 Figural reading as regards the church’s own identity in Christ, like 
narrative reading as regards Jesus’ identity, implies a posture of epistemological—and 
also political—humility.  
 
Frei articulated the centrality of the interpreting community in much greater detail in 
his later work, particularly focusing on the community’s role in shaping its own 
‘normative’ reading of scripture—i.e. the ‘literal’, realistic narrative approach and 
concomitant figural understanding. Therefore, the next chapter examines how Frei’s 
attention to the cultural-linguistic character of the church community, especially 
concerning scripture, continues to evidence the openness in his theology that makes 
for his promise as a theologian of Jesus’ transcendence. We will pay attention to how 
Frei’s understanding of the sociological nexus between believing community and text 
points to the way in which Christian theology employs philosophical and historical-
critical tools in an open-ended and revisable fashion, on account of its witness to 
divine activity within finite history. At the heart of that open-ended and revisable 
approach is what I shall refer to as the ‘hermeneutical normativity’ of the 
transcendent and particular person of Jesus. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter 4. 
 
HANS FREI: JESUS, TRANSCENDENCE, AND THE 
HERMENEUTICAL COMMUNITY 
 
Later in his career—particularly in two essays in the early 1980s—Frei articulated his 
insistence upon the unity of narrative and meaning within a more explicitly cultural-
linguistic, and consequently ecclesiological, account of Christian hermeneutics and 
theology. In doing so, he highlights that a ‘narrative reading’ of the Biblical text needs 
to be understood as the praxis of a faith community rather than an abstract theory. 
He therefore grounds a hermeneutical ‘normativity’ of the specific identity of Jesus in 
the complex, social and non-reducible praxis of the church, rather than in a theory of 
‘narrativity’ per se. In other words, the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus is understood to 
be the normative meaning of the narratives about him not only because of a property 
of the text, but also because of a complex coherence between the community’s 
confessional use of the narrative texts about Jesus, and the way those texts seem to 
lend themselves to such use. As a result, the historically particular identity of Jesus, 
which transcends the domesticating categories of post-enlightenment general theory, 
norms how Christians read the Bible and also how they understand their own lives—
this latter aspect being the practice of what Frei referred to in Eclipse as typological or 
figural reading.  
 
This chapter explains how Frei’s focus on hermeneutical praxis re-emphasises the 
particularity of Jesus over and against the generalising tendency of Culture 
Protestantism, and also points towards another dimension of historical particularity in 
the discussion of Jesus’ transcendence—i.e. the historically particular community in 
relation with Jesus now. In addition, taking cues from contemporary attention to the 
relationship between the apostles and scripture in Frei’s work, I will also draw on 
Richard Bauckham’s exploration of the gospels as testimony, and use that to 
supplement Frei’s content as regards the community from which scripture arises. As in 
chapter 3, I will also suggest that a reading of Frei’s work benefits from more explicit 
pneumatology, especially regarding the way the community is normed by Jesus Christ. 
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Finally, we look to Types of Christian Theology to see how Frei’s work gives us a vision of 
an abiding flexibility and conceptual humility in Christian theology, grounded not 
upon the priority of philosophical or historical-critical disciplines, but upon Jesus 
Christ who is both transcendent and particular. Again, Frei makes this observation via 
reflection upon how the particular hermeneutical praxis of the Christian community 
relates to and interacts with ‘external’ disciplines such as philosophy and historical 
criticism. Jesus’ particular transcendent identity ‘norms’ the way theology draws upon 
and utilises these other disciplines in an ad hoc fashion, for its own development and 
self-critique.  It becomes clear, therefore, that a conceptually humble Christian 
theology is the response to an orthodox account of, and relationship with, Jesus who is 
transcendent in his particularity. 
 
Recent scholarship argues that Frei’s later cultural-linguistic focus should not simply 
be construed as a novel or divergent aspect of his thought, as if a shift in perspective 
required him to jettison his earlier approach.1 Mike Higton uses structural imagery, 
suggesting that any development actually constitutes “more of a change to the 
scaffolding surrounding Frei’s Christological proposal than a change in its most 
important details”, insofar as Frei became more attentive to the social and 
ecclesiological factors that supported his argument for the centrality of a high 
Christology.2 Jason Springs, too, argues that Frei’s work should simply be interpreted 
as having a “developmental trajectory”, rather than a break.3 Frei’s later writings, 
argues Springs, build upon the central aspects of his earlier hermeneutical work, 
insofar as the later cultural-linguistic descriptions of Christianity’s approach to the 
relationship between text and meaning “presuppose” the “subject matter” of Identity—
i.e. “the unity of narrative form and Christological content of the gospel accounts of 
Christ’s death and resurrection.”4 Furthermore, Springs points out that the insights !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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explicit in Frei’s later Wittgensteinian methods are implicit in his deployment of Ryle’s 
model of the unity between inner and outer as regards character manifestation.5 I 
therefore read Frei’s attention to the cultural-linguistic and social-scientific dimensions 
of theology as a fleshing out of centrality of the transcendent Christ for Christian 
theology—i.e. the centrality of the salient Christological point drawn from Eclipse and 
Identity in the previous chapter. There is manifest development and ‘thickening’ in 
Frei’s later work, but as Fulford notes, the development of fresh categories of formal 
enquiry into how Christians practice their hermeneutics, should not obscure “the 
insight in whose service those categories are invoked, namely that the texts render the 
unsubstitutable identity of Jesus Christ as the one whose identity, uniquely, entails his 
presence.”6 The cultural-linguistic work, in other words, points back to the particular, 
transcendent figure of Jesus Christ, as described in Identity.  
 
I 
 
Community, Literal Sense and Transcendence 
 
Frei’s essay, ‘Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative’ (a revised form of an 
address given in 1982 at Haverford College, Pennsylvania, where he shared the 
platform with Paul Ricoeur)7 is a useful starting point for explaining how a description 
of the Christian use of scripture highlights the normativity of the narrated identity of 
Jesus Christ, based not upon a falsely reified theory of ‘narrativity’ per se, but 
“discerned in the actual interpretive practices of Christian communities over time.”8 
Frei suggests that such ‘interpretive practices’ of the church cohere with the priority of 
a ‘narrative’ reading of the Gospels, a reading he labels the sensus literalis of scripture, 
by which he wants to describe not only a theoretical hermeneutical option, but also 
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5 Springs, Toward, 46. See also Charles L. Campbell, Preaching Jesus: New Directions for Homiletics in Hans 
Frei’s Postliberal Theology (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 74. 
6 Fulford, Divine, 236. 
7 For Ricoeur’s paper, see Paul Ricoeur, ‘Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its 
Difficulties’, in Paul Ricoeur, Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1995), 236–248. 
8 Paul J. DeHart, The Trial of the Witnesses: The Rise and Decline of Postliberal Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006), 129. 
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the “sense of the text in its sociolinguistic context.”9 Following in particular 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis upon “the patterns of ordinary language use given within a 
social matrix”,10 Frei is unhappy to separate meaning from use, and therefore the 
Christology advocated in Identity comes to be elucidated also with reference to the 
social and cultural practice of the church. Granting Springs’ warning not to conceive 
of this essay as the point of departure for a break or shift in Frei’s thought,11 one can 
nevertheless read it for Frei’s explanation of why he wants to approach theology more 
deliberately in this way. Supplementing that reading with Frei’s observations in ‘The 
“Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative’ (1983) I will seek to articulate the relationship 
of the literal sense—the sensus literalis—of scripture to a theology of the transcendence 
of Jesus. 
 
Frei begins ‘Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative’ by describing two different 
ways of understanding what Christian theology is. On the one hand, theology can be 
understood as a conceptual discourse about God—drawing upon, and often founded 
upon, general categories of philosophical investigation. Although Frei describes it very 
broadly, this approach undoubtedly includes that which can be broadly characterised 
as the apologetic theology of Culture Protestantism, wherein the relationship between 
religious truth and human culture is investigated and explained via general theories of 
‘hermeneutics’, or the kind of historical Wissenschaft described in the previous 
chapter.12 On the other hand, theologians can recognise the inseparability of any kind 
of conceptual content from the specific embodiment and practice of the Christian 
faith community—the church as a “social organism”13—and thus understand 
theology as more of a cultural-linguistic task. Theology conceived in the latter sense—
focussed upon “the distinctive and irreducibly social functioning of Christian 
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9 Hans W. Frei, ‘Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative’, in Hans W. Frei, Theology and Narrative: 
Selected Essays, edited by George Hunsinger and William Placher (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 104. 
10 Nancey Murphy and Brad J. Kallenberg, ‘Anglo-American postmodernity’, in Kevin J. Vanhoozer 
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), 31. 
11 Springs, Toward, 42, n.5. 
12 Frei, ‘Theology’, 95, 101.  
13 Frei, ‘Theology’, 96. 
! 85 
language”14—concentrates less on abstract general theories, and rather on a 
description of concepts as they are embodied by the social organism, the church.15 
 
 This has important theoretical consequences, insofar as, 
 
Generalizing concepts like ‘meaning’ and ‘understanding’ … are analytical 
tools that likewise function in context dependent ways, parasitic on first-order 
language, and not as unitary, context-invariant universals describing either 
translinguistic essences of transsituational internal processes or events.16 
 
Frei suggests that if theology is more like a social-scientific enquiry than a conceptual 
philosophical investigation, the tools theologians employ are less likely to overtake that 
which is being described, precisely because what is occurring is a description rather 
than a definition. In Placher’s terms, theology conceived as a cultural-linguistic task 
resists domesticating its subject matter. Seen in broad perspective then, Frei’s sense of 
the formality of the theological enterprise therefore retains openness to God’s 
transcendence and to the particularity of Jesus and the Christian community. 
 
Frei then explores how an account of the meaning of scripture might take shape when 
approached like this. He asks how the church’s relationship to the text is embodied in 
its practice of reading, and writes of a “strong family relationship”17 between a 
cultural-linguistic understanding of what theology is, and an approach to 
hermeneutics that resists separating the meaning of scripture from the text itself.18 
There is a methodological fit, in other words, linking the relationship between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Frei, ‘Theology’, 101. 
15 Note Rogers: “Christians say that Christ’s body is the church—in which Christ subjects himself to 
sociological analysis. Any theology that rejects the social sciences is anti-incarnational; any theology 
that thinks they are evil by privation of good and nothing else forgets that by its own teaching what is 
assumable is redeemable.” Eugene F. Rogers, After the Spirit: A Constructive Pneumatology from Resources 
Outside the Modern West (London: SCM, 2006), 55. This need not imply that such sociological analysis 
wholly defines/confines the person of Christ; but rather that such analysis is meaningful in relation to 
him—that despite its incapacity, it enables meaningful discourse about God’s activity towards and in 
the church.  
16 Frei, ‘Theology’, 101. 
17 Frei, ‘Theology’, 102. 
18 “Theologians who approach scripture with the contextualist bent of interpretive social scientists 
rather than with a philosopher’s penchant for generalities are the ones most likely to read it in the 
traditional ways that Frei advocates.” Kathryn E. Tanner, ‘Theology and the plain sense’, in Garrett 
Green, Scriptural Authority and Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 59. 
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communal practice and meaning on one hand, and the relationship between narrative 
and meaning on the other.  Furthermore, historical particularity is preserved on both 
sides of this family relationship. The broad consensus toward the kind of narrative 
reading that preserves the unsubstitutable particularity of Jesus resides in the 
historically particular, acting community. Looking ‘inside’ the community (rather than 
away from it, to a general theory) for an understanding of the meaning of scripture for 
that community, coheres with looking ‘inside’ rather than behind or beyond the text 
for its meaning.  
 
Frei suggests that the dominant sense of scripture (i.e. the way it is read) especially in 
the pre-critical period, was the sensus literalis, or the literal sense. He describes three 
dimensions of this: firstly, that the text is understood as an enacted intention of the 
author; secondly, that the text is understood to manifest a union of sense and 
reference; and thirdly that the recognition of what is the literal sense of the text is 
inseparable from the community that reads it. The first two ways of describing the 
sensus literalis concern what Frei previously called ‘narrative reading’ of the gospels; the 
third makes explicit the unavoidable cultural-linguistic context of that kind of reading.  
 
Firstly then, as a reference to the text as enacted intention, the sensus literalis is 
understood along much the same lines as Frei’s insistence in Identity upon the unity 
between a person’s intention and their activity, insofar as the text is “an intelligibly 
enacted project, a unitary continuum rather than two separately intelligible acts, one 
mental, the other physical”.19 To read according to the sensus literalis is therefore to 
accept that one does not need to go behind the text to discover what the author 
intended to write, but that the text itself embodies the answer to that question. In the 
Christian tradition, of course, quite whose intention the text is enacting is a complex 
question, with the scriptures, for the most part, being understood as embodying some 
coherence between the intention of a human author and of God.20 This is not without 
complexity, therefore, but those further questions are to be asked under the 
assumption that as far as the community is concerned the text manifests the author’s 
intended meaning.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Frei, ‘Theology’, 102. 
20 Ibid. 
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Secondly, Frei uses sensus literalis to highlight the “descriptive fit” between the sense of 
a text (e.g. a description, a narrative) and its reference (e.g. that which is being 
described, narrated).21  Again, this continues the emphasis in Identity. To look behind 
or beyond the text for that to which it actually refers (which may or may not cohere 
with the author’s intention) is to transgress the sensus literalis. Here Frei points to 
something of quite a different order to Ricoeur’s thought, in which hermeneutics 
“passes through the detour of the text in the name of something beyond it … the 
‘matter of the text’”.22 Questions that are asked of the meaning of the text have to be 
asked of the text itself, for “[w]e have the reality only under the depiction and not in a 
language-neutral or language transcendent way.”23 Chapter 3 explained how this 
yields an emphasis upon the historical particularity of Jesus as the locus of the text’s 
meaning, and not an embodiment of something deeper—and here Frei similarly 
describes how, for the community of faith, Jesus’ Kingdom parables are “seen in the 
light of the story identifying Jesus of Nazareth rather than (reversely) providing the 
clue for the theme of that story.”24  As he puts it later on, “for the Christian 
interpretive tradition truth is what is written, not something separable and 
translinguistic that is written ‘about’”.25 Both the first and second aspects of the sensus 
literalis summarise those things to which Frei had drawn attention in Eclipse and 
Identity. 
 
Thirdly, Frei refers to the way the text “functions in the context of Christian life”.26 
Here the sensus literalis is explicated not with regard to a general theory, but in relation 
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21 Frei, ‘Theology’, 103. 
22 Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 4. In the paper 
Ricoeur gave prior to Frei’s, there are many points the latter would agree with—for example, the 
capability for a ‘narrative theology’ to present an alternative to “speculative … morally oriented … 
existential” theology, void of real reference to Jesus and Judaism, and “indifferent to the historical 
dimension” (Ricoeur, ‘Toward’, 236); the insistence upon the history-likeness of biblical narrative 
(Ricoeur, ‘Toward’, 244); and also Ricoeur’s sense that what a text means must be asked in the context 
of how it is used by the community of faith. However, Ricoeur’s ultimate orientation away from the 
‘inside’ of the text in his questions about meaning (Ricoeur, ‘Toward’, 240) constitutes a significant 
difference that Frei wants to call into question.  See Frei’s description of Ricoeur’s “distinction … 
between ‘what is written’ and ‘what it is written about’.” Hans W. Frei, ‘Conflicts in Interpretation’, in 
Frei, Theology and Narrative, 157. 
23 Frei, ‘Theology’, 103–104. 
24 Frei, ‘Theology’, 104. 
25 Frei, ‘Theology’, 108. 
26 Frei, ‘Theology’, 105. 
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to the community of faith in which this reading is practiced. The scripture and the 
community are inseparable in this case.  
 
“Finally, the sensus literalis is the way the text has generally been used in the 
community. It is the sense of the text in its sociolinguistic context—liturgical, 
pedagogical, polemical, and so on.”27 
 
Essentially, Frei is drawing attention to what chapter 2 called ‘confessional context’. In 
this case, the sensus literalis of the text is the sense of the text that ‘fits’ with the 
community—prioritising as it does ‘literal’ or ‘narrative’ reading in such a way that 
makes sense to the community of faith. Frei occasionally uses the phrase ‘plain sense’ 
as a substitute for sensus literalis, also to describe the idea that the question of texts’ 
meaning is wrapped up with the way the community reads the text: 
 
[A] specific set of texts, which happen to be narrative, has been assigned a 
literal reading as their primary or ‘plain’ sense. They have become the 
paradigm for the construal not only of what is inside that system but for all 
that is outside. They provide the interpretive pattern in terms of which all 
reality is experienced and read in this religion.28 
 
Prioritising a literal reading of the gospels (in which, as we saw in chapter 3, Jesus is 
understood to be the crucified and risen one who cannot be thought of as not-present) 
the community is thus in some way ‘normed’ by Jesus himself. The narratives at the 
heart of the community, which guide the way the community appropriates scripture 
itself, are narratives that imply the presence of Jesus Christ, whose identity is one with 
God’s. Loughlin summarises, “The scriptural text is used literally when the church 
seeks, in the circumstances of its time and place, to be conformed to the one whom 
scripture depicts.”29  
 
This practice of ‘Christological normativity’ therefore gives rise to Christological 
figural reading—reading the variety of literary forms in the New Testament in such a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Frei, ‘Theology’, 104. 
28 Hans W. Frei, ‘The “Literal Reading” of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition’: Does It 
Stretch or Will It Break?’, in Frei, Theology and Narrative, 148. In ‘Theology and the Interpretation of 
Narrative’, Frei also introduces the phrase “plain sense” to refer to the ‘function’ of the text “in the 
Christian life.” Frei, ‘Theology’, 105.  
29 Loughlin, Telling, 133. 
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way as they are focussed upon the narrative of Jesus—and also to figural reading of 
the Old Testament (its law and prophecy as well as its narrative). The fulfillment of 
the texts (in the various ways in which fulfillment can be understood) is agreed to be in 
Jesus Christ. A literal reading of Jesus’ story is “assigned primacy” over other non-
literal ways of reading other texts (parables, for example) meaning that the “unifying 
force and prescriptive character” of the story of Jesus resides at the heart of the 
hermeneutical practice of the Christian community.30  
 
As described in chapter 3, if scripture depicts “one cumulative story”31 that pertains to 
the world inhabited by the reading community and not just a ‘world’ contained 
between the covers of the Bible, the ‘unifying force’ of the identity of Jesus extends to 
the life of the community itself and its relation to all reality. Not only are Old and 
New Testament texts read as having their fulfillment—what we might call their 
wholeness—in the person of Jesus; but this is also true of how Christians and Christian 
communities understand and ‘read’, as it were, their own lives. In a narrative reading 
of the texts, Christian communities can recognise the centrality of Jesus, as narratively 
rendered in the Gospels, for their self-understanding.  Thus scripture is “taken up as 
interconstitutive of its users.”32 As Placher puts it, to accept that Jesus is the one who 
the texts say he is, is to “think through the Christian claims about the revelation of 
these texts to the Jesus to whom they witness … [and] … therefore to find oneself also 
thinking about their relation to one’s own life.”33 Frei, then, is offering a theological 
understanding of scripture that recognises how a community’s use of scripture allows 
the transcendent person of Christ, as witnessed to in scripture, to norm our 
understanding of ourselves and the world.  
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30 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 120–121. Lindbeck notes that this interpretive practice should serve to 
discredit simple supercessionism, insofar as “despite most later exegesis, the relation of Israel’s history to 
that of the church in the New Testament is not one of shadow to reality, or promise to fulfillment, or 
type to antitype. Rather, the kingdom already present in Christ alone is the antitype, and both Israel 
and the church are types.” George Lindbeck, ‘Critical exegesis and theological interpretation’, in 
Green, Scriptural Authority, 166.  
31 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 2. 
32 Loughlin, Telling, 113. 
33 William C. Placher, Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology and Scripture (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 1994), 96. 
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What Frei calls the “grammatical/syntactical sense” is therefore tied up with the focus 
upon “use-in-context”, 34 giving Frei a preferable alternative to any possibility that 
‘narrative theory’ per se might overtake the subject of the narratives—i.e. Jesus.35 Just 
as in Eclipse he resists subordinating the narratives to any general hermeneutical 
theory that divorces text and “reality referent”,36 here he is also aware that the use of 
a category like ‘realistic narrative’ can also fall into a similar trap of functioning like 
another general theory, where the text itself becomes subsumed under a theory about 
the coincidence between narrative and meaning. In such a case, the question of ‘truth’ 
is suspended, because the relation between text and meaning is merely internal, the 
narrative itself thereby limited by the concept of narrativity per se.37 The identity of 
Jesus to which the texts witness when read according to the sensus literalis, however, is 
truly beyond the community, thus mitigating such circularity. 
 
Although Frei resists the reduction of the meaning of the text to the ‘fact’ question, 
this does not mean he sidelines the nature of the truth of the narratives. As we saw, he 
believes that gospels, and in particular the resurrection narratives, force the question 
of historical ‘truth’. The point is, though, that the narratives are what force that 
question, rather than being forced to answer it, and by virtue of that order of things, 
their relation to truth is stronger than their being more theoretically subjected to a 
modernist conception of ‘fact’ as the defining category. It is the forcing of the truth 
question from within the strangeness and familiarity of the narrative that allows for 
the question of truth and historical reference to point to God’s transcendent activity 
towards the world in history. 
 
However, whilst Frei recognises that such a theory of narrativity would be less 
ambitious than general hermeneutical theory—insofar as it aims to articulate 
something about meaning rather than truth—there is still the possibility that “the less !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Frei, ‘Theology’, 110. 
35 “The plain sense of scripture is not a property of those texts that happen to function as scripture for 
the Christian community. One does not specify the meaning of the notion, therefore, by any 
philosophical discussion of hermeneutic circumstances or epistemological preconditions for the 
appropriation of texts in general … The plain sense is instead viewed as a function of communal use: it 
is the obvious or direct sense of the text according to a usus loquendi established by the community in 
question.” Tanner, ‘Theology’, 62–63. 
36 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 125.   
37 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 140.  
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high-powered general theory that upholds the literal or realistic reading of the Gospels 
may be just as perilously perched as its more majestic and pretentious hermeneutical 
cousin.”38 The scriptures, in other words, could be seen to mean literally because they 
fit under this category of narrative, and only as thus categorised do they relate to 
reality or truth. This again domesticates the identity at the heart of the Gospels, and 
makes the meaning of the gospels about the kind of text that they are, rather than the 
one to whom they witness. Cultural-linguistic description of the hermeneutical praxis 
of the Christian church, on the other hand, allows for the literal sense of a text to be 
described by terms like realistic narrative, but not defined under such terms.39  The 
concept of sensus literalis therefore holds up only as a description of a context-specific 
practice of discernment of how to read the text, and not as a de-particularised general 
theory.40 
 
We must also be aware, though, not to merely replace the concept of ‘narrativity’ with 
the concept of ‘community consensus’. Whilst ‘community consensus’ per se is context 
specific and at least to that extent not generalising, the idea on its own can imply the 
community’s control over the text—or the community’s uncritical subjection to a 
repressive function of a text—in a way that does not reflect how Christian praxis 
should look fundamentally to Jesus Christ, the Other who gives the community its 
identity by giving himself.41 Pointing to the practice of figural reading within this 
discussion of the plain sense, Tanner says that by virtue of its coherence around the 
narrative of God in human form, the specific Christian ‘plain sense’ is “open ended”, 
involving “the constructive process of continually reinitiating a Christian self-
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38 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 141. “There may or may not be a class called ‘realistic narrative’, but to take 
it as a general category of which the synoptic Gospel narratives and their partial second order 
redescription in the doctrine of the Incarnation are a dependent instance is first to put the cart before 
the horse and then cut the lines and claim that the vehicle is self-propelled.” Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 
142–143.  
39 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 144. 
40 Williams describes this ‘discernment’ helpfully: “[I]f the community finds its focus in this or that set 
of narratives and practices, finds that these articulate what the community holds itself answerable to, 
then what authoritatively matters in the text, and so in some sense organizes the text for a reader in this 
corporate context, is what grounds or explicates these identifying features.” Rowan Williams, ‘The 
Literal Sense of Scripture’, Modern Theology (7:2, 1991), 130. 
41 Concerning ‘repressive function’, Tanner speaks of the way in which the scripture could be 
understood to exercise a “repressive, hegemonic influence over the ongoing life of Christian 
communities, contemporary appeals to scripture being constricted through that influence into narrow 
channels of previous use.” Tanner, ‘Theology’, 72.  
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understanding by imaginatively repositioning the particulars of one’s own life within a 
story.”42 We can therefore explicitly point out that the particular story within which 
one ‘repositions’ one’s life is that of God’s transcendent activity towards the world in 
Christ, and that a truly theological account of scripture—here of the cultural-linguistic 
type—will recognise that the origin of the community’s consensus on the sensus literalis 
resides in the act of God. Only with this particular clarification can the concept of 
‘community consensus’ avoid overtaking the person of Jesus himself. 
 
Higton therefore comments that just as the literal sense of the text is not self-justifying, 
neither is the literal sense “the arbitrary decision of the Christian community, 
paradoxically exercising its right to do what it wants with these texts by handing itself 
over to them.”43 Rather, Christians,  
 
find themselves handed over to the text’s witness to and repetition of the Word 
of God spoken to us in Christ. The resilient depiction of the identity of Jesus 
Christ at the heart of scripture, and the figural echoes by which this heart can 
organise the rest of scripture and then the whole world … are the activity of 
God calling into being a people around this center.44  
 
The community that reads the texts literally is therefore constituted by an extrinsic—
i.e. outward looking—relation. As Frei says, the texts narrate the history-like “agent 
enacting the unity of human finitude and divine infinity, Jesus of Nazareth”,45 and 
therefore the activity of one beyond the community. This illuminates again the 
Anselmian character of Frei’s work, for the sensus literalis is essentially the praxis of a 
community of faith seeking understanding.  
 
Hauerwas argues that the role of worship/liturgy is underdeveloped in Frei, and 
therefore points out that “without the liturgy the text remains just that—text … before 
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42 Tanner, ‘Theology’, 74–75. 
43 Mike Higton, ‘Hans Frei’, in Justin S. Holcombe (ed.), Christian Theologies of Scripture: A Comparative 
Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 231. 
44 Higton, ‘Hans Frei’, 231. See also Frei, in a recently published lecture: “I still believe that I ought to 
leave open the possibility that a reading of the texts might actually and in principle influence modify, 
change these pre-conditions, rules, or what have you.” Hans W. Frei, ‘Historical Reference and the 
Gospels”, in Hans W. Frei, Reading Faithfully (vol. 1) Writings from the Archives: Theology and Hermeneutics, 
edited by Mike Higton and Mark Alan Bowald (Oregon: Cascade: 2015), 96. 
45 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 143. 
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the church had the New Testament it nonetheless worshipped and prayed to God in 
the name of Jesus of Nazareth.”46  Yet even supplementing Frei with Hauerwas’ focus 
on liturgical context, the nexus between text and the community of faith needs further 
explication not just in terms of a ‘fit’ between the reading and the worship of the 
community, but also in terms of the relation of both to two key particularities: the 
foundational apostolic community, and the person of the Holy Spirit. We turn, 
therefore, to these two. 
 
i) The apostolic community 
 
The transforming experiences of Jesus Christ within the original apostolic community 
of followers were foundational for their witness to and worship of him as God’s unique 
activity towards the world for its salvation. However, Frei’s work is comparatively thin 
when it comes to references to this community, and the addition of this emphasis is 
helpful, firstly because it serves to explore the nexus between community and text 
more deeply; and secondly because emphasis upon a particular community whose 
faith arose out of their experiences, highlights further the historically particular nature 
of God’s transcendent activity in Christ.  
 
The suggestion that Frei’s theology would benefit from more explicit treatment of the 
original apostolic community has been made elsewhere. David Demson identifies an 
omission in Frei’s earlier work as regards the role of the apostles in the narrative of 
Jesus, and suggests that as a result the particular way in which the community of the 
apostles and the church is part of the enacted identity of Jesus is lost.47 He proposes 
that Barth’s focus upon the call, gathering and upholding of the apostles functions as a 
corrective to Frei on this matter, especially as regards how we might understand a 
doctrine of the inspiration of scripture for the contemporary church.48 However, the 
fact that Demson does not address Frei’s later cultural-linguistic essays weakens his 
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46 Stanley Hauerwas, ‘The church as God’s new language’, in Green, Scriptural Authority, 196, n.11 
47 “Frei … concentrating on Jesus’ enacted identity in relation to God and on its manifestation by the 
act of God, but scarcely at all on Jesus’ enacted identity in relation to the apostles and the confirmation 
of that identity by the act of God, leaves out of [sic] account the apostles’ identity—and ours, too, as 
participant in the apostles’ identity.” David Demson, Hans Frei and Karl Barth: Different Ways of Reading 
Scripture (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1997), 95. 
48 Demson, Hans Frei, 109. 
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assessment of how Frei understands the nexus between community and text.49 For his 
part, Jason Springs also recognises that any kind of hermeneutical ‘rule’ in the 
Christian community was not “simply the result of the accruing consensus in that 
community. The rule derived its authority from the truth of the apostolic witness which 
accorded with the claims of Scripture.”50  
 
Below, I suggest that Richard Bauckham’s work in Jesus and the Eyewitnesses (2006) can 
effectively supplement Frei’s account of the fit between scripture and the community, 
pointing as it does to the category of testimony as a broad description of the bulk of 
the gospel texts, and doing so with the kind of epistemological nuance that chimes 
with the way Frei thinks about history—i.e. articulating the historiographical 
credibility of testimony whilst resisting the domination of post-enlightenment 
historical criticism. Bauckham accounts for the role of those who testify in and to the 
original community, and recognises that the texts—which emerge from the 
engagement of the authors with the testimony of the witnesses—need to be read in a 
way that takes into account the utter uniqueness of the events to which they testify.  
 
Bauckham argues that the gospels emerge from communities shaped by the testimony 
of individual eyewitnesses to Jesus’ ministry—those individual identities therefore 
being crucial within the gospel tradition. He suggests that questions about the 
historiographical character of the gospel narratives should therefore be concerned 
with their connection to eyewitness testimony, and that understanding the texts as 
rooted in testimony to extraordinary events is theologically preferable compared to 
the reductionist tendencies of the historical-critical methods typical of late modernity, 
which tried to argue for the verification of the narratives according to universal 
reason. There is a fundamental dissimilarity between the modernist critical focus upon 
repeatable individual verification, and the way testimonies ask for the trust of the 
reader/hearer. 
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49 It is for this reason that I have elected to explore this issue in this chapter rather than the previous 
one. If one makes suggestions about supplementing Frei’s implications as regards the identity of Jesus 
and its impact upon the church, it makes sense to take into account Frei’s later elucidations of what I 
have called Christological normativity, even if those too are lacking a focus on the original apostles and 
the Holy Spirit (see below). 
50 Springs, Toward, 152. My italics. 
! 95 
This need not mean that [testimony] asks to be trusted uncritically, but it does 
mean that testimony should not be treated as credible only to the extent that it 
can be independently verified … Trusting testimony is not an irrational act of 
faith that leaves critical rationality aside; it is, on the contrary the rationally 
appropriate way of responding to authentic testimony.51 
 
To accept testimony as historiographically and theologically appropriate, therefore, is 
to call modern historical critical assumptions into question. Two key features of 
testimony highlight this. Firstly, testimony requires that we accept the 
social/communal nature of ‘knowledge’ as just as fundamental to human 
epistemology as the notion of an individual knowing things autonomously. Accepting 
testimonies as historiographically meaningful shines a critical light on a Cartesian 
reduction to autonomous, purely individualistic epistemology, appealing instead to the 
“communal or inter-subjective” aspect of knowledge. Bauckham suggests that 
“epistemic trust is the basic matrix within which the individual can acquire and 
exercise what Coady calls ‘a robust degree of cognitive autonomy’”.52 He therefore 
asks for a degree of trust in the gospel narratives that is afforded to other sources and 
witnesses in life in general. Just because one cannot individually ‘verify’ that which is 
testified in the Gospels does not mean one cannot accept them as historical sources to 
be trusted as they ask to be. 
 
In Frei’s terms, Bauckham accepts the text as a fit enactment of the author’s intention. 
Although historians can enquire of things that yield information ‘in spite of 
themselves’ (i.e. not intending to be a record of something per se but functioning as one 
nonetheless—like archeological discoveries, for example) in the case of the Gospels we 
can understand ourselves to be “reading the explicit testimonies of the past for the 
sake of what they were intended to recount and reveal”.53 Furthermore, there is no 
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51 Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans, 2006), 5.  
52 Bauckham, Jesus, 477. Quote from C. A. J. Coady, Testimony (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 99–100. See 
also Stanley Hauerwas: “[E]ach speaker of a particular linguistic community is connected through the 
members of that community, living and dead, to a range of experience exceeding the speakers’ own.” 
Hauerwas, ‘The church’, 192. 
53 Bauckham, Jesus, 483. My italics. 
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possibility of going behind those testimonies to an isolated ‘fact’ that we can approach 
in abstraction from the testimony itself.54 
 
Secondly, Bauckham argues that testimony is theologically appropriate, because of the 
way it gives room for the exceptionality of the events testified to. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, an historical-critical approach guided purely by what we can 
imagine or most likely expect to have happened, given what we know about the 
historical world, places a limit upon the interpretation of the texts, reducing their 
meaning to the question of factuality or likelihood. Testimony, however, counters a 
tendency to trust only our own experiences and reduce the text to fit our own 
epistemological framework. 
 
[W]ithout the participant witness that confronts us with the sheer otherness of 
the event, we will reduce it of the measure of our own experience. In such 
cases, insider testimony may puzzle us or provoke disbelief, but, for the sake of 
maintaining the quest for truth of history, we must allow the testimony to resist 
the limiting pressure of our own experiences and expectations.55  
 
Testimony, in short, is one way in which we can come up against ‘otherness’ in 
history, in such a way that modernist reductionism simply does not allow.  
 
To support this argument, Bauckham draws on another form of testimony to an 
exceptional event—holocaust testimony—which, he suggests, parallels the gospels in 
the sense of being an event “at the limits”, or possessing a “unique uniqueness” (both 
phrases are Ricoeur’s).56 Like the gospels, holocaust testimony discloses something 
exceptional that we would not perceive, or be forced to come to terms with, apart 
from the testimony itself. Furthermore, like the evangelists, the holocaust eyewitnesses 
also embody an imperative to communicate what they witnessed.57  
 
Bauckham cites two specific cases wherein holocaust eyewitnesses communicate their 
testimony via “different narrative ways of conveying without distorting the truth they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 “[W]e cannot establish the truth of the testimony for ourselves as though we stood where the 
witnesses uniquely stood.” Bauckham, Jesus, 505. 
55 Bauckham, Jesus, 492. 
56 Bauckham, Jesus, 492–493. 
57 Bauckham, Jesus, 499–501. 
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witnessed.”58 Briefly, one example works apophatically by describing the eyewitness’ 
glimpse of the ‘normal’ world outside of Auschwitz in contrast to the distortion of 
reality in which she lives; the other develops its power through the witness’ 
intertextual reflection upon a phrase by Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karazmov—‘everything is 
permitted’—in relation to the horrifying burning alive of children and babies.59 The 
narrative form of each of these testimonies, in which skills are employed to 
communicate a truth quite beyond our normal set of experiences, makes for the 
testimony’s effectiveness. Despite the manifest and manifold differences between 
holocaust eyewitness testimony and eyewitness testimony to Jesus, Bauckham suggests 
they possess commonality in “their exceptionality and the role of testimony in 
conveying this, insofar as it can be conveyed”.60  
 
Bauckham therefore argues that the historiographical credibility afforded holocaust 
testimonies should be afforded the gospels too, on the grounds of their possessing this 
similarity in witnessing to utterly exceptional events. Like Frei, he wants to “beware of 
a historical methodology that prejudices inquiry against exceptionality in history and 
is biased toward the leveling down of the extraordinary to the ordinary”, and also 
wants to resist turning historical uniqueness into an analytical category which itself 
overtakes the particularity of the events themselves—events which possess 
commonality insofar as they “resist all reduction to ‘business as usual’ in history”.61 In 
other words, the category of ‘historicity’ is shaped by the narratives themselves, rather 
than a pre-ordained concept according to normal experience or factuality. 
 
Bauckham’s work is a useful supplement to Frei’s cultural-linguistic analysis of the 
sensus literalis. Where there may be a temptation for Frei’s interpreters to infer a 
circular relationship between text and community, the category of testimony accounts 
for the communal and inter-subjective nature of epistemology (thus remaining within 
a cultural-linguistic framework) and also connects the text itself with an original 
community who were present to, and drawn into, a formative set of events. Using the 
word ‘testimony’ reminds us of the texts’ inseparability not only from the community !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Bauckham, Jesus, 499. 
59 Bauckham, Jesus, 493–499. Re. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karazmov, trans. David Margarshack 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 77. 
60 Bauckham, Jesus, 499. 
61 Bauckham, Jesus, 506. 
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that reads them, but also from the community of witnesses out of whose experience 
and compulsion to testify they arise. Furthermore, the trust placed in testimony by the 
hearers and readers is a practice rather than a theory, and therefore coheres with 
Frei’s desire to describe a Christian theology of scripture in cultural-linguistic terms 
rather than general theory. 
 
There are, however, two points requiring careful nuance when introducing 
Bauckham’s term. Firstly, not all history-likeness in the gospels can be labelled 
‘testimony’. Bauckham himself suggests that the narrative sequence grounded upon 
eyewitness testimony—similar in all four Gospels—runs broadly from the narrative of 
John the Baptist to the resurrection appearances, thus not including, for example, the 
infancy prologues of Matthew and Luke, nor the cosmic prologue of John.62 He calls 
Luke’s infancy narratives, “a preliminary account of events that would give his main 
story an appropriate background and context”,63 even though in Frei’s terms they 
remain broadly ‘history-like’. This does not render the category of testimony un-
useful, but it pays to clarify that what is important for this argument is the emphasis 
upon the inseparability of the text from an original community who were “telling 
stories of significance.”64 The exact relation of every portion of the text—including 
evidently history-like portions—to eyewitnesses is not what is at stake here, but it pays 
to recognise that there are sections that seem to fall between the gaps. For example, 
although the temptation narratives belong in the sequence that Bauckham connects 
with eyewitness testimony (from John the Baptist to the resurrection), they narrate 
Jesus on his own without anyone to witness, and also push hard at the limits of history-
likeness (in narrating the appearance of the devil). I therefore draw on Bauckham’s 
category in a broad sense, recognising the need for clarification on how some texts fit 
into his scheme, but also recognising that this is peripheral to this particular argument. 
 
Secondly however, when it comes to Bauckham’s analysis of exceptionality, he comes 
close to another equivocation. Whilst he does indeed recognise the “vastly different”65 
character of gospel and holocaust testimonies, his point relies to a certain extent on 
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62 Bauckham, Jesus, 114. 
63 Bauckham, Jesus, 122. 
64 Bauckham, Jesus, 472. 
65 Bauckham, Jesus, 499. 
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the use of ‘exceptionality’ as a general category. Although the word exceptionality 
makes sense in each individual case, the holocaust witnesses testify to the exceptional 
horror of systematic de-humanisation and extermination, and the gospels to the 
exceptional saving activity of God in Christ. Their exceptionality is of a different 
kind—the first being an exceptionality of human evil and the second of God’s 
transcendent activity in history. A careless reading of Bauckham’s point, therefore, 
risks unhelpful equivocation. To conflate the exceptionality of both these events is to 
risk an unfruitful comparison between the two—to either speak of the holocaust as 
somehow not quite as exceptional as Jesus, or perhaps even to speak of the 
incarnation as not quite as wholly ‘historical’ as the holocaust. ‘Historiography’ is 
doing a different thing when narrating the exceptional activity of the transcendent God 
in history as it is when narrating the exceptional activity of the Nazis in the 1930s–
1940s. Bauckham’s comparison with holocaust testimony is meaningful insofar as it 
highlights the need for testimony to point beyond what can easily be imagined, but it 
does not serve to demonstrate the same kind of trust regarding an exceptional event as 
the kind of trust, or faith, that Christian readers develop in relation to their reading of 
the Gospels.  
 
Paul Janz (following Donald MacKinnon) gets closer to the nub of the matter, when 
he describes how thinking about how our relation to tragedies such as the holocaust 
can help us think about how we describe and relate to God’s transcendent activity, but 
only insofar as there is a similarity in how the reference itself operates in each case. 
Something about the epistemological finality of the tragedy of the holocaust—i.e. the 
way “any attempt to account for this evil … utterly breaks apart and shatters against 
the actual, individual and collective, tangible experiences of ineluctable human 
demise”66—means that the way we talk about it bears an incomplete but nonetheless 
meaningful relation to the reality. In a similar way, Janz suggests, we can make 
meaningful reference to the transcendent activity of God, despite the finality it 
constitutes for rationality. He highlights, more forcefully than Bauckham, that “[i]t is 
not as if tragedy and transcendence are ‘similar’, or as if the former becomes a model 
of some sort for the latter”.67  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 21. 
67 Janz, God, 22.  
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Frei retains the same kind of metaphysical differentiation that Janz hints at here, 
noting that what Janz calls the finality of the incarnation has its exceptionality in its 
being beyond metaphysical normality, and thus any ‘normal’ level of factuality per se. 
 
Is Jesus Christ … a ‘fact’ like other historical facts? Should I really say that the 
eternal Word made flesh, that is, made fact indeed, is a fact like any other? I 
can talk about Jesus in that way, but can I talk about the eternal Word made 
flesh that way?68 
 
Frei, I think, would have to say that whilst it is quite true that both incarnation and 
holocaust stretch our conception of what we can imagine to be possible, they do so in 
different manners. Thus, if we take on Bauckham’s proposal regarding the gospels as 
testimony—as indeed I suggest we should—we must nevertheless allow, as Frei does, 
for a kind of metaphysical nuance to shape the way Bauckham describes 
exceptionality.  
 
Taking this caution into account though, Bauckham’s work can be used to suggest 
something like this: Understanding the gospels as testimony retains focus upon the 
practice (not theory) of trust and faith in the Christian community, whilst also 
explicitly connecting that reading community with the community from which the 
texts originated, and with the historically particular experience of individuals. The 
normativity of the text for the Christian community therefore derives from its 
relationship to the historically particular experience of the apostolic community of 
testimony. Testimony is trusted not on the basis of an individualistic model of 
epistemology, but by the common practice of epistemic trust in knowledge as 
communal. The particularity of the testimony therefore takes priority over a post-
enlightenment theory of knowledge, and the practice of trust in particular testimony 
takes priority over a theory. On that basis, testimony can refer meaningfully to that 
which is beyond our normal comprehension of the world, and holocaust testimony is 
an example of one kind of ‘stretching’ that belief in testimony entails. The activity of 
God in Jesus Christ and the holocaust each possess exceptionality in a different way, 
so whilst trust/faith in God’s transcendent work in history calls for a different kind of 
‘stretching’ than is required of us when reading or hearing the terrifying holocaust !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 Hans W. Frei, ‘Response to “Narrative Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal”, in Frei, Theology and 
Narrative, 211. 
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testimonies, testimony remains a meaningful way of describing both—and therefore, 
in this case, of the way in which Christians’ interaction with the gospel texts relates to 
the original apostolic community.  
 
ii) The Holy Spirit  
 
In Eclipse Frei had described Calvin’s doctrine of the role of the Holy Spirit in the 
interpretation of scripture—highlighting in particular the cohesion of the Spirit’s 
testimony with the ‘meaning’ of the text, and therefore the role the Spirit was 
understood to play in the way the text ‘means’ for the community.69 However, not 
only does this emphasis fade towards the mid-portion of Eclipse, but more importantly 
this notion of the Spirit as somehow active in ‘literal’ hermeneutics is not explicated in 
Frei’s later essays. Chapter 3 noted the pneumatological reflection towards the end of 
Identity—concerning the connection between Jesus, the Spirit and the community—
but again, this is not carried through with any weight into Frei’s later essays. If 
emphasis upon the particularity of the original apostolic testimony is crucial to the 
nexus between the community and scripture, then the particular work of the Holy 
Spirit should also be emphasised in that same nexus. Reminding ourselves of Rogers’ 
emphasis upon the particular identity of the Spirit identified in interaction with the 
Son (see chapter 3) we recognise that the apostolic community of witness is also the 
community of Pentecost, insofar as their witness is enabled by God’s activity: “All of 
them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other languages, as the 
Spirit gave them ability.”70   
 
The original community, and the community which subsequently reads the text 
according to the normative identity of Jesus Christ, is the recipient of God’s generous 
gift of Godself in the Spirit. Frei himself does state that “[t]he primacy of the sensus 
literalis is in effect an assertion of the fitness and congruence of the ‘letter’ to be the 
channel of the spirit”,71 pointing to the fact that that scripture’s history-like depiction !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Frei, Eclipse, 22–23. 
70 Acts 2:4. On the union of the Spirit’s activity with Christ’s activity in the Pentecost narrative, 
consider how the gift of the Spirit is the fulfillment of Jesus’ promise of the baptism with the Spirit (Acts 
1:5) for the purpose of being his witnesses in the power of the Spirit (Acts 1:8), this coming after he has 
instructed them through the Spirit (Acts 1:2). 
71 Frei, ‘Theology’, 108. My italics. 
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of Jesus Christ is “sufficient” for orienting Christians within the “real world” of God’s 
activity.72 Nevertheless emphasis upon the active, generous person of the Holy Spirit in 
the reading community is thin to say the least, but is required for a full account of the 
inspiration of scripture.73 Nathan Hershberger recognises that Frei’s theology of 
scripture does indeed imply that “it is not with a particular style of reading … or the 
inculcation of a ‘biblical worldview’—that Christ will be made present to us, but 
rather through the action of God in Christ by the Spirit” and that it is therefore by the 
Spirit that “the efficacy of Scripture is finally in God’s hands, not ours”;74 but there 
still remains the need to highlight the nexus between the Holy Spirit, active in the life 
of Jesus and of the first apostolic community, and the contemporary reading 
community. Unless that fourfold relation—Spirit, apostles, text, community—is 
properly recognised, there will always be a weak link in the concept of the 
hermeneutical normativity of Jesus Christ. This is not to say that the texts possess no 
meaning or power in and of themselves, but it is to say that a theologically dynamic 
approach to the way the identity of Christ exerts pressure on the reading community 
requires an account of historical witness that includes a pneumatological, and 
therefore Trinitarian, dimension. Lamb’s constructive proposal in his recent survey of 
theologies of scripture encapsulates what is required here, highlighting how 
“[p]articipation in the triune life of God provides the proper context for consideration 
of the inspiration of scripture”.75 Thus the community’s reading of scripture is 
connected not just with a kind of religious cogency, but also with a genuinely outward 
looking hopefulness towards sanctification and salvation. 
 
[W]hen we encounter the divine mystery, we may find that we are 
overwhelmed and transformed by the holiness of God (Isa. 6.1–13). It is in this 
sense that Christians can speak of Holy Scripture.76  
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72 Frei, ‘Literal Reading’, 143. 
73 Loughlin, Telling, 114. 
74 Nathan Hershberger, ‘Patience as Hermeneutical Practice: Christ, church, and Scripture in John 
Howard Yoder and Hans Frei’, Modern Theology (31: 2015), 563. 
75 William Lamb, Scripture: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p.149. David Kelsey, 
too, emphasises that the Spirit, “sent by the Father with the Son … is present as the always-already-
there context of the lives of personal bodies who are members of such communities, precisely in, 
through, and under the communities’ enactments of such practices.” David H. Kelsey, Eccentric 
Existence: A Theological Anthropology, vol 1., (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 443–445.  
76 Lamb, Scripture, 150. 
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Overall, the cultural-linguistic form of investigation into the sensus literalis of 
scripture—especially when supplemented with Bauckham’s approach to testimony, 
and a recognition of the particular work of the person of the Spirit—enables Frei to 
propose the centrality of a literal reading of the narrative, and therefore the centrality 
of the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus, not on the basis of a general theory of 
narrativity per se, but on the basis of a description of the community of faith. Jesus, the 
crucified and risen One who is present by the Holy Spirit, is the one whose identity 
norms the community’s practice, and in whose likeness the community is fashioned. 
Jesus is therefore the one who transcends the church not just by being beyond or 
distant but also by exerting what Springs calls “constraints”77 upon the church’s 
activity, in the complex nexus between Spirit, apostles, community and text, whereby 
the community that worships Jesus Christ as God recognises his continual activity 
towards them by the work of God the Holy Spirit, and postures itself humbly in 
relation to that activity.78 At the heart of the theologically dense cultural-linguistic 
hermeneutic derived from Frei’s later work, we therefore encounter again the 
inseparability of the historical particularity of Jesus from his being the one who is 
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77 Springs, Toward, 154. 
78 In an article in 2001, Ray Anderson articulates how a community might practice this kind of 
Christological normativity, by asking not just what a particular scriptural passage might say about an 
issue when viewed in abstraction, but how it might be understood in the light of the work of Christ, by 
the Holy Spirit, in the community’s midst—in this case, the bestowal of gifts for apostolic/pastoral 
ministry upon women and men in equal weight. Ray S. Anderson, ‘The Resurrection of Jesus as 
Hermeneutical Criterion’, in Anderson, The Shape of Practical Theology: Empowering Ministry with Theological 
Praxis (Illinois: IVP Academic, 2001), 98–99. Suggesting that the resurrection of Jesus is the 
‘hermeneutical criterion’ for the church, Anderson highlights that the living person of Jesus is the 
church’s norm, because—as Frei articulated in detail in Identity—the resurrection as an event implies 
the presence of the risen one. The “presence and authority” of the risen Christ norms hermeneutics 
insofar as the person of Jesus himself, by the Holy Spirit, continues to teach and instruct the church—
the task of hermeneutics being to discern the substance of that teaching in relation to the scriptures. 
Anderson, ‘Resurrection’, 84. Consequently, the scriptures are spoken about as ‘the Word of God’ 
insofar as they “bind the interpreters of scripture to Jesus Christ as the living Lord”. Anderson, 
‘Resurrection’, 86. The notion of scriptural authority is subjugated to the authority of Jesus himself, 
with Anderson, like Frei, rejecting any kind universally ‘religious’ criterion for interpretation of 
scripture, and resisting the danger of ‘shifting’ the hermeneutical criteria “from the Word of God itself 
to a hermeneutical principle that controls the exegetical task”. Anderson, ‘Resurrection’, 88, 96. 
Sometimes, the normativity of the person of Jesus, who is understood to be active towards the church, 
requires a re-evaluation of the church’s reading of the scriptures themselves. In Frei’s language, the 
sensus literalis of the texts places a “high Christology” at the heart of the church’s self-understanding. See, 
e.g. Hans W. Frei, ‘On Interpreting the Christian Story’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 82. See also 
Hauerwas, “The church must always remain open to revision since the subject of its narrative is easily 
domesticated.” Hauerwas, ‘The church’, 193. 
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God’s transcendent act in the world, and in whose identity the world, and those who 
live in, it find their fulfillment.79  
 
iii) Summary 
 
Frei’s later work maintains the coherence of Jesus’ historical particularity with his 
transcendence. That this coherence resides in the cultural-linguistic practice of the 
church is itself an historically particular state of affairs open to transcendence—i.e. 
geared towards the One who is beyond the community. Understood theologically, the 
cultural-linguistic state of affairs is the work of the Holy Spirit at the level of real 
practicing community—it never collapses into de-particularisation but remains a 
communal event as the church continually seeks to let itself be shaped into the likeness 
of Christ by the Spirit. The church’s own life, then, is not just based upon a unity of 
particularity and transcendence, but is that in itself too. It makes sense only as the 
work of God in and towards the community—work that therefore cannot be 
articulated in abstraction from that community.80  
 
The most important aspects of Hans Frei’s theology for this thesis have now been laid 
out. Running through his work is the connection between Jesus’ historical 
particularity and his transcendence, with the recognition that such transcendence-in-
particularity informs both the definiteness and the humility of the Christian 
community. We have seen how Frei looks in detail at the role of the scriptures and the 
community’s use of them, and in doing so pinpoints the way Christian theology 
remains conceptually open/humble when it understands its hermeneutical practice as 
normed by Jesus Christ narrated in scripture, rather than hermeneutical categories 
norming its Christology.  
 
To fully appreciate the importance scholars attach to Frei as a theologian of a ‘middle 
way’, though, we need to look briefly at Types of Christian Theology, wherein the 
concepts of humility, flexibility and open-endedness are more explicitly laid out. Once !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 Colossians 1:15–20. 
80 “Whatever it was that the church meant to say, whatever was revealed or manifested to it could be 
indicated only in connection with an historical person and events in the life of his community. The 
confession referred to history and was consciously made in history.” H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning 
of Revelation (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 23. 
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more, the way Frei brings these qualities to the surface is related to the person of 
Jesus, whose transcendence is best articulated at the level of historical particularity.   
 
II 
 
Christological Transcendence and Theological Flexibility 
 
i) Types of Christian Theology 
 
Types of Christian Theology (1992) is a posthumously published collection of essays on 
theological typology that Frei intended to develop into a history of modern 
Christology.81 Just as ‘Theology and the Interpretation of Narrative’ explores two 
different ways of considering what theology is, Types explores five “attitudes” to how 
theology is understood—in particular whether its most natural “affiliate” is philosophy 
(as a general “criteria of intelligibility” under which theology establishes is 
meaningfulness) or the descriptive social sciences.82 Mapping the various ways in 
which Christian theology can be understood, in Types Frei asks, “what kind of 
theology is most nearly hospitable to the literal sense of scripture?”83  
 
Frei lays out a fivefold typology concerning the relation of theology to external 
disciplines—from theology totally subjugated to external philosophical/historical-
critical criteria at one end of the spectrum (Type 1) to theology operating totally 
independently from, and essentially inaccessible and un-relatable to such external 
categories of understanding (Type 5). In between these two extremes he describes 
varying degrees to which this relationship between internal self-description and 
external critical disciplines can be nuanced (Types 2–4).  Frei himself suggests that the 
kind of theology most ‘hospitable’ to the sensus literalis (on the whole, Type 4) 
understands its relation to external disciplines as operating in an ad hoc manner, 
guided or normed by the way the community affords priority to the identity of Jesus 
Christ, as narrated in the gospels. Thus that which can be described cultural-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 See David Kelsey, George Lindbeck and Gene Outka, ‘Forward’, in Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian 
Theology, edited by George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (Yale: Yale University Press, 1992), vii. 
82 Frei, Types, 2. 
83 Frei, Types, 18. My italics. Frei outlines the sensus literalis in the same way here as he does in ‘Theology 
and the Interpretation of Narrative’. Frei, Types, 15–16.  
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linguistically takes flexible priority over the general philosophical “criteria of 
intelligibility”.84 This means that philosophical, historical or social-scientific categories 
are employed to describe and examine the faith of the church, rather than the faith being 
categorically subjected to those disciplines as if they were more fundamental 
categories for meaning.  
 
Theology therefore possesses an abiding flexibility and revisability, grounded on this 
asymmetrical relationship between Christian ‘self-description’ (an internal 
confessional context) and external academic disciples such as philosophy. This 
asymmetry is itself rooted in the priority of the sensus literalis of scripture, which means 
it is grounded on the normative identity of Jesus for the community.85 Theologians 
can recognise that external disciplines may be of help, but also that theology is not 
about a total ‘grasp’ of their own belief according to general categories of universal 
reason, but about describing their commitment in faith to witness to Jesus Christ in 
the power of the Spirit.86 This functions as an effective summary of how a theology of 
the transcendence of Jesus—especially manifest in the sensus literalis of scripture—plays 
a vital role in grounding the simultaneously robust and yet also humble character of 
Frei’s theology.87 
 
It is generally accepted that Frei’s preferred ‘type’ of theology is the fourth, but also 
that the third type manifests significantly important characteristics that cannot be 
discarded. Type 3 aims for an equal correlation between philosophy and theology, 
with Schleiermacher as its main example. Schleiermacher, says Frei, avoids a totally 
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84 Frei, Types, 2. 
85 “General categories, like descriptive generalizations of any kind with regard to revelation, 
incarnation, and redemption are subordinated to, contained in, governed by the logical subject, ‘Jesus 
Christ’. Hans W. Frei, ‘Letter to William Placher, November 3, 1986’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 45. 
86 Acts 1:8. 
87 This type of theology again sits comfortably alongside H. Richard Niebuhr’s typology in Christ and 
Culture (1951). Niebuhr’s own preference, that Christ should be understood as the ‘transformer of 
culture’ rather than one either against or subsumed by culture, complements Frei’s ad hoc approach to 
the relationship between Christian self-description and external academic disciplines.  Niebuhr 
understood that seeing Christ as a transformer retains a “positive and hopeful attitude towards culture” 
whilst resisting the idea of a synthesis between Christ and Culture or a dualism between the two. H. 
Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 191. The relationship, in other 
words, is positively asymmetric. Niebuhr holds together both the positive approach to culture and 
creation with the proclamation of the Lordship of Christ, who “as the given historical reality in our 
human history … is the cornerstone on which we build.” Niebuhr, Christ, 255.  
! 107 
‘flat’ correlation between Christian language and philosophical analysis because he 
recognises that Christian theology, including its relationship to external disciplines 
such as philosophy and history, is a strictly second order task. Theology is at best a 
description of, or “reflection on” 88 the first order language of the Christian experience 
of religious relationship to God, or awareness of absolute dependence upon God that 
constitutes the relation with God itself.  
 
At the first order level then, Schleiermacher is against establishing Christian meaning 
upon external general philosophical foundations, and thus to Frei’s mind retains an 
important nuance.89 At the second order (descriptive) level, though, Schleiermacher 
proposes that, 
 
Theology as an academic enterprise and Christian self-description in the 
church must be correlated. Philosophy and theology must be correlated. 
External and self-description of Christianity must be correlated, and in each 
case, two factors are autonomous yet reciprocally related, but that reciprocity 
and mutual autonomy is not explained by any more basic structure of thought 
under which the two factors would be included.90 
 
Here, therefore, philosophical and phenomenological descriptions of human religious 
experience cohere with Christian theological language about what that religious 
experience is, but the two remain “ultimately technically independent of each 
other”.91 Christianity is not a particular instance of a general class or ‘religion’ and 
neither is the identity of Jesus read in a “rationalist allegorical” way.92 The former is 
simply another way of describing that which the latter describes. Christologically, 
Schleiermacher is effectively saying that “the believer has access to the Saviour or 
Redeemer … in a way different from that of the historian”,93 but that the two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Frei, Types, 35. 
89 “[T]he present work entirely disclaims the task of establishing on a foundation of general principles 
the Doctrine of God, or an Anthropology or Eschatology either, which should be used in the Christian 
church though it did not really originate there, or which should prove the propositions of the Christian 
Faith to be consonant with reason.” Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: T & T 
Clark, 1928), 3. 
90 Frei, Types, 38. 
91 Hans W. Frei, ‘Niebuhr’s Theological Background’, in Paul Ramsey (ed.), Faith and Ethics: The 
Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 36.  
92 Frei, Types, 72. 
93 Frei, Types, 72.  
! 108 
nonetheless have ‘access’.94 In summary, Type 3 concerns an often ad hoc but 
nevertheless equal correlation between internal description of the Christian faith and 
external disciplines such as philosophy and history. The ad hoc nature of the 
correlation is positive to Frei’s mind, but the ultimate equality implied is problematic, 
especially concerning the ‘availability’ of Jesus to historical criticism.  As Frei remarks 
at the end of his essay on Strauss, the question of whether this correlation is possible—
especially in Christological terms—has lingered since the inception of modernity, and 
characterises the history of Culture Protestantism.95 
 
To elucidate Type 4, with which Frei himself is most regularly identified, Frei turns to 
Barth’s theology, focussing on something very different to the description of Barth’s 
early work as manifesting an epistemological monophysitism. Barth, says Frei, 
compellingly elucidates how the academic philosophical endeavor serves the church, 
whose responsibility it is to speak faithfully about and to God—a task for which 
external disciplines of philosophy and historical-criticism can be useful, and indeed for 
which, as Higton puts it, they are “properly fitted.”96 Barth, says Frei, bids us “look 
steadily at the text and what the text says, and then you utilise, on an ad hoc basis, what 
the historical scholars offer you. You cannot state systematically or in a general theory 
what the relation between theological exegesis and historical criticism is.”97 The 
language and, crucially, the praxis of the Christian faith community is therefore the 
context in which the academic disciplines are deployed to aid self-description. Barth 
himself describes how faithful reflection on scripture necessarily involves “mode[s] of 
thought and philosophy”,98 but is clear that “the choice of a particular mode of 
thought for its serviceableness in this reflection is the business of grace”,99 and that the 
modes of thought are ‘good’ in themselves only insofar as they are subordinated to 
scripture itself, rather than in and of themselves. Frei therefore summarises: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 As Frei briefly recalls in Types, this is the view that Strauss so roundly rejected, because of its attempt 
to cross what was perceived as the unbridgeable gap between historical consciousness and faith in Jesus 
as the universal redeemer. Frei, Types, 72. 
95 Hans W. Frei, ‘David Friedrich Strauss’, in Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Patrick Sherry and Steven 
T. Katz (eds.), Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vol.1. (Cambridge: CUP, 1985), 255.  
96 Higton, Christ, 200. E.g. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2: The Word of God (London: T & T Clark, 
2004), 729–736. 
97 Hans W. Frei, ‘Scripture as Realistic Narrative: Karl Barth as a Critic of Historical Criticism’, in 
Frei, Reading Faithfully, 49. 
98 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 730. 
99 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 734.  
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In this highly formal sense, acknowledging the need for formal rules and 
criteria, but letting their use be governed by the specific theological issue at 
hand, and by the general rule that absolute priority be given to Christian 
theology as Christian self-description within the religious community called the 
church, or the Christian community, Barth acknowledges the need for a 
formal or technical philosophical vocabulary in theology.100 
 
Tools such as philosophy and historical-criticism are therefore utilised on an ad hoc 
basis, not norming but being normed by Christian self-understanding—at the heart of 
which is the sensus literalis of scripture, and therefore the particular identity of Jesus of 
Nazareth. This does not mean that Christian self-understanding is immune to 
challenge or re-shaping, but it does mean that the ‘pressure’ exerted by, say, 
philosophy on Christian dogmatics, is a result of a case-by-case deployment of 
external disciplines and critical resources, rather than by virtue of their possessing 
mastery of general categories.101 In a recently published letter to Gary Comstock, 
which supports the consensus that Type 4 is that which best fits Frei’s own views, he 
offers a remarkably clear elucidation of this kind of position: 
 
I am a Christian theologian and do not regard philosophy as ever having 
achieved that clearly demonstrated set of even formal certainties (and 
agreements) in 2,500 years that would allow it the kind of authoritative status 
you seem to want to accord it; and yet I believe theology cannot do without 
philosophy. Furthermore, theology cannot even invest so much in the 
foundational/anti-foundational debate as to come out (qua theology) in principle 
on the anti-foundational side.102 
 
In the case of the incarnation, this means that whilst the possibility of a person being 
“at once human and divine is not intrinsically irrational … the condition of its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 Frei, Types, 41 
101 Barth is clear that this ‘case by case’ approach concerns not just what philosophical tool one might 
employ, but also the fact that the same tool may sometimes be useful in the service of faithful reading of 
scripture, and other times may be problematic. Indeed, this is the proper order of things, for he asks, 
“[h]ow can we bind ourselves to one philosophy as the only philosophy, and ascribe to it a universal 
necessity, without actually positing it as something absolute as the necessary partner of the Word of 
God and in that way imprisoning and falsifying the Word of God? Thus from the point of view of 
scriptural exegesis the relevance of the inner conflicts and debates and the whole history of philosophy 
as the history of human modes of thought can only be contingent and provisional, not basic and 
ultimate.” Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, 733. 
102 Hans W. Frei, ‘Letter to Gary Comstock, November 5, 1984’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 37. 
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possibility, or rationality, is one we cannot know in this present finite state”.103  There 
is, to recall Identity, no ‘going behind’ the incarnation here; Christians do not rehearse 
the narrative of Jesus as God incarnate to signpost some deeper truth behind the 
specific doctrine, a truth that can be wholly grasped by modernist categories of 
rationality. Instead, dogmatic and philosophical reflection follows from the grammar 
of faith as given in the witness to God’s act in Christ, in accordance with the sensus 
literalis described above.  
 
Therefore, theology that broadly fits the description of Type 4 has, at its centre, a 
theology of the transcendence of Jesus in which his particularity is vital. The 
transcendence of God—the freedom of God’s activity in the world—is preserved in 
this type, for theology itself is not understood to be the kind of thing whereby an 
object is grasped or defined, but rather the kind of thing which understands itself to be 
speaking of one who precedes it, who transcends it, and upon whose activity theology 
reflects and to which it responds. Simply, if Christians are speaking about God as 
Creator and Redeemer, then their theological talk is self-consciously secondary to that 
divine activity.104 Christians understand themselves as acted upon and through by 
God, and recognise that activity as somehow one with the activity of Jesus Christ. 
Critical theological reflection springs up in response to this Christological belief. The 
particular shape of the Christian faith, which according to the multifaceted sensus 
literalis of the texts has the transcendent and particular identity of Jesus Christ at its 
heart, is therefore the map for the employment of external disciplines in Christian 
theology. Quite simply, Jesus Christ in his transcendent particularity is the reason 
Christian faith possesses its flexibility. The particular relationship between internal 
and external, or between theology and philosophy, is as flexible and complex as it is 
because of the particularities of the identity of Jesus who transcends and calls into 
question our categories of understanding. Christian engagement with academic 
philosophy is ad hoc not according to a pre-conceived theoretical map, but because 
that is what the Christian faith necessitates by virtue of its own sensus literalis and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 Frei, Types, 80–81. 
104 Of course, it is possible for those who understand philosophy as foundational for theology (Type 2) 
to say that they also understand philosophy to be anterior to God’s primary activity, but under such a 
model it would be hard to suggest that the general categories of a Christian philosophy of God should 
be prioritised over against the particular narratives God’s activity in the world in Jesus Christ, for the 
narrative of God’s specific activity holds greater weight for the community of faith than the general 
possibility of that activity being described/apprehended. 
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practice—in other words, because of the person of Jesus Christ (and, we would add, in 
union with the Holy Spirit). Type 4 resists the domestication of transcendence, and 
does so whilst recognising the coherence of transcendence and particularity in the 
identity of Jesus. 
 
Recalling the question of the ‘middle way’ between closed and wide-open religion as 
articulated by Ford (see chapter 1) an approach to Jesus’ transcendence derived from 
Frei’s theology is pertinent for asking how one might avoid theological arrogance or 
‘closed-ness’ (often associated with fundamentalist evangelicalism) on the one hand, 
and non-descriptive banality or ‘wide open-ness’ (often associated with liberalism, 
which often possesses its fair dose of arrogance too) on the other. Types suggests that 
theology that goes about its business in a ‘type 4 kind of way’ calls into question 
apologetic attempts to enclose Christian beliefs—most specifically about person of 
Jesus—inside theories of understanding, and thereby resists the collapse of 
hermeneutics into epistemology. Modern theologies often endorse that collapse, 
assuming that epistemology (theories of knowledge) and hermeneutics (theories of 
meaning) are the same thing.105 As a result, Christian ‘meaning’ is required to justify 
itself within general theories of univocal meaning—which Frei calls “a view of 
certainty and knowledge which liberals and evangelicals hold in common.”106 At the 
heart of the potential for something like Type 4 to offer an alternative to closed-ness 
or wide-openness, therefore, is the recognition that the life of Jesus is the locus for 
Christian thinking about the transcendence of God and the meaning of Christian 
language about God in relation to human epistemology. 
 
Frei, though, was cautious in his language about any kind of ‘middle way’ (he wanted 
to steer clear of “reductionist” and “compromising” anthropological attempts at 
mediating the universal and the particular elements of religion)107 and when 
summarising his theology on this matter we must be aware of his care to avoid 
demonising either ‘side’ in what might be perceived as a liberal/fundamentalist 
divide.108 In the spirit of this caution, DeHart warns against identifying Frei’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 Frei, Types, 84. 
106 Frei, ‘Response’, 211.  
107 Hans W. Frei, ‘History, Salvation-History, and Typology’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 152.  
108 “[W]e need a kind of generous orthodoxy which would have in it an element of liberalism … and an 
element of evangelicalism. I don’t know if there is a voice between those two, as a matter of fact. If 
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typological preferences with a definitive rejection of all liberal theology per se in favour 
of a new ‘post-liberalism’. This, says DeHart, “does not work because it depends on 
making into a principled opposition what Frei understands as a matter of tactical 
choice”.109 DeHart is referring in particular to a tendency to read Frei’s theology as a 
full forced rejection of any kind of correlation between theology and external 
disciplines—a rejection which at its extreme end, denies any kind of ‘truth in the 
world’ because of its unwillingness to engage with philosophical categories at all. 
Indeed, as DeHart recognises, Frei perceived that Barth’s ad hoc subordination 
approach may, if not approached with care, throw the baby out with the bathwater 
when it comes to a theological “criteria for intelligibility”.110  
 
We can recall H. Richard Niebuhr’s influence upon Frei to serve as an aid here. 
Niebuhr’s own approach to a theology of revelation had informed Frei’s concern 
about a residual epistemological monophysitism in Barth’s early work,111 and if we are 
to heed DeHart’s warning and avoid blacklisting all forms of ‘liberalism’ to the extent 
that worldly meaning is ‘evacuated’, then it certainly pays to keep Frei’s appreciation 
of Niebuhr in the foreground. Given the similarities between Frei and Niebuhr—
particularly in their desire to do justice to what Frei called “the miraculous 
penetration of the transhistorical into internal history”112—a temptation to 
concentrate upon Barth as Frei’s natural ally should perhaps be tempered by attention 
to the connections between Frei and Niebuhr. 
 
Overall, we should be wary of the temptation to make Frei’s idea of what theology is 
do what Frei suggests theology itself cannot do—i.e. put itself ‘in the right’ beyond all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
there is, I would like to pursue it. But I have conceded … that I’m not sure that there is a voice between 
liberalism and evangelicalism.” In the next paragraph Frei also describes himself as “not antiliberal”. 
Frei, ‘Response’, 208. The consensus of this thesis is that the pursuit of this “voice between” is indeed 
fruitful (despite Frei’s not being sure if that voice exists) and gives rise to much of what makes Frei’s 
theology attractive.  
109 DeHart, Trial, 217. 
110 Hans W. Frei, ‘Barth and Schleiermacher’, in Frei, Theology and Narrative, 196. DeHart argues 
therefore, that Schleiermacher’s ‘Type 3’ approach to ad hoc correlation may hold no greater danger 
than Barth’s subordination: “What if the clash in dogmatic discourse between ‘worldly’ and ‘faithful’ 
meanings always potentially threatening Schleiermacher’s ad hoc correlation were deemed not 
significantly more dangerous to theology than the opposite risk of an evacuation of all worldly meaning 
such as haunts a subordinating strategy like Barth’s?” DeHart, Trial, 223.  
111 See also DeHart, Trial, 247.  
112 Frei, ‘Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr’, 91. 
! 113 
question. Put more philosophically, Frei’s theology cannot posit its own infallibility, 
even something as apparently ‘humble’ as the infallibility of its own flexibility.113 To 
advocate that Frei’s flexible, confident and yet humble theology is the only right way, 
ironically fails to allow the character of theology to permeate the understanding 
theologians have of their own task. What DeHart’s work illuminates is not Frei’s 
theology as a forthright alternative to liberal approaches to correlation, but rather 
Frei’s caution when it comes to any kind of systematisation. His approach cannot be 
methodologically sealed, but, by virtue of its attempt to relate properly to the task of 
speaking meaningfully about God, retains an incapacity that works out as 
methodological flexibility in the light of the simultaneous concreteness and 
ungraspability of Jesus—i.e. Jesus’ transcendence in his particularity. It therefore 
informs a humility but confidence as regards the coexistence of the universal and the 
particular in Christian faith. A “wise” theologian, suggests Frei, would highlight both 
 
[a] God who endows all his human creatures with freedom and preserves his 
full creation from ultimate loss or absurdity; who, on the other, in the 
fulfillment of that creation as well as its radical redress in the face of evil has 
focussed his providence in the person of Jesus Christ in whom the reign of God 
has come near … A commitment to universalism concerning human destiny 
and a commitment to the specific of sacred or salvation within it are not in 
ultimate conflict, even if the manner of their cohesion is hidden.114 
 
ii) Conclusion 
 
A description of Frei’s later work has shed further light upon the meaning of the 
centrality of Jesus Christ for theology—the crucified and risen one who is present in 
his transcendent particularity. Chapter 2 drew attention to the particular way that 
historicity and transcendence cohere in a Christology positioned against modernist 
epistemology, and this latter analysis shows the continuity of that theme in Frei’s later 
work, as well as emphasising the particular Christian community in relationship with 
Jesus—the historically particular community in relationship with the particular 
transcendent one. Furthermore, engaging briefly with Types of Christian Theology, we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Consider again Frei’s phrase from his letter to Comstock: “theology cannot even invest so much in 
the foundational/anti-foundational debate as to come out (qua theology) in principle on the anti-
foundational side.” Frei, ‘Letter to Gary Comstock’, 37. 
114 Frei, ‘History’, 151–152. 
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have seen how the kind of Christology Frei develops illuminates another coherence—
this time of confident witness to the normativity of Jesus Christ on the one hand, and 
of flexibility, openness and humility on the other. Simply, the coherence of historicity 
and transcendence in the identity of Jesus Christ relates to the coherence of 
confidence and humility in the Christian community.  
 
Summarising Frei’s overall theological contribution, David Ford has recognised both 
these features, speaking of both the “element of incognito” in the “unsubstitutable 
identity of Jesus Christ, rendered in narrative form”115; and also of “the capacity to 
generate a generous orthodoxy hospitable to many different methods, philosophies, 
churches, anthropologies, cultures, periods, etc.”116 I have endeavored to highlight 
how the first is the grounds for the second, in such a way that illuminates how an 
account of Jesus’ transcendence articulated at the level of realistic narrative offers a 
way between a dichotomy of arrogance and banality. 
 
Ford’s attention to this ‘element of incognito’ in the identity of Christ refers to one of 
Frei’s most exceptionally crafted lectures, ‘On the Encounter of Jesus with the 
German Academy.’ Therein, more succinctly than elsewhere, Frei communicates 
something of the difficulty that the identity of Christ presents to us. He begins, 
 
It is frightening to stand behind a lectern or sit in a comfortable seminar room 
and talk about Jesus Christ. It is incongruous … He is a very demanding 
figure—to judge by a large consensus in a long tradition—requiring both our 
confession of him as Lord and Master and a form of life not indeed heroically 
reiterative of his own but recognisably shaped in his image even though at the 
distance of imperfection.117 
 
To describe a crucial aspect of this ‘difficulty’ in the disciple’s relation to Jesus, Frei 
turns to Kierkegaard, for whom the Jesus of the narratives is met ‘fully’ only when “we 
have also met him … in forgetfulness of himself or incognito in a crowd” and 
especially insofar as he is met in the “poor, the undeserving, the spiritual and 
economic underclass”,118 with whom Jesus was “self-identified … though he was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 David Ford, ‘Hans Frei and the Future of Theology’, Modern Theology (8: 1992), 207. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Frei, ‘Encounter’, 133. 
118 Frei, ‘Encounter’, 136.  
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neither identified by nor identical with them.”119 To speak about meeting Christ 
‘incognito’ is not to refer to a generalized identity, but a particular concealment. That 
is, it is not a generalised ‘Jesus-ness’ that is met, but Jesus himself.  Such as it is, then, 
the epistemological incapacity that is characteristic of a Christian’s relationship to 
Jesus is not merely a theoretical kind, but coincides with a particular form of calling to 
those on society’s margins. 
 
 
III 
 
Moving to Bonhoeffer 
 
At this point, reflecting upon coherence of Christ’s incognito with the mystery of 
meeting Christ in others, it becomes virtually impossible to hold off constructive 
comparison with Dietrich Bonhoeffer any longer. Not only are both these themes, 
along with many other aspects of Frei’s theology explored above, present in 
Bonhoeffer’s thought in strikingly similar ways; but Bonhoeffer’s own reflections upon 
Kierkegaard’s incognito also promise to take us into a significantly deeper reflection 
on the particularity of Jesus than Frei does here. Bonhoeffer explores the incognito in 
the context of a theology of the cross, where, if we want to speak of the transcendence 
of Jesus, we have to speak about the hiddenness of God in the humiliation of the 
crucified one. The intensity of this difficulty—grounded as it is in the historically 
particular event of Jesus of Nazareth’s execution—promises to significantly enhance 
the reflections we have derived so far from Frei, bringing the inseparability of 
transcendence and particularity into even sharper focus.120 Simultaneously, however, 
Frei’s sustained attention to the complex way in which historical particularity is 
central to Christology offers a basis on which Bonhoeffer’s works can be read to their 
fullest potential. The coming chapters explicate key elements of Bonhoeffer’s thought 
in relation to what we have already seen of Frei’s, so that their collaborative strength !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Ibid. 
120 Although Frei alludes briefly to an ecclesiology grounded in a theologia crucis in an ordination sermon 
in 1954 (“[E]ven if there be deep scars in the creation, the church, like her Lord, bears them in her 
body.” Hans W. Frei, ‘On Priesthood, the Past, and Peace’, in Frei, Reading Faithfully, 199) this is by no 
means a sustained reflection in the same way as it is for Bonhoeffer.  
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is illuminated, particularly in reference to a theology of the transcendence of Jesus 
which makes for a coherence of humility and confidence in Christian theology, 
countering closed or wide-open extremes. 
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Chapter 5. 
 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER:  
MODERNITY AND TRANSCENDENCE 
 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born in 1906 in Breslau—coincidentally the same town 
where Hans Frei would be born sixteen years later—into a large, upper middle class 
Lutheran family that was stable and secure, yet hit hard by the death of Bonhoeffer’s 
older brother Walter in the First World War. Having declared as a young man to his 
surprised family he would pursue the career of a theologian,1 Bonhoeffer began his 
theological education in Tübingen in 1923, before moving to study in Berlin in 1924, 
where he worked under Adolph von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg. His doctoral 
dissertation was accepted in 1927, and after a year as curate in Barcelona from 
February 1928, he returned to Berlin where his Habilitationschrift was accepted in 1930. 
He spent a post-graduate year at Union Theological Seminary in the U.S., before 
being ordained a Lutheran pastor in 1931 in Berlin, and then combining academic 
work at the faculty with pastoral service. Though deeply involved in the ‘church 
struggle’ during the rise of Nazism in Germany,2 Bonhoeffer left for London for two 
years in 1933 to pastor two churches, during which time he was also involved in 
significant ecumenical work directed against Nazism, especially as regards the church 
struggle. In 1935, he returned to Germany to lead two illegal seminaries for the 
Confessing Church which were closed in 1937, and after a period of ‘underground’ 
teaching, and a brief visit to New York to avoid conscription, Bonhoeffer returned 
again to Germany to participate in the resistance by joining the Abwehr—a senior 
counter-intelligence agency for whom he pursued important ecumenical contacts 
overseas and aided the smuggling of Jews out of Germany. In 1943, Bonhoeffer was 
arrested by the Gestapo and imprisoned in Berlin. In 1945, after the exposure of a 
failed plot to assassinate Hitler that implicated Bonhoeffer and some of his Abwehr 
colleagues, he was transferred to Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945, and 
executed for treason at Flossenberg on 9th April that year. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian, Christian, Contemporary (London: Collins, 1970), 22. 
2 See especially Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ch. 7. 
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Here I position Bonhoeffer’s early work—his doctoral dissertation Sanctorum Communio 
and his Habilitationschrift, Act and Being—in relation to Placher’s narrative of the 
domestication of transcendence, therefore paralleling the way Frei was introduced in 
the first part of chapter 3.3 Like Frei, Bonhoeffer aims to counteract a modernist 
epistemological relativisation of transcendence epitomised by Culture Protestantism,4 
and furthermore his approach to Karl Barth’s contribution to a theology of 
transcendence follows remarkably similar lines to Frei’s critique of ‘epistemological 
monophysitism’. Whilst enthusiastically commending Barth’s determination to subvert 
the domestication of transcendence, in Act and Being, Bonhoeffer simultaneously 
critiques the extent to which Barth fails to ‘ground’ revelation historically. As a result, 
Bonhoeffer’s understanding of the relationship between Christology and 
transcendence, like Frei’s, points to the importance of Jesus’ historical particularity.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s early work responds to the domestication of transcendence by critiquing 
the foundational principles of nineteenth century liberal ‘Cultural Protestant’ theology 
from within its midst.5 Adolph von Harnack, who spearheaded the Berlin faculty, 
epitomised liberal Protestantism, emphasising the priority “freedom of thought and 
the pursuit of truth on every path it took”.6 Bonhoeffer always admired Harnack, 
especially concerning this emphasis upon freedom,7 yet the latter’s theology 
propounds that which Bonhoeffer robustly critiques—namely a “confidence in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The general point about Bonhoeffer and transcendence is well attested in Bonhoeffer scholarship, and 
as such much of the below is merely a redescription. For a few examples, see Michael P. DeJonge, 
‘Bonhoeffer from the Perspective of Intellectual History’, in Clifford Green and Guy Carter (eds.), 
Interpreting Bonhoeffer: Historical Perspectives, Emerging Issues (Fortress, Minneapolis, 2013), 201; Ray S. 
Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1976), 76–77; 
Stewart R. Sutherland, ‘Ethics and Transcendence in Bonhoeffer’, Scottish Journal of Theology (30, 1997), 
543–554; and Rainer Mayer, ‘Christology: The Genuine Form of Transcendence’, in A. J. Klassen, A 
Bonhoeffer Legacy: Essays in Understanding (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981). The connection with Frei, 
however, appears yet unexplored in any detail, and thus the redescription below is a necessary stage for 
the connection to be made.  
4 On the use of the phrase ‘Culture Protestantism’ to describe that to which Bonhoeffer objects, see 
Barry Harvey, Taking Hold of the Real: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Profound Worldliness of Christianity (Oregon: 
Cascade, 2015), 160–162. Harvey actually uses ‘cultural Protestantism’, but the implied meaning is the 
same. 
5 See Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 44–46. 
6 Martin Rumscheidt, ‘The formation of Bonhoeffer’s theology’, in John W. de Gruchy (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 54.  
7 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘Eulogy for Adolph von Harnack’, in BBNY, 380; and Martin Rumscheidt, 
‘Harnack, Seeberg and Bonhoeffer’, in Peter Frick (ed.), Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 211. 
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human spirit … competence and authority of the power of thinking, and trust in the 
ability of human beings to transcend their subjectivity in the endeavor to reach true 
objectivity.”8 In contrast, Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being largely follow Barth’s 
protest against Protestant liberal theology, critiquing any attempt by human beings to 
place themselves into relationship with God in Christ. Human beings, Bonhoeffer 
emphasises, are placed into truth and into relationship with God by God, not by their 
own culturally liberated thought. In Anderson’s terms again, human beings are the 
objects of God’s transcendent activity towards them in history, specifically in Jesus 
Christ, by virtue of which they are placed into relationship with one another and with 
God. Standing in the midst of the contemporary academic crisis of transcendence—
by no means, of course, the most intense crisis out of which he will write—Bonhoeffer 
gives us the basis for a theology of Jesus’ transcendence. 
 
I 
 
Sanctorum Communio  
 
Bonhoeffer’s doctoral dissertation, Sanctorum Communio (written in 1927, published in 
1930) expounds the identity and structure of the church as a community given and 
held in its identity by God in Christ and the Holy Spirit. Firstly, I will observe how, in 
contrast to an enlightenment turn to the individual subject, Bonhoeffer highlights both 
the radical decentering and an ultimate affirmation of the ‘I’ that occur in true 
community with others and with God. Simply, I am given my individuality (my ‘I’) by 
the other person who is given by God, not by myself. Through this other person in 
community with me, I can encounter God, even though their identity is not reducible 
to a means by which God is encountered, nor collapsed into God’s own being.  
 
Secondly, because he believes God gives this community by giving Godself in Christ, 
Bonhoeffer summarises his ecclesiology as “Christ existing as church-community”.9 In 
the church-community (Gemeinde) God in Christ exists for and towards me in the 
other, and therefore towards and for the other in me. Christians are enabled to love 
one another as Christ loves, able to be Christ to one another precisely because of God’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Ibid.  
9 SC, 121. 
! 120 
love in Christ. In Sanctorum Communio, therefore, Bonhoeffer emphasises that the 
church, and the individual therein, are constituted from beyond themselves—
participating in the free and distinct activity of God in Christ.10 
 
i) Sociality and the individual 
 
Bonhoeffer recognises that the individual subject is fundamentally constituted from 
outside itself. His theological anthropology destabilises any kind of individualistic 
subjectivity, but in doing so stabilises the concept of the individual per se. Despite being 
initially de-centered, the ‘I’ is then truly validated insofar as the individual is 
constituted through the other person and ultimately God.  
 
In a sweeping historical summary of the concept of the individual, Bonhoeffer says 
that Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Epicureanism resolve the individual into the 
generalities of reason, ethics and pleasure respectively, each variously negating any 
concept of real social relation.11  Bonhoeffer’s primary critique, though, is directed 
towards an enlightenment concept of person, wherein “the knowing-I becomes the 
starting point of all philosophy”.12 He positions himself especially in relation to Kant 
(whose epistemological model is described in more detail below) who, he says, 
“fundamentally denies the person by subsuming the person under the universal”;13 
and Hegel, in whose work the I is resolved into Absolute Spirit, losing its ‘limit’—its 
identity as one and not another.14  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 On the continuity of Bonhoeffer’s theology in Sanctorum Communio with the participatory tradition, see 
Jens Zimmerman, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Heidegger: Two Different Visions of Humanity’, in 
Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmerman (eds.), Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 103; and Justin Mandela Roberts, Sacred Rhetoric: Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and the Participatory Tradition (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 23.  
11 SC, 36–40. In Aristotelianism human beings only become persons insofar as they participate in the 
species of reason” (36). Stoicism subordinates the person to a universally valid “higher imperative”, 
through obedience to which, “each soul … is of like nature with eternal reason and thus also with the 
soul of other persons” (37). Epicureanism values only the individual pleasure of fundamentally “alien 
and dissimilar” persons (38–39). 
12 SC, 40. 
13 SC, 41.  
14 “Hegel … has the I arise at the point where, drawn into objective spirit, it is returned to absolute 
spirit, a move that also overcomes in principle the limit of the individual person.” SC, 42.  
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In contrast to this, Bonhoeffer wants to develop an “ethical” concept of the person 
rather than a “metaphysical” one.15 By metaphysical, he means a concept of the 
person defined without any mediation from any other; whereas “the ethical concept of 
the person is a definition based on ethical-social interaction.”16 The freedom of the 
other person forms a “real barrier”17 to my intellect (myself as the thinking subject) 
and in doing so awakens me to ethical responsibility towards the ‘you’. The other 
person is utterly free in relation to me, and without their freedom I cannot be 
awakened to full humanity. To relativise this freedom would produce a deficient 
anthropology, imprisoned in the “abstract and metaphysical”18 and closed to the 
concrete fullness of life. The implication, therefore, is that genuine humanity requires 
an epistemological incapacity in relation to the other.  
 
Theologically, this incapacity is grounded in the created-ness of the other person—i.e. 
in their given-ness by God. In his interpretation of Genesis 1–3 (Creation and Fall) 
Bonhoeffer outlines a concept of creatureliness as that can help to supplement our 
reading of Sanctorum Communio. There, he rephrases what we have already noted, 
saying, 
 
The human being is not alone … and it is in this dependence upon one another that 
their creatureliness exists. The creatureliness of human beings … can be defined in 
simply no other way than in terms of the existence of human beings over-
against-one-another, with-one-another, and in-dependence-upon-one-
another.19 
 
Furthermore, though, this being over-against, with, and dependent upon, is a relation 
that is given to, rather than constituted by, humankind. Arguing that humankind’s 
likeness to God consists not in an analogia entis but in an analogia relationis, Bonhoeffer 
ultimately recognises that humankind’s freedom to relate to one another and thus 
constitute one another, is a freedom that resides primordially in God. The relationship !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 SC, 50. 
16 Ibid. 
17 SC, 46. 
18 SC, 49. 
19 CF, 64. Taking into account a broad doctrine of creation, and especially the pressing need for 
contemporary theology to be mindful of environmental ethics, one can suggest that a rehearsal of this 
position today should also highlight how human beings depend not only upon other human beings, but 
other creatures, and creation in general. 
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of human beings to one another is “not a human potential or possibility or structure of 
human existence; instead it is a given relation, a relation in which human beings are 
set, a justitia passiva!”20 Therefore, “the relation of creature with creature is a relation 
established by God, because it consists of freedom and freedom comes from God.”21  
 
God as the primordial divine other therefore grounds—or more actively, gives—the 
connection between the ‘other’ (the You) and the ‘I’. The ‘You’, in ethical relationship 
to whom my concrete ‘I’ is constituted, is ‘who they are’ by virtue of being given by 
God.22 This means the other person cannot simply be identified with God, nor can their 
other-ness consist of the same ‘thing’ as God’s otherness. God’s wholly-other-ness and 
otherness of the person as ethical subject are distinct, but the former is the origin, the 
transcendent giver, of the latter. “The other person is only a ‘You’ insofar as God 
brings it about.”23 They have their origin in God’s free creatio ex nihilo—giving purely 
out of free love, bound to nothing immanent. As Roberts puts it,  
 
This coming-to-be of personhood in the I-You relation is not merely a natural 
coincidence, a kind of awkward meeting of like kind in a cluttered cosmos. 
God in the condition and possibility of human consciousness, transcendentally 
comprising a ‘You’ layer … the individual and the community have a radical 
passivity about them.24 
 
Furthermore, the encounter with God through the other person is not about their 
‘usability’—as if they were a means by which to encounter God—but about the way in 
which they have their beginning and end in God just as I have mine. It is about 
something shared, rather than something possessed. Bonhoeffer’s concept of person is 
therefore firmly opposed to any attempt to ‘domesticate’ the other inside the 
boundaries of the individual’s use of reason.  Furthermore, this insistence upon !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 CF, 65. 
21 CF, 66.  
22 SC, 55. Bonhoeffer thus perceives a subtlety not evident in, for example, David Ratke’s argument 
that “God is a subject. The upshot of this is that we encounter God as we encounter any other living 
being … We can know our friends, our husbands, wives, parents, and children insofar as we know the 
external reality of them and in so far as they allow themselves to be known. So it is with God.” David 
C. Ratke, ‘Preaching Christ Crucified: Luther and the Revelation of God’, Dialog (43: 2004), 273. 
23 SC, 55. 
24 Roberts, Sacred, 37. By “radical passivity”, Roberts means “at the very depth of consciousness, 
constituted by an I-You relation, there is an actus of divine consciousness in which humanity 
participates.” Roberts, Sacred, 37, n.25. 
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exteriority is fundamentally theological, not merely anthropological. The otherness of 
the other person, in relation to which my ethical responsibility is developed, is 
grounded in the true otherness—the undomesticated transcendence—of God. Only 
because of one wholly beyond us, yet towards us in the act of creation whereby we are 
constituted by the gift of the other as ‘you’, can each of us truly be an ‘I’.  
 
ii) Society and community; God and church 
 
Bonhoeffer draws upon Ferdinand Tönnies’ distinction between community and 
society to articulate his ecclesiology. Tönnies outlined two ways of understanding the 
relationship of human wills to one another, which, he says, can be “conceived of 
either as real and organic life—this is the essential characteristic of the Gemeinschaft 
(community); or as imaginary and mechanical structure—this is the concept of 
Gesellschaft (society)”.25  Bonhoeffer believes in particular that the notion of Gesellschaft 
must be rejected by ecclesiology, because it trades on what we can call a domesticated 
concept of the other person. 
 
Gesellschaft, says Bonhoeffer, cannot sustain the concept of person described above 
because it is, 
 
an association of rational action [which] … appeals to human beings’ ability to 
use their reason most effectively, as demonstrated in the search for the most 
appropriate means to a willed purpose, and in using the society itself 
extensively to this end … Moreover, the other person must be treated with 
utmost consideration, precisely in order to be used to full advantage.26 
 
Reflecting Kant’s rejection of ‘means-ends’ as a basis for moral action, Bonhoeffer 
objects to the view of persons as means to an end, because, once more, that 
interiorises their meaning in relation to me and whatever ends I might wish to pursue, 
neutralising the ethical character of the other as ‘barrier’ or ‘limit’.27 An association of 
rational action cannot, therefore, sustain a proper concept of person. It fundamentally 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Civil Society, trans. Hollis (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), 33. 
26 SC, 90. 
27 Re Kant, see J. B. Schneewind, ‘Autonomy, obligation, and virtue: An overview of Kant's moral 
philosophy’, in Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 319. 
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dehumanises, erasing the notion of the other as created gift that is embedded in the 
concept of person described above.28  
 
Gemeinschaft, on the other hand is not something that has come into being for the 
purpose of pursuing an end external to itself, but is willed for its own sake. Thus, even 
though the church is “organized toward a certain end, namely the achievement of 
God’s will”,29 that will is realised purely insofar as the church is itself—and it is itself 
only insofar as it receives itself from God. 
 
[The] divine will is directed toward the church itself as a community of spirit, 
so that as a purposive society it is at the same time an end in itself … God, in 
seeking to implement the divine will, gives God’s own self into our hearts and 
creates community; that is, God makes the divine self the means to God’s own 
end.30 
 
Therefore, the church transcends a dichotomy of means and ends by virtue of the fact 
that God in Godself constitutes its existence.  Bonhoeffer expresses this ontological 
ecclesiology in the phrase “Christ-existing-as-community”,31 which points not to a 
diffusion of the particular identity of Christ into the many people that make up the 
church, but rather points to the church’s constitution from beyond itself. Christ, 
Bonhoeffer is clear, is both the head of and exterior to the church, whilst also being in 
the church as the one who constitutes it.32  
 
The church is ‘Christ existing as community’ by virtue of the work of the Holy Spirit, 
who actualises that which God establishes in giving Godself to the world in Jesus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 In Life Together (Bonhoeffer’s reflections on Christian community arising from his time leading the 
Confessing Church seminary at Finkenwalde) Bonhoeffer says, “the community of Christians is a gift of 
grace from the Kingdom of God.” LT, 30. For more on Finkenwalde, see Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
ch.10. 
29 SC, 261. 
30 SC, 261–262. The social and sociological are “presupposed and included in revelation. Only in this 
perspective can they be fully understood.” SC, 65. As Barry Harvey notes, this calls into question 
readings of Bonhoeffer that profess sociality as the primary basis for his ecclesiology (e.g. Green, 
Bonhoeffer, 19). Harvey rightly recognises the priority of revelation in Bonhoeffer’s thought and thus the 
priority of ecclesiology over sociality per se. See Barry Harvey, ‘Sociality, Ecclesiology, and the 
Polyphony of Life in the Thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in Jens Zimmerman and Brian Gregor (eds.), 
Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought (Eugene: Pickwick, 2010), 102–105. 
31 SC, 121, 189–190. 
32 SC, 137–139. The relation of Christ to the church-community is therefore “both ‘communal’ and 
‘governing’”. SC, 147.  
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Christ, who himself acts on behalf of humanity for humanity’s redemption. Regarding 
this ‘acting on behalf of’, Bonhoeffer describes Christ’s ‘vicarious representative 
action’ (Stellvertretung) and recognises that this is “fundamental for the church-
community … [as] the life-principle of the new humanity.”33 As the “one who 
represents the whole of humanity in his historical life”, Jesus the crucified and risen 
one both constitutes the new humanity, and establishes the principle of acting 
vicariously for the other at its heart.34 Thus, as Christiane Tietz summarises, ‘Christ 
existing as community’, 
 
describes what takes place concretely when one church member becomes 
Christ to the other. It is when we become Christ to the other in the church 
community that then Christ is present. This occurs in the structure of being 
with-each-other and in the action of being for-each-other.35 
 
Furthermore, with the Stellvertretung of Christ—his rejection and death undergone on 
our behalf, and his resurrection that makes for our life—constituting the way in the 
church is Christ existing as community, Bonhoeffer’s early ecclesiology not only 
emphasises that the church receives its being from outside of itself, but hints at how 
the historical life of Christ, narrated in the gospels, is at the heart of this constitution of 
the church by the Spirit.36  
 
Crucially then, the church’s concrete, historical existence is grounded in exteriority. 
Here the fundamental theological rationale is the same as that discussed above 
regarding ‘I’ and ‘You’—namely, that human beings cannot independently orient 
themselves epistemologically in relation to themselves, God or one another. In this 
case, the meaning of the church is not found in a universally accessible reason, or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 SC, 146–147.  
34 Ibid. Root interprets Stellvertretung as “place sharing”, which in Christological terms, has the benefit of 
emphasising that Jesus represents humanity from within. Root also uses this translation to drive a 
model for pastoral ministry. Andrew Root, Bonhoeffer as Youth Worker: A Theological Vision for Discipleship 
and Life Together (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 43.  
35 Christiane Tietz, ‘Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the Church’, in Adam C. Clark and 
Michael Mawson (eds.), Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship (Oregon: Pickwick, 
2013), 41. Tietz rightly positions herself strongly against any metaphysical implication that the 
community simply becomes Jesus Christ, or that “Christ is existing in the church community and 
nowhere else (i.e. as some of the death of God theologians have maintained.” Tietz, ‘Ontological 
Structure’, 40. See below, n.111, for a comparison of this view with Ray Anderson’s criticism of 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of transcendence and community in both Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being. 
36 SC, 147. We will see this much more clearly in the Christology Lectures of 1933, below. 
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humanity’s best efforts to form a society that enables pure religious faith, but in the 
free gift of God towards the world in Christ—a transcendent gift that cannot be 
domesticated by a delimited concept of universal reason.37 Recalling the ‘confessional 
context’ in which Frei’s theology resides (chapter 3) we recognise along with Tietz 
that, for Bonhoeffer, “what the church is can only be understood by believing its 
premise.”38 In the context of fides quaerens intellectum, Bonhoeffer articulates that the 
church receives its being from Christ, and participates in Christ’s being for others by 
virtue of the gift of the Holy Spirit. 
 
These two brief examples—a radical displacement of the ‘I’, and a recognition of the 
limitations of modernist epistemology and morality as regards the free gift of God in 
Christ—therefore demonstrate that from his earliest published work, Bonhoeffer’s 
theological rationale fits with a critique of the domesticated transcendence that 
characterised the Culture Protestantism of the Berlin faculty. We can also discern 
Bonhoeffer’s awareness of the importance of both the centrality of Jesus’ particularity, 
and also the particularity of the church, although these will develop more as his work 
continues. Whilst the prominence of pneumatology evident here fades somewhat as 
Bonhoeffer’s work develops—an issue addressed in the final chapter—at this stage in 
his career, he also uses pneumatological language freely, allowing more easily than 
Frei the recognition that the relation between Christ and the church (a relation which 
Bonhoeffer articulates more ontologically than Frei) has the work of the Spirit at its 
heart.  
 
II 
 
Act and Being 
 
Bonhoeffer’s early Christological response to domesticated transcendence is brought 
into sharper focus in Act and Being (1930). This section briefly describes his argument, 
so that in the following chapter it will be clear that Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis 
(examined in chapters 6 and 7) is built upon very similar critical perceptions as Frei’s. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 “Christian community is not an ideal we have to realize, but rather a reality created by God in Christ 
in which we may participate.” LT, 38. 
38 Tietz, ‘Ontological Structure’, 35. 
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In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer is interested in the formation of “genuine theological 
concepts”,39 and in particular how different ways of conceiving the relationship 
between ‘act’ and ‘being’ affects this formation. He examines and subsequently rejects 
philosophical approaches to the question of revelation, on the grounds that they collapse 
into a domestication of transcendence in which humankind merely posits its own 
meaning. He therefore insists that a theology of revelation—i.e. theology based on 
“something disclosed or given to be known to someone which apart from the act of 
revealing would remain hidden, disguised and unknown”,40 or what Gorringe simply 
refers to as “what we cannot tell ourselves”41—is necessary for the formation of any 
genuine theological concept. Next, he explores how divergent theological approaches to 
the categories of act and being give rise to a variety of theologies of revelation. Having 
cast the problem into relief, he posits his own theological concept of the union of act 
and being in the person of Christ.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s Christological approach to a theology of revelation emphasises not just 
the transcendence of God in Christ, but also the centrality of historicity in revelation, 
thereby articulating a simultaneous appreciation and critique of Barth that 
complements Frei neatly. Bonhoeffer, we will see, could have deployed the critical 
phrase ‘epistemological monophysitism’ in relation to Barth’s early work just as 
convincingly as Frei did, for Frei’s phrase essentially summarises something with 
which Bonhoeffer was equally concerned. 
 
In particular, this section follows Michael DeJonge’s focus upon Bonhoeffer’s 
engagement with Barth on the issues of revelation and transcendence, and his 
attention to the importance of Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran context for understanding the 
way Act and Being develops. DeJonge argues that even though Bonhoeffer embraced 
Barth’s critique of modernist epistemology, and his constructive theology of revelation 
grounded in God’s subjectivity as opposed to God’s objectivity,42 it was the former’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 AB, 27. 
40 Trevor Hart, ‘Revelation’, in John Webster (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2000), 37. 
41 Timothy J. Gorringe, Discerning Spirit: A Theology of Revelation (London: SCM, 1990), 71. 
42 “Barth … faults theology for treating humans as the subjects in the story of theology, in the 
relationship between God and humanity. If humans are the subjects, thinks Barth, it follows quite 
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Lutheran convictions as much as any philosophical sensibility that led to his 
dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of historicity or continuity in Barth. It is 
primarily on this confessional basis, says DeJonge, that Bonhoeffer posited a “person 
concept of revelation” which orients “both to transcendence and history”.43 
 
The critical sections of Act and Being are divided into two categories: Part A enquires 
into philosophical approaches to the question of act and being; Part B enquires into 
theological ones. Bonhoeffer then subdivides each of these categories themselves. Part 
A considers ‘transcendental’ then ‘ontological’ attempts to answer the question of act 
and being. Part B considers ‘act concepts’ then ‘being concepts’ of revelation, before 
beginning to articulate Bonhoeffer’s own ecclesiological-Christology that is continued 
in Part C. Regarding Part A, Paul Janz argues that despite the impression Bonhoeffer 
gives in his introduction, each philosophical subdivision is concerned with a different 
way of approaching the relation between act and being, rather than outlining 
epistemological theories concerned purely with one (act) or the other (being). Thus, as 
far as philosophy is concerned, the ‘transcendental’ section concerns “the attempt of 
thinking (act) to understand the pre-theoretical thinking being out of which thinking 
proceeds, or which is the condition for its possibility”; and the ‘ontological’ section 
concerns “the attempt of thinking (act) to understand the being of that into which 
thinking enquires outside of itself.”44 Part B of the book, however, is more clearly 
divided in terms of theologies of revelation conceived in terms of act on one hand, and 
those conceived in terms of being on the other, and as we shall see, there is a sense in 
which the act theologies converge with the ‘transcendental attempt’ and the being 
theologies with the ‘ontological attempt’.45  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
naturally that God is the object … God is not free and transcendent but comes under the power of the 
knowing subject … Bonhoeffer follows Barth in recognizing that the problem of transcendence 
demonstrates the inadequacy of objective concepts of God, and requires theology to rethink the 
concept of God.” Michael P. DeJonge, ‘Bonhoeffer from the Perspective of Intellectual History’, in 
Green and Carter, Interpreting Bonhoeffer, 199–200.  
43 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 7. 
44 Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind’s Desire: Reference, Reason and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 
105–6.  
45 Janz writes of “the erroneous conclusion that the ‘transcendental attempt’ has mainly to do with the 
‘act’ part of the book and the ‘ontological attempt’ with the ‘being part of the book.” Janz, God, 105. 
This therefore counters DeJonge’s assessment that Bonhoeffer’s Part A does indeed deal with act- and 
being-philosophies in turn, precisely in order to prepare the ground for the theological assessment of act- 
and being-theologies of revelation, and Bonhoeffer’s own constructive alternative. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 
21–22. Granting Janz’s point that what Bonhoeffer actually embarks upon in Part A is indeed an 
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i) Part A: Philosophical issues 
 
a) Kant and transcendentalism 
 
In the first section of Part A, Bonhoeffer is interested in philosophy that emphasises 
the thinking act of the individual subject, directed towards gaining an understanding 
of itself as subject (i.e. it’s own being) and this leads him to engage with the 
philosophical revolution of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Despite not featuring 
significantly in Placher’s thesis (see chapter 2) Kant’s relationship to the enlightenment 
question of transcendence is singularly noteworthy, insofar as he revolutionised the 
relationship between the human thinker and the ‘transcendent’, whilst retaining the 
enlightenment drive towards positioning theology within the framework of universal 
human reason. Bonhoeffer recognises something important in Kant’s thinking that 
has the potential to hold on to a genuine (echten) transcendence, but ultimately assesses 
Kant as collapsing epistemology back into the ‘I’ such that the transcendent has little 
relevance.  
 
Kant’s epistemology revolved around the experience of the self, the relationship 
between noumena (things) and phenomena (the experience of things) and therefore 
question of what knowledge ‘is’. His revolution was to argue that the mind is “active” 
rather than “passive” in relation to that which it seeks to know.46 Kant described how 
a subject always makes an impression upon the object about which they think. As a 
result, ‘the thing-in-itself’ (Das Ding an Sich) can never be apprehended ‘purely’ by 
reason:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
investigation into the relation, Bonhoeffer himself nevertheless claims that in theologies of revelation as 
‘act’, “the problem of transcendental philosophy presents itself anew” (AB, 85) and also that theologies 
of revelation as ‘being’ oppose that transcendental attempt, and cohere more naturally with the 
ontological epistemologies discussed in Part B. Therefore there is a coherence, in Bonhoeffer’s own 
understanding of the problem, between the transcendental attempt and ‘act’, and between the 
ontological attempt and ‘being’. AB, 103–104. This difference notwithstanding, Janz and DeJonge both 
recognise the key point that neither a transcendental/act or ontological/being attempt at epistemology 
are satisfactory in relation to transcendence, as they result in “orienting thinking and ultimately the 
world around the self.” DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 32. 
46 Ibid. 
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There can be no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one mode of 
knowledge with another, without that unity of consciousness that precedes all 
data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of objects is alone 
possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness I shall name 
transcendental apperception.47 
 
By thinking about something, I affect my perception of that thing, and going beyond 
this fundamental subject-object relationship is impossible. In this aspect of Kant’s 
thought, as Bonhoeffer puts it, “the resistance of transcendence to thinking is 
upheld”48 insofar as the mind never grasps that which is beyond itself, because the act 
of the mind upon that which it considers is a determining factor. Far from delivering 
all power to the thinking act, the upshot of this is that the thing-in-itself can never 
actually be known independently. Knowing therefore, does not duplicate reality per se, 
but always yields a particular rendering of it inseparable from the limits of the act of 
subjective thinking.49 True knowledge of that which is beyond us is hidden, and 
transcendence, positively, remains.50 If Kant’s transcendental attempt at epistemology 
were to remain here, it could preserve a posture of humility before the transcendent—
in theological terms, leaving room for a posture of worship.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s insight, however, is that there will always be two ‘poles’ of transcendence 
in Kant’s subjectivity, because when the subject (the ‘I’) asks/thinks about itself, the ‘I’ 
both precedes and follows the thinking act.51 The ‘I’ is already there as that which is 
thinking, and also that which is apprehended (or rather not apprehended) through the 
thinking act.  In spatial terms, “human existence is always out in front of human 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929), 136.  
48 AB, 35. 
49 AB, 37. 
50 Janz assesses Kant’s influence on Bonhoeffer positively, describing how “it is precisely this world—in 
which we find ourselves causally susceptible and conditioned as sensibly embodied beings—that for Kant 
provides the most fundamental ‘critical limit’ for discursive reason … Kantian philosophy limits any 
claims by reason to be able to assert ultimate jurisdiction over sensibly embodied reality, and shows to 
the contrary that thinking must always self critically ‘leave room’ for the empirical reality that 
challenges and confronts thinking on its own causal terms.” Paul D. Janz, ‘Bonhoeffer, This-
Worldliness, and the Limits of Phenomenology’, in Gregor and Zimmerman, Bonhoeffer and Continental 
Thought, 56–57. Nevertheless, this does not mitigate Bonhoeffer’s recognition that Kant can only serve a 
purpose up to a point, given his lack of a positive account of revelation. 
51 AB, 39. Janz, God, 108. 
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beings, but already behind them at every time”.52 As regards the question of 
transcendence, this pans out into two broad epistemological options. 
 
The first option is to acknowledge an implicit “self-limitation.”53 Despite preserving 
the truly transcendent, this ultimately ushers one into an epistemological cul-de-sac, 
because “this something transcendent cannot prove itself to be genuinely 
transcendent”, and therefore “Kant’s original conception comes to naught.”54 
Incapacity there may be, but there is no positive correlate to that—no exteriority of 
the transcendent in relation to the thinking subject. We have the possibility of the 
transcendent but nothing more—nothing which encounters humanity; no 
revelation.55 As Hoff puts it, with Kant the truly transcendent God “evaporates into 
an empty concept”.56 Indeed, Kant himself argues that religion is only meaningful 
insofar as it can be resolved into practical moral instruction, such that “our concern is 
not so much to know what [God] is in himself (his nature) but what he is for us as 
moral beings.”57 Kant resolves everything on the side of reason, thereby depositing 
the transcendent over the other side of an epistemological barrier and making the idea 
of faith and trust in God a functional “moral obligation”;58 and interprets the 
particulars of the Christian faith as meaningful only insofar as they point to a 
‘universal’ moral religion.  
 
[E]very church erected on statutory laws can be the true church only to the  
extent that it contains within itself a principle of constantly coming closer to 
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52 AB, 38. 
53 AB, 39. 
54 AB, 49. 
55 AB, 52–54. 
56 Johannes Hoff, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Kantian Paradigm of Modern Theology’, in Conor 
Cunningham and Peter M. Chandler (eds.), The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, Tradition and Universalism 
(London: SCM, 2010), 186. 
57 Immanuel Kant, ‘Religion within the boundaries of mere reason’ (1793), in Immanuel Kant, Religion 
and Rational Theology, edited by Wood and Giovanni (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 165. Kant’s phrase “for 
us as moral beings” should be distinguished from the Lutheran emphasis on Christ’s pro me (expounded 
in the following chapter). For Kant, the emphasis is not, as Tanner puts it, upon “the character and 
consequences of God’s action in Christ, but a general theological principle about conditions for proper 
talk about or belief in God—for example, a principle that makes subjective appropriation one such 
condition.” Kathryn Tanner, ‘Jesus Christ’, in Colin Gunton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Doctrine (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 253. 
58 Hoff, ‘The Rise’, 186. 
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the pure faith of religion … and of eventually being able to dispense with the 
ecclesiastical faith (in its historical aspect).59 
 
Kant therefore subordinates human religious practice, and in particular that which 
purports to relate the human being to God who is beyond reason, to what he calls 
‘natural religion’ that guides the moral disposition, making for cohesive moral society 
by motivating us towards becoming pleasing to God. The particularity of Christian 
faith and praxis is subordinated to this more universal and ‘practical’ religion, which 
has human reason as its most reliable guide: 
 
[U]niversal human reason must be recognized and honored as supreme 
commanding principle in a natural religion within the Christian doctrine of 
faith.60 
 
Despite what Bonhoeffer recognises as something genuinely transcendent being 
preserved in a ‘pure Kantianism’, this practically oriented resolution back into human 
reason subjugates God, and the doctrine of revelation, to rationality. Therefore, whilst 
Kant does not perform a ‘domestication’ of transcendence in the same univocal terms 
as Placher describes, the effect of his epistemology remains one which disallows any 
true relationship of humanity to God who acts towards us as one who is wholly 
other.61  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Kant, ‘Religion’, 176. 
60 Kant, ‘Religion’, 186. 
61 Christopher Insole has recently argued, rather more critically, that there is not really the possibility of 
‘genuine’ divine transcendence in Kant at all, but that Kant’s “aversion to heteronomy” leads him to  
“[locate] divinity exhaustively within our rational willing and not outside of it.” Christopher J. Insole, ‘A 
Thomistic Reading of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Searching for the Unconditioned’, 
in Modern Theology (31: 2015), 288–289. Kant, suggests Insole, believes that God cannot be the 
“unconditioned and good-without-limit external object for our practical reason and will”, because God 
is “external and heteronomous” and therefore “constrains the creature’s true and perfect freedom.” 
Insole, ‘Thomistic Reading’, 298. The theological tradition “says ‘yes’ to heteronomy, when, and only 
when, the ‘other’ is God” (Ibid.) but Kant refuses this heteronomy altogether, and although he retains a 
“theological shape”, the ‘divine’, for Kant is human beings as they “become pure reason”. Insole, 
‘Thomistic Reading’, 310–11. Therefore, Insole suggests that rather than depositing God over the far 
side of human epistemology, Kant in effect replaces God within human rationality. Further in depth 
critical work on the relationship between Bonhoeffer and Kant would need to take account of Insole’s 
suggestions, but my own focus here is on how Bonhoeffer’s own reading of Kant contributes to his 
Christological alternative to a domesticated transcendence, rather than on whether Bonhoeffer has in 
fact read Kant right.  
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In the second option for Kant’s epistemological revolution—idealism—the I “simply 
becomes the point of departure instead of the limit-point of philosophy.”62 Everything 
is enclosed in the circular movement where the ‘I’ is both the subject and the object. 
This collapses the distinction between transcendental apperception and the thing-in-
itself. Theologically, idealism implies that “the movement of the spirit is turned in 
upon itself, and Bonhoeffer modifies Luther’s terminology about human sinfulness to 
refer to this as “ratio in se ipsam incurve [reason turned in upon itself]”.63 Idealism therefore 
also fails to offer any kind of genuine transcendence; it understands the world purely 
‘through me’ rather than the ‘in relation to me’.64 As DeJonge summarises, “this kind 
of self-understanding suits only a monistic, isolated self that lacks a connection to the 
outside world.”65  
 
Two problems are evident, therefore. Firstly, there is the problem of historical reality. 
Idealism as described here is located wholly within my own consciousness, and 
therefore occurs in isolation from the continuity of life in the world. Thus idealism 
stands in opposition to Bonhoeffer’s point in Sanctorum Communio, that the ‘I’ is 
constituted in historical relation with the ‘You’ who encounters me from without (see 
part I, above). Secondly, we have the theological problem of an epistemology that 
defines God ‘from inside itself’, objectifying God in the process: 
 
idealistic philosophical reflection implies the system in which God’s own self 
resides … I discover God in my coming to myself; I become aware of myself. I 
find myself—that is, I find God.66 
 
God is thus resolved into the act of thinking subject and thereby into the thinking 
subject itself, yet with no continuity and no encounter with the other. Only a concept !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 AB, 39. 
63 AB, 41. On Bonhoeffer’s modification of Luther’s phrase, see Christiane Tietz, ‘Bonhoeffer on the 
Uses and Limits of Philosophy’, in Gregor and Zimmerman, Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought, 43.n.9. 
Beyond the issue of a technical misquote, the fact that Bonhoeffer harnesses Luther’s phraseology here 
highlights how he views errors of idealism soteriologically, insofar as that the fundamental tenets of the 
enlightenment reflect humanity’s sin or fallen-ness, from which God in Christ saves. “At many points in 
his writings Bonhoeffer uses Luther’s phrase cor curvum in se, to summarize sin and the soteriological 
problem.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 122. His (mis)use of the phrase here therefore highlights the confessional 
context within which he views the problem. 
64 John Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: SCM, 1960), 59. 
65 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 27. 
66 AB, 50. 
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of revelation can pierce this ratio in se ipsam incurve that domesticates God and 
downplays historical reality. 
 
  b) Ontology 
 
The ontological approach to the question of act and being emphasises the ‘always-
there-ness’ of existence as that which is beyond consciousness. Here Bonhoeffer is 
concerned with how the I enquires into the world outside of it, and argues that 
ontological/phenomenological thinking arrives at the same cul-de-sac as the 
transcendental attempt, resolving being into its own understanding. Just as he thinks 
Kantian act-epistemology can retain a genuine openness to revelation, Bonhoeffer 
suggests that if ‘being’ were allowed to truly transcend the thinking subject, then 
ontology too could involve an incapacity that allows it to genuinely relate to the 
transcendent.67 However, in his view, ontology only initially acknowledges that being 
transcends consciousness, before subsequently trying to “clear the way”68 and grasp 
being independently of consciousness. The implication is then that human beings can 
“bear within themselves the potential to arrive at the eternal essentials”,69 resulting 
again in what Bonhoeffer calls ratio in se ipsam incurve.  
 
He argues that phenomenologists such as Husserl and Scheler, and Heidegger after 
them, all ultimately infer this same thing—an ontology without exteriority. Firstly, 
Husserl’s phenomenology focuses purely on the unmediated encounter with the 
essence of pure being within consciousness, enabling consciousness to form the idea of 
being for itself.70 What should be a question of exteriority (i.e. of being which 
transcends the thinking subject) is resolved via interiority (i.e. the consciousness of the 
subject). Secondly, although Scheler prioritises the given over consciousness itself, he 
believes that human beings can wholly apprehend this ‘given’ through “the feeling of 
values.”71 With both Husserl and Scheler, then, the remainder is pure immanence. 
This kind of ontology merely brings being inside the thinking subject, and for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 AB, 60. 
68 AB, 61. 
69 Ibid. 
70 See Pierre Keller, Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 39. 
71 “[I]n this ‘feeling of values’ the beholding I is capable of taking into itself the whole world … and the 
very deity; being person, the I bears within itself that which enables it to behold the highest value, to 
understand God and itself.”  AB, 66. 
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Bonhoeffer this is virtually indistinguishable from the idealism described under the 
‘transcendental attempt’ above. Consider for a moment the contemporary approach 
of David Wood highlighted in chapter 2, where transcendence is reduced to the interior 
experience resulting from encounter with the ‘other’, and it becomes apparent how 
Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being critiques that kind of approach. Once more, transcendence 
is effectively denied. 
 
Bonhoeffer thinks Heidegger offers a promising critique of traditional ontology 
because he emphasises being as temporal and externally relating, in contrast to pure 
phenomenology’s interiority.72 Heidegger thought the quest for ‘pure ontology’ was a 
lamentable error, because human beings do not enquire into the ontological question 
in isolation, but reflect upon their being from within their concrete situation.73 
Heidegger therefore describes human being as ‘Dasein’ (‘being-there’) emphasising that 
there is never ‘being’, nor thought about ‘being’, without the ‘there’. In Husserl’s 
phenomenology, consciousness itself (i.e. where ontological questions are considered) 
remains totally distinct from all about which it enquires, and therefore in a way it 
‘escapes’ phenomenological enquiry. This Heidegger objects to this as 
phenomenologically false.74 
 
In Heidegger therefore, what Charles Marsh calls “the aristocracy of the self-reflective 
subject and the privileges accorded its cognitive domain”75 gives way to the concrete 
reality of being in relation to the world—a shift understandably appealing to 
Bonhoeffer. The ontological question can only be asked from the perspective of 
consciousness as already Dasein.  The attempt to prove the existence of the external 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Heidegger is a considerably more important figure for Bonhoeffer than either Husserl or Scheler. 
Bonhoeffer’s preceding critique of phenomenology is essentially itself drawn from Heidegger.  See 
Stephen Plant, ‘Heidegger and Bonhoeffer’, in Frick, Bonhoeffer’s, 319.  
73 “Cartesian and idealist attempts to get from the isolated mind back into reality are rejected by 
Heidegger as the presumption to separate reflection from ontological determination.” Jens 
Zimmerman, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Heidegger: Two Different Visions of Humanity’, in 
Gregor and Zimmerman, Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought, 111. 
74 “How Husserl envisions phenomenology, therefore (and which makes his method very similar to 
Descartes) is that there must be an absolute split between the world and consciousness. But how is this 
division, Heidegger asks, possible, when the very beings for whom this separation occurs (ourselves as 
concrete living beings) also belong to the world?” William Large, Heidegger’s Being and Time (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 9. 
75 Charles Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise Of His Theology (Oxford: OUP, 1994), 118. 
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world, which Heidegger calls the “scandal of philosophy”,76 is but a futile attempt to 
speak of humanity ‘standing apart’ from being as if to enquire about it. Dasein finds 
itself already in temporality, already in relationship to what is there, already within 
limits, and always in relationship to ethics because it cannot be abstracted from the 
concrete. As far the atheist Heidegger is concerned, Dasein’s possibility for authenticity 
is its ‘being towards death’ (Sein-sum-Tode) a kind of paradoxical constitution of oneself 
via the negative, which Large summarises as, “facing the nothingness which is at the 
heart of your existence as nothing and holding fast to it.”77 Nevertheless, the rejection 
of pure phenomenology in favour of a recognition of being in the world—and 
therefore in history—and also of being always in ethical relation to the other (recall 
Sanctorum Communio) means Bonhoeffer marks Heidegger off from the other 
phenomenologists, holding him in considerably higher regard.  
 
However, Bonhoeffer maintains that despite this openness to existentiality and 
therefore ethics, Heidegger’s post-ontological metaphysics nevertheless implies that 
“human beings, qua Dasein, have the understanding of being systematically at their 
disposal”78 and that therefore, “no room has been left for the concept of revelation”.79 
Heidegger has given an account of act and being together, insofar as Dasein’s act is 
always its being in the world (and vice versa) but his resolution remains intra-
subjective: it “represents yet another Pelagian attempt of the self to understand itself 
out of itself.” 80  
 
Overall then, what Bonhoeffer wants to show in Part A is that diverse philosophical 
epistemologies from Kant to Heidegger all fall short theologically, failing to 
acknowledge the correlative necessity for divine revelation, and to embody what in the 
previous chapter we called epistemological incapacity.81  In his essay ‘Concerning the 
Christian Idea of God’ (1932) Bonhoeffer summarises exactly that to which he wants !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are 
expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an 
ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and 
‘outside’ of it a ‘world’ is to be proved as present-at-hand.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. 
Macquarrie & Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 249. 
77 Large, Heidegger’s, 73. 
78 AB, 72. 
79 AB, 73. 
80 Zimmerman, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, 114. 
81 Wayne Witson Floyd, ‘Kant, Hegel and Bonhoeffer’, in Frick, Bonhoeffer’s, 107. 
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to draw attention in this section of his Habilitationschrift—that “theological thinking 
convicts philosophical thinking of being bound … to a presupposition, namely, that 
thinking in itself can give truth.”82 What is required, therefore, is a theology of 
revelation, which emphasises that, 
 
reality is consequently beyond my own self, transcendent—but, again, not 
logically transcendent, but really transcendent. Reality limits my boundlessness 
from outside, and this outside is not more intellectually conceivable but only 
believable.83 
 
The emphasis upon believability points to “the fact of faith”84 as the basis for all 
theological thinking, which means, once more, we are ushered into a confessional 
context for theological epistemology—that context in which, according to Placher, the 
undomesticated conceptions of transcendence in the pre-critical period flourished.  
However, purely recognising the necessity of a theology revelation conceived in a 
confessional context does not immediately resolve the issue. As Bonhoeffer shows, 
theologies of revelation themselves can fall into either the act or being category (thus 
betraying similarities with both transcendental and ontological epistemologies) and in 
doing so fail to do justice both to contingency and continuity that he believes is vital. 
 
Part B argues that a theological examination of these questions requires careful 
nuance with regard to both the contingency and continuity of God’s revelation. In 
other words, for Bonhoeffer, overcoming a domestication of transcendence so that 
God can genuinely be seen to relate to human beings presents—just as it did for 
Frei—a question about faith and history. Furthermore, as is the case with Frei, these 
issues appear clearly for Bonhoeffer’s via his analysis of Barth’s recovery of the true 
otherness/transcendence of God in relation to human beings. 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 BBNY, 452. 
83 BBNY, 453. 
84 BBNY, 454. 
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ii) Part B: Theological issues 
 
a) Act 
 
Bonhoeffer’s primary example of revelation conceived in terms of ‘act’ is Karl Barth’s 
concept of the freedom of God in God’s contingent revelation—a concept 
encountered in chapter 3 of Frei’s doctoral dissertation, and to which Bonhoeffer, like 
Frei, is attracted. As described in chapter 3, Barth was determined to reverse the way 
nineteenth century theology had “sought to take a private road from the depths of 
human experience and consciousness to God”,85 and therefore to counteract the 
epistemological moves implicit in a domesticated account of transcendence.  For this 
reason, Barth’s approach appeals to Bonhoeffer, convincing him that “the problem of 
transcendence poses a fundamental challenge for theology that can be met only 
through a nonobjective concept of God.”86 We recognise along with DeJonge, 
therefore, that only in his positive relation to Barth’s theology can Bonhoeffer be 
understood as a critique of the domestication of transcendence. 
 
Recall that for Barth, revelation is never merely ‘the state of affairs’—never a dormant 
divine truth always potentially graspable by human beings—but is about God’s 
freedom. Human beings “cannot speak of God simply by speaking of man in a loud 
voice”.87 Speech about God is therefore dialectical insofar as we cannot of our own 
volition speak of God, because “to speak of God seriously would mean to speak in the 
realm of revelation and faith … to speak God’s word, the word which can only come 
from him.”88 Such speech is only possible on the basis of “prior divine address”,89 not 
on the ontological grounds of those who speak. God is not necessarily bound to 
humanity, especially not by what Torrance calls “some Ariadne’s thread of immanent 
continuity or anamnesis … into eternity”.90 Moreover, revelation is not to be conceived 
temporally, but is purely contingent, having “all the instability of a deed being done !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910–1930 (London: SCM, 
1962), 46.  
86 DeJonge, ‘Bonhoeffer from the Perspective’, 200. 
87 Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, trans. D. Horton (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1935), 196. 
88 Barth, The Word, 198. 
89 Hart, ‘Revelation’, 41. 
90 Torrance, Karl Barth, 46. 
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right now”.91  Revelation cannot be explained with reference to a broader context of 
natural law or ontology—it ‘just happens’ because God is truly, ultimately, free.   
 
The positive correlate to this negative is that revelation is the free loving act of God, who 
chooses to enact the miracle of revelation, “the restoration of life to that which 
otherwise was doomed to corruption.”92  Barth’s dialectical approach to revelation, 
therefore, clarifies “both the separation and the connexion which the act of revelation 
effects, because revelation is God himself coming to man, God in his goodness coming 
to man in his humanity”93—supremely in Jesus Christ. The strength of this position as 
regards Bonhoeffer’s critique should be clear: Barth is insisting upon the act of the 
truly other as that which places humanity into truth. Therefore Barth’s act concept of 
revelation utterly rejects the modernist attempt to define God within the 
epistemological act of the individual subject. 
 
Nevertheless, as appealing as this approach is—cutting as it does the ties with 
nineteenth century emphasis upon revelation as innate possibility94—Bonhoeffer, like 
Frei, believes Barth’s emphasis upon the contingent act of God as subject does not 
ground proper human relationship to transcendence, but dramatically restricts the 
place of continuity—and thereby the historical—in relation to revelation. In Barth’s 
scheme, says Bonhoeffer, the pure contingency of revelation means “God’s freedom 
and the act of faith are essentially supratemporal”.95 Echoes of Frei’s diagnosis of 
epistemological monophysitism are not hard to discern here, and the fact that both 
theologians make this similar point in relation to Barth, whilst criticising him only “as 
an ally”,96 is a significant similarity in their point of departure on the question of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Karl Barth, Die Christliche Dogmatik, quoted in AB, 83.  
92 Hart, ‘Revelation’, 43. 
93 Torrance, Karl Barth, 82. 
94 In his inaugural lecture in Berlin, Bonhoeffer robustly dismisses the concept of ‘possibility’ in 
theology. Revelation as ‘possibility’, he says, rationalises and fixes reality in a semi-Pelagian fashion that 
fails to allow human beings to be actually confronted and changed by what they encounter, making 
reality instead utterly graspable. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘The Anthropological Question in 
Contemporary Philosophy and Theology’, in BBNY, 403–405. See also BBNY, 452. 
95 AB, 84. 
96 Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 53. See also Pangritz: “The acuity of the critique of Barth present in Act and 
Being should not deceive one into ranking Bonhoeffer with the colleagues at the Berlin faculty in their 
opposition to Barth. The converse is more likely: Precisely because he feels close to Barth—the many 
approvingly cited quotations affirm this perception—Bonhoeffer endeavors to work out as closely as 
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revelation, and thus points toward the promise of putting their Christology’s together. 
Both theologians develop their constructive Christology with concerned attention not 
just to un-domesticated transcendence, but also to historicity. Therefore the act of 
reading them together to supplement and support one another’s theology is a task 
complementing their own agendas. In other words, this particular ‘fit’ between Frei 
and Bonhoeffer—such that Frei’s diagnosis of epistemological monophysitism can 
function to describe that to which Bonhoeffer too is averse—provides a strong basis 
for my constructive comparison.97 
 
Bonhoeffer also thinks Barth’s dialectical act concept of revelation possesses the same 
failing as transcendentalism, insofar as it is primarily an inward-looking reflection upon 
the inability of the human being to really connect with the transcendent, with God. 
DeJonge explains how, for Bonhoeffer, Barth’s notion of human incapacity as regards 
revelation results  
 
“from a philosophical conviction about the finite mind’s inability (incapax) to 
grasp the infinite … Barth arrives at a ‘quite general’ not-knowing based on 
philosophical anthropology rather than on the reality of revelation.”98  
 
Thus, in the same way that transcendentalism fails concerning its lack of historicity 
and its self-referential nature, so, believes Bonhoeffer, does Barth’s formal act-concept 
of revelation.  
 
Contrastingly, Bonhoeffer wants to speak of humanity being genuinely encountered 
by God in historical continuity, where the substance of that encounter is the substance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
possible the differences which nevertheless exist between them.” Andreas Pangritz, ‘Bonhoeffer and the 
Barthian Movement’, in Frick, Bonhoeffer’s, 251–252. 
97 It is important to specifically locate this similarity between Frei and Bonhoeffer in relation to Barth’s 
early work, and not just ‘Barth’s theology’ in general. Tom Greggs argues that there are number of ways 
in which Barth’s later theology (especially in Church Dogmatics II/2 and III/1, neither of which 
Bonhoeffer lived long enough to engage critically with) go a considerable way to answering 
Bonhoeffer’s criticisms in Act and Being and later on in Letters and Papers from Prison (see chapter 7). Tom 
Greggs, Theology Against Religion: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and Barth (London: T&T Clark, 
2011), 74–86. See also Marsh, Reclaiming, 3–33, and n.100 below.  Furthermore, Frei’s engagement 
with Barth, especially looking to him as an example of a preferable ‘type’ of theology, also goes beyond 
the specific issue of ‘epistemological monophysitism’ (see chapter 4, part II) and so cannot be reduced 
to that. The suggestion here, therefore, is specifically that both theologians’ engagements with ‘the early 
Barth’ offer a useful locus for exploring their similarity in general. 
98 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 61. 
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of revelation as person. Hence Bonhoeffer’s oft-quoted re-evaluation of the meaning 
of God’s freedom in revelation: 
 
It is a question of the freedom of God, which finds its strongest evidence 
precisely in that God freely chose to be bound to historical human beings and 
to be placed at the disposal of human beings. God is free not from human beings but 
for them. Christ is the word of God’s freedom. God is present, that is, not in 
eternal non-objectivity but—to put it quite provisionally for now—‘haveable’, 
graspable in the Word within the church. Here the formal understanding of 
God’s freedom is countered by a substantial one.99 
 
In being towards the world in Christ, God freely donates Godself in pure self-giving 
love that truly bites with the cogs of historical human life. Rather than emphasising an 
incapacity of humanity or historicity to ‘contain’ infinitude (on the basis of which 
Barth makes revelation wholly contingent) Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran sensibility—as 
DeJonge consistently points out—binds him to confess that the finite bears the infinite 
(finitum capax infinite) in the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, who is God’s 
revelation.100 Revelation as God’s freedom towards the world in the person of Christ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 AB, 91. 
100 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 144. Cumin summarises thus: “[F]or Luther the central issue was … about the 
immediate presence of this God right at hand.” Paul Cumin, Christ at the Crux: The Mediation of God and 
Creation in Christological Perspective (Oregon: Pickwick, 2014), 73. The emphasis by DeJonge on the 
confessional divergence between Bonhoeffer (Lutheran) and Barth (Reformed) complicates the view 
that Barth simply developed the capacity to get around Bonhoeffer’s critique as Charles Marsh thinks 
he does (see n.97, above). Marsh admits that the pure dialectics of Barth’s early theology warrant 
Bonhoeffer’s criticism, but believes that Barth, understanding through his reading of Anselm that 
speech about God’s being is a response to God’s act of revelation, offers a nuanced understanding of 
the relationship between God’s aseity (God’s being in Godself) and promeity (God’s being towards us) 
so that God’s being for us is possible only on the basis of God’s being for Godself in Trinity (God’s 
‘primary objectivity’). Barth, says Marsh, wants to “stress the priority of God’s aseity over his promeity, 
not in order to forge a dichotomy between God in himself and God in his revelation but simply to say 
that before all else is, God is God.” Marsh, Reclaiming, 31. ‘God being God’ is God acting in Trinitarian 
self-relation, which is God’s being-in-act prior to God’s revelation. Marsh, Reclaiming, 17.  Marsh 
believes that Bonhoeffer is not as attentive as Barth to this ‘primary objectivity’, offering instead “a 
continuous wandering along the various paths of the secondary objectivity of revelation, attentive with 
an intensity not found in Barth to the inner rhythms of worldliness but by no means disregarding the 
majestic narrative of God’s aseity ascribed by him.” Marsh, Reclaiming, 32. DeJonge, on the other hand, 
believes that these nuances matter very little as regards Bonhoeffer’s critique, for they remain focused 
upon a Reformed understanding of revelation as subject-act rather than Lutheran ‘person’ 
understanding. Bonhoeffer is objecting to a view of God-in-Godself always ‘at the back of’ revelation 
rather than wholly ‘in’ it, and therefore “Bonhoeffer could very well concede that Barth’s theology 
makes significant gains in deploying being-language and securing continuity. But he would remain 
dissatisfied that Barth grounds these gains elsewhere than the historical person of Christ.” DeJonge, 
Bonhoeffer’s, 106. Again, “Barth understands revelation’s contingency as the act of a divine subject, while 
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preserves the otherness and contingency of God’s act, whilst maintaining the 
substantial (rather than formal) nature of God’s being present. In the Christology 
lectures that we examine in the following chapter, this priority of the particular person 
of Christ—overlapping as it does with Frei’s priority of person over presence—will be 
developed and expressed more pointedly. 
 
By ‘have-able’, Bonhoeffer does not mean that God is graspable like an object for 
empirical examination, but like Luther, he is emphasising God’s free gift of Godself to 
the church, by virtue of which Christians have their righteousness in God, and the 
church finds its identity outside of itself.101 The fundamental characteristic of 
Lutheranism that Hampson calls “living extrinsically” is preserved, insofar as 
revelation is genuinely beyond humankind, whilst wholly for them.102 Rather than 
purely being acted-upon, human beings must be encountered by, and therefore 
encounter for themselves, the God who is free for them and towards them. Whilst 
allying himself with Barth on the crucial otherness of God from the world, Bonhoeffer 
believes that Barth’s theology of revelation as contingent act alone gives an 
unsatisfactory account both of the fullness of God’s act towards human history in 
Christ and of the contemporary reality of the Christian person in relation to God’s 
revelation.  
 
  b) Being 
 
Bonhoeffer treats attempts to define revelation as ontology comparatively briefly, 
showing us—as was the case with both transcendental and ontological philosophies—
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Bonhoeffer understands revelation’s contingency as the act of a divine person whose being is in 
history.” DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 145. 
101 See also LT, 31–33. Luther (as Bonhoeffer also explains in LT, 31) speaks of the “the righteousness 
of another, instilled from without” according to which, “[t]hrough faith in Christ, therefore, Christ’s 
righteousness becomes our righteousness and all that he has becomes ours; rather, he himself becomes 
ours.”  Martin Luther, ‘Two Kinds of Righteousness’, in Timothy F. Lull (ed.), Martin Luther’s Basic 
Theological Writings (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 155–156. On God’s giving of Godself to Christians 
and the church in Luther’s theology, and the argument that Luther advocates theosis, see Simo Peura, 
‘What God Gives Man Receives: Luther on Salvation’, in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, 
Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1998), 89–92.  
102 Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2001), 49. 
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that such ontological attempts at the theology of revelation turn upon a domestication 
of transcendence, because they define revelation within the continually accessible. 
He uses three examples to describe how revelation can be understood ontologically—
namely, revelation as doctrine, as consciousness and as institution. Firstly, to equate 
revelation with doctrine (e.g. saying ‘the doctrine of the incarnation is God’s revelation’) 
makes the divine nature “subject to classification”.103 What is ‘revealed’ is a category 
or description into which God is understood to fit, rather than the description 
pointing to the greater reality. Here Bonhoeffer’s discomfort with classification 
complements Frei’s understanding of theological doctrine as a “descriptive 
grammar”104 rather than a set of categories under which God in Christ is classified, or 
with which God in Christ is wholly correlated.105  Revelation as doctrine loses sight of 
the sense in which revelation encounters human beings from without, destabilising and 
challenging them, requiring the suspension of knowing.106 Doctrine as the being of 
revelation simply does not preserve an epistemological incapacity.  
 
Secondly, equating a theology of revelation with consciousness means that religious 
experience has the “objective status of being”.107  Once again, God is “found in my 
experience, understandable and subject to classification within the human system of 
experiences”.108 This is little different from the idealism that Bonhoeffer rejected in 
Part A, presenting before us the same problem of God being resolved into the human 
thinking subject. Again, we see kinship between Bonhoeffer’s sensibilities and Frei’s 
unease concerning the subjection of the particular revelation of God in Christ to a 
more general category of religious ‘experience’.  
 
Thirdly, if institutions (e.g. church, or scripture) are understood as the continuous 
existence of pure revelation, then again they place God at humanity’s disposal. In 
these three ontological concepts of revelation “the I arranges a preordained place for 
that which exists and subjects itself freely to it … The I can subject itself only because 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 AB, 103. 
104 Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology (Yale: Yale University Press, 1992), 20. 
105 Frei, Types, 81–82. 
106 AB, 107. 
107 AB, 104. 
108 Ibid. 
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that is how it experiences an ultimate securing of itself.”109 In other words, that which 
is beyond is conceived within the boundaries of the I, and thus its true otherness is 
illusory. 
Having rejected these three options, Bonhoeffer theologically modifies what he 
understands to be the agreeable aspects of Heidegger’s Dasein, and suggests that the 
only feasible ontological approach to revelation is to understand the human person as 
already being in (sein in) that which constitutes, really affects, and thus confronts them. 
Quite simply, this means being in God, which means being in Christ, which means 
being in the church. In Part C Bonhoeffer describes how 
Dasein becomes free, not as if it could stand over against its being-how-it-is as 
autonomous being, but in the sense of escaping from the power of the I into 
the power of Christ, where alone it recognizes itself in original freedom as 
God’s creature.110 
 
Here Act and Being charts territory close to Sanctorum Communio, where ecclesiology is 
the historically grounded alternative to intra-subjectivism. As he moves on to an 
integrative alternative to pure act and pure being theologies (towards the end of Part 
B and in Part C) Bonhoeffer therefore argues that Christological ecclesiology offers a 
properly theological integration of act and being.  
 
iii) Christ, the form of revelation 
Bonhoeffer focusses on revelation as the person of Christ, in whom Christians live, in 
the church. This bypasses individualism in favour of a community that genuinely 
receives its meaning from outside—that is, from Christ, and secondarily from the 
other person through whom Christ is present. Thus Bonhoeffer presents a theology of 
revelation conceived in relation to genuine, undomesticated transcendence.111  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 AB, 108. 
110 AB, 150. 
111 Ray Anderson, commenting on both Act and Being and Sanctorum Communio, believes Bonhoeffer does 
in fact “equate the living Word, the person of Christ, with the believing community” and thereby 
makes the community a pole of transcendence in such a way that overtakes the historical transcendence 
of God in Christ, thus calling into question whether Bonhoeffer is really on the right lines here. 
Anderson, Historical, 218. He is right that this would be a problem, but in the light of the distinctions 
outlined by Tietz and others (see above, n.35) wrong that this is what Bonhoeffer has done. 
Incidentally, Anderson wants to recognise scripture as the other pole of historical transcendence, but 
his own elucidation of how scripture constitutes this pole is over-positivistic and lacking in nuance of the 
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Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology differs from the human self-categorisation that occurs when 
the church is approached as revelation-in-institution, without any real encounter from 
outside itself, because ecclesiology “conceived in personal terms … [is] created by and 
founded upon Christ, in which Christ is revealed as the δεύτερος ἀνθρωπος, as the new 
human, or rather, as the new humanity itself.”112 Here, human beings know 
themselves as persons not via intra-subjective ontological reflection upon 
consciousness or the like—which in Part C Bonhoeffer introduces theologically as 
“being in Adam”113—but by knowing themselves as “encountered, judged, or created 
anew by Christ”,114 in the proclamation of his death and resurrection. This is possible 
only by “being already in the community of Christ”—i.e. the church wherein one 
encounters God’s act towards the world through others in that body. Occupying a 
child-like orientation to the future, rather than a self-reflexive “look back upon 
themselves”, Christians are oriented to the one who defines them from beyond.115   
This Christological and ecclesiological theology of revelation cuts across the 
dichotomy of act and being in revelation, because revelation is God’s free contingent 
act towards the world in Christ,116 and the continuous being of the church as “the 
community of persons that is constituted and formed by the person of Christ”.117  
Bonhoeffer stresses that faith is central to being in Christ in the church (as opposed to 
being in Adam) emphasising how the confessional context of theology means that 
revelation is not delivered into the hands of the subject. A person’s own faith is 
subsequent to God’s act rather than some kind of act-upon-God, for faith is 
“understood not as a human possibility but as God’s gift”.118  Nevertheless that person 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
complexity between text, history and community. Anderson, Historical, 219–222. Were one to follow 
Anderson in seeking to overcome Bonhoeffer’s problem of over-identifying Christ and community with 
a theology of scripture—something I believe to be ultimately unnecessary—Frei’s approach to scripture 
is much more nuanced and careful. One could, therefore, explore Frei’s theology of scripture in 
comparison with Anderson’s, but that is beyond the scope of this study. 
112 AB, 112. 
113 AB, 144–145.  
114 AB, 152. 
115 AB, 161. 
116 “God’s action alone can cause it to be historical reality so that it must be presupposed prior to every 
reflection upon it.” Ernst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, trans. Rumscheidt (Philadelphia: 
Fortress, 1985), 13. 
117 AB, 113. 
118 AB, 117. Recall Barth’s reading of Anselm on faith, in Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum: 
Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of his Theological Scheme, trans. Ian W. Robertson (London: 
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lives their faith in the continuity of being in the church, in the body of Christ. The 
historical reality of the church as the body of Christ is the act of God that makes for 
faith. Thus being in faith, contingent and continuous, is the mode of existence of the 
human subject encountered by God’s revelation in Christ. Emphasis upon faith, 
therefore, is not emphasis upon an intra-subjective epistemological act or ontology, 
but upon being encountered by Christ, the one who cannot be domesticated.119  
 
 
III 
 
Conclusion 
 
Like his ecclesiology in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer’s Christological account of 
revelation in Act and Being is robustly positioned against the intra-subjective 
epistemology that characterises modernity. Human beings, he wants to emphasise, 
cannot place themselves into truth, nor offer of their own volition an exhaustive 
account of God. Bonhoeffer is therefore drawn to Barth’s recovery of transcendence 
in relation to God’s subjectivity. However, concern to unite God’s act of revelation 
with the continuity of historical existence also leads Bonhoeffer to mount much the 
same criticism as Frei does when the latter describes Barth’s ‘epistemological 
monophysitism’. Following DeJonge’s recognition that “the problem of act and being 
… points to the necessity of developing a form of thinking that respects God’s 
transcendence while theoretically grounding the historical aspects of the Christian 
life”,120 we can understand Frei’s phrase to function as an effective label for that to 
which Bonhoeffer objects.  
 
In positioning himself critically in relation to Barth, Bonhoeffer pushes us towards the 
importance of historical particularity in any account of Jesus’ transcendence that 
resists the domestication described by Placher. In short, here we have the beginnings !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
SCM, 1960), 170–171. See also Bonhoeffer’s essay ‘Concerning the Christian Idea of God’ (1932) 
wherein faith is the transcendent act of God, received by humankind. BBNY, 459. 
119 “One can speak ‘authentically’ of existence only as of existence to which things happen. Every 
concept of existence that is not formed by being encountered or not being encountered by Christ is 
‘inauthentic’ (including Heidegger’s ‘authentic’ existence).” AB, 116. 
120 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 129.  
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of how Bonhoeffer, like Frei, resists domesticated transcendence whilst emphasising 
the historicity of Jesus, and therefore points towards an account of the transcendence 
of Jesus himself that has his historicity at the heart.  
 
Nevertheless, despite Bonhoeffer’s concern for historical continuity and especially for 
a personal-ecclesiological account of revelation, in Act and Being in particular there is 
little explicit emphasis upon the particular shape of the life of Jesus of Nazareth. The 
emphasis upon historicity per se does not pan out satisfactorily into descriptions of 
Jesus’ historically particular activity or identity. To be sure, Christ encounters me 
from without, and determines my existence on account of this primordial exteriority 
and his presence to me through others. Bonhoeffer does not collapse Christ into the 
rest of humanity nor into consciousness or a similar kind of generalisation, for in Act 
and Being, Jesus’ cross and resurrection are at the heart of God’s transforming 
encounter with humanity, before which human being is judged, and out of which 
human beings live oriented to God’s future.121 However, Bonhoeffer does not 
emphasise how the cross and resurrection only mean what they do in relation to the 
particularity of the man Jesus of Nazareth. In Sanctorum Communio, the issue is less stark 
but broadly similar, insofar as whilst Christ’s historicity per se is constitutive of the 
historical existence of the church by the Spirit, his historical particularity is emphasised 
very little. 
 
To mitigate a fall into that which Bonhoeffer wants to avoid—i.e. the generalisation of 
Jesus Christ under a ‘principle’ such that his personhood is no longer free—Frei’s 
term ‘unsubstitutability’ serves to alert us to the kind of thing that needs bringing out 
more in Bonhoeffer’s early work. Jesus’ cross and resurrection are not only contingent 
events that interrupt human beings in their present, but also concrete particularities 
that, in Frei’s terms, are constitutive of the narrative of the identity of Jesus of 
Nazareth—the one who is also transcendent. As Frei highlights by resisting the 
abstraction of the meaning of the gospels from the narrative, they are events that 
cannot be abstracted from the identity of the one who enacts and undergoes them.  In 
other words, emphasis upon unsubstitutability can ensure that we are really speaking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 E.g. “Proclamation of the cross and resurrection, determined by eschatology and predestination, 
and the occurrence effective within that proclamation, lift the past into the present or paradoxically 
into the future.” AB, 111. 
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of a theology of Jesus’ transcendence rather than a concept of transcendence (the 
general category) that is only secondarily Christological. To borrow Frei’s term, if 
properly conceived, transcendence is “constrained” to refer to Jesus himself, rather 
than vice versa.122 Unsubstitutability guards against generalisation. 
 
If the confessional (Lutheran) aspect is crucial to understanding Act and Being, then, as 
DeJonge also notes, it is also explicitly central to Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures in 
1933, where the substance of Christ as revelation over and against human 
epistemology is explicated via a Lutheran theologia crucis.123 H. Gaylon Barker has 
recently demonstrated that it would be a misrepresentation of Bonhoeffer’s work to 
suggest that a theologia crucis appears from nowhere in the Christology lectures.124 
Indeed, even without Sanctorum Communio or Act and Being, Bonhoeffer’s sermons and 
meditations prior to 1933 illuminate the importance of a theologia crucis for him.125 
However, the 1933 lectures are where this aspect of Bonhoeffer’s thought is explicated 
in the most sustained and detailed way—especially regarding the humiliation of Christ 
as the stumbling block to humanity—and they also become a vital reference point 
when understanding work that follows them.126   
 
Therefore, we turn now to Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures for the purpose of 
explicating his crucial contribution to a theology of the transcendence of Jesus 
developed alongside Frei. Where this chapter has described Frei and Bonhoeffer’s 
similar starting point regarding a theology of transcendence, the next chapter 
continues to emphasise and how Frei’s notion of ‘unsubstitutability’ can guide a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 153. 
123 DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s, 85. 
124 H. Gaylon Barker, The Cross of Reality: Luther’s Theologia Crucis and Bonhoeffer’s Christology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2015) esp. part III (125–248). Note: there is a mismatch in how the parts of this book are 
labelled, the contents page describing this section as part II, and the actual section being labeled part 
III.  
125 E.g. “We stand before Good Friday and Easter, the days of God’s almighty deeds in history, deeds 
in which God’s judgement and grace became visible for all the world, judgement in those hours in 
which Jesus Christ the Lord hung on the cross, grace in that hour when death was devoured in 
victory.” BBNY, 484; “[F]rom within eternity itself God has extended a hand into time in Jesus Christ 
… amid all the transitoriness and darkness stands a sign from eternity, serious and mighty, bathed in 
the radiance of the divine sun of grace and light—the cross.” BBNY, 519; “Christ on the cross—that 
was the message which Paul sent out … That was the God for whom the first martyrs died. It was the 
God that Luther rediscovered … Christ on the cross, Christ the hidden king of the hidden kingdom—
that is the message of the Protestant church.” EAPW, 418. 
126 Barker, The Cross, 230–231.  
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reading of Bonhoeffer’s theology of revelation in Christ, but in addition, reflects upon 
how Bonhoeffer’s theology—specifically his theologia crucis—can significantly develop 
Frei’s work.  
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Chapter 6. 
 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER: TRANSCENDENCE,  
A THEOLOGIA CRUCIS AND UNSUBSTITUTABILITY 
 
This chapter describes how Bonhoeffer’s 1933 Christology lectures further his 
Christological critique of domesticated transcendence, especially via a Lutheran 
theologia crucis (theology of the cross); and shows how reading this aspect of 
Bonhoeffer’s work alongside Frei allows both theologians to add to each another’s 
contribution towards a theology of the transcendence of Jesus.1 Fusing central 
Lutheran themes with Kierkegaard’s language of ‘incognito’, Bonhoeffer emphasises 
Kierkegaard’s sense of the paradoxical offense at the heart of the gospel, whilst 
following Luther in such a way that allows a more robust concept of particular 
historicity than Kierkegaard himself. This makes for a rich theology of Christ’s 
transcendence: Jesus is the one who as wholly other comes to us from without and 
transcends in and by virtue of his concrete—and scandalous—history. 
 
After highlighting how Bonhoeffer’s lectures begin from the same starting point as 
Frei’s Identity, this chapter suggests three ways Bonhoeffer and Frei can develop one 
another’s work. Firstly, I re-state the point at made the end of the preceding chapter, 
that Frei’s concept of unsubstitutability urges us to highlight, more explicitly than 
Bonhoeffer does, the historical particularity of Jesus in a theologia crucis. Frei exhorts 
Bonhoeffer readers to articulate Bonheoffer’s theologia crucis at the level of realistic 
narrative, so that Jesus is understood always to transcend precisely as a concrete and 
particular person. Here, Frei assists a corrective to readings of Bonhoeffer that 
concentrate too heavily on the general anthropological dimension of Christ as person 
per se, without emphasising his unique particularity as Divine-human person. In 
return, Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis offers a deep reflection upon the problematic 
paradox of Jesus’ own unsubstitutable historicity, and thereby supplements Frei’s own 
description of how Jesus who “walked incognito”2 is “a very demanding figure”.3 This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures are possessed only in the form of students’ notes, but these are 
adequately detailed for a meaningful reconstruction. See B, 299 n.1. 
2 Hans W. Frei, ‘The Encounter of Jesus with the German Academy’, in Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian 
Theology, edited by George Hunsinger and William Placher (Yale: Yale University Press, 1992), 136. 
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difficulty of relating to Christ forms a particularly strong example of how Frei and 
Bonhoeffer can be brought together towards articulating a theology of Jesus’ 
transcendence at the level of historical particularity. Thirdly, I elucidate the 
connection between Bonhoeffer’s emphasis upon Christ as pro me and Frei’s cultural 
linguistic attention to the community normed by the identity of Christ. Here, my 
observation that Bonhoeffer offers Frei scholarship an emphasis upon the ‘offense’ of 
Christ is applied to the experience of the church, such that the difficulty of relation to 
Jesus can inform the humility, flexibility and generosity of its theology. 
 
I  
 
Bonhoeffer’s ‘Who’ Question 
 
One of the clearest examples of the affinity between Frei and Bonhoeffer is the way in 
which Bonhoeffer’s lectures begin with the same central point that Frei makes in 
Identity—i.e. emphasising the question ‘who’ as fundamental to Christology. Virtually 
mirroring Frei’s emphasis on who Jesus is rather than how he is present, Bonhoeffer 
begins his lectures by insisting that ‘who?’ (rather than ‘how’ or ‘what’) is the only 
legitimate Christological question.4 Both Frei and Bonhoeffer, then, are theologians of 
the question ‘who is Jesus Christ?’  
 
Recalling the argument outlined in chapter 5, Bonhoeffer insists, like Frei, that 
Christology asks ‘who?’ rather than ‘how?’ or ‘what?’, because Jesus Christ is not an 
object to be analysed, nor a figure whose life or psychology merely points to a 
universal idea, but rather is the divine person who encounters us. Bonhoeffer narrates 
an interruptive encounter between the “human logos” (i.e. human self-understanding 
as epitomised in post-enlightenment thought) and the “counter Logos” (Gegenlogos)—
the person of Christ who is the incarnate Word (Logos) of God.   
 
[W]hat happens if the counter Logos suddenly … appears, somewhere and at 
some time in history, as a human being, and as a human being sets itself up as 
judge over the human logos and says, ‘I am the truth’ [John 14:6], I am the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Frei, ‘Encounter’, 133. 
4 B, 302. 
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death of the human logos, I am the life of God’s Logos, I am the Alpha and 
the Omega? [Rev 1:11] Human beings are those who must die and must fall, 
with their logos, into my hands. Here it is no longer possible to fit the Word 
made flesh into a logos classification system. Here all that remains is the 
question: Who are you?5 
 
Asking ‘who’ therefore retains a posture of epistemological humility—which 
Bonhoeffer calls “the silence of the church”—because it enquires properly about Jesus 
who is out of my grasp.6 Recalling the previous chapter, the ‘who’ question therefore 
prioritises the person of Christ over an idealist theology of revelation (see previous 
chapter) for as Bonhoeffer put it in 1932, “man will always be able to learn a new idea 
and fit it into his system of ideas; but a revelation in ‘once-ness’ in a historical fact, in a 
historical personality, is always anew a challenge to man.”7  
 
Asking ‘how’, on the other hand, concerns the way in which the person of Jesus might 
fit into my categories of understanding, how he might be ‘mastered’ by me; it is the 
question of an objective theology of revelation. In 1928 Bonhoeffer gave a lecture 
called ‘The Essence of Christianity’, where, reflecting Frei’s critique of the nineteenth 
century ‘lives’ of Jesus, he described the connection between these Jesus novels and 
the objective theology of revelation. Jesus novels “give free reign to our imagination”, 
says Bonhoeffer, and assume that, “because we already know from our own 
philosophy about the best possible morality, and the highest, most appropriate idea of 
God, we can simply insinuate this information into Jesus’ own words.”8 
 
Bonhoeffer saw this liberal approach as little more than a form of Docetism, reducing 
the particular humanity of Christ to “the embodiment of a religious idea” such that 
the particular form of Christ is no longer challenging for us.9 In contrast, therefore, 
Bonhoeffer narrates what Phillips calls a “dispossession of the human sciences by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 B, 302. 
6 B, 300. 
7 BBNY, 457. 
8 BBNY, 346. 
9 B, 336. “[A]ll liberal theology must be understood in the context of a docetic Christology. The idea of 
Jesus’ humanity bypasses here the reality of Jesus as a human being, confuses the ideal of his humanity 
with its reality, in short, makes his humanity into a symbol.” B, 337. 
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Christology”10 to reject the same aspects of the post-enlightenment Christology of 
Culture Protestantism that Frei wishes to counter in Eclipse and Identity. With a system 
of ideas giving way to a person, we have Bonhoeffer alluding very much to what Frei 
called unsubstitutability, and Frei’s notion functions as an effective term for what 
Bonhoeffer is getting at here. 
 
Having laid out the ‘who’ question, Bonhoeffer touches again on his argument in 
Sanctorum Communio that personhood is constituted from without—primordially by 
God, and derivatively in relation to God through community—and in this vein 
explains that the ‘who’ question simply is the question of transcendence: 
 
The question that asks about my existence, and calls it into question, is also the 
question of transcendence, because it is with reference to transcendence that 
my own being is called into question; in theological terms, because it is only 
with reference to God that human beings know who they are. If the ‘who 
question’ is the only question I ask that goes beyond my own being, then this is 
the only question that asks about transcendence and existence.11 
 
In this case, then, transcendence is not about distance or separateness, but about what 
Hampson calls “living extrinsically”12—i.e. having one’s personhood defined from 
beyond oneself, in particular by God. As we will see, God’s transcendent being-
towards-the-world is not mere epistemological one-upmanship, as if God’s act in 
Christ is merely to prove people wrong and God right. Rather, God’s being towards the 
world is, as Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran Christology will make clear, about the world’s 
salvation through the crucified and risen Christ. 
 
Christology is therefore not in the business of proving or rationalising the union of 
Jesus’ divinity and/or humanity under post-enlightenment categories, nor is it the 
‘science’ of the hypostatic union as a necessary prerequisite to thinking about Jesus. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Jacob Philips, ‘Dispossessed Science, Dispossessed Self: Dilthey and Bonhoeffer’s Christology 
Lectures of 1933’, in Adam C. Clark and Michael Mawson (eds.), Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and 
Contemporary Scholarship (Oregon: Pickwick, 2013), 68. See also Paul Janz, God the Mind’s Desire 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 205. Janz too recognises that this “genuinely dispossessive question” is the true 
question of transcendence. 
11 B, 305; SC, 51. 
12 Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2001), 49. 
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One cannot go behind any person and split off their ‘parts’ for analysis without 
objectifying them and thereby dismantling their person-hood, and supremely in the 
case of Jesus Christ, one cannot get behind the personal union of divinity and 
humanity that is fundamental to his identity.13 In a later section of the lectures on the 
basic issues at stake in the history of dogmatic Christology, Bonhoeffer says that the 
Chalcedonian confession—of one Christ with two natures—functions not as a positive 
rationalisation but a statement of the mystery of this person.14 Witnessing to the 
“limitations of its own concepts”,15 Chalcedon refuses the ‘how’ question. “The matter 
itself is left as a mystery, for we cannot enter into it within the parameters of positive 
thinking. We can only enter in faith.”16 Christology, therefore, should highlight only 
the point emphasised in Bonhoeffer’s introduction: that Jesus encounters us from the 
beginning as the one who is the incarnate Word of God, and whose identity is not 
available to us in analysable parts prior to this encounter.17  
 
Bonhoeffer’s lectures also re-emphasise the ecclesiological nature of Christology 
described in Sanctorum Communio and Act and Being. Bonhoeffer believes that the faith 
“that God was revealed in Jesus Christ … cannot be theologically questioned”.18  
Christology is not about asking ‘how can Jesus be God?’ but ‘what does it mean that 
Jesus is God?’ or ‘who is this one who is God?’ We recall Frei’s unpreparedness to 
consider Jesus Christ in abstraction from the faithful praxis of reading the narratives 
of Jesus as literal descriptions of his identity as God incarnate, and recognise that 
Bonhoeffer too thinks Christology is a discipline that only ‘works’ in the context of fides 
quaerens intellectum.   
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 B, 304. 
14 See again DeJonge: “Bonhoeffer argues that Chalcedon, by resolving the debate about natures in 
terms of the person, prohibits discussion of natures in the abstract.” Michael P. DeJonge, ‘The Presence 
of Christ in Karl Barth, Franz Hildebrandt and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in Dietrich Bonhoeffer Yearbook 4: 
2009/2010 (München: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 2010), 110. 
15 B, 343. 
16 B, 342. 
17 “[O]ne can legitimately ask who only after the self-revelation of the other to whom one puts the 
question has already taken place … That is, the question of who can only be asked on the condition that 
the answer has already been given.” B, 303. 
18 B, 304. 
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Christology necessarily involves those who ask the ‘who’ question, primarily because 
asking this forces Christians to realise that they are the ones being truly questioned 
and encountered.  
 
The question we have to put to the person of Christ, ‘Who are you?’ comes 
back at us: who are you, that you ask this question? … Who are you, you who 
can only ask about me because you have been justified and received grace 
through me?19 
 
Here, then, the transcendence of Jesus is not just what Sykes describes as “questions of 
transcendence raised by Jesus”,20 but is about the questions asked by Jesus of us.  In 
Christ human beings encounter God, the creator and redeemer, and therefore one 
who is utterly prior to humanity. Human beings do not define Christ, but Christ 
defines them. As Bonhoeffer emphasised in Creation and Fall, human beings cannot 
posit their own existence, but exist as those in the “middle”—receiving their 
beginning and end from God.21 Here in the Christology lectures, Christ counters 
humankind’s self-definition, and calls them instead to receive their beginning and end 
from him. Again, his transcendence is his being towards us as wholly other. 
 
As mentioned above, this emphasis upon ‘who’ illuminates how Bonhoeffer’s 
Christological sensibilities overlap with Frei’s on the priority of identity over presence, 
and also on the centrality of Jesus as the risen one as regards his contemporaneous 
presence. Bonhoeffer introduces the question of Jesus’ presence in almost exactly the 
same way that Frei does, pointing towards the fact that with any other past historical 
figure, the word ‘presence’ can only be explicated with regard to continuing influence 
or personality, force of memory or the like (we can meaningfully say, for example, that 
Louis Armstrong is still ‘present’ to the jazz tradition). However, approaching Christ’s 
unique presence in that way fails to take account of his resurrection, which is the 
“ground and prerequisite” for speaking about Jesus’ presence as person rather than 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 B, 305. 
20 Stephen Sykes, ‘Transcendence and Christology’, The Modern Churchman (16, 1973), 66. Sykes speaks 
of an account of transcendence in relation to Christology “built on experiences at the instigation of 
Jesus which cause questions to be raised in a manner which continually points beyond the experiences”. 
He does, however, recognise that questions of Christology are about the person (i.e. ‘who’) rather than 
precisely how such a person is ‘possible’. Sykes, ‘Transcendence’, 67. 
21 CF, 30–31.  
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effect or idea.22 Therefore, like Frei’s assertion that the Christian community simply 
cannot understand Jesus as not-raised, and that this constitutes the basis for 
meaningful talk about his presence, Bonhoeffer points to the resurrection as the basis 
for Jesus’ presence to us now as himself—i.e. the particular “God-human”23 —not as 
an abstract or generalised idea detached from history. Although, as we will see below, 
Bonhoeffer understands the resurrection as even more interruptive and ambiguous 
than Frei does, like Frei he understands it as the grounds for continuity in speaking 
about Christ. Christopher Holmes therefore implicitly summarises both Frei and 
Bonhoeffer, when he says “this Jesus—the Jesus of history—is present because his 
history never dies: he rose again and ascended. His past is present and also future.”24  
 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology is an all or nothing discipline, in the face of which reason is 
“horrified, dethroned”,25 or in slightly more positive terms used elsewhere, reason is 
“willing to humiliate itself and surrender itself before the miracle of God”.26 That 
which Frei critiqued—i.e. the post-enlightenment compartmentalisation of aspects of 
the Gospel narratives according to the perceived impasse between faith and history—
is included under that which Bonhoeffer is protesting against here. Jesus is not 
available for rationalisation or compartmentalisation according to our own 
conceptions of possibility.27 This will lead Bonhoeffer to make two crucial points, 
firstly that the difficult or confusing aspects of Christ’s historical identity cannot be 
withdrawn from reflection upon his identity, and secondly that this ‘whole’ Christ is 
known only as one who is pro me (for me) or pro nobis (for us).  Both of aspects are key to 
speaking about Jesus as transcendent, insofar as his particular ‘difficulty’ is understood 
as fundamental to the way in which he is pro nobis.  Let us consider first the profound 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 B, 312. 
23 B, 313. 
24 Christopher R. J. Holmes, Ethics in the Presence of Christ (London: Continuum, 2012), 11. 
25 B, 302. 
26 TEU, 532. 
27 In his inaugural lecture in Berlin in 1930, Bonhoeffer asserts “we maintain that the concept of possibility 
has no place in theology and thus no place in theological anthropology.” BBNY, 403. Recall Marion’s proposal that 
God is the one who is defined by impossibility, which in chapter 2 I suggested was a valuable insight, 
but not one that required the jettisoning of more orthodox theologies of transcendence, such as 
Bonhoeffer and Barth cleave to. See chapter 2, re. Jean Luc Marion, ‘The Impossible for Man—God’, 
in John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (eds.), Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern Enquiry (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 2007). 
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‘difficulty of Christ’, that for Bonhoeffer arises from his existence in the humiliation of 
sinful flesh.  
 
 
II 
 
Transcendence, Hiddenness and Humiliation: Bonhoeffer, Luther and Kierkegaard 
 
Human beings today still cannot get around the figure of Jesus Christ. They 
have to deal with him.28 
 
‘Dealing’ with Jesus Christ is not as straightforward as what we might call ‘facing up 
to the facts’, as if we have to accept something regrettable but nonetheless perfectly 
clear (as one might acknowledge defeat in sport). Rather, it involves acknowledging 
the paradoxically problematic nature of Jesus’ revelation to us, in history, as God 
incarnate. For Bonhoeffer, the incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus draw 
us into a narrative of paradoxical revelation and hiddenness. First of all, he 
emphasises that ‘dealing’ with Jesus is not about a grasp of his identity on the basis of 
his works in history. As Sutherland puts it, “[t]here is no epistemology of faith to be 
derived from historical study alone”.29 Later, in part II of the lectures, Bonhoeffer 
explains that whilst “dogmatics needs the certainty of Jesus’s historical existence”,30 
historical research per se cannot “sustain a dogmatic assertion”31—i.e. cannot 
adequately access Jesus Christ’s whole identity as the Logos of God. Bonhoeffer does 
not wish to dismiss historical critical tools, but like Frei, he does want to radically 
contextualise them within the framework of the narrative of God’s revelation in 
Christ. “Access through the historical [geschichtlich] Jesus is only possible through the 
Risen One, through the Word by which Christ resurrected bears witness to himself.”32    
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28 B, 306. 
29 Stewart R. Sutherland, ‘Ethics and Transcendence in Bonhoeffer’, Scottish Journal of Theology (30: 
1997), 545. 
30 B, 329. 
31 Ibid. 
32 B, 330. 
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Therefore, as for Frei, historical investigation operates within the framework of fides 
quaerens intellectum, simultaneously recognising its inadequacy and importance, 
understanding that the Christ who cannot be accessed by critical tools is nevertheless 
the one whose identity is inseparable from historical particularity. The Gospels 
narrate events within history; they belong, no matter how uniquely, in the kind of 
world in which people live. The incarnation means history cannot be isolated from 
God’s redemptive activity, but neither can that redemptive activity be defined by 
historical criticism. The ‘whole Christ’ by whom we are encountered is therefore 
always the historical Christ, but his ‘historicity’ transcends our categorisation.33 Here 
Frei’s notion of unsubstitutability, by which Jesus’ historicity is understood as at one 
with transcendent universality, effectively summarises what Bonhoeffer is doing 
here.34 It is the unsubstitutable one who is not graspable by historical criticism, 
because he is the transcendent one who defines history. ‘Historicity’, therefore, has 
two strands for Bonhoeffer: history and faith. 
 
“The two are linked together by our saying that this is the way the historical 
Jesus humbled himself, and that the [historically] incomprehensible Jesus is [as 
Christ] the object of faith.”35  
 
We have this problematic incomprehensibility because although the mission of the 
Son of God was undertaken in history, this does not amount to a wholesale revealing, 
but instead to an ambiguity, an enigma: “This is the issue, that the Son entered into 
the flesh, that he wants to do his work within the ambiguity of history, incognito.”36 
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33 “It is the Christ of history, the whole Christ, whom we ask and who answers … To put it in the 
abstract: The personal ontological structure of the whole, historical Christ is the subject matter of 
Christology.” B, 310. 
34 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 123. 
35 B, 331. 
36 B, 309. This point does not set Bonhoeffer in opposition to Frei where the latter’s ‘intention-action’ 
identity description is concerned (see chapter 3). Frei’s insistence upon the unity of inner and outer 
could be perceived as contradicting Bonhoeffer’s argument that Jesus’ actions in history do not yield the 
‘who’; but it must be recalled that Frei, too, wants to avoid a wholesale subjection of Jesus’ identity to 
the tools of historical criticism, and instead explore how the Gospels function as the meaningful 
descriptions of Jesus’ identity in the context of the faith of the Christian community. Therefore, 
intention-action description is about reading the Gospels as narratives of revelation, not investigating 
textual content so as to scrutinise the validity of revelation’s claims. Both theologians therefore 
recognise that the one whose identity is narrated in the Gospels transcends the boundaries of a 
modernist conception of faith and history.  
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Bonhoeffer uses Kierkegaard’s word ‘incognito’ to summarise the impossibility of 
grasping Jesus’ identity on the basis of historical analysis. Crucially, though, he takes 
us beyond this basic ‘ambiguity’ of history as it is related to historical criticism, 
connecting Kierkegaard’s concept of incognito with the hiddenness and humiliation 
that characterise a Lutheran theologia crucis. Here, I argue that Bonhoeffer develops 
Kierkegaard, allowing for Christ’s incognito to be elucidated in terms of Jesus’ 
particular historicity, not just a general notion of divine transcendence in history. 
Contrary to Kirkpatrick’s suggestion that, in comparison with Kierkegaard, 
“according to Bonhoeffer, the identity of Christ as paradox … does not play as strong 
a role”,37 I suggest that Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Christ’s incognito, which neatly 
reflects Frei’s own logic, actually forces a more specific paradox upon us than 
Kierkegaard does.  Highlighting the difference between Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard 
in this matter will illuminate how Frei’s concept of unsubstitutability brings the best 
out of Bonhoeffer as regards a theology of Jesus’ transcendence, and also how 
Bonhoeffer can offer a robust theologia crucis back to Frei.  
 
i) Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer on the incognito 
 
“No theologian of his generation”, remarks Daphne Hampson, “was more taken up 
with Kierkegaard than the young Dietrich Bonhoeffer”,38 and indeed, Kierkegaard’s 
ideas of Christ’s incognito, the offense of the gospel, and the ‘ultimate paradox’ 
(especially evident in his pseudonymous writings as Johannes Climacus and Anti-
Climacus)39 all play a key role in Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Matthew D. Kirkpatrick, Attacks on Christendom in a World Come of Age: Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer and the 
Question of ‘Religionless Christianity’ (Oregon: Pickwick, 2011), 149. 
38 Daphne Hampson, Kierkegaard: Exposition and Critique (Oxford, OUP, 2013), 175. 
39 Exploration of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms goes beyond the scope of this thesis, but a basic grasp of 
the relationship between Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus helps to grasp the point above. 
Johannes Climacus presents a somewhat more philosophical exploration of Christianity (see, e.g. 
Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: The Arguments of the Philosophers (London: Routledge, 1982), 15, 44) or as 
Julia Watkin describes it, is a “nineteenth century Copenhagener who is concerned with what it means 
to be a Christian.” Julia Watkin, Kierkegaard (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1997), 52.  Anti-Climacus, 
on the other hand, can be regarded as a person of Christian faith. The relationship between Johannes 
Climacus and Anti-Climacus, however, is not one purely and simply of opposition, of different 
perspectives, with Anti-Climacus regarded more highly than the other (even to the extent that Anti-
Climacus represents an “ethical ideal” that Kierkegaard himself did not believe he had reached. 
Hannay, Kierkegaard, 166–167). As Hong and Hong explain, therefore: “The prefix ‘Anti’ may … be 
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Kierkegaard’s understanding of Jesus’ incognito focusses upon the categorical 
difference between God and humanity, and locates the incognito primarily within his 
being God-in-history. Writing pseudonymously as Anti-Climacus, Kierkegaard says,  
 
To be the individual human being or an individual human being (in a certain 
sense it is a matter of indifference whether he is a high-ranking or low-ranking 
person) is the greatest possible distance, the infinitely qualitative distance, from 
being God, and therefore it is the most profound incognito.40 
 
Christ’s incognito is therefore an aspect of his being what Kierkegaard’s more 
skeptical pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, calls the “absolute paradox”—i.e. the one 
in whom “[t]he eternal truth has come into existence in time”.41 This incognito—that 
Jesus is actually the eternal God, but in human form—therefore makes for a proper 
posture of faith, rather than a confidence in the apprehend-ability of God in Christ by 
human understanding. Kierkegaard’s more ‘Christian’ pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, 
highlights how Christ wills to be incognito, so that as the contradiction of human 
rationality, he can be the object not of rational self-congratulation concerning human 
ability to discern God (“the nonsensical-undialectical climax of clerical roaring”)42 but 
of humble faith grounded on God’s own act of revelation. Jesus’s incognito is also 
bound up with his profound humility, that is, his humble will not to be recognised as 
who he is, except by faith. “What self denial!” remarks Anti-Climacus, “what an 
enormous exertion, for at every moment he has had it in his power to show his true 
character.”43  
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misleading. It does not mean ‘against’ but ‘before’, a relation of rank, the higher, as in ‘before me’ in 
the First Commandment.” Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, ‘Introduction’, in Søren 
Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Hong and Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 
xiii. The specific argument above can therefore proceed meaningfully by reading these two particular 
pseudonyms as representing a broad ‘Kierkegaardian’ position on incognito and paradox, whilst 
acknowledging that the quest for a broader ‘Kierkegaardian’ theology or philosophy across all the 
various pseudonyms is a much bigger task, and regarded by some as not only impossible but inherently 
spurious.  
40 Kierkegaard, Practice, 127–128.  
41 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Hong and Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 209.  
42 Kierkegaard, Practice, 128. 
43 Kierkegaard, Practice, 130. 
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First, we note the basic elements of this position with which Bonhoeffer is in 
agreement. Like Kierkegaard he wants to emphasise that “only through Christ’s own 
revelation do I have open to me his person and his works”,44 and that this applies both 
humanly and divinely. Humanly, as we have seen, no person is directly accessible 
solely on the basis of what they do. Divinely, Jesus’ historical activity does not, in itself, 
prove anything about God unless one believes beforehand that it is God who acts in 
Christ. Therefore, for Bonhoeffer as for Kierkegaard, ‘incognito’ points to the 
centrality of revelation and faith for Christology. This means that the birth, life, death 
and resurrection of Jesus are not approached as potential proof that this is God. 
Rather, vice versa, we approach the historicity—the birth, life, death and resurrection 
of Jesus—in faith, asking ‘who is this God-human?’ The incognito refers to the whole 
Christ in his identity as the revelation of God. 
 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s insistence that Christ’s incognito is an aspect of the 
‘ultimate paradox’ bids us think of paradox as something ultimately positive, and 
understanding this use of the term is important as we go on, because it can be applied 
meaningfully to summarise aspects of Bonhoeffer’s thought. Paradoxes of hiddenness 
and revealed-ness, and sin and sinless-ness, must be understood, as De Lubac puts it, 
as those “whose orientation is towards fullness”.45 Here, then, the paradoxical 
incognito is about God’s being towards the world in Christ, for the salvation of the 
world. De Lubac distinguishes paradox from dialectic, which seeks to achieve 
synthesis by “the clever turning of for into against”,46 whereas paradox maintains the 
simultaneity of the one and the other, and has its energy—or its “vigor”—in a 
simultaneity that is oriented to but does not achieve synthesis.47 Theological 
paradoxes point to truth grounded in the mystery of God, rather than in the grasp of 
humankind. They are, says Pyper, “irreducible and inescapable because the 
encounter with God pushes reason and the capacities of language beyond human 
possibility.”48 Paradox is ultimately a hopeful, positive theological category. 
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44 B, 310. 
45 Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1966), 9. 
46 De Lubac, Paradoxes, 11. 
47 De Lubac, Paradoxes, 12. 
48 Hugh S. Pyper, ‘Paradox’ in Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason, Hugh Pyper (eds.), The Oxford 
Companion to Christian Thought (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 516. Therefore, Ronald Hepburn speaks of the way 
a theologian perceives paradox as “not a mere contradiction, but a sublime Paradox, a Mystery”. 
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Kierkegaard’s work reflects this understanding. As MacKinnon describes it, paradox 
for Kierkegaard is not about logical contradiction per se, but is more to do with the 
‘contradiction of the self’, Christianity fundamentally being an “existence 
communication [that] requires the revision of our underlying conceptions.”49 As in De 
Lubac, then, Kierkegaard’s paradox orients us beyond ourselves towards faith in the 
truth of God, which is God’s relation to us. Understanding Jesus Christ not as merely 
paradoxical but as the paradox—insofar as he is the God-man, the one in whom not 
only the eternal relates to the temporal humanity, but the sinless one to sinners50—
Climacus insists that the attempt to grasp Jesus by a delimited concept of rationality 
fails, and the only meaningful response is an acceptance of the paradox by the 
understanding, which is called faith.51  
 
Whilst Bonhoeffer only uses the word paradox once in the Christology lectures,52 it 
describes what is going on at the heart of their theology, with their focus upon 
hiddenness and revealed-ness, and particularity and universality. Therefore the link 
between Bonhoeffer’s lectures and Kierkegaard’s work goes beyond the term 
incognito, insofar as Bonhoeffer, too, is a theologian of paradox in the positive sense 
that Kierkegaard understands it. 
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Ronald W. Hepburn, Christianity and Paradox, Critical Studies in Twentieth Century Theology (London: Watts 
& Co., 1966), 17. 
49Alastair MacKinnon, ‘Believing the Paradoks; A Contradiction in Kierkegaard?’, Harvard Theological 
Review, (61, 1968), 635. Rather curiously, Ray Anderson enlists MacKinnon’s article to argue that the 
concept of paradox has no place in theology and should be replaced by ‘problematic’. Unlike 
Kierkegaard and De Lubac, Anderson believes that paradox necessitates a Hegelian-type dialectic, and 
stands as something that needs to be resolved, thus failing to possess the kind of epistemological 
incapacity required in theology. Ray S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God: A 
Christological Critique (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1974), 69–70. However, were Anderson to adopt De 
Lubac’s and Kierkegaard’s understanding, he would not need to reject paradox. Anderson understands 
Kierkegaard’s theology of faith to be so wholly subjective (in human terms) that it provides for itself the 
rationality of relation to God, rather than being given its rationale by God who is wholly other. 
However, if Kierkegaard’s concept of faith is in fact about “a letting go (a trusting another); if an act, 
then a negative act as Kierkegaard would have it” (Hampson, Kierkegaard: Exposition and Critique (Oxford, 
OUP, 2013), 24) then Anderson need not reject Kierkegaard’s paradox. 
50 Kierkegaard, Concluding, 208–209. 
51 Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Hong and Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985), 59. 
52 B, 330. 
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Nevertheless, as suggested above, the theologies of Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer do 
not map unproblematically onto one another in these matters. They differ concerning 
what they imply about historicity, highlighting the role of history in a ‘Bonhoefferian’ 
account of the transcendence of Jesus. In particular, that which Bonhoeffer implies 
about historicity as regards incognito and paradox, reflects that on which Frei insists, 
especially in ‘Theology Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection’. 
 
For Kierkegaard, the intensity of the incognito—pointing as it does to the acuteness of 
the absolute paradox and the corresponding futility of historical-critical tools—leads 
him to render Jesus’ historical particularity comparatively incidental to the heart of 
Christology. In Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus says, 
 
The heart of the matter is the historical fact that the god has been in human 
form, and the other historical details are not even as important as they would 
be if the subject were a human being instead of the god.53 
 
This is meant to emphasise that someone in temporal proximity to Jesus, who might 
be thought to have the historical ‘facts’ at her or his disposal, is in fact at no greater 
advantage than someone considering Jesus hundreds of years after his life.54 This is 
because the substance of the paradox (God in human form) stands alone as a moment 
to which none can be contemporary as such, because it is not an ‘event’ like a 
conversation between two people or a dinner party.55 Rather it is a fundamental 
“coming into existence”,56 or, as an earlier translation of the Fragments renders it, 
“concerns becoming”.57 Put in terms of revelation as the early Barth conceives it, the 
substance of the paradox is therefore wholly contingent. The historicity of the 
incarnation is the becoming human of God—something that is ‘eternally historical’, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Kierkegaard, Philosophical, 103–104. 
54 Kierkegaard is protesting against what Anti-Climacus summarises in Practice, that “[t]he majority of 
people living in Christendom today no doubt live in the illusion that if they had been contemporary 
with Christ they would have recognized him immediately despite his unrecognizability.” Kierkegaard, 
Practice, 128. 
55 As Ziegler puts it, for Kierkegaard, Christ is “an unhistorical person who, as the absolute, is 
unmediated by history and, instead, establishes all relations to him within a single situation, namely that 
of contemporaneity.” Phillip Ziegler, ‘Christ For Us Today: Promeity in the Christologies of 
Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’, International Journal of Systematic Theology (15, 2013), 28. 
56 Kierkegaard, Philosophical, 87.  
57 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1936), 72. All other references to Philosophical Fragments refer to the 1985 edition. 
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insofar as the fact of God becoming human is ‘historical’ for any believer who, at any 
time, “makes this fact the object of faith.”58 Positively, this means that those not 
historically contemporaneous with Jesus of Nazareth are at no disadvantage.59 
Negatively though, the actual historical particularity of Christ—his unsubstitutability, 
and the life that he lived—is virtually subsidiary to the argument. Indeed, Climacus 
follows up with the assertion that, 
 
Even if the contemporary generation [i.e. to Christ] had not left anything 
behind except these words, ‘We have believed that in such and such a year the 
god appeared to us in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among 
us, and then died’—this is more than enough.60 
 
Kierkegaard is not dismissing the existence of Jesus in historical particularity per se, nor 
dismissing the person of Christ in favour of a principle. As Ziegler says, to claim that 
Kierkegaard is “concerned with the meaning of Christ for one’s existence to the 
exclusion of interest in the identity of Christ himself” overlooks the fact that only on 
the basis of God’s being towards us (pro me) in the person of Christ can we relate to 
God.61 However, even granting Kierkegaard’s focus on the person, the statement 
above threatens to sideline the very particular historicity upon which it insists, 
marginalising its details and approaching the threshold of the kind of generalisation 
that Frei recognises can happen if narrative particularity is not insisted upon.   
 
Should we suspect that this is characteristic only of the speculative Johannes 
Climacus, as Anti-Climacus Kierkegaard implies a similar point regarding the 
incognito. Anti-Climacus certainly makes more of the particularity of Christ over and 
against the modernist tendency to think of him only generally,62 and but under this 
pseudonym Kierkegaard still identifies the force of the incognito in terms of Christ’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Kierkegaard, Philosophical, 88. 
59 “[G]iven the paradoxical character of the hidden revelation, this does not put us at a disadvantage 
over Jesus’ contemporaries … God’s presence remains a hidden presence.” William Placher, The Triune 
God: An Essay in Postliberal Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 45. 
60 Kierkegaard, Philosophical, 104. 
61 Ziegler, Christ, 37. “[T]he God-man is the unity of being God and an individual human being in a 
historically actual situation” Kierkegaard, Practice, 124. 
62 “The God man has been made into that speculative unity of God and man sub specie aeterni … or 
made visible in that nowhere-to-be-found medium of pure being, rather than that the God-man is the 
unity of being God and an individual being in a historically actual situation”.  Kierkegaard, Practice, 
123. 
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being God in particular human form per se rather than those things he experienced, 
taught and suffered—which are understood to be consequences of his being incognito 
rather than somehow constitutive of it. That Christ is God but elects to become human is 
“the most profound incognito or the most impenetrable incognito that is possible”, 
precisely because of the “infinitely qualitative contradiction” that is involved.63 Again, 
neither Christ’s teachings nor the “other results of his life” are as important as the 
“fact that he lived” as this contradictory God-man, whose true identity is incognito.64 
 
This does not sit easily with the way Bonhoeffer develops the concept of incognito in 
relation to his theologia crucis. What is at the very least an ambiguity with regards 
historical particularity casts Bonhoeffer’s theology into relief in such a way that the 
latter’s affiliation with Frei is illuminated all the more. More than Kierkegaard, 
Bonhoeffer allows for the significance of Jesus’ historical particularity—upon which 
Frei insists—to characterise the incognito, because he begins from the assumption that 
“[i]t is the Christ of history, the whole Christ, whom we seek and who answers…  The 
personal ontological structure of the whole, historical Christ is the subject matter of 
Christology.”65  
 
We are therefore forced to consider not just the paradox of saying that God has a 
particular human life per se; but also the difficulties involved in saying that this particular !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Kierkegaard, Practice, 131. 
64 Kierkegaard, Practice, 124. 
65 B, 310. Bonhoeffer seems to modify his position from that which he articulated in a lecture in 1928, 
where without mentioning Kierkegaard he nevertheless rehearses a position more akin to him on Jesus’ 
history. “[O]ur New Testament originated in a church-community that worshipped Jesus not as a 
historical personality but as the kyrios, the Lord … and thus as God himself. Any psychologizing or 
historicizing interest is thus quite naturally absent. Its interest is rather purely to the point, immediate, 
and aims at the center of the phenomenon of Jesus of Nazareth, over against which all historical 
elements become unimportant.” BBNY, 345. Admittedly Bonhoeffer seems to be dismissing a particular 
nineteenth century ‘historical quest’ style approach to history rather than historicity per se, but he lets 
this run on to a dismissal of Jesus’ particularity that clearly recalls Kierkegaard’s own argument. 
Bonhoeffer wants, in this essay, to subject a ‘Jesus-personality-cult’ to faith in Jesus as the incarnation of 
God, but does so in such a sweeping fashion that he threatens to subject the ‘who’ of Jesus to an 
incarnation-cult, very much in opposition to the position he articulates in the 1933 lectures: 
“[A]nything involving his own personality, for example, with whatever fascinating or repulsive 
characteristics may attach to that personality, is infinitely insignificant to Jesus compared to the main 
issue, which is the decision for God’s will.” BBNY, 348. We can recognise a priority of identity over 
activity here, but the Christology lectures offer a much more nuanced version of this point—that the 
priority of the ‘who’ centralises the historical person of Jesus without making him subject to historical 
containment. 
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human life is God’s. The ambiguity of incognito is not just in the ‘that’ God became 
human, but also in whom God became.66 The claim that the infinite enters into history 
is challenging enough; but the particular things Jesus experiences, suffers and does 
serve to further confound the problem rather than offer clarity, and it is towards those 
things, insist both Frei and Bonhoeffer, that the word paradox should point. It is those 
things that Bonhoeffer insists constitute the paradox of the incarnation: 
 
If we speak of the human Jesus we speak of God, we should not speak of him 
as representing an idea of God, that is, in his attributes as all-knowing and all-
powerful, but rather speak of his weakness and manger.67 
 
We cannot ‘get around’ the questions or confusions that Jesus’ particularity might 
provoke, especially in relation to assumptions about what we might expect of someone 
who is God incarnate. Rachel Muers summarises, “The question ‘Who is God?’, in 
Bonhoeffer’s theology, brings us to this incognito inseparably associated with a 
particular personal history.”68 
 
This key difference between Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’s concepts of incognito is 
most clearly evident as Bonhoeffer argues that Christ is present not only as the risen 
one but also as the one hidden (incognito) in humiliation. Prioritising, like Frei, 
identity over presence, Bonhoeffer roots the paradox of Christ’s hiddenness in exactly 
that whole identity. Frei alludes to this issue in his remarks on the concept of paradox, 
saying, “the word paradox ought at least to be used with caution in reference to the 
personal being of Jesus of Nazareth”,69 the need for caution being precisely to mitigate 
the overtaking of Jesus’ particularity by ‘paradoxical themes’ (Frei is remarking 
specifically on Jesus’ simultaneous power and powerlessness).70  Whilst Frei himself is 
nervous about using the word paradox, lest it imply generalisation, the suggestion that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 B, 354. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Rachel Muers, Keeping God’s Silence: A Theological Ethics of Communication (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 76.  
69 Hans W. Frei, ‘Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection’, in Frei, 
Identity, 5–6.  
70 “When we speak of the contrast of power and powerlessness in Jesus as he is depicted in the Gospels, 
we have in mind then no mere paradox, tension or transition between two states, qualities or elements 
in a cosmic, spiritual power struggle. Rather, we have in mind the mystery and the changing situation 
of a human being whose consistent intention is also portrayed as that of his and the universe’s God: the 
accomplishment of men’s salvation” Frei, ‘Theological Reflections’, 6. 
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paradox be descriptively applied to Bonhoeffer’s elucidation of Christ’s historically 
particular incognito would seem to be acceptable to Frei. We can therefore say that 
Bonhoeffer follows Frei’s logic about unsubstitutability when it comes to the concept 
‘incognito’, and in doing so, differs from what Kierkegaard seems to point to by using 
the phrase.  
 
In a doctrinal sense, contrary to Johannes Climacus, Bonhoeffer wants to deploy the 
phrase ‘incognito’ to describe the hiddenness of the person who is both divine and human, 
and not to the hiddenness of divinity in humanity. When we speak of Christ’s 
hiddenness, Bonhoeffer emphasises, we are not speaking about God hiding God’s 
‘divine self’ in or behind humanity as if humanity itself were a disguise. Therefore,  
 
The God-human who is present in time and space is veiled in the ὁμοίωμα 
σαρκός (Romans 8:3). The presence of Christ is a veiled presence. But it is not 
God veiled in the human being; Instead, the whole God-human is hidden.71 
 
A slight complication arises when we read this passage, because the Greek quoted 
(ὁμοίωμα σαρκός) translates as ‘likeness of flesh’, whereas what Paul writes in Romans 
8—and what Bonhoeffer is undoubtedly pointing to—is Jesus being in the likeness of 
sinful flesh: εν ὁμοιώμαυτι σαρκός ἁμαρτιας.72 Despite only having students’ notes, we can 
be sure that Bonhoeffer does not mean that becoming human per se constitutes God’s 
hiddenness. For example, he explicitly remarks that “the principle of hiddenness … is 
not the relation of God and human in Jesus Christ, but rather the relation of the God-
human, as already given, to the ὁμοίωμα σαρκός.”73  
 
Furthermore, reflecting the Lutheran dogma of the two states of the incarnate 
Christ—his humbled and exalted state—Bonhoeffer emphasises that God’s becoming 
human per se is a “glory”, for it is “God’s message about the glorification of God, who 
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71 B, 313. 
72 Romans 8:3. The editors of the DBWE version of the Christology lectures highlight the omission of 
‘ἁμαρτιας’, but in explaining the discrepancy between the notes and the scriptures, Paul’s phrase is 
mistakenly translated “in the likeness of human flesh” rather than “in the likeness of sinful flesh”. B, 313, 
n.34. This actually subverts Bonhoeffer’s claim (see above). Elsewhere, a correct translation of Romans 
8:3 is given (B, 356, n.171) but in this particular case, the matter is substantially confused by the error.  
73 B, 313.  
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honors himself by being in human form.”74 The “revelation of the Creator through 
the creature”75 is not humiliation, not least because the risen Jesus ascends as the 
bodily God-human, glorified and exalted in divinely human form. Christ is exalted as 
divine human being, the primordial imago Dei.76 Yet, as ideas of incognito and 
hiddenness stress, “God’s becoming human in Jesus Christ does not visibly glorify 
God; because God who became human is the Crucified One.”77 
 
Now we are closer to the heart of Bonhoeffer’s difference from Kierkegaard. Unlike 
Kierkegaard, for whom it is the incarnation as ‘contingent becoming’ that constitutes 
the incognito, Bonhoeffer locates Christ’s incognito in the ambiguity of his historical 
particularity. Christ is climactically incognito in the historicity of his humiliation, in 
the likeness of sinful flesh, on the cross, where “for our sake [God] made him to be sin 
who knew no sin”.78 To use Frei’s word to draw out the crucial difference, Bonhoeffer 
is pointing towards the unsubstitutable historicity of Christ’s incognito, not the idea of 
God in human form. 
 
Wolf Krötke states that “in all the important questions that must be decided in the 
doctrine of Christology, Bonhoeffer took his bearings from Luther”,79 and 
Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of incognito follows Luther’s Heidelberg Disputation in seeing 
the paradoxical nature of God’s revelation in hiddenness in the particular historical 
humiliation of crucifixion.  Consider Heidelberg Disputation, §19: 
 
“He deserves to be called a theologian … who comprehends the visible and 
manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross”.80 
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74 B, 355. “Lutheran orthodoxy speaks of Christ passing through two states. The incarnation is not 
confined to the first state, the status exinanitionis, the humiliation characteristic of his life from the manger 
to the cross, but also refers to the status exaltationis, the exaltation, which glorifies the incarnation 
eternally within the life of the Trinity.” Jennifer McBride, The Church for the World: A Theology of Public 
Witness (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 70. 
75 B, 313. 
76 Colossians 1:15. 
77 B, 313. 
78 2 Corinthians 5:21. 
79 Wolf Krötke, ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther’, in Peter Frick (ed.), Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual 
Formation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 60. 
80 Martin Luther, ‘Heidelberg Disputation’, in Timothy F. Lull (ed.) Martin Luther’s Basic Theological 
Writings (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 31. 
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Luther will not have us see the things of God except in Christ who was crucified. For 
Luther the communicatio idiomatum—the communication of divine attributes to 
humanity of Christ and vice versa—meant that one finds the whole person of God in the 
person of Christ, and in particular the suffering Christ.81  Luther contrasts this theologia 
crucis—finding God only in Christ who was crucified—with a ‘theology of glory’, 
which “looks upon the invisible things of God as though they were clearly perceptible 
in those things which have actually happened.”82 By ‘invisible things’, Luther means 
“virtue, godliness, wisdom, justice, goodness, and so forth”,83 which are not given to 
human beings to comprehend directly. Instead, what God makes visible is actually 
God’s hiddenness in the crucifixion of Christ: 
 
Now it is not sufficient for anyone, and it does him no good to recognise God 
in his glory and majesty, unless he recognises him in the humility and shame of 
the cross. Thus God destroys the wisdom of the wise, as Isa [45:15] says, 
‘Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself.’84  
 
Luther emphasises a paradox of revelation in hiddenness and hiddenness in 
revelation, and on account of his radical commitment to the communicatio idiomatum 
recognises that this paradox is inseparable from the historical “humility and shame” of 
Jesus of Nazareth. “[T]he God who saves me” as Lienhard puts it, “must not be 
sought anywhere except in the form of the man Jesus.”85 The paradox—as 
Kierkegaard would of course agree—therefore shifts us away from reliance upon the 
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81 “The theory of the communication of attributes is intended to emphasize the fundamental theme 
that since the incarnation, there is no longer any valid relationship with God which is not also a 
relationship with the man Jesus.” Marc Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 
1982), 342. Dennis Ngien explains how for Luther the communicatio idiomatum functions not only to insist 
upon the true unity of the divine and human natures in the one person of Christ, but also to ascribe that 
which belongs to one nature to the other, in particular the human suffering of Christ being ascribed to 
the divinity of God, insofar as God divinely bears human suffering. For Luther, explains Ngien, this was 
not a theoretical deduction, but a concrete statement of witness grounded in God’s own revelation. 
Dennis Ngien, ‘Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond: Luther’s Understanding of the Communicatio 
Idiomatum’, Heythrop Journal (45, 2004), 64–65. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Luther, ‘Heidelberg’, 43. 
84 Luther, ‘Heidelberg’, 43. “Luther’s theological breakthrough is intimately related to the idea of a 
hidden revelation—the ‘righteousness of God’ really is revealed in the cross of Christ, but it can only be 
discerned by the eye of faith … a real revelation of God, it is nevertheless not recognizable as a 
revelation of God, because it contradicts preconceptions of what form that revelation should take.” 
Alister E. McGrath, Luther’s Theology of the Cross (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985), 158. 
85 Lienhard, Luther, 343. 
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clarity of human grasp of God’s revelation, and towards faith.86  For Luther therefore, 
and for Bonhoeffer, God in Christ’s hiddenness constitutes that which makes for faith 
and therefore for our justification, and does so always at the level of historical 
particularity. In ‘Concerning the Christian Idea of God’, Bonhoeffer summarises 
succinctly: “God entered history in Jesus, and so entirely that he can be recognised in 
his hiddenness only by faith.”87 
 
So, to return to comparison with Kierkegaard: the “other historical details”88 that 
Kierkegaard apparently dismisses as peripheral to the paradox of Christology are 
utterly central for the way in which Bonhoeffer follows Luther on the idea of God-in-
Christ’s hiddenness. Whilst it is right to explicate the incognito in Bonhoeffer’s work 
with reference to its origin in Kierkegaard, the way Bonhoeffer adopts the concept—
especially with regard to his implicit affirmation of the communicatio idiomatum—does 
not allow for a straightforward line to be drawn between their deployment of the 
term, and their difference on this matter is illuminated significantly by partnering 
Bonhoeffer with Frei.  
 
Furthermore, one of the clearest ways to describe the difference between Bonhoeffer 
and Kierkegaard is to see that the way Bonhoeffer follows Luther on the importance 
of the communicatio idiomatum leads him to develop Kierkegaard’s concept of incognito 
along the same lines as his criticism of Barth in Act and Being. In comparison with 
Bonhoeffer, both Kierkegaard’s incognito and Barth’s act concept of revelation can be 
understood to emphasise contingency at the expense of continuity. Bonhoeffer’s 
elucidation of the particular shape of Christ’s incognito—hiddenness in humiliation—
follows the logic of what DeJonge calls his person concept of revelation in Act and Being 
(which grounds his attempt to regulate Barth’s ‘act’ emphasis in revelation by insisting 
upon the continuity of God’s activity in the person of Christ). To join the dots with 
Frei, we can say that in comparison with Bonhoeffer, when it comes to Christ’s 
incognito, Kierkegaard is guilty of a degree of epistemological monophysitism. In !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Von Loewenich comments on the inseparability of faith and hiddenness in Luther’s theology overall: 
“As revelation or faith is posited, hiddenness is also posited. The hidden God and the revealed God are 
completely identical.” Walther von Loewenich, Luther’s Theology of the Cross, trans. Bouman (Belfast: 
Christian Journals Ltd., 1976), 37. 
87 BBNY, 460. 
88 Kierkegaard, Philosophical, 103. 
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other words, when Kierkegaard describes Christ’s incognito, he is in danger of 
devaluing the particular historicity of the Word incarnate in a way that both Frei and 
Bonhoeffer would be wary of. The Christology lectures therefore imply a theology of 
Jesus’ transcendence, developed according to the same logic as Bonhoeffer’s critique 
of Barth in Act and Being and Frei’s critique of the same, and explicated with the 
historical humiliation of Jesus at its heart.  
 
ii) Incognito and the scandal of the Gospel. 
 
Bonhoeffer fills out the idea of incognito and hiddenness with reference to the 
stumbling block, or scandal, of the humiliation of Jesus. Like Luther, Bonhoeffer 
draws upon 1 Corinthians 1 and Galatians 5, where Paul describes the gospel of 
Christ crucified (not just incarnate) as a σκανδαλον.89 The NRSV translates Paul’s word 
σκάνδαλον in two different ways —“stumbling block” in 1 Cor 1:22, but “offence” in 
Gal 5:11. Luther’s German translation (used by Bonhoeffer) is more consistent, using 
Ärgernis for both instances. So, where the English translation of the notes from 
Bonhoeffer’s lectures reads “scandalous form” (ärgerlichen Gestalt) in one instance and 
“form of the stumbling block” (Gestalt des Ärgernisses) in another, the two should be 
understood as explicating exactly the same central concept—the σκάνδαλον of Christ 
crucified.90 In an admittedly rather historically sweeping statement, which again 
reflects Luther’s understanding of the communicatio idiomatum (that the human suffering 
of Christ can be ascribed to the divinity of God) Bonhoeffer says, 
 
God himself dies and reveals himself in the death of a man, who is condemned 
as a sinner. It is precisely this, which is the foolishness of the Christian idea of 
God, which has been witnessed to by all genuine Christian thinking from Paul, 
Augustine, Luther, to Kierkegaard and Barth.91 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 “For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, God decided, 
through the foolishness of our proclamation, to save those who believe. For Jews demand signs and 
Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ crucified, a stumbling-block (σκάνδαλον) to Jews and 
foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and 
the wisdom of God.” 1 Corinthians 1:21–24. “But my friends, why am I still being persecuted if I am 
still preaching circumcision? In that case the offence (σκάνδαλον) of the cross has been removed”. 
Galatians 5:11. 
90 B, 313. 
91 BBNY, 460. 
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In Jesus Christ, God is “present in the form of σαρξ, the form that is a stumbling block 
[Gestalt des Ärgernisses].”92 Instead of apprehending Jesus via categories of 
understanding, humanity ‘trips over’ not the idea that God enters creation as the 
creature per se, but rather the idea that God is humiliated in being in the likeness of 
fallen, sinful humanity. 
 
[T]he conditions for his humiliation are set by the curse, the fall of Adam. In 
being humiliated, God enters of his own free will into the world of sin and 
death ... He comes among us humans not in μορφὴ θεου but rather incognito, as 
a beggar among beggars, an outcast among outcasts; he comes among sinners 
as the one without sin, but also as a sinner among sinners.93 
 
Climaxing on the cross, being in sinful flesh pervades all of Jesus’ historical activity 
incognito. In this form the Word incarnate was vulnerable to temptation like all 
human beings. Like Gregory of Nazianzus, Bonhoeffer wants to affirm that Christ 
could only save us by virtue of being utterly like us in sinful flesh.94 He even goes so far 
as to suggest that this likeness means Jesus appeared sinful in his actions, despite his 
sinlessness: 
 
He also did things that appeared to be sins; He gave a hard answer to his 
mother in the temple; He evaded his opponents’ questions; He called for 
resistance against the ruling castes of the pious and of people. In people’s eyes, 
he must have looked like a sinner.95 
 
One could call into question whether these things (his answer to his mother, evading 
questions, calling for resistance) can be described as ‘looking like sin’, and suggest that 
from other standpoints these might not be necessarily regarded as ‘appearing sinful’. A 
more robust example of appearing sinful would be his table-fellowship with ‘tax 
collectors and sinners’,96 and this particular activity—one in which Jesus is witnessing 
profoundly to what Frei calls his “enacting the good of men on their behalf”97—places 
Jesus historically particular activity at the heart of his being in the likeness of sinful !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 B, 313. 
93 B, 356 
94 “[T]he unassumed is the unhealed”. Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistola, 101.32, quoted in Gerald 
O’Collins, Christology: A Biblical, Historical and Systematic Study of Jesus (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 160.  
95 B, 357. 
96 E.g. Mark 2:15–17; Luke 19: 1–10. 
97 Frei, Identity, 152. 
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flesh. Nevertheless, the point stands that Bonhoeffer reads the likeness of sinful flesh as 
describing not just the scandal of the crucifixion but also the arresting challenge of 
Jesus’ particular unsubstitutable life as a whole. The term theologia crucis therefore 
describes more than Bonhoeffer’s theology of crucifixion.98 
 
However, the paradox of this one without sin who comes as a sinner does indeed 
reach its climax on the cross where God appears as not-God; where Jesus Christ is, as 
Bonhoeffer emphasises in Discipleship and Barth would later explicate, the elected one 
who is the rejected one.99 There God in Christ is subjected to the worst that human 
beings can do to one another: torture and execution, and this gospel of crucifixion 
constitutes most fully what Bonhoeffer calls the “scandalous form” of the church’s 
preaching.100 
 
Reading Bonhoeffer after Frei bids us recognise that Christ’s incognito—i.e. his 
hiddenness in humiliation—needs to be articulated at the level of historical 
particularity, which means reflecting to full effect the historicity of the crucifixion as 
an event that happened to someone. Doing this brings Frei’s emphasis to bear on 
Bonhoeffer fully, and also traces Bonhoeffer’s difference from Kierkegaard to its 
logical conclusion regarding Jesus’ transcendence. For example, we recognise that 
when Bonhoeffer speaks of the ‘crucified one’ in connection with the incognito (e.g. 
“God’s becoming human in Jesus Christ does not visibly glorify God; because God 
who became human is the Crucified One”)101 this is always an historically particular 
identification, functioning only with reference to the one whose identity is narrated in 
the Gospels. The phrase ‘crucified one’ refers to an execution by a first century !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 H. Gaylon Barker, The Cross of Reality: Luther’s Theologia Crucis and Bonhoeffer’s Christology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2015), 14–15. 
99 D, 84–87. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2: The Doctrine of God (London: T & T Clark, 2004), 346.  
100 B, 313. On execution as the worst form of killing, see Dostoyevsky, “Murder by legal process is 
immeasurably more dreadful than murder by a brigand. A man who is murdered by brigands is killed 
at night in a forest or somewhere else, and up to the last moment he still hopes that he will be saved … 
But here all this last hope, which makes it ten times easier to die, is taken away for certain; here you have 
been sentenced to death, and the whole terrible agony lies in the fact that you will most certainly not 
escape, and there is no agony greater than that. Take a soldier and put him in front of a cannon in 
battle and fire at him and he will still hope, but read the same soldier his death sentence for certain, and 
he will go mad or burst out crying … It was agony like this and of such horror that Christ spoke. No, 
you can’t treat a man like that!’” Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot, trans. David Margarshack (Middlesex: 
Penguin, 1955), 47–48. 
101 B, 355.  
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empire in the midst of a particular political complexity of the relationship between 
Jewish leaders and their occupiers. The incognito of Christ is therefore unsubstitutable 
and historical—as Frei would put it, it is “simply not the stuff of mythological 
tales”102—because it is thought through with reference to the communicatio idiomatum. 
 
Whilst Jesus’ incognito reaches its intensity in the crucifixion, he is incognito also in 
his risen and exalted identity, where his historical particularity remains. If we are 
going to claim that the crucified one is exalted, says Bonhoeffer, then, “the converse 
must also be true: we can have the Exalted One only as the Crucified One. The 
resurrection of Christ does not get us round the stumbling block. Even the Risen One 
remains the stumbling block for us.”103 Therefore, 
 
[W]e cannot get around the stumbling block. To the very end, even through 
the empty grave, Jesus remains incognito, in the form of a stumbling block. 
Jesus does not emerge from his incognito, not even as the Risen One.104 
 
This identification of the risen one as the crucified one reflects Frei’s point that the 
narratives make no distinction between two ‘identities’. Muers’ observation that 
Bonhoeffer’s theological convictions force us to see “the continuing self-identification 
of Christ”105 from incarnation, to crucifixion to resurrection, complements the way 
Frei’s reading of the Gospel narratives highlights the continuing unsubstitutability of 
Jesus Christ.106 Furthermore, that Frei focusses explicitly on the narratives themselves 
reminds us that this identification is not just by a principle of continuity of ideas, but 
because of what happens in those narratives. The narratives identify Jesus precisely by 
the marks of his torture and execution—the continuity of his particular crucifixion.107 
It is only as the wounded one that he is risen. 
 
The resurrection, then, provides no way around the ungraspability or the offense of 
Jesus, because the one who emerges from the tomb has the problematic identity of the 
God-human who was crucified. That wounds remain visible in Jesus’ hands and feet, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
102 Frei, Identity, 174. 
103 B, 359. 
104 B, 360. 
105 Muers, Keeping, 81. 
106 Frei, Identity, 181–182.  
107 Luke 24:39–40. 
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and that those wounds are testimony to his identity, reminds us that the resurrection is 
not a simple negation of crucifixion, as if that is past now. On the contrary, his 
wounds are central to Thomas’ identification of Jesus not just as the person he knows, 
but as somehow God.108 The offense of the cross of Christ is perpetuated, not 
mitigated, by the fact that the risen Christ self-identifies with reference to his 
woundedness, and in the eyes of Thomas identifies himself with God. Secondly, 
Bonhoeffer, like Frei, recognises that the resurrection itself is a problematic 
proclamation that, although historical, refuses to be contained or exhausted by 
rational investigation. He appeals to the “historical fact of the empty grave”109 as that 
which highlights the resurrection as perpetuating the stumbling block of the gospel. 
The empty tomb means Jesus is ‘not there’. If he were manifestly there, faith in 
resurrection would be false. Thus, 
 
The impossible possibility that the grave was empty is the stumbling block of 
faith. The affirmation of the empty grave is also a stumbling block. Who is 
going to prove that Jesus’ disciples did not find the body?110 
 
The empty tomb, therefore, is a negative sign, a kind of historically manifest 
apophasis, where by not seeing Christ the disciples are propelled towards the belief 
that he is alive. As noted in chapter 3, too, the Gospels narrate post-resurrection 
appearances of Jesus, but not the moment of resurrection itself. Even though the 
tradition does not leave us with the empty tomb alone, the subsequent appearances do 
not neutralise the apophatic element in the resurrection, and the continual slipperiness 
of the resurrection appearance narratives strengthen Bonhoeffer’s point. In addition 
to Thomas’ confession, we have Jesus presentation of himself to Mary Magdalene, 
who thinks she has lost him, that culminates in the need not to cling on;111 and the 
moment of recognition post-Emmaus that is immediately followed by a 
disappearance.112 Rachel Muers summarises Bonhoeffer’s thinking on resurrection by 
commenting on “an intensified silence of God” where again, “the risen Christ is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 John 20:24–28. “[F]ar from pain and death being bypassed or ‘transcended’ in the usual sense, they 
are presented to us as now interwoven with God as we encounter him.” Rowan Williams, Resurrection: 
Interpreting the Easter Gospel (London: DLT, 2002), 79. 
109 B, 360. 
110 Ibid. 
111 John 20:17. 
112 Luke 24:31. 
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available to comprehensive analysis, has no defined set of innerworldly characteristics, 
cannot be reduced to a collection of words, is irreducibly a who.”113 Rowan Williams’ 
theology of resurrection can also be read as explicating Bonhoeffer’s theme, 
highlighting the resurrection appearances as narratives of an “encounter with a 
stranger”,114 whom the disciples meet through the initial “absence and loss”115 of the 
empty tomb, and subsequently through the appearances of a “hidden and elusive 
Christ”.116 The resurrection thus perpetuates the impossibility of holding Christ 
within the post-enlightenment framework of human epistemology (as exemplified, for 
example, by the historical Jesus movements) because the stumbling block which gives 
rise to our faith, and “displaces the ego from its central and domineering position”,117 
is as evident in the resurrection narratives as anywhere.  
 
Muers marks the two forms in which Christ’s incognito is ‘deepened’ by his 
resurrection. Firstly, as is the case in Frei’s theology too, when resurrection is 
recognised as an indispensible aspect of his history, Jesus as the risen one cannot be 
accessed or grasped “within a framework of historical causality”;118 and as Bonhoeffer 
says, he is thus incognito in the epistemological ‘ambiguity’ of history, insofar as his 
resurrection marks a discontinuity for historical enquiry within a nonetheless historical 
(or in Frei’s terms, history-like) narrative. Secondly, Muers highlights a continuity, 
insofar as Jesus the risen one remains incognito in the form of the crucified (i.e. 
wounded) one.119 Thus she highlights the unity of Christ’s incognito in historical 
humiliation with the way in which he is beyond all epistemological grasp: 
 
[T]he resurrection confirms the identity of Christ as the one who on the one 
hand can be known as the bearer of a particular ‘history’ and ‘form’, and on 
the other hand cannot be reduced to a fully comprehensible object of 
knowledge.120 
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113 Muers, Keeping, 72. 
114 Williams, Resurrection, 75. 
115 Williams, Resurrection, 78. 
116 Williams, Resurrection, 80. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Muers, Keeping, 80. Muers also draws attention to Bonhoeffer’s theology of resurrection in Creation 
and Fall, where the resurrection, like creation itself, is ex nihilo.  
119 Muers, Keeping, 81. 
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We are then able to say that in Bonhoeffer’s theology Jesus’ historical particularity—
his existence as one who identified with the poor and marginalised, and as one who 
was betrayed, tortured, executed and is risen—constitutes his transcendence, his 
ungraspability. As Muers comments (admittedly in relation to Bonhoeffer’s later 
letters, but it is wholly applicable here too) the existence of Jesus in historical 
humiliation is about “the irreducibility of Christ to what is knowable, and hence to his 
transcendence of attempts to define or judge him.”121 God’s ‘exegesis’ of Godself in 
Christ is troublesome for us—a stumbling block to any attempt to hold Christ within 
the boundaries of a post-enlightenment rationality. 122 If we are speaking about the 
way Jesus evades human ‘grasp’ or classification, then Bonhoeffer makes it impossible 
for us to have that conversation without reference to the crucified God-human, Jesus 
Christ.  
 
The stumbling block of Christ’s hiddenness in humiliation is thus a focal point for 
considering the transcendence of Christ in relation to his unsubstitutability. When 
Frei’s own emphasis upon unsubstitutability is read alongside Bonhoeffer’s work, not 
only does Bonhoeffer’s implicit centrality of Jesus’ historical particularity become 
illuminated, but also Frei’s own Christology is significantly modified to point not only 
to the unsubstitutability but also the offense of the transcendent one. Regarding Frei’s 
comments on paradox in Christology, Bonhoeffer follows Frei in implying that any 
paradox is to do with the particular ‘who’ of Christ and not a general paradoxical 
relation, but adds to Frei by exploring the content of the paradoxical ‘who’ of Christ 
via a theologia crucis.123 
 
In eschatological terms, Bonhoeffer recognises that an ‘emergence’ from the incognito 
will come, with Christ coming, finally unveiled, as “the Eternal, the God who became 
human, in divine power and glory.”124 The incognito, the hiddenness and the 
humiliation will thus be ‘cast off’ at the bringing of all things into Christ, resolving the 
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121 Muers, Keeping, 77. 
122 On the phrase ‘God’s exegesis’, see John 1:18 “It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father’s 
heart, who has made him known (ἐξηγήσατο)”. I am grateful to Roger Forster for pointing this out. 
123 See again, Frei, ‘Theological Reflections’, 5–6. 
124 B, 360. 
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stumbling block.125 This might seem a somewhat sweeping dismissal of the 
ambiguities and paradoxes that Bonhoeffer has insisted cannot be evaded, but the 
theological sense is clear—a recognition of the Christian hope of God’s being “all in 
all”;126 a teleology of presence rather than absence, affirmation over negation. 
Whatever ambiguity, tension and difficulty might be characteristic of the time in 
which the kingdom of God is ‘now and not yet’, the fulfillment of all things in Christ is 
beyond that tension, where the age to come is no longer in tension with the age that is 
passing away. Here, then, is the fullness towards which the paradoxes of Christology 
are oriented. Christ does not cease to be transcendent as who he is now—the crucified 
and risen one—but this identity will no longer conflict with the world. 
 
And yet, despite this promise, the fact that Christ has not yet ‘laid aside’ his incognito 
means that the world and Christians remain in relation to the ‘stumbling block’ aspect 
of his transcendent identity. They cannot ‘solve’ the problem of being united by the 
Spirit with Christ who is incognito as the crucified and risen one, for the stumbling 
block is something that Christians must “accept as believers in Christ.”127 Though, as 
he says in Discipleship, Christians participate in Christ’s suffering and rejection,128 as we 
will see in relation to Ethics, this participation never collapses the distinction between 
Christ and disciple—even for those who participate in the form of Christ, he is the 
σκάνδαλον. 
 
III 
 
Transcendence pro nobis 
 
Alongside the prominence of the paradox of the stumbling block in Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology is his refusal to consider Christ except as the one in whom God is towards 
me (pro me) or towards us (pro nobis). Therefore, God’s being towards us in the 
transcendence of Christ’s paradoxical incognito cannot be separated from the 
community to which Christ is present, and thus we recognise how Frei’s cultural !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 Ernst-Albert Scharffenorth, ‘Editor’s Afterword to the German Edition’, in B, 488. Also, 1 
Corinthians 13:12. 
126 1 Corinthians 15:28. 
127 B, 359. 
128 D, 85. 
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linguistic investigations into the meaning of Christ’s identity cohere with Bonhoeffer’s 
concerns.  
 
To recall the introduction, it is only by virtue of God’s coming to us in Christ that we 
can ask the Christological question, ‘who’ at all, and even then we find ourselves the 
ones who are questioned. Christology is only possible because God is pro me, and God 
is pro me for the sake of my justification in Christ. 
 
“[B]y virtue of what personal ontological structure is Christ present to the 
church? If one answers, by virtue of his God-humanity, that is correct but still 
needs explication. It is the ‘pro me’ structure. The being of Christ’s person is 
essentially his relatedness to me. His being Christ is his being for me.”129 
 
Therefore, Christ is not available to us “in his being in himself”,130 but only knowable 
by us as he is for us—i.e. as the crucified one risen for our justification.131 Kant’s 
unknowability of the thing-in-itself is superseded by emphasis upon the wholly-other-
one who comes to us, as one for us. In speaking of Jesus known only as pro me, 
Bonhoeffer is emphasising both what in Act and Being he called genuine 
transcendence—the impossibility of knowing God-in-Christ ‘in himself’—and also 
how knowing Christ is rooted in Christ’s gift. That is, we know Christ as he gives only 
because he gives, and in his giving of himself for our salvation. The model of revelation 
as knowledge gives way to the one who saves.132 And yet, as Bonhoeffer stresses, 
Christ as pro me remains the stumbling block—the one whose transcendence climaxes 
in the scandalous form of God in the likeness of sinful flesh. Our salvation is in the 
form of the σκάνδαλον.  
 
We can trace Bonhoeffer’s own explication of Christ’s pro me/nobis through the 
description of Christ’s contemporaneous presence in word, sacrament and church 
community. Crucially, in each of these the stumbling block is perpetuated and the 
notion of hiddenness in humiliation is recapitulated. Thus, as McBride summarises, 
“God in God’s freedom not only suffers the cross but also wills to remain present and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 B, 314. 
130 Ibid.  
131 Romans 4:25. 
132 See Kathryn Tanner, ‘Jesus Christ’, in Colin E. Gunton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian 
Doctrine (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 253. 
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public through contemporary humiliation.”133 What Frei bids us recognise is that 
although this ‘contemporary humiliation’ is wholly bound up with the church, at no 
point does this imply a dissolving of Christ’s unsubstitutability, nor his transcendence 
as the one who is normative for the community.  
 
Firstly, as the Word of God in the church (not “timeless truth, but rather … truth 
breaking into a concrete moment as God’s speaking to us”)134 Christ is present in 
human proclamation, and as such is present in humiliated form. “God’s Word, Jesus 
Christ, as the Word of God that has taken human form, is the Word of God that has 
humbled itself by entering into the human word.”135 Once more we must understand 
that it is not presence in corporeality per se that constitutes humiliation, but the 
presence of Christ as the Word of God in the word spoken by fallen humanity, 
announced and received by broken humankind. Again, McBride says, “the Word of 
God is humiliated not only in the inadequacy of human speech and thought but also 
in its vulnerability to human critique.”136 The one who is proclaimed is the one 
crucified (i.e. hidden in the likeness of sinful flesh) and the very presence of this one in 
human proclamation makes that humiliation contemporaneous. Yet, at no point is 
this humiliation in Word to be considered separate from the humiliation of the 
particular God-human on the cross, because Bonhoeffer is not talking merely about 
Christ being ‘referred to’ in word, but about the whole person of Christ being actually 
present. What one might call Jesus’ ‘textual’ humiliation derives from and is secondary 
to his unsubstitutable humiliation. Unsubstitutability serves as an appropriate term by 
which to indicate that once more this makes Jesus’ historical particularity central to 
the church’s contemporaneous relationship to the one who is present to them (as we 
saw in Frei) but with Bonhoeffer we observe that this constitutes a stumbling block 
and thus intensifies the epistemological incapacity of the community in relation to his 
identity. 
 
Secondly, in speaking of Christ pro me as sacrament, Bonhoeffer again wishes to focus 
upon God-in-Christ’s presence in the likeness of sinful flesh. Agreeing with Luther 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Ibid. 
134 B, 317. 
135 B, 318. 
136 McBride, The Church, 79.  
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that Christ as Logos is wholly present in the sacrament,137 Bonhoeffer nevertheless 
wishes to sidestep the complex Lutheran discussions on how Christ is present,138 and 
focus upon that fact that, as wholly present in the sacrament, Christ remains a 
σκάνδαλον.  
 
The sacrament is not the becoming-human of Christ but rather the ultimate 
humiliation of the God-human … Christology is primarily asking, not about 
the possible union of divinity with humanity, but rather about the hiddenness 
of the God-human who is present in his humiliated state … Consequently the 
question of Christ’s presence in the sacrament can be analyzed not as the 
question of the humanity and divinity of Christ but rather as the presence of 
the God-human in humiliated form, as the stumbling-block.139 
 
The hiddenness of Christ in the humiliation of sinful flesh makes for faith because the 
one who appears as not-God is in fact God, and correspondingly Christ’s hiddenness in 
the eucharist—“he is the human being humiliated in the bread and wine”140—makes 
for faith insofar as the elements (bread and wine) are in fact more than they appear to 
be (body and blood).  
 
We can draw on Catherine Pickstock’s work on the “inexhaustibility of meaning”141 in 
the eucharist to explicate this link between the sacrament and the theologia crucis. She 
explains how, in the eucharist, the normal order of sense and reference, where one 
can make sense without a specific reference (for example, speaking sensibly about an 
imaginary tree) is reversed. In the liturgical act however, the reference (the ‘this is’) is 
what makes for the sense, not vice versa as is usually the case. The reference, ‘this is 
my body/blood’, discloses an otherwise hidden sense—that bread and wine are not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
137 “The Reformed say that Christ remains only as Logos-person outside the sacrament of the body of 
Christ. Christ in his bodily form is not the Logos. He remains extra, outside it. Luther answered the 
Reformed question in the form of his doctrine of ubiquity. He said that it is the body of Christ that, as 
the body of the God-human and in its communication with the divine nature itself, has taken on divine 
characteristics. The body of Christ is not bound by its bodily nature but is present everywhere 
simultaneously as the genus majestaticum.” B, 320. 
138 Bonhoeffer believes that Luther’s split account of Christ’s presence in sacrament—ubiquity and 
ubivoli—ultimately collapse into being the ‘how’ not the ‘who’ question. B, 320–321. See DeJonge, 
Bonhoeffer’s, 99–100.  
139 B, 320. 
140 B, 322 
141 Catherine Pickstock, ‘Thomas Aquinas and the quest for the Eucharist’, in John Milbank and Simon 
Oliver (eds.), The Radical Orthodoxy Reader (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 266. 
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what they appear to be, but are the body and blood of Christ.142 This hidden sense is 
confirmed only by “Jesus’ phrase itself, uttered with a simple authority which kindles 
our trust.”143 For Pickstock, the way in which the eucharist holds together absence 
and presence discloses the promise of the sacramental character of reality: 
 
[I]n carrying the absence which characterizes every sign to an extreme (no 
body appears in the bread), it also delivers a final disclosure, or presence (the 
bread is the Body), which alone makes it possible now to trust every sign.144 
 
Therefore, when we inhabit “faithful trust”145 in the words of Christ, those words are 
a promise for us rather than nonsense. That things are not what they seem fuels our 
desire for God by pointing us towards the mystery of God’s gift to and in the world. 
This simultaneous presence and absence, where by things not being what they seem 
they point to God’s activity, corresponds with the hiddenness of Christ in sinful flesh 
in Bonhoeffer’s/Luther’s theologia crucis. Bread and wine do not seem to be the body 
and blood of the crucified one, but via faith, the paradox of revelation and hiddenness 
points to God’s activity towards the world, disclosing God’s gift towards us in Christ, 
which goes beyond our normal grasp of the world. The eucharist centres on Christ’s 
unsubstitutable activity (Frei), and in doing so also to the paradoxical revelation-in-
hiddenness at the heart of his unsubstitutable identity. 
 
Thirdly, after Word and sacrament, Christ is pro me as church-community (Gemeinde); 
but as Clifford Green explains, this constitutes an amalgam of the previous two rather 
than a distinct form in itself, because Word and sacrament themselves operate in 
terms of sociality. “To speak of the Christian Community as the form of Christ is to 
highlight the sociality of Christ’s presence in Word and Sacrament.”146 Gemeinde is the 
social form of the Word spoken in its midst, the Word which calls the community to 
“love of the neighbour, thus creating the mutuality of freedom and love for one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 “[T]hey are not symbols, but Word of God. They do not mean something—they are something.” B, 
319. 
143 Pickstock, ‘Aquinas’, 272. 
144 Pickstock, ‘Aquinas’, 272–273. 
145 Pickstock, ‘Aquinas’, 272. 
146 Clifford Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, second edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 
219. 
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another in the community of the new humanity.”147 Likewise Gemeinde is the social 
form of the sacrament—the community nourished by the gift of the body and blood of 
the crucified, risen and exalted Christ. Here, Green emphasises, Bonhoeffer continues 
in the vein of Sanctorum Communio, insofar as Christ is understood as not only the ‘head 
and Lord’ of the church, but also, 
 
the reality of the congregation itself and every member. This means that while 
the congregation only exists because of the revelation of Christ, this revelation 
takes temporal-bodily-social form: in the relations of persons shaped and 
formed by Word and sacrament, revelation is socially present in time and 
space.148  
 
The Gemeinde experiences the eschatological tension of being a community in Christ 
and yet also in Adam. Yet this tension itself is wholly Christological, insofar as it 
relates to the stumbling block of Christ’s simultaneous exaltation and humiliation, for 
Christ is present in the humiliated form of the church’s simultaneous existence as 
sanctorum communio and peccatorum communio.149 Bonhoeffer says, 
 
Insofar as the church-community is the church-community, it no longer sins. 
But it remains in the world of the old Adam, and as such it still lives in the 
aeon of sin. Christ’s being as the church-community is, like his being as Word, 
a being in the form of the stumbling block.150 
 
As with his presence as Word and sacrament, being present as community perpetuates 
Jesus’ hiddenness in humiliation, and we have already emphasised that this 
humiliation cannot be detached from the unsubstitutability of Jesus Christ—his 
concrete existence as the incarnate, crucified and risen God-human. Christ’s presence 
in Word, sacrament and community—themselves historically particular—does not 
overtake his particularity as Jesus of Nazareth, the Word Incarnate hidden in the 
humiliation of sinful flesh. Therefore, at no point does the idea of Christ’s 
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147 Green, Bonhoeffer, 216. 
148 Green, Bonhoeffer, 220. “[T]o understand the Christology lectures fully it is necessary to recognize 
that Bonhoeffer still employs here the concept of Kollektivperson. As first in Sanctorum Communio, so here 
too, he presents Christ as the Kollektivperson of the new humanity.” Green, Bonhoeffer, 211. 
149 On Luther’s ‘simul iustus et peccator’ see Hampson, Christian, 24. 
150 B, 323. Consider this tension in the pastoral reflections of 1 John 1:5–2:3. 
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contemporaneous presence dilute his particularity and uniqueness—as can happen (as 
Frei pointed out) in more generalised elucidations of his presence.  
 
In The Church for the World (2012) Jennifer McBride makes Bonhoeffer’s connection 
between Christ’s hiddenness in humiliation and the public form of the church central 
to her proposal for an ecclesial witness that is “simultaneously non-triumphal and 
faithful to the Christian proclamation of the Lordship of Christ”.151 Her argument is a 
salient example of reading Bonhoeffer towards the kind of ‘middle way’ described in 
my introduction. In the concepts of incognito, hiddenness and humiliation, she 
recognizes a Christological form to which the church can confidently witness without 
falling into triumphalism: 
 
The incognito of the crucified and risen Christ offers the church a non-
triumphal place to stand in the midst of personal and sociopolitical complexity 
and enables the church to encounter humanity’s doubt, suspicion, and protest 
against the hidden God with empathy instead of judgement … The church 
witnesses to Christ fully aware of the ‘christological contradiction’: God’s 
revelation in human form seen ‘through a glass darkly’ (1 Cor. 13:12).152 
 
McBride offers a Christological re-description of repentance grounded in Bonhoeffer’s 
Christology lectures, whereby the church takes the form of God’s own ‘taking 
responsibility’ in the hidden and humiliated Christ. Where repentance is understood 
as taking responsibility for sin rather than limited to confession of personal 
wrongdoing, she says, it makes theological sense to suggest that Christ embodies a 
“divine repentance”153 by existing in the likeness of sinful flesh as the repenting one, 
even whilst maintaining his personal sinlessness.154 Subsequently, the church is called 
to take the form of Christ’s presence in the world as the one who takes sin upon 
himself (humiliation) and calls human beings to responsibility for their sin. As she 
explains in an earlier article,  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 McBride, The Church, 9. 
152 McBride, The Church, 77. 
153 McBride, The Church, 75. 
154 McBride follows MacFarland’s distinction between “fallenness [as] a property of nature and sin of 
hypostasis”.  Thus Jesus can exist in fallen (and therefore sinful) nature and yet be personally sinless. A 
total taking on/taking responsibility for sin is therefore theologically congruent.” Ian A MacFarland, 
‘Fallen or Unfallen? Christ’s Human Nature and the Ontology of Human Sinfulness,’ International 
Journal of Systematic Theology (10, 2008), 412–413, quoted in McBride, The Church, 74–75. See B, 357. 
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[W]hen it becomes necessary for church-communities to complement public 
engagement with speech that is particularly Christian, I suggest this language 
first be the language of confession of sin.”155  
 
Repentant language moves into repentant activity, where the church takes 
responsibility for its complicity in the world’s brokenness by acting with loving and 
sacrificial humility towards human brokenness—in, for example, socio-economic 
deprivation and ecological neglect.156 In this way, she suggests, the church is faithful to 
what Bonhoeffer describes as its need to be continually humiliated with its Lord, both 
confessing its own sin and taking responsibility for the sin of the world.157   
 
McBride’s proposal therefore has at its heart the perpetuation of Christ’s existence in 
sinful flesh in his presence as Gemeinde, which prevents the church from taking hold of 
Christ in a triumphal manner whilst witnessing to his specificity.158 However, it must 
also be emphasised that even when the church takes the form of the humiliated 
Christ, at no point does Christ become an object for the church—as if we simply 
model ourselves on this way of being—but remains the transcendent and 
unsubstitutable ‘who’, the unsubstitutable one hidden in the humiliation of sinful flesh. 
The desire to be Christ-like must co-exist with recognition of his otherness. 
 
Indeed, regarding Bonhoeffer’s reflections upon Christ as Gemeinde, emphasising 
unsubstitutability assists our discussion of Jesus’ transcendence in a crucial way, 
countering an over-emphasis upon anthropology that sometimes manifests in 
Bonhoeffer scholarship concerning this point—an over-emphasis that threatens to 
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155 Jennifer McBride, ‘Thinking Within the Movement of Bonhoeffer’s Theology: Towards a 
Christological Reinterpretation of Repentance’, in Stephen Plant and Ralf K. Wüstenberg (eds.), 
Religion, Religionless and Contemporary Western Culture (Frankfurt: Peter Laing, 2008), 101. 
156 McBride concentrates on two specific communities that demonstrate this form of witness – the 
Eleuthero Community in Portland, Maine; and The Southeast White House in Washington, D.C. See 
McBride, The Church, chs. 6 and 7. 
157 B, 360; and D, 88. See also Michael Mawson, who adds a pneumatological edge to McBride’s 
emphasis: “Christ and the Holy Spirit are working in and through the church as a community of sin … 
The existing church is a distinctive and visible witness in the world, to a significant extent at least, by 
means of the Spirit convicting it of its sin.” Michael Mawson, ‘The Spirit and the Community: 
Pneumatology and Ecclesiology in Jenson, Hütter and Bonhoeffer’, International Journal of Systematic 
Theology (15, 2013), 468. 
158 McBride, ‘Thinking Within’, 93–95. 
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skew the discussion of Jesus’ transcendence towards generalisation and away from the 
particular form of the crucified one.  
 
For example, Alexander Jensen has argued that the centrality of personal encounter 
with the other in Bonhoeffer’s theology makes a strong case for his identity as an 
apophatic, or ‘negative’ theologian. Bonhoeffer’s Christology, says Jensen, is based 
upon an “apophaticism of person”159—i.e. “the mystery of encounter with the other, 
who, as person, cannot be fully understood and explained”.160 He argues that this is 
the first of two apophatic elements in Bonhoeffer’s thought; the second being his 
understanding of the limiting rather than defining function of theological language 
like the Chalcedonian confession—that is, “theology is negative insofar as it … sets 
boundaries for the legitimate expression of the foundational experience.”161 Although 
one could not disagree with the latter point, the summary of the first point is 
incomplete, for to develop Bonhoeffer’s apophatic credentials by reference to a 
general ‘otherness of other people’ fails to point explicitly to the fact that this otherness 
is itself derivative of Jesus Christ’s identity as primordially other—i.e. as the Incarnate 
Logos of God (see chapter 5).162 Furthermore, it bypasses what I suggest is a more 
significant apophatic element in Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran Christology, namely that 
Christ evades our attempts to define him precisely because of his scandalous form—
the hiddenness of the Word of God incarnate in the humiliation of sinful flesh—and 
not by virtue of his general personhood.  
 
Anthropology does not wholly constitute the transcendence at the heart of 
Christology, and neither does drawing on Bonhoeffer’s account of human otherness as 
a primary example of apophasis adequately express the paradoxical transcendence of 
Christ at the heart of his Christology. An exploration of apophasis (which implies !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
159 Alexander S. Jensen, ‘Schleiermacher and Bonhoeffer as Negative Theologians: a Western Response 
to some Eastern Challenges’, St Mark’s Review (215: 2011), 15. Jensen draws this term from Eastern 
Orthodox theologian Christos Yannaras. Jensen, ‘Schleiermacher and Bonhoeffer’, 9–11. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Jensen goes some way to correcting this imbalance in his 2014 book Divine Providence and Human 
Agency. The introduction derives from the 2011 article, but in the book he has added that the mysterious 
encounter with Christ the ‘other’ needs to be understood ontologically, with relation to “the structure of 
the relation of the divine and human nature of Christ, which is necessary for the appropriate 
understanding of the encounter with him”. Alexander S. Jensen, Divine Providence and Human Agency: 
Trinity, Creation and Freedom (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 21.  
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transcendence) in Bonhoeffer’s Christology should, I argue, take account of the 
theologia crucis, recognising that it is as the particular humiliated one that Jesus 
transcends, even in the present. This constitutes a much deeper and more paradoxical 
apophasis—one more truly ‘Bonhoefferian’—than the general unknowability of the 
other person. Therefore, where Clifford Green says that “[t]he form of transcendence 
is … human sociality”,163 we would be better to say that the form of transcendence is 
the particular union of divine and human in Jesus Christ, in which human sociality 
participates, receiving his generously given self. Frei’s emphasis upon Jesus’ 
unsubstitutability therefore keeps us alert to this central element of particular 
historicity in Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis, allowing us to mine it for a theology of Jesus’ 
transcendence in a particularly nuanced way.  
 
The overemphasis on anthropology can also lead to another related problem that 
recalls the third stage of Placher’s argument (see chapter 2)—insofar as some scholars 
place Bonhoeffer’s ‘person centred’ account in opposition to what they perceive as a 
traditional theology of transcendence. Barker, for example, implies that the pro me of 
Christ in a theologia crucis stands opposed to a theology of God’s wholly-otherness or 
eternal transcendence,164 and Green also contrasts transcendence as human sociality 
with “an inaccessible otherness or beyondness of God.”165 Recalling Placher’s 
suggestion that the contrast between transcendence and God being towards the world 
is a false dichotomy—the result of reading transcendence through the domesticating 
filter of modernism—we should challenge this perceived mutual exclusivity of Christ’s 
pro me and God’s wholly-otherness. Far from endorsing a dichotomy, Bonhoeffer 
presents us with a theologia crucis where the wholly otherness and transcendence of God 
is one with (not mitigated by) God who is wholly other, and who is pro me in the form 
of the σκανδαλον of Christ crucified.166  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Green, Bonhoeffer, 215. 
164 “In every circumstance, God in Christ is the norm and authority standing over against all human 
thought or ideology. But at the same time, God is not wholly other, so different and distanced from the 
world as to be removed from it.” Barker, The Cross, 432 (also 418). 
165 Green, Bonhoeffer, 214. 
166 As Ziegler comments, Bonhoeffer resists “defend[ing] divine freedom and majesty by way of an 
abstract affirmation of divine transcendence,” and instead emphasises Christ’s promeity as God’s 
“specific relation to the world”. Ziegler, ‘Christ’, 32. In the lectures, Bonhoeffer also explores the ‘place’ 
of Christ pro me, emphasising a threefold ‘being-there’ (Dasein) for humanity, for history and for nature. 
In exploring these (history and nature in particular) he again stresses the σκάνδαλον of the person of 
Christ, present for us only as the one who is humiliated. Being there for humanity is being at the centre 
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Overall therefore, Bonhoeffer’s theology of Christ pro me in Word, sacrament and 
community fruitfully engages with Frei’s thought in the following ways: First of all, 
Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on Christ as pro nobis complements Frei’s insistence that one 
cannot speak of the unsubstitutable Christ in isolation from the cultural-linguistic 
praxis of the community who confess the Lordship of the one narratively attested in 
the gospels. To give Bonhoeffer’s term to Frei, the latter’s enquiry into cultural 
linguistics investigates the way in which the community relates—especially in terms of 
the sensus literalis of scripture—to Christ as pro nobis. In short, Frei’s cultural linguistics 
investigate Christ’s being pro nobis. Secondly, Frei’s own emphasis on the sensus literalis 
of scripture in the community prioritises the unsubstitutability of Jesus, and I have 
been allowing that to alert us to the importance of that unsubstitutability in what 
Bonhoeffer calls Jesus’ ‘pro me structure’, warning us away from straying towards 
generalisation. Finally, along exactly the same lines as that explored above, 
Bonhoeffer’s focus on the incognito of Christ supplements the content of Frei’s 
cultural linguistics, thereby supplementing Frei’s contribution to a ‘middle way’. Frei’s 
cultural linguistic investigations are the point at which his vision for ‘generous 
orthodoxy’ comes into view, and his understanding of theology’s ‘flexibility’ and 
‘humility’ is strengthened and deepened by focus upon Jesus’ transcendence in the 
hiddenness of humiliation as Bonhoeffer expresses it. In other words, Bonhoeffer lends a 
theologia crucis to Frei’s ‘generous orthodoxy’ and thus to the question of the ‘middle 
way’. In these three ways, the relationship between Christ’s pro me structure in 
Bonhoeffer and Frei’s attention to cultural linguistics is fertile ground for constructive 
comparison. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
of human existence as the beginning of the new humanity, yet also as its boundary—determining 
humanity’s creatureliness by being the Other in whom their life resides. (C.f. CF, 86). Being there for 
history likewise corresponds to Christ being the center of history, again both as limit and center in an 
eschatological sense —being the one who is beyond history and also the one who is in history, drawing 
history to fulfillment in God. “[I]n Christ the messianic expectation of history is crushed as well as 
fulfilled. It is crushed because its fulfillment is hidden. It is fulfilled because the Messiah has truly come. 
The meaning of history is swallowed up in an event that takes place in the deepest desolation of human 
life, on the cross. History finds its meaning in the humiliation of Christ.” B, 325. Being there for nature 
is Christ’s being the new creation. In the light of his newness, creation is recognized in its old-ness, and 
encounters its “dim desire to free itself, to make itself into a new creation.” B, 327. C.f. Romans 8:18–
25. Bonhoeffer also reaches back to the notion of Christ present as sacrament, where the corporeal 
elements are the locus of his redeeming presence for nature. Here Christ is nature’s centre—“the 
mediator between nature and God”—present in, and yet redeeming, fallen nature. B, 327. 
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IV 
 
Critically Evaluating Historicity in the Christology Lectures 
 
In contrast to the above emphases, John Howard Yoder has voiced the criticism that 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology and its subsequent interpreters allow Jesus’ particularity to 
fall out of the picture. I have already proposed that Frei can help to counter this 
tendency—insofar as the anti-mythical notion of unsubstitutability prevents the 
themes overtaking the person, pointing us more firmly towards the importance of the 
gospel narratives—and furthermore I argue below that in comparison with Yoder, 
Frei is a better corrective companion to Bonhoeffer. In offering greater focus on what 
he calls unsubstitutability, Frei does not disenfranchise the notion of transcendence in 
Bonhoeffer’s thought, whereas Yoder is in danger of such a move. 
 
Yoder suggests that “to leap … as does Bonhoeffer, from crib to cross is precisely to 
leave out of one’s Christology the substance of social living in occupied rebellion torn 
Palestine.”167 Put in terms of my argument above, Yoder believes that the criticism 
made of Kierkegaard is true for Bonhoeffer too—that is, that “once history is 
affirmed, the historical details turn out to be unimportant after all.”168 Abstract 
paradoxes of hiddenness, humiliation and of the “intellectual scandal”169 of revelation, 
says Yoder, lead Bonhoeffer’s interpreters into an internalising ‘logology’ concerned 
with the psychology of faith, and also lead to a theology of incarnation that “serves as 
the label for a commitment to the sweeping acceptance of things as they are.”170 
‘Logology’ affirms things as they are because it considers becoming-human in general 
terms according to experience of being human, and applies that to Jesus, thus writing 
an anthropological or socio-political status quo onto Christology.  
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167 John H. Yoder, ‘The Christological Presuppositions of Discipleship’, in Jens Zimmerman and Brian 
Gregor (eds.), Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought (Oregon: Pickwick, 
2010), 143. Re. B, 356. 
168 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 146. 
169 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 147. 
170 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 144–145. 
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“The concept of incarnation serves to support the claim that God asks us to 
behave that way (the way humans do) for the sake of His presence in the 
world, presence for which the name of Jesus is a symbol.”171  
 
Yoder, therefore, calls for an externally oriented ‘Jesuology’ wherein the particular 
events of the gospels dominate. By clinging to a particular person, Jesuology forces 
socio-political critique in the light of that particular life, rather than an insipid 
affirmation of all human life in general. ‘Logology’ per se says Yoder, is a speculative 
discipline to be subordinated to the “fact of the incarnation”172—the person that Jesus 
was—if it is not to collapse into banality. It would seem that Yoder wants what 
Bonhoeffer seemed to want in the lectures—i.e. the priority of the ‘who’ question, so 
that Christology asks not “whether or how God could or did become man, but what 
kind of man He chose to be”.173 He believes, though, that Bonhoeffer never got to 
that point, and that a ‘Jesulogical’ gloss is required on the lectures and to Bonhoeffer’s 
theology in general. 
 
In one sense, Yoder highlights that to which I have drawn argued above—that 
attention to Jesus’ unsubstitutability, and the recognition that this binds one to the 
gospel narratives, guides us towards the most fruitful way of reading of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology. In another, though, Yoder’s criticism masks the importance of the 
paradoxical incognito of Christ. Suggesting that Bonhoeffer’s lectures serve to point 
away from particularity to this ‘logological’ Christology, Yoder introduces a dichotomy 
between logology and Jesuology that unbalances our reading in two ways:  
 
Firstly, Bonhoeffer’s rationale expressly forbids a de-particularisation of Christology, 
especially a reduction of the notions of incognito or hiddenness to no more than the 
idea that (to quote Johannes Climacus) “the god has been in human form”, or that 
“the god appeared in the humble form of a servant, lived and taught among us, and 
then died.”174 Therefore, the existence of Jesus in the likeness of sinful flesh is 
expounded with reference to Jesus’ appearance to his contemporaries; his existence as 
the one hidden in humiliation implies reference to an historical crucifixion; and, as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 145. Italics mine. 
172 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 151. 
173 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 147. 
174 Kierkegaard, Philosophical, 103–104. 
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Bonhoeffer explicitly says, dogmatics requires Jesus’ historical existence as this 
particular person.175 ‘Logology’ is clearly rejected in the priority of ‘who’ over ‘how’. 
What is required, then, is not a refocus, but a reading onwards on the momentum of 
what is already said. Yoder does hint that had Bonhoeffer’s life not been cut short, he 
might have developed a more ‘Jesulogical’ approach in line with his explorations of 
‘non-religiousness’ in the prison letters (see chapter 7) but still suggests that the lectures 
themselves do not allow dogmatic speculation to be subordinate to “the fact of the 
incarnation”.176  
 
Secondly, Yoder’s suggestion that Bonhoeffer’s ‘logology’ serves to uncritically affirm 
the status quo fails to appreciate how the unavoidable σκανδαλον of Christ acts as a 
challenge not only to politically banal Christology, but also to any kind of attempt to 
build an unquestionable socio-political system upon the identity of Jesus. Where 
Bonhoeffer recognised, amongst other things, that the historical cross and resurrection 
stood against modernist reductions of Christ’s identity to that which is 
epistemologically graspable, Yoder himself appeals to the ‘fact’ of the incarnation as 
grounds for a concrete socio-political ethic. Christology grounded upon such a ‘fact’, 
for Yoder, is about  “the whole Jesus, from his desert temptation and Nazareth 
platform sermon, through his moral teaching and founding of an evangelization 
movement, to cross and resurrection,”177 and elsewhere he outlines how Jesus Christ 
offers a norm for a concrete socio-political ethic, which has the character “not [of] 
inscrutable paradox but as meaningful affirmation”.178 Bonhoeffer’s Christology 
cannot be reduced to the affirmative in the way that Yoder seems to desire (hence 
Yoder’s unease) but this turns out to be Bonhoeffer’s strength, not his weakness. Not 
only, as we have seen, does he forbid us from deriving Jesus’ identity and meaning 
from his activity alone, but furthermore, his Lutheran and Kierkegaardian roots 
(modification of the latter notwithstanding) do not allow us to dispense with the 
paradoxical. As Jens Zimmerman summarises in a similar response to Yoder’s 
argument, “Yoder’s hermeneutic is itself open to the danger of literalism, historicism, 
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175 B, 329. 
176 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 154. 
177 Ibid. 
178 John H. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1996), 238. 
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and even certain fundamentalism because it wants concreteness”.179 Bonhoeffer, on the 
other hand, does not allow such literalism. If what Yoder calls the more ‘logological’ 
aspects of Bonhoeffer’s Christology are in fact those aspects that most forcefully 
highlight the paradox of Jesus the σκανδαλον, then those aspects are vital for calling into 
question any kind of grasp of the identity of Jesus. We make, of course, affirmative 
statements about Jesus’s activity and words that are at the heart of his identity as 
yielded by the Gospels, and these inform our socio-political praxes—but these do not 
simply replace the paradoxical with the affirmative, the hidden with the visible, or, to 
follow the dichotomy to its end, the transcendent with the immanent. Being patterned 
after Christ is a fragile business. As Anderson is at pains to make clear, even a calling 
to be patterned after Christ’s humble self-emptying (kenosis) could be negatively made 
into a principle and lose its transcendent dimension.180 If the theme of the σκανδαλον is 
logological, therefore, then this logology cannot be understood as purveying a status 
quo, because the σκανδαλον of Christ hidden in humiliation calls humanity to a posture 
of humility. In other words, what Yoder labels ‘logological’ in Bonhoeffer is in fact an 
insistence upon the “irreducible who”181 of Jesus Christ that undermines the human 
grasp of him, and impicitly criticises a Christology which unquestioningly underwrites 
a particular socio-political programme. Implying that the systematic elements of the 
lectures limit transformative encounter with Christ ignores the very element in 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology that testifies to something at the heart of how Jesus is 
transformative—i.e. being the transcendent person who encounters us as God, often 
challenging the status quo, but never in such a way that can be pinned down and 
concretely institutionalised for all time.  
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179 Jens Zimmerman, ‘Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christological 
Humanism’, in Zimmerman and Gregor, Being Human, 42. 
180 Anderson suggests that “the assumption of a kenotic way of life on the part of the church in the 
world occludes the very truth which kenosis discloses, and envelopes the ego of the church ever more 
securely in a posture of humility. A life which is devoted to self-emptying can be a life committed most 
powerfully to a manner of self-existence. It is most understandable that the natural reaction to a power-
full church is a radical call for a power-less church. But, while the way of poverty and powerlessness is 
indeed a more attractive virtue than a spirit of acquisitiveness and superiority, that way is a temptation 
because of its very attractiveness … The question is not, it seems to me, how the church can assume a 
kenotic way of life … but, of where one locates the reality of the church itself … There may well be a 
genuine kenotic life which appears similar to this way of life, but its source and its (ultimate) power comes 
from another Spirit. In a word, the life of kenotic community is a life of transcendence.” Anderson, 
Historical, 230–231.  
181 C.f. Muers, Keeping, 72. 
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Granted, Bonhoeffer’s Christology would benefit from greater emphasis upon 
particularity, and Yoder makes very much the same point as Frei when he advocates a 
‘Jesuology’ wherein one understands that “the revelation happened before and outside 
the believer, in Jesus of Nazareth, and in the apostolic church’s appropriation of him 
in her believing testimony, so that the Gospel events retain a categorical priority over 
the church’s reflection and confession of them”.182 However, the way Yoder labels 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures ‘logological’ risks sidelining the very character which 
points to the transcendence of Jesus—itself inseperable from the particularity to which 
Yoder wants to draw attention—and therefore skewing the emphasis in an opposite 
direction. Bonhoeffer’s dogmatics do the work of pointing to transcendence in a way 
that Yoder does not. Zimmerman again: 
 
[T]he strength of Bonhoeffer’s incarnational Christology lies in the paradox of 
affirming the concrete precisely because affirming the transcendence of the 
God-man Jesus Christ.183  
 
Recall from chapter 5 that both Frei and Bonhoeffer want to counter the reduction of 
Christology by the modernist epistemology of Culture Protestantism, and it becomes 
apparent that Frei is a more nuanced critical partner for Bonhoeffer—insisting on 
unsubstitutability and the importance of the Gospel narratives without implying quite 
the same thing about ‘factuality’ as Yoder, or excluding the paradoxical by demoting 
Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis.184 We can acknowledge Yoder’s point, but a more effective 
way to fill out the implicit particularity in Bonhoeffer is to utilize Frei’s emphasis upon 
the centrality of unsubstitutable identity of Christ as narrated in the Gospels—a 
narrative which does not enclose, but witnesses to, the transcendent Christ in his 
irreducible existence.  
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182 Yoder, ‘Christological’, 147. 
183 Zimmerman, ‘Being’, 47. 
184 Frei, we have seen, is nervous about the paradoxical, but his own sensibilities are not in opposition 
to the paradoxical elements of Bonhoeffer’s Christology, developed as they are in relation to the ‘who’ 
of Christ. 
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V 
 
Conclusion 
 
At the heart of Bonhoeffer’s Christology is the particular ‘who’ of Christ, the one 
beyond us in the form of the stumbling block—i.e. the humiliation of sinful flesh. We 
observed how Frei’s emphasis upon Jesus’ unsubstitutability arises from an equally 
firm insistence upon the ‘who’ question, and that their similarity on this matter serves 
to highlight Bonhoeffer’s implicit recognition of the importance of Jesus’ historical 
particularity (in contrast with Kierkegaard) on the basis of which the paradoxical 
σκάνδαλον of the theologia crucis is understood to be an explication of Jesus’ transcendence 
in his historical particularity. In short, Bonhoeffer’s work counters domesticated 
transcendence and epistemological monophysitism with a theologia crucis. Reading his 
lectures in the light of Frei’s work, we can say that it is the historically unsubstitutable 
person, narrated in the Gospels, who is transcendent in the humiliation of sinful flesh. 
The fact that Christians are held off from ‘owning’ Christ cannot solely be expressed 
in terms of general ‘otherness’, but must be expressed with reference to the 
paradoxical revelation of God in the crucified and risen Christ.  
 
Furthermore, Bonhoeffer’s insistence that we know Christ only as pro me—and even 
then, always as the σκάνδαλον—can be joined with Frei’s cultural linguistic investigation 
into the normativity of the unsubstitutable Christ for the community of faith. Where 
Frei recognises that the sensus literalis implies the presence of the risen one to the 
community, leading to a humble and ‘flexible’ approach to theology, Bonhoeffer 
emphasises that as pro nobis, this risen one is always Christ incognito in the humiliation 
of sinful flesh, which furthers the sense of theology’s humility by appealing to the 
paradoxcial theologia crucis. In other words, Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis seasons Frei’s 
generous orthodoxy. 
 
The following chapter looks to Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison, where the 
paradoxical theologia crucis continues to shape Bonhoeffer’s theology in various ways— 
particularly in the cosmic terms of Ethics and in terms of the criticism of religion in the 
letters—and where the complementarity I am suggesting between Frei and 
Bonhoeffer is further evident.  
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Chapter 7. 
 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER:  
CHRISTOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENCE IN ETHICS AND 
LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON  
 
This chapter looks to Bonhoeffer’s Ethics and his theological letters from prison, 
continuing to observe the fruitfulness of reading Bonhoeffer alongside Frei on the 
question of the transcendence of Jesus. I begin with a brief description of the realist 
cosmic Christology that forms the conceptual framework for Ethics. Bonhoeffer 
understands that the incarnate, crucified and risen Christ constitutes the reality of 
God’s reconciliation of the world to Godself in which human beings are called to 
participate, labeling this the Christuswirklichkeit, or ‘Christ-reality’. Ethics reflects very 
much the theologia crucis observed in the previous chapter, so following the suggestion 
above that Frei’s concept of unsubstitutability can supplement a reading of the 
Christology lectures, we recognise again that it is only as the scandalous 
unsubstitutable one that Jesus constitues reality. It is only as the unsubstitutable 
stumbling-block that Jesus transcends.  
 
In Ethics Bonhoeffer also introduces a nuanced terminology of ‘ultimacy’ and 
‘penultimacy’ to describe the eschatological tension in which Christians find 
themselves, and also to insist upon how a Christological ontology affirms, rather than 
de-values, the world. Reflecting similar thinking as H. Richard Niebuhr in Christ and 
Culture and Frei in Types of Christian Theology, Bonhoeffer recognises that what DeJonge 
calls “oppositional”1 thinking about Christ and the world fails to adequately reflect the 
Christuswirklichkeit.  What is required is a nuanced ontology where the world finds its 
true being in Jesus who transcends it. This cosmic Christology complements Frei’s 
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1 See Michael P. DeJonge, ‘Between Fundamentalism and Secularism: Bonhoeffer’s Negotiation of 
Oppositional Pairs in Ethics and its precedent in Act and Being’, in John W. DeGruchy, Stephen Plant, 
Christiane Tietz (eds.), Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A Way Between Fundamentalism and Secularism? 
(Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 2009), 74. 
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approach to a Christian affirmation of history, and makes sense as a fleshing out of the 
high Christology that grounds the sensus literalis.2 
 
Bonhoeffer’s Letters and Papers from Prison revisit the theme of domesticated 
transcendence through the narrative of a modernist obsession with God as a religious 
stop-gap, in contrast to which he calls Christians to witness to Jesus Christ who is “the 
human being for others”;3 to God’s strength in the weakness of the cross; God’s 
transcendence pro nobis. Again, a theologia crucis is central, and when read with the 
observations of the previous chapter in mind, these letters offer piercing insights into 
the paradoxical challenge of true relationship to Jesus Christ, once more filling out 
Frei’s theology with an emphasis upon the difficulty the church cannot avoid as it 
seeks to embodying faith in the unsubstitutable Jesus of the gospels, especially as 
regards his transcendence as encountered in and through others.  
 
I 
 
Ethics 
 
Ethics is an incomplete collection of manuscripts penned during Bonhoeffer’s 
involvement with the Abwehr—a senior German counter-intelligence agency operating 
overseas under the guise of apparent Nazi propaganda activities, under whose cover 
Bonhoeffer made crucial ecumenical contacts and helped Jews escape Germany.4 As 
Rasmussen summarises, “what we have as the book Ethics is a posthumous collection 
of Bonhoeffer’s unfinished efforts, written while awaiting travel assignments for the 
conspiracy”.5 These manuscripts were never finally redrafted to Bonhoeffer’s 
satisfaction, nor did he definitively order the material. However, in the 1980s, a re-
ordering of the work for the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke edition made the essay ‘Christ 
Reality and the Good’ the first chapter, properly highlighting the Christological basis 
for Ethics. Ann Nickson suggests that prior to the new versions, the Christology of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Hans W. Frei, ‘Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal’ in Hans W. Frei, Theology and 
Narrative: Selected Essays, edited by George Hunsinger and William Placher (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 37. 
3 LPP, 501. 
4 See Edwin Robertson, The Persistent Voice of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Bath: Eagle, 2005), 174–193. 
5 Larry Rasmussen, ‘The ethics of responsible action’, in John W. de Gruchy (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 215. 
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Ethics was “softened by its placement midway through the volume”. Its revised 
prominence, however, testifies that “Bonhoeffer sees his task as … a radical re-
formulation of the entire basis of Christian ethics in Christological terms.”6 This re-
formulation is expressed powerfully through the concept Christuswirklichkeit (Christ-
reality). 
 
i) Christuswirklichkeit: the cosmic transcendence of Jesus 
 
Reflecting again his language of the Christological ‘who’, examined in the previous 
chapter, Bonhoeffer’s explication of Christuswirklichkeit forbids one ‘go behind’ God’s 
reconciling activity in Christ to a more general reality. The reconciliation of the world 
to God in Christ is the irreducible grounds of all reality and therefore of ethics. 
Christuswirklichkeit does not point to more fundamental questions of ‘good and evil’; 
rather, those questions are “themselves embedded in a wholly other ultimate reality, 
namely the reality of God the Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer.”7 The ‘who’ 
remains at the centre of Christian ethics. 
 
Therefore Ethics also manifests a posture of epistemological humility, because like the 
Christological question, the ethical question is given its reality from beyond itself. In 
contrast to Kant’s “pure faith of religion”,8 Bonhoeffer’s Christianity is not in the 
service of morality, as if the purpose of the Church’s existence was to point to moral 
principles more fundamental than Jesus Christ. Rather, questions of ‘good’ are only 
genuinely real (rather than abstract) when undertaken in relation to God in Christ—
because God in Christ is the world’s reality. For this reason, ethics is always with 
reference to and possible only because of the transcendence of God—the pro nobis 
exteriority of God in Christ.9 Christian ethics is therefore about Christocentric 
teleology: 
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6 Ann L. Nickson, Bonhoeffer on Freedom: Courageously Grasping Reality (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 119. 
7 E, 48. Italics mine. 
8 Immanuel Kant, ‘Religion within the boundaries of mere reason’ (1793), in Immanuel Kant, Religion 
and Rational Theology, trans. Wood and Giovanni (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 176. 
9 There is a “connection between God in Christ and all human life which is all-embracing and 
ontological, and prior to all human thinking, willing and believing” Jürgen Moltmann, ‘The Lordship 
of Christ and Human Society’, in Jürgen Moltmann and Jürgen Weissbach, Two Studies in the Theology of 
Bonhoeffer (New York: Scribner, 1967), 59. 
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The ultimate, or final, reality, discloses itself to be at the same time the first 
reality, God as the first and last, the Alpha and Omega. Without God all 
seeing and perceiving of things and laws become abstraction, a separation 
from both origin and goal. All questions of our own goodness, as well as the 
goodness of the world, are impossible unless we have first posed the question of 
the goodness of God. For what meaning would the goodness of human beings 
and the world have without God? Since God, however, as the ultimate reality 
is no other than the self-announcing, self-revealing God in Jesus Christ, the 
question of good can only find its answer in Christ.10 
 
Furthermore, God’s reconciling activity in Christ does not make for a supra-mundane 
reality pertaining to a purely ‘spiritual’ consciousness, but encompasses the whole 
world. There are, says Bonhoeffer, “not two realities, but only one reality, and that is 
God’s reality revealed in Christ in the reality of the world … Hence there are not two 
realms, but only one the one realm of the Christ-reality [Christuswirklichkeit].”11 Christ, “the 
indivisible whole of God’s reality”12 therefore grounds a theological metaphysic, in 
which, says Zimmerman, Bonhoeffer is “modifying Christologically the theological 
realism that was taken for granted by classical Christianity and epitomized in the 
theology of Thomas Aquinas.”13 Simply, that which is not according to the 
Christuswirklichkeit is not reality, because it is not according to God’s work in Christ. In 
more Thomist terms, that which is not according to the Christuswirklichkeit does not 
participate in the reality that is the world’s relationship to God the transcendent 
creator and redeemer.14  
 
Therefore, thinking in terms of separate realms (like church and world) is 
misleading—bound to the sub-reality of the fall—because in Christ all things have 
been caught up into God’s reconciling activity. Realm-thinking (Raumdenken) is clumsy, 
envisioning a battle for space between two opposing realities, “bumping against and 
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10 E, 49. 
11 E, 58. 
12 E, 53. 
13 Jens Zimmerman, ‘Finitum Capax Infiniti or The Presencing of Christ’, in Ralf K. Wüstenberg and 
Jens Zimmerman (eds.), God Speaks to Us: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Biblical Hermeneutics (Frankfurt: Peter Laing, 
2013), 86. 
14 “[Bonhoeffer’s] ethic is derived from the conviction that ‘reality’ is complex in its dynamic participation 
in the transcendent simplicity of Christ’s personality.” Justin Mandela Roberts, Sacred Rhetoric: Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and the Participatory Tradition (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2015), 19. 
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repelling each other”.15 It goes behind God’s reconciling activity in the same way that 
the ‘how’ question goes behind the ‘who’ of Christ in the Christology lectures. Again, 
“[t]here are not two realms, but only the one realm of the Christ reality”.16  
 
Even the ‘spheres’ of church and evil, apparently distinct in the New Testament, are 
only properly conceived in their relation to the one Christuswirklichkeit.17 Firstly, the 
church occupies ‘space’ in the world not for its own sake, but for the purpose of 
witnessing to the world’s ultimate reconciled reality.18 Secondly, the idea that the 
world is “under the power of the devil”19 does not refer to a distinct, ontologically 
stable realm of evil, but rather an illusory sub-reality, or in Augustinian terms, 
privation.20 As Bonhoeffer explains in a sermon in 1939: 
 
Death and sin puff themselves up and instill fear in humankind, as if they were 
still the rulers of the world. But it is only an illusion. They have long since lost 
their power. Jesus has taken it from them.21 
 
Although evil’s orientation away from Christ and towards un-reality is anything but 
imaginary (Ethics, as Schlingensiepen describes it, was “‘written and lived’ by turns”22 
in the midst of the reality of Nazism) its ultimate power is illusory. The opposition 
between Christ and evil exists only insofar as “the devil, unwillingly, must serve Christ, 
and, willing evil, must ever again do good.”23 Once more the point is teleological: all 
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15 E, 57. The German Raum “holds more explicit spatial connotations than the English rendering 
‘realm’ … There are two distinct spaces that can be seen as confronting each other.” Ulrik Becker 
Nissen, ‘On Mystery and Reality in Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Ethics’, Journal of Religious Ethics (39, 2011), 
326–327. 
16 E, 58. This exposes Kirkpatrick’s over-simplistic comparison between Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard, 
in which he says, “[f]or both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer there are two distinct realms”. Matthew D. 
Kirkpatrick, Attacks on Christendom in a World Come of Age: Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer and the Question of 
‘Religionless Christianity’ (Oregon: Pickwick, 2011), 124. 
17 E, 62. 
18 E, 63–64.  
19 E, 64. 
20 St. Augustine, ‘Confessions’, 7.16 in Mary T. Clark (ed.), Augustine of Hippo: Selected Writings, trans. 
Mary T. Clark (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 7; Matthew Levering, The Theology of Augustine (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2013) 100.  
21 TEU, 487. 
22 Ferdinand Schlingensiepen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer 1906–1945: Martyr, Thinker, Man of Resistance (London: T 
& T Clark, 2012), 250.  
23 E, 65.  
! 200 
things are ordered in relation to the only ‘real reality’, the Christuswirklichkeit, which 
exposes as false any dichotomy of world and God—i.e. any Raumdenken.  
 
Therefore, ‘ethical’ living is fundamentally participation in world’s continual coming-
to-reality—i.e. coming-to-be in Christ in whom it is reconciled with God—and this 
ontological teleology implies a profoundly biblical eschatological tension whereby the 
world is becoming what it truly is. The term Christuswirklichkeit, then, is not static; it implies 
the ‘now and not yet’ of the Gospel, insofar as it remains for the world to participate 
in the reality given it by God.24  
 
Bonhoeffer reframes this same eschatological tension in his subsequent and significant 
discussion of ultimacy and penultimacy. He understands the ultimate (in individual 
terms God’s justification of the sinner; in cosmic terms the reconciliation of the world 
to God) as the grounds and goal of the penultimate.25 Penultimate things temporally 
precede God’s ultimate justification and reconciliation, yet have their place only in 
their relationship to that ultimacy.26 Bonhoeffer explains this relationship by implying 
that the instinct to remain silent alongside a grieving person (penultimate activity) is 
more ‘real’ than offering a word about God’s justification and reconciliation (the 
ultimate).27 Remaining silent in worldly grief can constitute a more meaningful 
orientation to the ultimate than quickly pointing beyond the immediate sense of pain 
and loss to painless eternal life in Christ. This kind of penultimate activity does not 
constitute God’s reconciliation, but does participate in it and is ordered towards it, 
being therefore wholly valid in the light of it.  
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24 “Wirklichkeit … with its root werken—to ‘bring about’ or ‘effect’ … suggest[s] something ‘realized’ or 
‘being realized’.” Harold Lockley, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: his Ethics and its value for Christian Ethics Today, 
(Swansea: Phoenix, 1993), 17.On ‘now and not yet’ in synoptic terms, see, for example, Morna D. 
Hooker, the Gospel According to St Mark (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 57–58. In Pauline terms one considers 
the ‘groaning of all creation’ as it waits the fullness of its freedom according to God’s work in God’s 
children (Rom 8:18-23).  
25 E, 149 –150.  
26 Pangritz points out the similarity with Barth’s distinction between the εσχατον and the “next to the 
last”. Barth speaks of the εσχατον as “not the continuation, the result, the consequence, the next step after 
the next to last, so to speak, but, on the contrary, is forever a radical break with everything next to the 
last; and this is just the secret of its connotation of Origin and its moving power.” Karl Barth, The Word 
of God and the Word of Man, trans. D. Horton (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1935), 324, quoted in 
Andreas Pangritz, Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000), 65.  
27 E, 152–153. 
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As Barry Harvey has recently pointed out, “participation is not a competitive, zero-
sum game, as the relation diminishes neither party, and participants actually gain 
from it.”28 The participatory relationship of penultimacy to ultimacy does not devalue 
the historical, the transitory, or what we might call the secular, but re-values it in the 
light of Christ. In other words, as is the case in Frei’s theology too, being in the world 
is sanctioned and freed in its own wholeness by the transcendence of God in Christ.  
 
In valuing both ultimate and penultimate things, the concept of Christuswirklichkeit calls 
into question what Bonhoeffer calls both “radicalism” and “compromise”—both of 
which fail to properly relate to God’s transcendence, and that constitute extremes that 
pertain to the question of a ‘middle way’.29 ‘Radicalism’ concentrates on the ultimate 
to the devaluation of penultimate things, making Christ “the destroyer and enemy of 
everything penultimate … the sign the world is ripe to be consigned to the fire.”30 
‘Compromise’, on the other hand, is life in the penultimate to the exclusion of 
ultimate things, wherein “the ultimate stays completely beyond daily life and in the 
end serves only as the eternal justification of all that exists”.31  This reflects the deistic 
tendencies of liberal Culture Protestantism—a domestication of transcendence that 
imprisons God apart from the world.32 Both radicalism and compromise, therefore, 
fail because of the mutual exclusivity that they imply between ultimacy and 
penultimacy. They cannot perceive the union of God and the world in Christ that 
truly affirms the world, and therefore trade on Raumdenken, limiting the transcendence 
of God in Christ in relation to the whole world, and domesticating God either into the 
other-worldly or the purely socio-political. As DeJonge says, these “oppositional 
pairs”,  
 
treat ‘the worldly’ and ‘the Christian’ as distinct, in-principle autonomous 
realms … Despite appearing to be drastically different approaches to ethics, 
sectarianism and secularism share the same fundamental mistake, making a 
principled distinction between what belongs together in reality, in Christ.33  
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28 Barry Harvey, Taking Hold of the Real: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Profound Worldliness of Christianity 
(Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2015), 54. 
29 E, 159.  
30 E, 153. 
31 Ibid.  
32 “Cultural Protestantism makes this-worldliness independent of Christ.” Harvey, Taking, 161. 
33 DeJonge, ‘Fundamentalism’, 77. 
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In contrast, precisely by virtue of his transcendence (his ultimacy) as the one who 
“reconciles the opposition between God and the world”,34 Jesus Christ affirms the 
penultimate—the sphere of Christian activity that prepares the way for him who 
comes from without.35 Penultimacy is always lived in the light of and towards the 
ultimate. Here we have what Anderson calls “the correspondence between the 
absolute otherness of God and the utter profaneness of the world.”36 Again, by God’s 
transcendent act towards and for the world in Christ, the world gains its “authentic 
secularity”37 as that which is not God, yet is created, loved and redeemed by God. 
God’s ultimate difference from the world grounds the world’s authenticity. Similarly, 
for Bonhoeffer, the world’s ‘freedom to be’ is not gained either by a radical struggle 
against the penultimate, nor a compromising relativisation of the ultimate, but by the 
transcendent activity of God in Christ.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s vision of ultimacy and penultimacy also highlights how the 
Christuswirklichkeit challenges the dichotomy between faith and history—Lessing’s 
‘accidental’ and ‘necessary’ truths—according to the cosmic transcendence of Jesus 
Christ. It is the person of Jesus who causes a re-evaluation of history’s relation to God, 
rather than historical Wissenschaft positioning Jesus in relation to history according to 
its own concept of rationality. That which Higton observes in Frei—i.e. the 
development of a Christian historical consciousness in contrast to that characteristic of 
the critical period—can therefore be found also in Bonhoeffer. Through the concept 
of Christuswirklichkeit, Bonhoeffer connects an alternative historical consciousness, 
which affirms the world in its historicity, to the transcendent identity of Christ. 
 
Furthermore, Bonhoeffer’s themes of penultimacy and ultimacy share conceptual 
ground with H. Richard Niebuhr’s idea of ‘Christ the transformer of culture’ in Christ 
and Culture, and also with Frei’s understanding of the relationship between the 
theology of the Christian community and external academic disciples in Types of 
Christian Theology. Hale suggests that Bonhoeffer simply trumps Niebuhr’s typology,38 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 DeJonge, ‘Fundamentalism’, 78. 
35 E, 167. 
36 Ray Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1975), 71. 
37 Anderson, Historical, 60. 
38 Lori Brandt Hale, ‘Bonhoeffer’s Christological Take on Vocation’, in Keith L. Johnson and Timothy 
Larsen (eds.), Bonhoeffer, Christ and Culture (Nottingham: Apollos, 2013), 181. See also Harvey, Taking, 
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but in fact Bonhoeffer’s concept of ultimacy and penultimacy makes sense as a 
particularly broad example of the view that Christ is the ‘transformer of culture.’ 
Niebuhr’s ‘transformation view’ envisions the world’s origin and destiny in Christ, 
interrupted by the fall but nonetheless redeemed in the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of Christ, in whom all things ultimately have their telos.39 In Types, Frei 
favours an understanding of the relationship between Christian theology and external 
disciplines that reflects much of what Niebuhr highlights in describing Christ as 
culture’s transformer. Just as Niebuhr understands the world, and culture specifically, 
as possessing a goodness which is fulfilled only in relation to God’s action in Christ, so 
Frei perceives disciplines external to the Christian faith as capable of fruitful service 
when thoughtfully, and often critically, deployed in relation to the ultimate context of 
the Christian sensus literalis—i.e. the normativity of the person of Christ. In particular, 
I suggest that Bonhoeffer’s concept of Christuswirklichkeit gives a cosmic Christology 
that frames the way in which Frei thinks about Jesus’ normativity for the way theology 
relates flexibly to external disciplines. One can therefore include the external 
disciplines of which Frei speaks in Types under Bonhoeffer’s category of penultimacy, 
by virtue of which they are understood to possess their telos in the person of Christ, 
without being evacuated of meaning, or elevated to ultimate status. 
 
Following these suggestions about Bonhoeffer’s contribution to a reading of Frei, we 
therefore find Bonhoeffer offering Frei a participatory ontology with which to frame 
theology’s relationship to external disciples. As referenced above, Roberts and Harvey 
(themselves writing from very different confessional settings) as well as Jens 
Zimmerman have recently highlighted the natural connection between a patristic 
notion of participation and Bonhoeffer’s ethical thought.40 Given the ways in which 
Ethics coheres with Frei’s concerns, it makes sense to suggest that Frei’s work can be 
effectively communicated within that ontological framework. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163–164, where Harvey seems to misappropriate Niebuhr’s view of the relationship between Christ 
and Culture and then contrast it with Bonhoeffer’s. 
39 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 191–196. 
40 Roberts writes within the Radical Orthodoxy tradition; Harvey is Professor at Baylor (Baptist) 
University in Texas. Re Zimmerman, see Jens Zimmerman, ‘Being Human, Becoming Human: 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Christological Humanism’, in Jens Zimmerman and Brian Gregor (eds.), Being 
Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought (Oregon: Pickwick, 2010), 33. 
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Overall, the transcendent person of Christ grounds the relationship between ultimacy 
and penultimacy, in the light of which neither extremes of arrogant radicalism nor 
banal compromise are plausible. Keith Clements summarises effectively: 
 
The churches are rightly concerned to retain their identity and calling as witnesses 
to the gospel of Christ in its specificity and finality. But, unsure of their status in a 
secular and pluralist society, they are susceptible to two temptations: either, to 
retreat from the world as it is in to a self-enclosed space in which the absolute 
verities can be contemplated and enjoyed in unchallenged fashion; or, to seek to 
impose directly what they regard as these absolute truths on the world around 
them. Bonhoeffer’s full-blown recognition of the ultimate, yet of the rights of the 
penultimate realm as the place where the coming of the ultimate requires patient 
preparation, remains crucial for preserving that space in the public realm where 
faith can be in dialogue with all who seek justice, peace and human fulfillment and 
dignity.41 
   
ii) Christuswirklichkeit and Jesus’ particularity 
 
God affirms history (we might say God says ‘yes’ to it) by taking on particular 
historical existence, binding divine revelation to the historical world in the person of 
Jesus of Nazareth, in and through whose life, death and resurrection God reconciles 
the world to Godself. Crucially then, God’s reconciliation is brought about not only 
for the world, but also in the world. The historicity of God’s reconciling activity 
cannot be abstracted from its meaning per se, for God’s saving act is the historical cross 
and resurrection of Jesus. Again recalling the 1933 lectures, the ‘who’ comes before 
the ‘how’, and in Frei’s terms, the meaning is that which is narrated. Ethically, Jesus’ 
historicity does not function as a mythological signpost to an a-historical ‘goodness’ 
(that human beings need to apply or realise in concrete situations) but as the grounds 
of what is good.42 As Holmes summarises, “[t]ruth is indeed identical to a very 
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41 Keith Clements, ‘Public Ethics and the Reception of Bonhoeffer in Britain’, in Clifford Green and 
Guy Carter (eds.), Interpreting Bonhoeffer: Historical Perspectives, Emerging Issues (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2013), 
32. 
42 “Reconciled reality as revealed in Jesus Christ is good. Indeed, God, the good and real are essentially 
one. This means that what is good is what is real, and that it is … determined by God himself and is to 
be identified with the person and work of his Son.” Christopher Holmes, ‘The Indivisible Whole of 
God’s Reality’: On the Agency of Jesus in Bonhoeffer’s Ethics’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 
(12, 2010), 285. 
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particular person, Jesus the Christ, and to his ministry, cross, resurrection, ascension 
and session”.43  
 
We therefore encounter a paradox: history has its meaning both in that which 
happens within it, and that which is thoroughly beyond it. Though the Son of God is 
beyond the world, God incarnate in Jesus Christ reconciles the world to God from 
within the world. God’s exteriority operates internally. The ‘authentic secularity’ that 
re-evaluates the faith/history dichotomy is therefore grounded by Jesus’ particularity 
and transcendence. Furthermore, just as in the Christology lectures Bonhoeffer 
considers the particularity of Jesus according to the paradox of God’s revelation in 
hiddenness of the crucified Christ, so here it is as the crucified and risen one—the 
σκανδαλον—that Jesus ontologically grounds ethics. As Kohler says, “the ‘who’ that is 
the basis of our reality is revealed to us in the incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ”.44 
 
In Ethics, Bonhoeffer recapitulates a threefold Christological scheme of incarnation, 
crucifixion and resurrection to explicate this ‘who’.45 To understand the 
Christuswirklichkeit, Bonhoeffer says,  
 
[a]bove all we must turn our eyes to the image of Jesus Christ’s own body—
the one who became human, was crucified and is risen. In the body of Jesus 
Christ, God is united with humankind, all humanity is accepted by God.46  
 
This threefold Christological identity—the incarnate, crucified and risen one—is then 
explored more fully in the section entitled ‘Ethics as Formation’. There, Bonhoeffer 
takes as his heading Pilate’s words ‘ecce homo’ (‘behold the man’)47 and reflects 
sequentially on Jesus as incarnate, crucified and risen. At the heart of his reflections lie 
the familiar themes of Luther’s theologia crucis, for in Jesus Christ, “[i]n an 
incomprehensible reversal of all righteous and pious thought, God declares himself as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Christopher Holmes, Ethics in the Presence of Christ (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 66. 
44 R. F. Kohler, ‘The Christocentric Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, Scottish Journal of Theology (23, 1970), 
39. 
45 Here Bonhoeffer reflects in more expansive form emphases found in chapter 10 of Discipleship. 
Especially D, 213–216. 
46 E, 66. 
47 John 19:5. NRSV: “Here is the man.” 
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guilty toward the world and thereby extinguishes the guilt of the world … God takes 
responsibility for godlessness, love for hate, the holy one for the sinner.”48 Once more 
Bonhoeffer alludes to theses §19 and §20 from Luther’s Heidelberg disputations, 
recognising that God is not to be found except through the “humiliation and shame of 
the cross.”49  
 
As the incarnate one, Jesus Christ embodies God’s love for the world, and real human 
beings in the midst of that world. Antithetical to Nazi super-humanism, Jesus Christ 
comes to human beings as they are, in sinful flesh, enacting God’s love for all 
humanity “without distinction”.50 Nearly three decades later, Moltmann would offer a 
powerful summary of that to which Bonhoeffer points here, describing how God in 
Christ,  
 
embodied the secret, ‘God with us’, ‘God for us’, on earth in such a way that 
he became brother to the wretched. For this reason the rejected and outcasts 
come to him out of the holes and corners into which good society has driven 
them.51 
 
In Jesus the crucified one humanity knows both God’s judgment and peace with God. 
“Only as judged by God can human beings live before God; only the crucified human 
being is at peace with God.”52 The judgement of divine love as revealed and 
embodied in Jesus’ being-for humanity is the basis on which human beings can ‘stand’ 
before God. In Christ, God judges humanity and declares them righteous only 
according to God’s love, not according to either their success or failure. As we would 
expect, here Bonhoeffer points again to the theologia crucis that dominates his 
Christology: 
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48 E, 83. 
49 Martin Luther, ‘Heidelberg Disputation’, in Timothy F. Lull (ed.), Martin Luther’s Basic Theological 
Writings (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 44. 
50 E, 84. “The message of God’s becoming human attacks the heart of an era when contempt for 
humanity or idolization of humanity is the height of all wisdom … At such a time the tyrannical 
despiser of humanity makes use of the meanness of the human heart” E, 85–86.  
51 Jürgen Moltmann, Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present, trans. John Sturdy (London: 
SPCK, 1974), 18. 
52 E, 88. Also D, 215. 
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This is how the reconciler of the world appears, upon whom humanity’s guilt 
has fallen, pushing Christ into shame and death under God’s judgement … 
Only by executing God’s judgement on God can peace grow between God 
and the world, between human and human.53 
 
As the risen one, Jesus Christ comes through judgment and death, embodying God’s 
‘yes’ for the new humanity on the other side of death—a humanity into which all are 
welcomed. This frees earthly (penultimate) life from the burden of bearing eternity, 
enabling human beings to live in an oftentimes ambiguous day-to-day, yet knowing 
that life’s endurance belongs in the one who has not circumvented death, but is 
present as the risen one. The reality of new humanity is established, even though 
human beings are yet to participate fully in it. “The night is not yet over, but the day 
is already dawning.”54 
 
Humanity and the world thus receive reality according to the incarnate, crucified and 
risen one in his historical unsubstitutability. This threefold description must not be 
generalised, as if incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection were simply general 
‘themes’ embodied by Jesus and then applied to ethics. As Discipleship also emphasises, 
the acceptance, judgement and reconciliation of humankind and the world is 
inseparable from Jesus’ own body.55 Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the historical activity of 
God in Christ as constituting the centre of history and of ethics (recall, above, “the 
love really lived in Jesus Christ”)56 warns against generalised readings of his 
explications of the identity of Jesus in Ethics. As he puts it in a manuscript included 
later in the volume,  
 
Good is historical action that receives its laws of historical action from the 
center of history. Since it is true that God became human in Jesus Christ, that 
God entered history, so that he born was at the time of Emperor Augustus, 
when Quirinius was governor of Syria, that he was man during the time of the 
emperor Tiberius, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate—then this is the 
point where the very nature of history must reveal itself to us.57 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 E, 88. 
54 E, 92. 
55 D, 214–216. Bonhoeffer also emphasises the bodily community of Jesus’ first disciples. “The bond 
between Jesus and the disciples who followed him was a bodily bond … They live and suffer in bodily 
community with Jesus.” D, 215. 
56 E, 83. 
57 E, 228. 
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Complementing our reading of the Christology lectures, then, the ontological 
foundation for ethics is Christ who is transcendent and at the ‘centre of history’ 
precisely in his scandalous particularity. Christopher Holmes, whose Ethics in the 
Presence of Christ is one of the few works to explicitly employ both Bonhoeffer’s and 
Frei’s Christological terminology, summarises thus: 
 
How indeed can an unsubstitutable happening like the resurrection of Jesus be 
regarded as constitutive of reality? The scandal of the Christian Gospel is that the 
empty tomb and resurrection appearances are concrete declarations which bring 
one into communion with new reality.58 
 
The unsubstitutable Jesus is the one in whose reconciliation human beings are called 
to participate if they wish to live according to ‘good’. We move therefore to consider 
more specifically that participatory aspect of Ethics, exploring what it means to say 
that Christians participate in the form of the unsubstitutable one. 
 
iii) Taking the form of the transcendent Christ   
 
Human beings are “invited to participate in the reality of God and reality of the world 
at the same time”,59 and therefore to take the form of Christ by being in the world 
towards the other. Christian ethics is grounded not in abstract principles of ‘good’ and 
‘evil’ but in the particular and definitive being-for-others (pro me) of Christ—a 
conformation to the particular person. Freed from abstraction, Christians are called to 
act responsibly towards the other, the neighbour, in the midst of the complexity of the 
world.60 Everyone remains a ‘who’; there are no generalisations—not Jesus, not 
myself, not the other(s) towards whom I act and in whom I meet Jesus.  
 
This constitutes more than exemplarism, as if Christ were someone in the past to be 
imitated in the present. As Holmes puts it, ethical acts are “acts that, one hopes, are 
acts participant in the presence of the hypostatic union of God and humanity in Jesus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Holmes, Ethics, 35. 
59 E, 55. “[E]thics in the presence of Jesus is ethics in accord with his promeity … this is the way in 
which his person is pro nobis.” Holmes, Ethics, 91. 
60 Ethical activity is “risked in faith” in amongst the ambiguity of the “historical situation”. E, 221. 
Recall the Christology lectures regarding history’s ambiguity. B, 309. 
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Christ”,61 such that “Jesus’ contemporary ministry, the ministry of him who is really 
One with us in our humanity, that grounds ethics and is the place from which ethics 
proceeds and by which it is sustained.”62 Recalling both Frei and Bonhoeffer, Holmes 
recognises that if Jesus is at the core of Christian ethics as the unsubstitutable one, 
then he is at that core as the living one.63  
 
Bonhoeffer recalls the concept of vicarious representative action (Stellvertretung) from 
Sanctorum Communio, as the pivot for explaining how ethical action—which he 
understands as responsible action for the other in the concrete64—is a participation in 
Christuswirklichkeit, which as we know is participation in the particularity of Christ.  
 
Jesus Christ is the very embodiment of the person who lives responsibly … His 
entire life, action, and suffering is vicarious representative action. As the one 
who has become human he stands in the place of all human beings … All 
human responsibility is rooted in the real vicarious representative action of 
Jesus Christ on behalf of all human beings … It is only on this ground that 
there is genuine vicarious representative action and thus responsible action.65 
 
The particular activity of God in Christ thus concretises and gives the ontological 
ground for human activity in accordance with reality. Jesus took responsibility for 
human guilt and sin and bore it vicariously upon the cross, and in doing so, becomes 
guilty in solidarity with guilty humankind for our salvation.66 Indeed, on the basis of 
this activity, human responsibility towards the other in the concreteness of historical 
life often involves both “willingness to become guilty” as well, ultimately, as freedom from 
fear of becoming guilty.67 Freed from the preciousness of adhering to a general 
principle like truthfulness (Bonhoeffer contrasts his view with Kant, who would have 
us give up a hiding friend to a murderer who enquired if the friend were inside) 
human beings live genuinely towards the other.68  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Holmes, Ethics, 13. 
62 Holmes, Ethics, 15. 
63 “Exemplarism … trades upon principles and a dead Jesus.” Holmes, Ethics, 24. 
64 E, 266. 
65 E, 231–232. 
66 E, 233. 
67 E, 275, 279. 
68 E, 279–80.  
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Recall from chapter 6 Jennifer McBride’s explication of Christian public witness 
specifically with reference to Christ’s becoming guilty for us. There, the representative 
aspects of the theologia crucis highlighted in Ethics are at the heart of her vision for 
confident yet humble witness. We are free “for responsible action and for the other”, 
not “from the cross itself. Christian freedom necessitates conforming to the goodness 
and righteousness of Jesus ‘who entered into community with the guilt of other human 
beings.’”69 Witness envisaged as taking the form of the repenting Christ, she contends, 
is particularly resistant to being distorted into arrogant or self-justifying religiosity: “A 
God who accepts responsibility for sin and calls followers into conformation is 
decisively free from religious manipulation and control.”70 Here then, McBride links 
Jesus’ evasion of manipulation with his being the crucified one, and as we have 
emphasised throughout, especially through reading Frei alongside Bonhoeffer, Jesus is 
only the crucified one as particular, unsubstitutable human being, who cannot be 
generalised or encapsulated in concepts, but only encountered as the same one whose 
identity is narrated in the gospels. Yet what should underpin the kind of suggestion 
McBride makes is not just the idea of taking responsibility for sin, but that the one to 
whom we conform by taking responsibility ourselves is the transcendent God-human 
narrated in the gospels, whose identity can never be resolved into our own. As 
suggested in the previous chapter, without this kind of emphasis upon transcendence, 
even taking responsibility for sin can be systematized and distorted.71  
 
It is crucial, therefore, to emphasise that a human ‘becoming guilty for others’ is not 
identical to Jesus’ Stellvertretung, but only indirectly participates in it. Bonhoeffer says, 
 
Only where a person becomes guilty out of love and responsibility does their 
action have a part in the justification pertaining to Jesus Christ’s sinless guilt-
bearing. What remains is the qualitative difference between the essential 
sinless-ness of Jesus’ willingness to become guilty and the universal 
contamination of all human action by original sin.72 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 McBride, The Church, 82–83. Quote from E, 276. 
70 McBride, The Church, 83. 
71 Muers puts it well: “It is easy to identify, in Bonhoeffer’s work, practices and ways of life that can be 
described as life ‘conformed to Christ’. Even these, however, could be misunderstood as guidelines for a 
project of personal or institutional self-creation. The cross can be estheticized, or made the basis for an 
uncritical affirmation of the demands of particular ‘victims;’ any given understanding of ‘conformity to 
Christ’ is open to suspicion.” Muers, Keeping, 84 
72 E, 235 
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Ultimately, for Bonhoeffer, Jesus’ action as God towards us in history is the 
ontological foundation for our living responsibly towards God and neighbour even in 
the midst of our own sinfulness; but at the same time his constitutive being for others 
is about his being distinct, transcendent. He can only be completely pro nobis, and only 
completely constitute our being for others, as the one who is utterly different from us.  
As remarked in the previous chapter, conformation to a particular way of being—
even as admirable as a posture of repentance—can always be generalised and even 
manipulated. Therefore, human beings can participate in the reality of the sinless one 
who became sin for us, but must recognise that such participation always requires a 
posture of repentance and a recognition of his transcendence. The historical 
particularity and uniqueness of the crucified and risen Christ grounds human 
participation in God’s good reality. Describing what it means for Christian life and 
Christian action to be ‘in Christ’, Bonhoeffer says, “[l]ife is not a thing, an essence, or 
a concept, but a person—more specifically, a particular and unique person … My life 
is another, a stranger Jesus Christ.”73 
 
The concept of the ‘stranger’ encapsulates how binding Christian ethics to the person 
of Christ never delivers that person—who is uniquely and ‘transcendently’ God 
incarnate—into our hands. This ‘slipperiness’ of Christ is one with his being incognito. 
The one whose identity constitutes the world’s reconciled reality, whose form 
Christians take in responsible action towards the other—is the transcendent ‘who’ of 
the Christology lectures—the Word of God incarnate, hidden in the σκανδαλον of the 
gospel.  
 
Again, this time with reference to human participation in Christ, I suggest that 
Bonhoeffer’s participatory ontology in Ethics can supplement Frei’s theology of the 
normativity of the person of Christ for the church, but I also suggest that, in turn, 
Bonhoeffer’s ontology can benefit from Frei’s explication of figural reading. Firstly, we 
notice that both theologians concentrate on how Christians are called to pattern their 
individual and corporate lives in accordance with Jesus Christ. For Bonhoeffer, 
participation in Christuswirklichkeit, positioned as it is against generalisation and towards 
the multifaceted concreteness of life in the world, plays out not into ethical principles, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 E, 249. 
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but into humble ethical flexibility characterised by asking ‘what is the will of God?’74 
Christians are never excused from having to ask and discern the will of God; they 
must dismiss the illusion of their own ‘knowledge of good and evil’, looking only to 
Christ as the personal grounds for responsible living.75 Frei, for his part, explicates the 
sensus literalis of the church as grounded in the identity of the risen Christ, in relation to 
whom general theories are subordinated. He describes the practice of figural reading 
whereby not only are the scriptures interpreted with reference to Christ as their telos, 
but also the lives of individual Christians and their particular communities are ‘read’ 
in the light of God’s activity towards the world in Christ. It is not much of a step, 
therefore, to see Frei’s cultural linguistic commentary on the church’s hermeneutical 
praxis as complementing, perhaps ‘belonging in’, Bonhoeffer’s Christological 
ontology. 
 
Beyond this similarity, we note firstly that Bonhoeffer’s reflections on the form of 
Christ as the incarnate, crucified and risen one can once more supplement Frei’s work 
as regards the σκανδαλον of the gospel. That aspect of Bonhoeffer’s work which is so 
important for McBride—the call to take the form of the one who becomes guilty for 
others—functions as a deeper reflection upon the problematic of Jesus’ transcendence 
than Frei gives. Bringing Bonhoeffer’s theology, in particular McBride’s reflections 
upon it, to Frei’s concept of figural reading (which itself has participatory implications) 
allows us to highlight the following: figural reading should be understood not as a 
platitudinous identification with another world—an escapist strategy—but rather a 
call to complex, mysterious and often difficult conformation to and participation in 
Jesus Christ in his scandalous particularity. Bonhoeffer’s cosmic Christological is 
therefore a rich context for Frei’s approach to figural reading. 
 
In reverse, though, Frei’s elucidation of figural reading points towards a helpful 
clarification for Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of Christuswirklichkeit, for figural reading as Frei 
understands it accounts for the way in which the historical reality prior to the 
incarnation can still be said to have its reality in Christ. The need for this clarification 
arises from Bonhoeffer’s insistence on Christ as history’s centre, in abstraction from 
whose becoming-human, reality cannot be lived in (“in Christ, all human reality is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 E, 297. 
75 E, 323. See CF, 113. 
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taken on. That is why it is ultimately only in and from Christ that it is possible to act 
in a way that is in accord with reality”).76 Unless one can account for the meaningful 
relationship of pre-incarnation history to Christ, then the doctrine of Christuswirklichkeit 
is in danger of implying that action in accordance with God’s reality was impossible 
for people prior to the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ. Figural 
reading—which for Frei is always a practice and not a theory—offers the means by 
which these connections can be made.  
 
Although Bonhoeffer practices figural reading elsewhere in his work, he is less 
attentive to explicating the importance of the historical particularity of the ‘type’ than 
Frei is. For example, a study of King David (1935) focusses on how David prefigures 
Christ by virtue of the former’s anointing, his persecution by the world, his servant 
kingship, and his existence as forgiven sinner (in which Bonhoeffer links David’s 
punishment and forgiveness with the life-giving punishment for sin that falls upon 
God in the cross of Christ). Bonhoeffer also links the sinful flesh into which David’s 
son Solomon is born with the form of sinful flesh in which God in Christ is 
incarnate.77 As Harvey notes, he makes efforts to “posit a real connection grounded in 
the revelatory activity of God in Christ between the people and events narrated in the 
Old Testament and those in the Germany of his day”.78 In all this, though, in contrast 
to Frei’s point that figural reading need not overrule the particularity of the person or 
event narrated, Bonhoeffer states that “David is important only insofar as he is a 
witness to Christ, not in and for himself, but for Christ and thus for the church of 
Christ.”79 Frei, on the other hand, stressed that figural reading maintains the 
typological significance of a person or event without overriding their “independent or 
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76 E, 224. 
77 TEF, 875–891. See also Pangritz, Andreas, ‘Who is Jesus Christ for us today?’ in De Gruchy (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 145–148. As regards the form of sinful flesh, “Solomon 
comes from the sinful flesh of David and Bathsheba, but he is also the son on whom God’s peace now 
rests. The seed of David who is to bear his promise comes into this world in the flesh of sin, έν τω 
ὁμοιώματι σαρκος (Rom 8:3), but as the king of peace.” TEF, 889. 
78 Harvey, Taking, 227. 
79 TEF, 874. Plant comments upon the hermeneutical ‘Christ-monism’ of portions of Ethics, which also 
could be mitigated somewhat by introducing Frei’s nuanced view of figural reading as described above. 
Stephen Plant, Uses of the Bible in the Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, PhD thesis (Cambridge University: UK, 
1993), 143–145. Earlier in the thesis, Plant suggests that Bonhoeffer’s approach to scripture, especially 
insofar as it focusses upon the Gestalt of Christ, fits fairly well under Frei and Tanner’s descriptions of 
the sensus literalis/plain sense. Plant, Uses, 109–111. 
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self-contained status.”80  Figural reading, as Frei understands it, maintains that a 
person or event is meaningful in its own right whilst nevertheless being “incomplete, 
and thus ‘figures’ of the event-and-or-meaning that fulfills them”.81  
 
In order to allow for the integrity of the world that Bonhoeffer prizes so highly in 
Ethics, we therefore do better to follow Frei’s theory of figural reading rather than 
Bonhoeffer’s. Pangritz suggests that Bonhoeffer’s “expropriation of the Jewish Bible” 
in his Christological reading of David is “corrected and even reversed”  in his later 
work,82 and along these lines one may also observe that the somewhat ambiguous 
approach to David’s historicity—cast into relief by Frei’s emphasis upon the 
importance of the type in their own right—sits uneasily with Bonhoeffer’s later 
emphasis on worldliness. In short, then, Frei’s account of the practice of figura assists 
reflection upon the Christuswirklichkeit in a better way than Bonhoeffer’s earlier 
practice, because the former holds on to the integrity of the historical in a way that 
turns out to be vital for Ethics, but is not explicated in that work. The way Frei 
describes figural reading complements Bonhoeffer’s thought about ultimacy and 
penultimacy, in a way that Bonhoeffer’s own figural reading from earlier in his career 
does not. Frei’s tightly focussed hermeneutical project thus contributes valuably to 
Bonhoeffer’s cosmic theological vision. 
 
In Types of Christian Theology Frei was interested the way in which the sensus literalis 
works out into a flexible and humble theology, and this image of ‘flexibility’ can also 
serve as a description of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. It is not that his reflections are less than 
robust, but rather that they refuse to allow generalisations to overtake the 
transcendent unsubstitutability of the one at the centre of history, Jesus Christ. Frei’s 
Christology drives his capacity to generate theological flexibility that makes for a 
‘middle way’, and this is the case for Bonhoeffer too, who says, 
 
The origin of action that is in accord with reality is neither the pseudo-Lutheran 
Christ whose only purpose is to sanction the status quo, not the radical 
revolutionary Christ of all religious enthusiasts who are supposed to bless every !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 28.  
81 Hans W. Frei, ‘The Literal reading of the Biblical Narrative: Does it Stretch or will it Break?’, in 
Hans W. Frei, Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 121. 
82 Pangritz, ‘Who is Jesus Christ’, 147–148.  
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revolution, but rather the God who became human, Jesus Christ who loved 
human beings, judged them and reconciled them with God.83  
 
For both Frei and Bonhoeffer, the transcendence of the person of Jesus, explicated 
always in relation to his historical, and non-mythical unsubstitutability, resides at the 
heart of a generous orthodoxy that counters extreme open-ness or closed-ness.  
 
iv) Summary 
 
Jesus Christ’s cosmic transcendence, in light of which the world is given its reality and 
affirmed in its penultimacy, turns not only upon God-in-Christ’s divine exteriority—
though that is fundamental—but also upon the paradoxes of a theologia crucis. 
Bonhoeffer’s call for participation in Christuswirklichkeit is always about the paradoxical 
relationship of Christians to the Christ who is with us as one who is other than us, and 
who is hidden from us in his incognito. In other words, Bonhoeffer’s cosmic Christology 
leads to an ethics of a theologia crucis. Furthermore, the participatory ontology in  
Ethics—particularly apparent in the concepts of ultimacy and penultimacy—provides 
an attractive metaphysical framework in which to place Frei’s theological 
understanding of faith and history (particularly the retention of history’s ‘authenticity’) 
and of the Christological sensus literalis and figural reading. The normativity of the 
person of Christ is seen to shape the church according to the transcendent, 
scandalous, and unsubstitutable identity of Christ. In turn Frei also offers a useful 
resource to readers of Ethics: the potential for Bonhoeffer’s Christuswirklichkeit to imply a 
problem as regards living ‘in reality’ before the time of Jesus of Nazareth is mitigated 
somewhat if Frei’s understanding of figural reading is taken hold of to think through 
historical reality before Christ.  Finally, in the light of Ethics, the two theologians 
complement each other as regards ethical and theological flexibility in the light of the 
transcendent Jesus Christ. The thrust of Bonhoeffer’s thinking—away from 
generalised ethics towards a flexible ethic of responsible action—compliments the way 
in which the hermeneutical normativity of Christ in Frei’s theology makes for a 
generous orthodoxy. 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 E, 224. 
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II 
 
Letters and Papers from Prison 
 
Largely on account of his activities with the Confessing Church and the illegal 
Finkenwalde seminary for pastors opposed to the German Christian movement, in 
September 1940 Bonhoeffer was forbidden to speak in public, and in March 1941 
publication of his writings was made illegal. The exposure of the Abwehr early in 1943 
led to a series of arrests, and Bonhoeffer was arrested on 31st March 1943 and taken to 
an interrogation prison in Tegel, Berlin.84 A trial and perhaps even subsequent release 
was expected in late 1943, but the public failure of an attempt to assassinate Hitler in 
July 1944 implicated friends, co-conspirators and Bonhoeffer himself. In October 
1944 he was transferred to a Gestapo prison and from there, in February 1945, to 
Buchenwald. In April 1945 he was taken to Flossenberg, where on 9th April he was 
hanged for treason.   
 
Bonhoeffer’s letters from prison do not yield polished theological arguments, but 
witness to the trajectories along which his theology was developing during the final 
months of his life. Their fragmentariness and intimacy gives them a character that 
Bonhoeffer himself valued.85 They evidence a dynamic high point (but not a brand 
new departure) in his critique of modernity and his call for Christian witness to be 
grounded in the scandalous form of the crucified and risen Christ—the one who 
transcends the world by being in the midst of the world. Coining phrases such as ‘the 
world’s coming of age’, ‘religionless Christianity’ and ‘beyond in the midst’, 
Bonhoeffer develops a compelling narrative of the way the problem of transcendence 
is exposed by late modernity, and how this exposure forces Christians back to 
considering the paradoxes of relationship with the transcendent Jesus. 
 
This section draws together two salient motifs as they are related thematically, rather 
than strictly chronologically. First, we consider what Bonhoeffer calls humanity’s 
‘coming of age’, and the consequent demise of a deus ex machina—a ‘god’ who exists to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 See Roberston, The Persistent Voice, 192–193. 
85 “By the way, it would be very nice if you didn’t throw away my theological letters … One writes 
some things in a more uninhibited and lively way in a letter than in a book” LPP, 458.  
! 217 
solve human problems.86  Religion that seeks to preserve this ‘god of the gaps’ fails to 
connect with all of human life, and by pointing this out, Bonhoeffer exposes the 
problematic mutual exclusivity of transcendence and historicity in the theology that 
characterises liberal modernity. Here Bonhoeffer’s work is in agreement with Frei’s 
observations in Eclipse and beyond. Secondly, I explain Bonhoeffer’s alternative to 
such thinking—i.e. the gospel of the crucified and risen Christ who is transcendent in 
the midst of the world, which calls for a ‘non-religious’ approach to Christian faith 
and activity. Here the theologia crucis presented in the Christology lectures reappears 
with new force. Rather than advocating a 1960s style secularisation, Bonhoeffer’s 
‘non-religiousness’ brings to light the paradoxical transcendence of the crucified and 
risen Jesus, and the call for Christians to participate in God’s being for others, which is  
described as ‘sharing in the sufferings of God’. This particular aspect of Bonhoeffer’s 
theology brings us into contact with what appear to be Hans Frei’s only published 
comments on Bonhoeffer, where Frei himself does not seem to appreciate much of the 
potential for Bonhoeffer’s work to motivate and supplement his own Christological 
critique of modernity. In contrast, I will be suggesting that ‘religionless Christianity’ in 
fact offers a critical framework akin to Frei’s own sensibilities and has the potential to 
deepen Frei’s own reflections on the character of the normativity of Christ for the 
church. 
 
i) ‘Coming of age’ and domesticated transcendence 
 
From 30th April 1944 onwards, Bonhoeffer’s theological letters to Eberhard Bethge 
reflect upon the question, “what is Christianity, or who is Christ actually for us 
today”.87 Although it represents a probing insight into his own cultural-intellectual 
milieu, Bonhoeffer’s ‘for us today’ in the letters is misapplied if it leads to conveniently 
reimagining Jesus’ identity according to one’s own context. As should be apparent 
from chapter 6, ‘for us’ does not mean something relative, like ‘to my mind’, but 
rather refers to God’s pro nobis—God being for us—in the specific ‘who’ of Jesus Christ. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Deus ex machina: ‘God out of the machine’. John de Gruchy summarises: “[I]n ancient theatre this was 
a figure who could be made to appear ‘suddenly’ with the help of a mechanical device and to solve 
problems ‘supernaturally’.” LPP, 366 n.25. Following Wüstenberg, I accept the virtual 
interchangeability of phrases ‘deus ex machina’, ‘god of the gaps’, and ‘God as a working hypothesis’. 
Ralph K. Wüstenberg, A Theology of Life: Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Religionless Christianity (Cambridge: 
Eerdmans, 1998), 23.  
87 LPP, 362.  
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As Ziegler points out, the “concreteness Bonhoeffer himself consistently coveted” is 
not achieved by  “constant re-imaginings of Jesus Christ in ways relevant to our 
shifting circumstances”, for this becomes merely “deeply self-interested and self-
involving”.88 Rather, “the promeity of Christ grounds the concreteness of revelation 
and redemption in Christ’s own person, rather than in any subjective capacity we 
might have to appropriate his value in and from our personal and communal 
contexts.”89 In short, as I have been emphasising, Christ’s pro me is about the 
transcendence of Jesus. Asking how Christianity thinks of Christ and responds to 
Christ ‘today’, Bonhoeffer emphasises a commitment to the gospel of the crucified and 
risen Christ, who though beyond us is pro nobis in being rejected, executed and 
resurrected.  
 
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer does offer an analysis of his own ‘today’, suggesting that a 
‘religious’ age is at an end. People, he says, are unable and/or unwilling to engage 
with the particular type of religious or theological language that pervaded nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Christianity. The idea of a “religious a priori” (that human 
beings are by definition ‘religious’) no longer works, for “[w]e are approaching a 
completely religionless age; people as they are now simply cannot be religious 
anymore.”90 There may be a minority who, in their “hour of weakness”,91 can be 
convinced to be ‘religious’—something Bonhoeffer finds distasteful—but overall, 
religion is perceived as irrelevant for everyday living. Crucially though, the reason for 
this is not because the Christian idea of God lacks meaning for a contemporary 
rational world, but because the idea of God in the ‘religion’ that people are rejecting is 
not the Christian God at all.  
 
Religious people speak of God at a point where human knowledge is at an end 
(or sometimes when they’re too lazy to think further) or where human strength 
fails. Actually, it’s a deus ex machina that they’re always bringing on the scene, 
either to appear to solve insoluble problems or to provide strength when !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Philip Ziegler, ‘Christ For Us Today: Promeity in the Christologies of Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’, 
International Journal of Systematic Theology (15, 2013), 25.  
89 Ziegler, ‘Christ’, 34. 
90 LPP, 362. Whilst Bonhoeffer suggests, perhaps erroneously, that the entirety of Christian tradition is 
built upon the assumption of this ‘religious a priori’, his critique actually pertains more to the way this 
‘a priori’ is more symptomatic of modernist epistemology than Christian theology as a whole.  
91 LPP, 363. “[S]hould we jump on a few unfortunates in their hour of weakness and commit, so to 
speak, religious rape?” Ibid. 
! 219 
human powers fail, thus always exploiting human weakness or human 
limitations. Inevitably that lasts only until human beings become powerful 
enough to push the boundaries a bit further and God is no longer needed as a 
deus ex machina.92 
 
The ‘religiousness’ that is being rejected, as Bonhoeffer understands it, is epitomised 
by a domesticated transcendence—a theological approach that “allowed the world the 
right the assign to Christ his place within it”93 (for Kant, we recall, God functions as 
little more than a necessary grounding for a moral society).94  The domesticated God 
(the deus ex machina) is a mere tool to be deployed in cases of human unknowing, where 
the concept of universal reason seems to run out—the irony being that God as 
conceived within structure of rationalism is growingly irrelevant as that rationalism 
itself progresses: late modernity is progressively rejecting its own God.  
 
Bonhoeffer calls this situation a ‘coming of age’,95 and uses this language about growth 
into adulthood and independence to describe something ultimately positive. However, 
coming of age is not about a self-sufficiency by virtue of which human beings refuse to 
believe in the Christian God anymore. Unlike Kant—for whom the enlightenment 
was humanity’s “exit from its self-incurred immaturity”96 by virtue of the deployment 
of free rational thinking—Bonhoeffer does not equate the idea of coming of age with 
the enlightenment, but rather with the rejection the kind of theology the enlightenment 
itself bred. The suspicion of religion in modernity’s later stages therefore presents a 
positive opportunity for the truly transcendent God to be proclaimed, over against the 
domesticated transcendence of the enlightenment. Humanity’s coming of age enables 
a re-orientation to the substance of the Christian faith: “[O]ur coming of age leads us 
to a truer recognition of our situation before God.”97 Thus, as Selby puts it, 
“Bonhoeffer insists both on a historical development leading to human autonomy and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 LPP, 366.  
93 LPP, 428. 
94 “God is being increasingly pushed out of a world come of age, from the realm of our knowledge and 
life and, since Kant, has only occupied the ground beyond the world of experience.” LPP, 450. “Kant is 
basically a deist” LPP, 477. 
95 “[O]ne must simply recognize that the world and humankind have come of age.” LPP, 455.  
96 Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment’, in James Schmidt,  What is 
Enlightenment? Eighteenth-century Answers and Twentieth-century Questions (London: University of California 
Press, 1996), 58.   
97 LPP, 478. 
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on a gospel impetus to autonomy, both requiring a situation where the deus ex machina 
is replaced by a God who is truly a suffering participant within the life of the world.”98 
 
Religion allied to a deus ex machina opposes this coming of age by fatally retreating into 
the private sphere, the only place where the ‘stopgap God’ can be protected. By trying 
to “persuade this world that has come of age that it cannot live without ‘God’ as its 
guardian”,99 religion invites its own demise, continually creating for itself a ‘bastion’ of 
religious relevance—specifically, the inner, personal life. As Clifford Green says, 
‘religion’ as Bonhoeffer is outlining it here, “describes a particular way of behaving, 
feeling and thinking in the effort to cope with human weaknesses and problems” 
manifested in a “psychic posture with three aspects: weakness, dependence, and the 
power of God.”100 A zero-sum-game between God’s power and human ability is 
therefore implied by religion: if God mitigates human weakness, then human strength 
relegates God to irrelevance. Therefore this retreat of religion into the private or 
individualistic-existential sphere is ultimately self-defeating. It leads not to religion’s 
preservation at all, for humanity come of age perceives its retreat as indicative of its 
progressive irrelevance.    
 
At the heart of this ‘religion’, is the failure to think properly about the transcendence 
of God. Firstly, a deus ex machina does not transcend, but merely serves a particular 
purpose. Secondly, as there are only certain areas of life where God is meaningful, 
God cannot relate to the world in its fullness, and consequently the world cannot find 
its meaning in God. In Ethics, Bonhoeffer had protested against Raumdenken (realm-
thinking) and in these letters he finds religiousness unable to think of God and the 
world together. 
 
Bonhoeffer reaffirms Barth’s stature as a critic of the domestication of transcendence, 
with his emphasis upon the contingency of divine revelation, but, echoing his critique 
of what Frei calls Barth’s epistemological monophysitism, accuses Barth of a 
“positivism of revelation” that “in the end … sets up a law of faith and tears up what 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
98 Peter Selby, ‘Christianity in a world come of age’, in De Gruchy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 235.  
99 LPP, 426–427. 
100 Green, Bonhoeffer, 262.  
! 221 
is—through Christ’s becoming flesh!—a gift for us.”101 Much has been discussed 
around quite what Bonhoeffer means by ‘positivism of revelation’ here.102 Amidst all 
these discussions, it at least seems clear that he was concerned to emphasise the 
continuity and ambiguity of the world in a way he felt Barth had not. In Barth, “[t]he 
church stands in the place of religion—that in itself is biblical—but the world is left to 
its own devices, as it were, to rely on itself. That is the error.”103 Therefore, whilst 
resisting the temptation to blow Bonhoeffer’s passing comment out of proportion, it 
seems reasonable to highlight continuity here with his critique of Barth in Act and 
Being, which I argued fits appropriately alongside Frei’s critique of Barth’s 
epistemological monophysitism. Bonhoeffer is looking for an affirmation of the world 
by virtue of its relationship to God—something that is impossible for this post-
enlightenment ‘religious’ model, but also problematic, he thinks, in Barth’s protest 
against religion.   
 
The progressively impotent deus ex machina is therefore rejected in favour of a radical 
proclamation of God ‘in the midst’. 
 
I’d like to speak of God not at the boundaries but in the center, not in 
weakness but in strength, thus not in death and guilt but in human life and 
human goodness.104 
 
Contrary to a zero-sum-game between human epistemology and God’s ‘place’ in the 
world, Bonhoeffer envisages human knowledge and strength as belonging properly ‘in’ 
God.  
 
God wants to be recognized in the midst of our lives, in life and not only in 
dying, in health and strength and not only in suffering, in action and not only 
in sin. The ground for this lies in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. God is 
the center of life and doesn’t just ‘turn up’ when we have unsolved problems to 
be solved.105   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 LPP, 373.  
102 See Andreas Pangritz, ‘Bonhoeffer and the Barthian Movement’, in Peter Frick (ed.), Bonhoeffer’s 
Intellectual Formation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 277–278; and Tom Greggs, Theology Against 
Revelation: Constructive Dialogues with Bonhoeffer and Barth (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 54–64. 
103 LPP, 373. 
104 LPP, 366–367. 
105 LPP, 406–407. 
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To borrow from Ethics, ‘religious-ness’ fails to participate in the Christuswirklichkeit, 
where human life is affirmed in its penultimacy, its worldliness.106 Therefore, the 
question that follows ‘who is Christ for us today’ is “how do we speak … in a worldly 
way about God?”107 Bonhoeffer continues, 
 
How do we go about being ‘religionless-worldly’ Christians, how can we be 
εκ-κλησία, those who are called out, without understanding ourselves as 
religiously privileged, but instead seeing ourselves as belonging wholly to the 
world? Christ would then no longer be the object of religion, but something 
else entirely, truly lord of the world.108 
 
Bonhoeffer’s emerging answer to these questions points to God as the transcendent 
one at the centre of the world in Christ—the one whose presence is not limited to the 
periphery of human capabilities or to human weakness, but whose transcendence is 
exhibited precisely in being amongst us. Not as a ‘solution’, but the origin and 
meaning of life: 
 
God’s ‘beyond’ is not what is beyond our cognition. Epistemological 
transcendence has nothing to do with God’s transcendence. God is the beyond 
in the midst of our lives.109 
 
Speaking of God in a worldly way is therefore not about jettisoning the concept of 
transcendence per se, but instead reclaiming it from the domesticating narrative of 
modernity. God who is “properly transcendent” overcomes the domesticated deus ex 
machina.110 What Bonhoeffer goes on to call “religionless Christianity”111 is 
Christianity that refuses a domesticated account of God’s transcendence, and instead 
recognises the wholly otherness of God as God’s being for the world as Creator and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 See Ziegler’s recognition of the prison letters as expounding the logic of ultimacy and penultimacy in 
Ethics. Bonhoeffer, he says, developed his “theological concept of the secular in terms of the real 
dialectic between the ultimate and penultimate”. Philip G. Ziegler, ‘Eschatology and Secularity in the 
Late Writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in John De Gruchy, Stephen Plant, Christiane Tietz (eds.), 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A Way Between Fundamentalism and Secularism (München: Gütersloher 
Verlaghaus, 2009), 127–128.  
107 LPP, 364.  
108 Ibid. 
109 LPP, 367. 
110 Ziegler, ‘Eschatology’, 133.   
111 LPP, 364. 
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Redeemer—most fully as Jesus of Nazareth, God Incarnate as a human being. As 
Ziegler also summarises, then, Bonhoeffer sees that Christianity can “affirm true 
worldliness because—and not in spite of—‘a real coming from the other side’”.112 
 
On these matters, we come across what are apparently Frei’s only published 
comments on Bonhoeffer, where he recognises Bonhoeffer as a theologian of 
transcendence, but incorrectly allies him with the secularisation movement, and 
overlooks his Christocentrism. In an essay on German theology (1974) Frei repeats 
something similar to Bonhoeffer when he says, “only an utterly transcendent God … 
can be true to a secular age, a secular world, a secular man”,113 but apparently fails to 
see that Bonhoeffer’s Christological reconfiguration of the question of transcendence 
operates along the same lines as his own theological sensibilities. Frei perceives the 
link between Bonhoeffer’s critique of Barth’s theology of revelation, and Luther’s 
emphasis on “the full descent of God into the finite order in Christ”114 (recall again 
their complementarity as regards epistemological monophysitism). However, Frei 
seems to believe that Bonhoeffer reacts to Barth primarily along the lines of a liberal 
secularisation that belongs more within the framework of domesticated transcendence 
than in the true transcendence of Christ in the midst of the world. Problematically 
partnering Bonhoeffer with Gogarten, Frei says, 
 
Whereas to the early Barth the attack on religion had meant the affirmation of 
God’s deity, Bonhoeffer and Gogarten affirmed man in the world without the 
‘God hypothesis’, because God enters precisely into that historical, living 
secular context and not in to a sacralized, metaphysically tinged world … To 
speak of God in a secular way, Bonhoeffer’s quest, is to speak of secular man in 
a secular world, affirmed by God not in his weakness but in his strength and 
confidence. This was the obverse side of Barth’s early proclamation of divine 
transcendence; but it is a contrapuntal effect Barth hardly would have 
sounded.115 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 Ziegler, ‘Eschatology’, 125. 
113 Hans W. Frei, ‘German Theology: Transcendence and Secularity’, in Charles E. McClelland and 
Steven P. Scher (eds.), Postwar German Culture (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974), 105. 
114 Frei, ‘German Theology’, 105. 
115 Frei, ‘German Theology’, 105–106. On Friedrich Gogarten’s view of secularisation, see Larry 
Shiner, ‘Gogarten and the Tasks of a Theology of Secularization’, Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion (36, 1968), 99–108. See also Frei’s brief description of Gogarten, along with Bultmann, as a 
theologian for whom “the uniqueness of Jesus Christ lies not in the original ‘mythological’ or at least 
metaphysical picture of Him, but in our translation of its meaning into the terms of the contemporary, 
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Though Frei recognises Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran perspective on God’s ‘full descent’ into 
finitude in Christ, he omits Bonhoeffer’s (and thereby Luther’s) Christocentrism. As 
we shall see below, it is by virtue of such Christocentrism that the Bonhoeffer’s protest 
against domesticated transcendence is ultimately focussed on the transcendence of 
God in the crucified and risen Christ—expressed again in terms of a Lutheran theologia 
crucis. As Wüstenberg has pointed out, one who “fails to see Bonhoeffer’s 
Christological center misinterprets him … especially with regard to the notion of 
nonreligious interpretation.”116 We cannot hold Frei to account as if he were 
publishing an entire essay on Bonhoeffer, but we can at the very least recognise the 
ironic way Frei’s paragraph on Bonhoeffer highlights a missed opportunity for 
recognising the similarities in their theological outlooks.  
 
Frei’s comments, though, reflect the shape of much misinterpretation of Bonhoeffer in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Notoriously, John Robinson’s Honest to God (1963) popularised 
an enthusiastic misinterpretation of Bonhoeffer’s thought about non-religious 
language, calling for language about God’s transcendence— especially God being ‘up’ 
or ‘out’ there—to be abandoned.117 Robinson presumed that such ‘transcendental’ 
language once did have a place, but in light of modern humanity’s grasp of the world 
was now meaningless. In a sweeping statement of (probably unintended) Western 
intellectual prejudice, Robinson suggested that whilst other cultures/people may 
remain content with the idea of God as transcendent beyond the world, it was 
impossible for an “intelligent” person to accept that.118 However, where Robinson 
defended the past legitimacy of the ‘old’ approach whilst wanting to jettison it for his 
own time, to Bonhoeffer a ‘religious’ and ‘un-worldly’ approach to God was never 
acceptable.  
 
The problem for Bonhoeffer is not the idea of God beyond the world per se, but the 
categorisation of God as a stop-gap. Robinson’s misreading of Bonhoeffer is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
lignin ‘existential’ history of free selves.” Hans W. Frei, ‘Religion (Natural and Revealed)’ in Marvin 
Halverson and Arthur Cohen, A Handbook of Christian Theology (London: Meridian, 1958), 320–321. 
116 Wüstenberg, Theology of Life, xiv.  
117 John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (London: SCM, 1963), 13, 43. 
118 Robinson writes that religious language “is still the language of most of [God’s] children … There is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with it … Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that this whole way of 
thinking can be the greatest obstacle to an intelligent faith” Robinson, Honest, 43. Italics mine. 
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symptomatic of the former’s inability to perceive that the problem lies with modernist 
‘religion’ and not with orthodoxy.119  Bonhoeffer’s disagreement is with the limitation of 
God to what Williams calls “a tribal speech, understood only by an inner circle”,120 
and Robinson’s approach is also fundamentally ‘tribal’—it too seeks an expression of 
God that ‘fits’ for a particular milieu. In that sense, it is part of the “decline” that it 
seeks to reverse.121  
 
Secularist readings of Bonhoeffer therefore “reflect the religious or secular 
perspectives of the interpreters” and ignore “the Christological core in Bonhoeffer’s 
theology”.122 To Bonhoeffer’s mind, the world’s coming of age (which for Robinson 
implied a growing-out of the concept of God’s exteriority) in fact calls people to the 
mystery of God in Jesus of Nazareth—for and in the world as the crucified and risen 
one.123 Worldliness and ‘non-religious-ness’ point towards God in Christ as the 
beyond (the transcendent) in the midst of the world, rather than towards a collapse of 
any kind of transcendence into a ‘Christology from below’.124  
 
What is beyond this world is meant, in the gospel, to be there for this world—
not in the anthropocentric sense of liberal, mystical, pietistic, ethical theology, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 “Dr. Robinson does not seem to realize that some of the positions he puts forward as revolutionary 
discoveries, especially suited to twentieth century man who has ‘come of age’, are in fact commonplaces 
of traditional thought.” Herbert McCabe, O.P., ‘Review of Honest to God’, in John A. T. Robinson and 
David L. Edwards, The Honest to God Debate (London: SCM, 1963), 166. 
120 Rowan Williams, Speech at the opening of the International Bonhoeffer Congress, University of 
Wroclaw, Poland, 2006. 
http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2116/dietrich-bonhoeffer-
archbishops-speech-to-the-international-bonhoeffer-congress-poland. 
121 “Honest to God is … part of the very phenomenon whose decline or decadence prompted its writing.” 
Rowan Williams, Anglican Identities (London: DLT, 2004), 119. 
122 Ralph K. Wüstenberg, ‘Philosophical Influences on Bonhoeffer’s “Religionless Christianity”’, in 
Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmerman (eds.), Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 137–138. “Bonhoeffer … quickly became a hero of 
iconoclastic radicals … It is not biased to claim that these theologians fundamentally misinterpreted 
and distorted Bonhoeffer when they drafted him in for their own secular agenda.” Timothy K. Larsen, 
‘The Evangelical Reception of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in Johnson and Larsen, Bonhoeffer, Christ and Culture, 
40. 
123 Colossians 4:3. 
124 For an example of ‘Christology from below’, see MacQuarrie: “To call him the God-man … is to 
claim that in him human transcendence has reached the point at which the human life has been so 
closely united with the divine life that, in the traditional language, it has been ‘deified’.” John 
MacQuarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought (London: SCM, 1990), 370. 
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but in the biblical sense of the creation and the incarnation, crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ.125 
 
This is why Bonhoeffer, though he admired Bultmann, could never agree with the 
latter’s ‘demythologization’ project. To Bultmann, the world of heaven, earth and 
hell, angels, miracles and in particular resurrection, is “incredible to men and women 
today because for them the mythical world picture is a thing of the past”126 Bultmann 
wished to extract the New Testament proclamation from its mythological garb, 
believing that the mythology was merely the cultural and historical décor of the 
message as it was proclaimed in its time.127 Bultmann did not totally de-historicise the 
New Testament’s message, but believed that the historicity lay in the transformative 
preaching of the message of divine love and freedom which originated out of faith in 
the resurrection of the crucified Christ,128 rather than in the historicity of the events 
themselves: “the only thing that can be comprehended as a historical event is the 
Easter faith of the first disciples.”129   
 
Bultmann therefore offers what Bonhoeffer calls a “liberal reductionism … reducing 
Christianity to an ‘essence’”, epitomising the kind of individualistic, existential, other-
worldly religiousness that is no longer of any relevance.130 Like Robinson’s 
secularisation, Bultmann’s project works to fit the gospel inside the intellectual 
furnishings of modernity, thus embodying that to which Frei too was seeking an 
alternative.131 What Bonhoeffer wants to do is describe and communicate the entirety 
of the Christian gospel (not just aspects of it) in a way that is free from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 LPP, 373. 
126 Rudolf Bultmann, ‘New Testament and Mythology: The Problem of Demythologizing the New 
Testament Proclamation (1941)’, in Rudolf Bultmann, New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic 
Writings, trans. Schubert M. Ogden (London: SCM, 1985), 3. 
127 “[T]here is nothing specifically Christian about the mythical world picture, which is simply the 
world picture of a time now past that was not yet formed by scientific thinking.” Bultmann, ‘New 
Testament’, 3. 
128 The “meaning of the Christ event” is “that we can have our authentic life only in submission, and 
yet cannot realize such submission because of all our efforts we remain our highhanded selves … our 
authentic life becomes a possibility in fact for us only when we are freed from ourselves.” Bultmann, 
‘New Testament’, 30. 
129 Bultmann, ‘New Testament’, 40. 
130 LPP, 430. “You can’t separate God from miracles (as Bultmann thinks); instead, you must be able to 
interpret and proclaim them both ‘nonreligiously.’ Bultmann’s approach is still basically liberal (that is, it 
cuts the gospel short) whereas I’m trying to think theologically.” LPP, 372. 
131 Like Robinson too, Bultmann implies a sweeping intellectual prejudice: “no mature person 
represents God as a being who exists above in heaven.” Bultmann, ‘New Testament’, 4. 
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domesticated ‘religious’ idea of God, and in this he complements Frei’s agenda. 
‘Religionless-ness’ does not abstract the meaning of the narratives from the events in 
them, but recognises the inherently ‘worldly’ character of those narratives of God’s 
being pro nobis in Christ. Bultmann may well have recognised the incongruity between 
liberal modernity and ‘religion’, but offered a solution still within the confines of the 
former and therefore did not, says Bonhoeffer, go “far enough”.132  
 
Both Bonhoeffer’s desire here to go ‘beyond’ Bultmann, and the way Frei ‘turns 
Bultmann’s demythologization on its head’ highlight a similar response to Bultmann’s 
project, insofar as they believe that the whole Christian gospel has to be extracted from 
the nineteenth century dichotomy of faith and history, and read in the context of faith 
in God’s activity towards the world. Bonhoeffer recognises that the particular 
narrative of God in Christ cannot be dispensed with, and that speaking of God’s 
relation to the whole world means speaking of the incarnate, crucified and risen Jesus 
of Nazareth, in a freshly non-religious way. Describing in his own way something like 
Frei’s insistence upon the union of narrative and meaning, Bonhoeffer summarises: 
 
[T]he full content, including the ‘mythological’ concepts, must remain—the 
New Testament is not a mythological dressing up of a universal truth, but this 
mythology (resurrection and so forth) is the thing itself!133  
 
However, if Bonhoeffer is not a liberal secularist (pace Frei’s assessment) neither, again 
like Frei, is he engaged in a pure project of recovery, for he understands himself as 
thinking forwards. Whilst he builds on a critique of post-enlightenment epistemology, 
and fashions an alternative characterised by Lutheran orthodoxy, he does not simply 
imply that what is needed is a recovery of a medieval theology. Quite to the contrary, 
he chastises those who “condemn the entire development that has brought them to 
this impasse”,134 especially those who favour, 
  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
132 LPP, 372. 
133 LPP, 430. Clifford Green suggests that Bonhoeffer’s approach to myth here might be fruitfully 
explored in relation to the hermeneutical questions thrown up by Ricoeur. Clifford Green, 
‘Bonhoeffer’s Quest for Authentic Christianity’, in De Gruchy et al, Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today, 339. I 
would suggest that using Frei as an accompaniment to Bonhoeffer is a good place to start that line of 
research, given that Frei complements Bonhoeffer on these matters whilst articulating his view explicitly 
within the hermeneutical field. 
134 LPP, 478. 
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the salto mortale back to the Middle Ages … The return to that is only a counsel 
of despair, a sacrifice made only at the cost of intellectual integrity. It’s a 
dream to the tune of ‘Oh, if only I knew the road back, the long road to 
childhood’s land’.135 
  
This nostalgic attempt to go back ‘behind’ reality fails to really live in the world. 
Bonhoeffer genuinely believes in the need for something ‘new’ to counter religious-
ness, but this new thing is forged out of worship and obedience to the God and Father 
of Jesus Christ—who is eternally new.136 The newness and freshness is not about 
reimagining a different gospel, but asking how, given the theological perversities of 
modernity, true obedience to the crucified and risen Christ can be lived authentically 
in that situation. Of course Bonhoeffer recognises such authenticity in figures of 
Christian history, but knows that an imitation of such authenticity is about 
participation fully in his today, just as those figures participated in theirs. He asks what 
commitment to the same gospel looks like in his particular milieu.  
 
‘Religionless-ness’ is not, then, a call to relativisation—but neither is it a pure project 
of recovery. It is about living today before the God of the gospel; before, in and with 
the crucified and risen one. Whilst a wholly religionless world has, as Greggs says, 
failed to materialise,137 Bonhoeffer’s call to recognise the paradoxical transcendence of 
God in Jesus of Nazareth is no less potent today. The theological substance that 
accompanies the sociological prediction is what matters, and this substance reaches its 
peak in a recovery of the explicit theologia crucis of the Christology lectures. 
 
ii) Jesus Christ, the transcendent crucified one for others 
 
As we might expect, then, coming of age leads not to a comfortable recognition of 
God in all parts of life—a cultural Christianity which sustains itself with an account of 
what Bonhoeffer in Discipleship called “cheap grace”138—but to the scandal of God’s 
transcendent activity in the crucified one pro nobis. Religion’s failure to satisfactorily !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 LPP, 478. ‘salto mortale’ is generally understood to mean ‘death defying leap’. LPP, 478, n.32. 
136 Revelation 21:5. 
137 Tom Greggs, ‘Religionless Christianity in a complexly religious and secular world’, in Stephen Plant 
and Ralf K. Wüstenberg (eds.), Religion, Religionless and Contemporary Western Culture (Frankfurt: Peter 
Laing, 2008), 114. 
138D, 43. 
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account for either God’s transcendence or the world’s relationship to God must give 
way to a theologia crucis that emphasises the paradoxical transcendence of Jesus in the 
world as the crucified one, by virtue of which God is for the world. Coming of age 
leads us to the cross, and as Bonhoeffer pointed out in Discipleship, the ‘hiddenness’ of 
the cross does not translate into an invisible, compromised church, but to a visible 
church community that bears the cross of Jesus.139 
 
For Bonhoeffer, then, Jesus Christ is the transcendent Saviour in his scandalous 
particularity. This is clearly seen in one of his most startling passages: 
 
God would have us know that we must live as those who manage their lives 
without God. The same God who is with us is the God who forsakes us (Mark 
15:34). The same God who makes us to live in the world without the working 
hypothesis of god is the God before whom we stand continually. Before God, 
and with God, we live without God. God consents to be pushed out of the 
world onto the cross; God is weak and powerless in the world and in precisely 
this way, and only so, is at our side and helps us … Human religiosity directs 
people in need to the power of God in the world, God as deus ex machina. 
The Bible directs people towards the powerlessness and the suffering of God; 
only the suffering God can help. To this extent, one may say that the 
previously described development towards the world’s coming of age, which 
has cleared the way by eliminating a false notion of God, frees us to see the 
God of the Bible, who gains ground and power in the world be being 
powerless.140 
 
Humanity’s ‘coming of age’ and the parallel death of the deus ex machina reveal that 
God’s saving presence in the world is actually another death—another pushing out of 
God—not this time of a false working hypothesis but the execution of the God-human 
Jesus of Nazareth. In true Lutheran fashion, in that which is wholly not-God—i.e. 
death and sin—we find God for us. The death of Christ is not merely absence from 
the world, but paradoxically is also the saving presence of God in the suffering and 
rejected one. Unlike the domesticated deus ex machina, God in Christ “is not reduced to 
absenteeism, but helps us by virtue of his weakness.”141  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
139 “It is an evil sophistry which uses the cross of Jesus to derive from it the church’s call to 
conformation to the world … Is the cross conformation to the world?” D, 114. 
140 LPP, 479–480. 
141 Stephen Plant, Bonhoeffer (London: Continuum, 2004), 136.  
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Rachel Muers’ commentary on Bonhoeffer’s image of God ‘pushed out of the world 
onto the cross’ highlights that mentioned in the previous chapter: the way in which 
the hiddenness that characterises the theologia crucis constitutes Jesus’ transcendence—
his ungraspability. Bonhoeffer’s image, she says,  
 
[o]n the one hand, points to the crucifixion as the culmination of the self-
humiliation of Christ, the point of greatest weakness and complete hiddenness. 
On the other hand, it indicates another aspect of the incognito—the 
irreducibility of Christ to what is knowable, and hence to his transcendence of 
attempts to define or judge him, a radical freedom over against the world.142 
 
In Frei’s terms, ‘that which Jesus undergoes’ is that which both makes for his universal 
soteriological significance and also makes for his ungraspability—or what Muers 
summarises effectively as a perpetual “calling into question the final validity of any 
particular reading, or personal or communal ‘manifestation’ of the history of 
Christ.”143 
 
The connection between God being ‘pushed out’ and humanity being ‘set free to live 
without God’ does not imply a convenient quasi-mature atheism, but rather implies 
life without a God who solves all our problems or who is co-opted into our political 
agendas, and instead, and in its place life with the crucified and risen one. True 
Christian freedom is therefore freedom to suffer alongside the suffering Christ—to 
participate in God-in-Christ’s vicarious representative action for the other.144 This 
kind of participation in the form of Christ is overtly concrete and ‘worldly’. Here, as 
Harvey says, Bonhoeffer’s “use of participation language takes on a new intensity”.145 
Bonhoeffer says, 
 
The human being is called upon to share in God’s suffering at the hands of a 
godless world. Thus we must really live in that godless world … Our lives must 
be ‘worldly’, so that we can share precisely so in God’s sufferings.146  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
142 Rachel Muers, Keeping God’s Silence: Towards a Theological Ethics of Communication (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), 77. 
143 Muers, Keeping, 85. 
144 See Sanctorum Communio and Ethics. 
145 Harvey, Taking, 53. 
146 LPP, 480. 
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Bonhoeffer distinguishes suffering with Christ from human suffering per se. There is no 
direct equivocation of Christ with all human beings, for participation, we recall, 
“names the intimate yet asymmetrical relationship of faith that exists between 
ourselves as participants in God’s messianic suffering, and Christ as the one in whom 
we participate, in whom the triune God unties the divine reality with the reality of the 
world.”147 The emphasis is upon turning towards the other in their suffering, which 
may lead to our own suffering (or, in terms of Ethics, our own guilt). Turning from 
inward-looking-ness towards participation in Christ’s being for the other is true 
repentance (μετάνοια)—true participation in the new humanity of which Christ is the 
head.148 Christ therefore remains transcendent, beyond us as the one who defines our 
humanity and yet who can never be relativised into our own identity and activity. As 
Mayer says, “[t]he experience of transcendence is to be sought not simply in being-
for-others but in Jesus’ being-for-others.”149 Indeed, in notes which draw together the 
salient aspects of our entire treatment of Bonhoeffer, he uses the language of 
transcendence to describe cruciform Christian living: 
 
Our relationship to God is no ‘religious’ relationship to some highest, most 
powerful, and best being imaginable—that is no genuine transcendence. Our 
relationship to God is a new life in ‘being there for others’, through 
participation in the being of Jesus. The transcendent is not the infinite, 
unattainable tasks, but the neighbour within reach in any given situation. God 
in human form! Not as in the oriental religions in animal forms as the 
monstrous, the chaotic, the remote, the terrifying, but also not in the 
conceptual forms of the absolute, the metaphysical, the infinite, and so one, 
either, nor again the Greek god … But rather ‘the human being for others’! 
therefore the Crucified One. The human being living out of the 
transcendent.150 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 Harvey, Taking, 54. 
148 LPP, 480; See also McBride: “The church offers a non-triumphal witness in a pluralistic society not 
by viewing itself as religiously or morally favored but by taking the form of the crucified Christ, who 
belonged wholly to this world through a divine righteousness expressed through repentance.” McBride, 
The Church, 87. The only weakness in this statement, I think, is that the past tense ‘belonged’ has the 
tendency to isolate Christ’s belonging to the world in the past. 
149 Rainer Mayer, ‘Christology: The Genuine Form of Transcendence’, in A. J. Klassen, A Bonhoeffer 
Legacy: Essays in Understanding (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 188–189. 
150 LPP, 501. Whilst he describes this as ‘not in … the metaphysical’ it is perhaps more accurate to 
describe this as a rejection of speculative, ‘other-worldly’ metaphysics rather than metaphysics per se (see 
Harvey, Taking, 137). Indeed, an approach to transcendence grounded in the crucified Christ implies a 
rigorous Christological metaphysic as found in the concept Christuswirklichkeit. Of course, in rejecting the 
deus ex machina, Bonhoeffer rejects any speculative abstraction from human life in the world, but 
! 232 
 
Jesus’ ‘transcendent being for others’ is his being the incarnate one who is the 
crucified one. In Ziegler’s words, transcendence is “concretely identified” by God’s 
suffering in Christ.151 As God pushed out of the world—crucified outside the city 
walls—Jesus is wholly for others, the one in whom all humanity’s sin is taken on and 
rejected by God.152 Christian discipleship, “rooted in the theologia crucis of the Lutheran 
tradition that Bonhoeffer had begun to make his own over a decade earlier”,153 is 
marked by participation in the paradoxically transcendent being of God incarnate, 
the one beyond the world who is nevertheless in the world; the one who is hidden in 
the humiliation of sinful flesh, in the utter rejection of crucifixion. Christians 
participate in the one beyond them; their life is found in the one who is supremely 
other—transcendent and particular.  
 
Participation in the transcendent Christ then makes for true relationship to 
transcendence in every day ‘worldly’ life—i.e. in relationship with the neighbour—
both because the exteriority of the other person is not master-able and cannot be 
resolved into my own existence; and most fundamentally because God-in-Christ, the 
ultimate other, is found (though not exclusively) in and through life for others.154 
Anderson speaks of Bonhoeffer’s recognition of “the normative character of basic 
ontic relationships”,155 by which he means that God ‘places’ human beings into truth 
through relationships in which they are for others. Therefore, “man is up against God 
himself when Christ meets him at the centre of an ontic relationship”.156 Anderson, 
like Tietz and others, recognises that God must remain other in all of this, because 
human relationships do not constitute something of the divine by their own volition. 
God “is not a reality added to the social relation, but the reality of God constitutes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
conceived Christologically, the metaphysics of transcendence is concrete and immediate, whilst being 
grounded in the transcendence the crucified Christ—the human being for others.  
151 Ziegler, ‘Eschatology’, 133. 
152 Hebrew 13:12. In Barth’s words: “That the elected man Jesus had to suffer and die means no more 
and no less than that in becoming man God makes Himself responsible for man who became His 
enemy, and that He takes upon Himself all the consequences of man’s action—his rejection and his 
death.” Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II.2: The Doctrine of God (London, T & T Clark, 2004), 124.  
153 Green, Bonhoeffer, 273. 
154 Matthew 25:40. 
155 Anderson, Historical, 79. 
156 Anderson, Historical, 85. 
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that relation.”157 Again, the reality of God towards the world in the crucified Christ 
constitutes the transcendent character of human life for the other—only because of 
God’s activity is weakness and suffering for the other the form of Christ.158 Thus on 
account of God’s transcendent act, Christianity is understood in ‘worldly’ terms, 
because Christians are redeemed for, not away from, life in the world.  
 
This connection between God’s transcendent act and the world-oriented character of 
redemption is emphasised by Bonhoeffer’s reading of the resurrection—which here is 
linked to worldliness in a clearer fashion than in the 1933 lectures. “The Christian 
hope of resurrection”, he says, “refers people to their life on earth in a wholly new 
way, more sharply that the OT.”159 We must understand this in the light of 
Bonhoeffer’s positive emphasis, in many of his letters, upon the importance of 
“reading the [Old Testament] in the light of the new”.160 According to Harvey, the 
way Bonhoeffer practices this throughout the letters is a sustained (yet not 
theoretically explicated) example of a more mature kind of figural reading than found 
previously, wherein he locates Israel at the centre of Christian theology, in contrast to 
the rampant Nazi supercessionism against which he protested in the church struggle 
of the 1930’s.161 Bonhoeffer says in that Old Testament readers find “redemption !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
157 Anderson, Historical, 77. See also Christiane Tietz, ‘Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the 
Church’, in Adam C. Clark and Michael Mawson (eds.), Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary 
Scholarship (Oregon: Pickwick, 2013), esp. 44. Tietz writes specifically about Act and Being but her 
observations pertain to Letters and Papers from Prison too. Compare this to the misleading implications of 
Geoffrey Kelly’s comments on transcendence and Christology: “the mode of transcendence and 
freedom manifested through Christ became a model for the ultimate transcendence and freedom to 
which every person is drawn by God.” Geoffrey B. Kelly, Liberating Faith: Bonhoeffer’s Message for Today 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 51. Pace Kelly, Christ is not the ‘model’ for transcendence, but is the 
transcendent one who constitutes the meaning of human relationships to one another by the work of 
the Spirit.  
158 “There is no ‘power in weakness’ which, by itself, transcends the world and offers an ontological 
vision of Christ. Nor can one simply make the way of humility an ontic form of existence and thereby 
reach the transcendence of God.” Anderson, Historical, 184. As mentioned in chapter 5, Anderson 
ultimately concludes that Bonhoeffer does not manage this distinction well enough, in the end making 
co-humanity a “pole of transcendence.” In Bonhoeffer’s later work, says Anderson, he simply “moves” 
this pole from the church (in Sanctorum Communio) “out into the world”. Anderson, Historical, 218. On the 
basis of the scholarship presented here, especially in relation to resurrection (see above and below) I 
suggest Anderson’s charge can ultimately be negated. 
159 LPP, 448.  
160 LPP, 367. 
161 Harvey, Taking, 218–223. If indeed we are to take on Harvey’s categorisation of this aspect of 
Bonhoeffer’s work as ‘figural’, then this is certainly a more nuanced example than the reading of David 
(see above). Even so, here Frei’s insistence on the historicity of the type still serves to critically elucidate 
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within history, that is, this side of the bounds of death. Israel is redeemed out of Egypt so 
that it may live before God, as God’s people on earth.”162 Bonhoeffer’s radical 
concentration on the Old Testament is therefore an affirmation of a Christianity that 
‘refers’ people to the world. Yet, by virtue of the resurrection, the one in whom God 
exists wholly for others even unto death is himself present in this the world in a wholly 
new way—i.e. in his resurrection body. In participating in the being of the risen Jesus 
Christ, human beings are participating too in the new humanity, and are called to be 
‘new’ in the world. “Christians do not have the ultimate escape route out of their 
earthly tasks and difficulties into eternity … Christ takes hold of human beings in the 
midst of their lives.”163 Worldliness is ultimately about union with the crucified and 
risen Christ who is in the world as one pushed out of it. 
 
As in 1933, here Bonhoeffer emphasises that the worldliness of resurrection does not 
neutralise its profound ambiguity. To recall the lectures, and Frei’s point about the 
unsubstitutability of Jesus continuing through the resurrection narratives, the risen 
one remains the crucified one; the resurrection does not discard the paradoxical 
theologia crucis. Because Jesus’ resurrection is not about his salvation to another realm 
(recall again Bonhoeffer’s opposition to Raumdenken in Ethics) Easter faith proclaims 
that the crucified one is now alive in the crucified and risen body—the body in which 
he was tortured and humiliated—present yet hidden in his identity as God for us. In 
the resurrection the hiddenness and ‘slipperiness’ remain; the paradoxical theologia 
crucis is not neutralised. Instead, as remarked previously, the resurrection appearances 
are characterised by the transcendence of Christ who returns powerfully to the 
community of disciples and yet is never graspable by them. The reference back to life 
on earth does not simply affirm a status quo, as if the resurrection were a turn to 
immanence over and against transcendence, or an affirmation of worldliness over and 
against beyondness. Instead, Christ is present (immanent) precisely as the 
transcendent and hidden one.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Bonhoeffer’s practice, and thus serves as a meaningful theoretical basis on which to read Bonhoeffer 
both critically and affirmatively. 
162 LPP, 447. 
163 LPP, 448. 
! 235 
Therefore, to interpret Bonhoeffer through Williams again, we cannot treat the 
resurrection as a ‘giving back’—as if Christ taken in crucifixion is now given into our 
hands in resurrection.164 The resurrection is, of course, good news—for through the 
crucified and risen Christ, God is opening the way to eternal life for the old 
humanity.165 However, precisely as that good news, it is not a perpetual reassurance 
for human beings as they are. The risen Christ does not function as a working 
hypothesis (a deus ex machina) to mitigate fear of death. Instead, the risen one 
transcends as God incarnate, who was hidden in the humiliation of crucifixion, and 
who now operates beyond the boundaries of ‘normal’ living, yet in the midst of life. 
Participation in the life of the risen one is the same as participation in the life of the 
crucified one—living for others in the midst of the world; living in relationship with 
and to Jesus Christ who ultimately slips through our fingers, and through our locked 
doors, as the transcendent one. 
 
As I have emphasised throughout, this paradoxical transcendence must be expounded 
according to what Frei calls ‘realistic narrative’, for a de-particularisation of the cross 
and resurrection moves towards the kind of abstraction that Bonhoeffer wants to 
avoid. This means that when we speak of God in Christ pushed out of the world onto 
the cross, we speak of that which must also be narrated, not just described in 
principle—because the fullest expression of the crucifixion involves Roman and 
Jewish figures of authority, the manipulation of public opinion, a mother witnessing 
her child’s torture, distressed friends, and other particularities surrounding the event. 
Of course, these things are not categorically unique to Jesus’ own crucifixion per se, but 
their tragic commonality does not necessitate their generalisation; and in any case 
what is utterly unique is that this is God, and God’s revelation of Godself in the 
humiliation of sinful flesh does not happen in abstraction from these particular things 
which characterise the world at its worst. Furthermore, the resurrection of Christ 
cannot be expressed or ‘understood’ without the particular joyous puzzlement of 
Jesus’ friends and the mysterious but concrete particularity of someone appearing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
164 Williams insists upon the importance of the strangeness of the risen Christ for recognising that Jesus’ 
victimhood cannot be wholly assimilated into our own, and thereby turned into an ideological trump 
card on account of Christ my “fellow sufferer”. By virtue of the continuation of his unsubstitutable 
identity, the cross remains “his, not ours”, and thus it remains the cross of the one who is other, 
unrecognisable and strange. Rowan Williams, Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel (London: DLT, 
2002), 71–75.    
165 1 Corinthians 15.49. 
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beyond a locked door. Abstracting these particularities empties the paradox of some of 
its content, diluting the absoluteness of God’s being among us in Christ, which is why 
allowing Frei to complement and guide our reading of Bonhoeffer is helpful.  
 
However, when parsed according to Frei’s emphases upon particularity, Letters and 
Papers again demonstrate how Bonhoeffer’s can offer a fuller account of the 
paradoxical transcendence of Jesus’ particularity than Frei’s work is able to offer on its 
own, on account of his particular approach to a theologia crucis and to the ambiguity of 
the resurrection.  In short, Bonhoeffer holds off any kind of resolution to accounts of 
Jesus’ identity, ensuring that the difficult, slippery aspects of the gospel are not 
neutralised, but present themselves starkly. 
 
iii) Summary 
 
Bonhoeffer contrasts the ‘who’ of Jesus Christ—pro nobis as one pushed out of the 
world—with a domesticated deus ex machina of post-enlightenment theological 
rationalism. Explicating ‘transcendence’ as God’s being for humanity in the crucified 
and risen Christ, the human being for others, he points to what Anderson calls the 
“logic” of historical transcendence—that is, “instead of God’s absolute difference 
being diminished in any way by his interaction with the world, it is made more real 
and explicit, because this ‘worldly’ act is God’s transcendence”.166  
 
The full implication of the ‘worldliness’ of this transcendence is explicit when we allow 
Frei to illuminate what is implicit in Bonhoeffer’s Christology—that the only way 
Christians have to talk about God’s act in Christ is wedded to historical particularity 
and unsubstitutability. ‘Being for others in the midst of the world’ is not a thematic 
principle, but a concrete ontological precedent in one person’s action insofar as he 
was/is God incarnate. The truly worldly aspect of Christianity has its meaning only in 
the transcendent—that it is God who acts towards the world in Jesus of Nazareth; and 
the truly transcendent aspect has its meaning only in the worldly—that God towards 
the world is this particular man. When we allow Frei to emphasise the concrete 
unsubstitutability of Jesus Christ, Bonhoeffer’s theology can be read as plumbing the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Anderson, Historical, 70. 
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paradoxical depths of that unsubstitutability which is the very substance of Jesus 
Christ’s transcendence—i.e. his existence as stumbling block.  In this sense, the 
transcendence of Jesus is not only recognised as ‘worldly’, but also as something 
fundamentally challenging for us. Humanity come of age is redefined by God who is 
the beyond in the midst—beyond both as the Creator and Redeemer, and as the 
problematic stumbling block, God hidden in the humiliation of sinful flesh.  
 
This potential addition to Bonhoeffer’s theology goes unnoticed by Frei himself, 
whose summary of Bonhoeffer stays within a prevailing categorisation of him as a 
‘secular’ theologian. Yet contrary to Frei’s reading of Bonhoeffer’s theology as 
constituting an extreme flip-side to Barth’s theology of contingent revelation (which 
elsewhere Frei refers to as ‘epistemological monophysitism’) Bonhoeffer’s theology in 
fact complements Frei’s own response to Barth, shedding light on the middle ground 
between domesticated transcendence on one hand, and an unworldly theology of 
revelation on the other. If, as Sonderegger suggested, Frei manifests a ‘chastened’ 
orthodox monophysitism167—emphasising that Jesus’ historicity is always that of the 
transcendent God—then Bonhoeffer too can be seen to articulate such a position, and 
offer substantial content to Frei as regards the profound paradoxes of the 
unsubstitutable Christ. Bonhoeffer’s theology explicates normativity of Christ for the 
church in a deeply challenging way. 
 
III 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined how the transcendence of Jesus Christ—at the heart of 
which lies the paradox of a theologia crucis—resides at the centre of both Bonhoeffer’s 
Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison, again in a way that supplements and benefits 
from Frei’s work. Resisting domesticated transcendence, Bonhoeffer gives us both a 
cosmic and political Christology grounded in the ‘who’ of the crucified and risen one 
who cannot be reduced to human principles, limited to solving human problems, or 
deposited beyond the ‘worldly’. Christ in Ethics and Letters and Papers is the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
167 Katherine Sonderegger, ‘Epistemological Monophysitism in Karl Barth and Hans Frei’, Pro Ecclesia 
(22, 2013), 260. 
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transcendent one pro nobis as the one wholly in the world, for the world. Contrary to 
Barker’s summary that Bonhoeffer dispenses with God’s wholly other-ness so as to 
emphasise God’s presence in the world,168 Bonhoeffer envisions a fully historical 
transcendence wherein God who is wholly other ‘transcends’ in and for the world.  
 
This account of Jesus’ transcendence opposes what Bonhoeffer in Ethics calls 
radicalism and compromise, both of which erect domesticating boundaries around 
Jesus Christ. As Greggs says, whilst fundamentalism—undoubtedly a form of what 
Bonhoeffer called radicalism—may hold an “innate concern” to “place God at the 
centre” in opposition to perceived secularisation, it actually recourses to a deus ex 
machina, requiring “the sense of an ever shrinking space for God in society in order to 
establish its own apocalyptic vision, and to gain support for those who also wish to 
place God back at the centre.”169 Fundamentalism thrives on opposition to 
humanity’s coming of age, meaning it belongs squarely within Bonhoeffer’s ‘religious’ 
bracket and is therefore, as Williams observes, “a quintessentially modern thing”.170 
Furthermore, fundamentalism opposes the Christ who breaks down boundaries, and 
who calls into question the ability of the religious community to ever fully grasp the 
one in whose name they speak. On the other hand, compromise—manifest in what H. 
Richard Niebuhr calls “Culture-Protestantism”171—limits Christ according to the 
boundaries of human rationality, reducing him to a figure of a broader theme—like 
justice, peace, tolerance or fairness. This is the Christ of a deus ex machina, whose 
function is to prop up or aid a pervasive socio-political status quo and affirm humans 
in their rational capabilities.  
 
In contrast to the closed-ness of fundamentalism, or the wide-openness of Culture 
Protestantism, reading Ethics and Letters and Papers alongside Frei has shown how 
witness to the concrete and particular Christ is witness to the transcendent Christ, and 
that neither emphasis upon the historical particularity of Jesus of Nazareth (such as 
fundamentalism might misuse to insist upon an inflexibility) nor upon the ‘unknowing’ 
aspect of Christian faith (such as Culture Protestantism might appeal to, to prop up a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 Barker, The Cross, 432–433; and H. Gaylon Barker, ‘Without God, We Live With God: Listening to 
Bonhoeffer’s Witness in Today’s Public Square’, in De Gruchy et al., Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today, 165. 
169 Greggs, ‘Religionless Christianity’, 118–119.  
170 Rowan Williams, Faith in the Public Square (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 124. 
171 Niebuhr, Christ, 84.  
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relativisation of Jesus’ identity) can be abstracted from each other. Rather, the 
Christology at the heart of both Frei and Bonhoeffer’s theologies—that holds 
unsubstitutability and transcendence together and that becomes stronger as they are 
read together—crucially grounds their own theological flexibility, or to turn Frei’s 
phrase around, their orthodox generosity.  
 
We now move to take stock of this reading of Frei and Bonhoeffer, to fill out more 
fully the suggestion that their theology of the transcendence of Jesus grounds their 
usefulness in the pursuit of a theological ‘middle way’, and also to recognise that whilst 
much has been gained by reading the two together, the role of the Holy Spirit has so 
far been under-articulated. In the following conclusion, as well as drawing together 
the ideas laid out above, I will suggest that a more robust pneumatology, such as 
hinted at in chapters 3 and 4, would serve to further ground these ideas. In particular, 
thinking about the work of the Spirit helps conceptually ground Jesus’ own 
particularity without turning to exclusivity; and also helps us to explicate the nexus 
between the unsubstitutable Christ and the community to which his identity is 
generously given by God. 
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Chapter 8. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This conclusion begins by summarising the conversation between Frei and Bonhoeffer 
on the matters explored above, drawing together three key similarities before turning 
to four summaries of how each theologian’s work can constitute a critical addition to 
the other. I then suggest that whilst both theologians make room for the work of the 
Holy Spirit, a more explicit pneumatology can strengthen an account of the 
transcendence of Jesus derived from them both, especially concerning the relationship 
between the ‘scandal of particularity’ and the generosity of the triune God. Finally, I 
summarise the elements of a theology of Jesus’ transcendence derived from 
Bonhoeffer and Frei with a figural reading of John 19:19–23, and offer brief 
suggestion regarding the function of the project for ongoing theological reflection. 
 
I 
 
Summarising the Conversation 
 
i) Key similarities 
 
a) Undomesticated transcendence and the integrity of history 
 
The overlap of Bonhoeffer and Frei’s concerns was traced by beginning with their 
objection to the impact of the epistemological constraints placed upon theology by 
modernity, and their determination to maintain the integrity of the historical in 
relation to God’s transcendent activity. In Placher’s terms, they both express 
dissatisfaction with a domesticated transcendence that allies them with Barth; and in Frei’s 
terms, they reject an epistemological monophysitism that they recognise in Barth’s early work. 
 
Frei’s doctoral dissertation shows his appreciation of the way Barth responded to 
domesticated transcendence, re-positioning theology as faith seeking understanding, 
and expounding God’s utterly gratuitous, saving act towards the world in the crucified 
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and risen Christ, over against the natural religion of Culture Protestantism. 
Nevertheless, Frei was worried that Barth downplayed creaturely, continuous 
historical being (especially in Christology) in the interest of emphasising the utter 
contingency and freedom of God’s act. This concern for a greater recognition of the 
integrity of the historical in relation to God—a concern that reflected that of his 
teacher, H. Richard Niebuhr—then becomes the context in which his implicit critique 
of the domestication of transcendence develops.   
 
Frei more specifically casts aspersions on modernity’s domesticating tendencies by 
tracing the loss of coherence between narrative and meaning in hermeneutics from 
the seventeenth century onwards, a loss that derives from the perceived impasse of 
faith and history. Where a problem of faith and history becomes the ultimate 
framework in which religious concerns must be articulated, the ‘truth’ of history-like 
narratives in the scriptures is separated from the narratives themselves. The question 
becomes something like ‘how can these texts fit in the understanding of truth which 
universal reason gives us?’ and the theological implication of that is ‘how is God’s 
activity coherent with what we know of universal rationality of the universe?’ Behind 
the divorce of narrative and meaning—especially in what Niebuhr calls ‘Culture 
Protestantism’—lies the domestication of transcendence, and both Frei’s critique of 
the ‘eclipse’ of narrative reading and his constructive outline of a narrative reading of 
the gospels are constructed against that backdrop. Frei’s insistence upon the 
unsubstitutable history-likeness of Jesus therefore arises consistently out of this implicit 
critique. His Christology emphasises that the freely transcendent God acts towards 
and in the world in the historically particular Jesus Christ, in whom the world finds its 
true telos. As Frei develops his later cultural linguistic analyses, particularly regarding 
the sensus literalis of the scriptures and the kind of theology ‘hospitable’ to it, modernist 
assumptions that domesticate God are once more in Frei’s sightline. There he 
critiques the expectation that theology should perform apologetic moves to 
demonstrate its correlation with, or submission to, generalised theories. His cultural-
linguistic exploration also prioritises the historical and contingent—for it is amongst 
the actual praxis of communities that the act of God towards and in history is 
articulated and responded to.  
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Bonhoeffer, too, follows Barth’s critique of humanity’s attempt to place itself into truth 
or into relationship with God in Christ, and the concomitant insistence upon the 
transcendent act of God in Christ—known by faith that seeks understanding—as the 
foundation of human being and knowing. Yet like Frei, Bonhoeffer is dissatisfied with 
the way Barth apparently disenfranchises historical existence in relation to God’s 
activity, and therefore he insists upon person (i.e. Christ) as a model of divine 
revelation. As Bonhoeffer’s theology develops he becomes a theologian of 
‘worldliness’—particularly in Ethics and Letters and Papers—never emptying the 
transcendence of God into the world, but recognising how God’s transcendent activity 
affirms the world in its historicity, or what one might call ‘secularity’. 
 
Frei and Bonhoeffer therefore overlap in starting point. This brings both into nuanced 
engagement with the Christology of Culture Protestantism (which can broadly be said 
to trade in a domesticated Jesus) and leads them both to demonstrate that a recovery 
of transcendence does not entail an other-worldliness, but affirms the world as that 
reconciled to God in Christ. 
  
b) Christology as ‘who?’ 
 
Both theologians respond constructively to the domestication of transcendence by 
prioritising the personal identity of Jesus Christ. In their closest terminological overlap, both 
maintain that Christology is about the ‘who’ of Christ.  
 
From Frei’s perspective this means one must ask about the identity of Jesus as 
narratively attested in the gospels, before one can explore how Christian belief about 
Jesus’ presence can make sense (especially within a post-enlightenment concept of 
faith and history). Frei highlights how, when the gospels are not subjected to a 
reductive historical consciousness, they yield a description of Jesus who belongs in the 
realm of unsubstitutable historicity rather than being a mythical figure who points to a 
general truth behind the narratives about himself. In particular, crucifixion and 
resurrection are not narrative themes that point to Jesus’ ‘meaning’, but are things he 
underwent that point to his own unsubstitutable identity as the crucified and risen 
one, whose identity implies his contemporaneous presence. In a coherence of 
transcendence and historical particularity, the gospels narrate the unsubstitutable 
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Jesus in such a way that history-like-ness itself—especially in terms of the 
resurrection—bends to his identity. For Frei, the narratively rendered meaning of the 
gospels is who Jesus is; and in his later work, that irreducible ‘who’ is the normative 
constraint upon the sensus literalis of the scriptures.  Frei therefore understands 
categories or schemes for theological analysis to operate only formally, and, in his later 
work especially, resists reification of concepts like ‘narrative’ or ‘literal’, so that such 
descriptive terms witness to rather than contain the unique identity of Jesus. The kind 
of enquiry that Frei undertakes belongs squarely within the ecclesial realm—the faith 
seeking understanding of the community.   
 
Bonhoeffer introduces his focus on the ‘who’ question in his Christology lectures, 
explicating, as DeJonge recognises, the emphasis of Act and Being upon a ‘person 
concept of revelation’.1 Just as Frei prioritised the question of identity over the 
question of Jesus’ presence, so for Bonhoeffer the ‘who’ question cannot be relegated 
to the question of ‘how’ Jesus might be the union of God and humanity. Jesus Christ is 
the counter-Logos to the human logos, who as the crucified and risen one is out of the 
grasp of human epistemology and defines humankind according to God’s revelation 
(like Frei, Bonhoeffer’s approach to the resurrection in particular highlights an 
ungraspability about Jesus’ historicity). Asking ‘who’ therefore emphasises that the 
person of Christ cannot be resolved into my own being or understanding, and 
therefore highlights Christologically what Bonhoeffer had insisted upon since 
Sanctorum Communio—that human beings are constituted from beyond themselves, by 
God who meets us in the person of Christ, encountered in the church, the sacraments 
and the community. This emphasis upon the ‘who’ question exerts its influence in 
Bonhoeffer’s subsequent works—especially in the Christological ontology of Ethics and 
his response to the ‘religious’ domestication of God that he believed characterised his 
own day (in Letter’s and Papers From Prison). Like Frei, Bonhoeffer insists upon the 
necessarily ecclesial/confessional context for Christological enquiry—he sees 
Christology as a response to God’s act in Christ, not a preliminary to it. Again, 
Christological categories operate formally, pointing to the one who cannot be 
‘contained’ by them. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Michael P. DeJonge, Bonhoeffer’s Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth and Protestant Theology (Oxford: OUP, 
2012), 85. 
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For both theologians, Christology is about the transcendent ‘who’—Jesus Christ who 
cannot be reduced to generalisations or effects, or objectively deconstructed for 
analysis. Furthermore, this ‘who’ is irreducibly historical—the incarnate, crucified and 
risen one in whom God reconciles the world to Godself from within the world-
historical itself, and whose own particular historicity constitutes his identity. 
 
c) Cultural linguistics and Jesus pro me 
 
Bringing together Frei’s cultural linguistic focus and Bonhoeffer’s explication of Jesus 
as pro me and Christ existing as community, illuminates how, for both theologians, the 
transcendent ‘who’ of God in Christ is always understood as oriented towards, not away from, 
Christian communities.  
 
Frei’s later essays in particular emphasise that the priority of the unsubstitutable 
identity of Jesus for reading the scriptures should be understood not as a general 
theory in isolation from, or prior to, the communities of faith that read the texts in this 
way. Particularly when supplemented with focus on the testimony of the original 
apostolic community (chapter 4 drew on Bauckham for this) Frei’s work highlights 
that the normativity of Jesus’s identity cannot merely be accounted for by appealing to 
an internally originating community consensus. Rather, the extrinsic aspect of relation 
to God in Christ must be emphasised, as the community recognises the hermeneutical 
normativity of the identity of Jesus according to faith in the activity of God that 
coheres with the apparent literal sense of scripture. The cultural-linguistically 
described sensus literalis is therefore grounded in the transcendence of the 
unsubstitutable Jesus who is towards the church, defining it from beyond itself. 
Furthermore, Frei understands that both Word and sacrament constitute the indirect 
(i.e. non-physical) presence, or “self-communication” of God in Christ to the 
community only because of the promise and self-witness of God, and not by virtue of 
their own intrinsic power.2 Frei shows that focus upon the praxis of the community 
points towards, not away from, the particular Christ whose presence to the 
community is the presence of God—the one in whom the community sees the 
Father.3    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 1997), 194. 
3 John 14:9. 
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Bonhoeffer followed Luther, insisting that Jesus Christ is known only as one who is pro 
me/nobis. This does not collapse into what Tanner calls “a subjectivist epistemological 
swerve” wherein Christ’s pro me is “identified with God as a matter of human 
apprehension” (as one might argue happens in Kant).4 Rather, encountering Christ in 
Word, sacrament, and the church-community, is the result of God in Christ’s own 
initiative—the one who is known only according to his being towards us. The 
implication therefore is that the transcendence of Jesus—his being wholly other, out of 
the grasp of self-sufficient human epistemology—is something that one can relate to 
only from within the community that has faith in him as pro nobis. In word, sacrament 
and in the other person in the church-community, Bonhoeffer insists that Christ 
cannot be resolved into our own comprehension, but remains transcendent.  
 
For both Bonhoeffer and Frei therefore, the Christian community exists in the 
complexity and ‘ambiguity’ of historical existence, but also as the locus of relationship 
with the transcendent Christ, known only according to his unsubstitutable 
particularity. The focus upon the Christian community—found both in Frei’s cultural 
linguistic essays and Bonhoeffer’s emphasis upon pro me—thus evidences again the 
inseparability of transcendence and historical particularity. 
 
ii) Mutual strengthening and critique 
 
a) Frei: unsubstitutability 
 
Frei’s concept of unsubstitutability functions to point to and draw out the central 
importance of historical particularity for a theology of Jesus’ transcendence. 
Bonhoeffer is clearly not blind to the importance of Jesus’ particularity—consider his 
critique of Barth, the way he follows Luther to implicitly modify Kierkegaard’s 
incognito, and his own remarks on Jesus as the one in the midst of the world—but 
especially where that kind of emphasis is implicit rather than explicit in Bonhoeffer’s 
work, Frei’s term helps considerably as a conceptual gloss. In short, Frei brings a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Kathryn Tanner, ‘Jesus Christ’, in Colin Gunton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 253. 
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useful term to the conversation, insisting upon Jesus’ historical particularity to a 
greater degree than Bonhoeffer does.  
 
Frei points to the unity of Jesus’ non-repeatable historicity with his saving universality 
in the gospels,5 and as such ensures that the ‘who’ question is always one about 
historicity as well as transcendence. This complements and fills out Bonhoeffer’s focus 
on the ‘who’ of Jesus, highlighting how what Frei would call Jesus’ unsubstitutable 
‘history-like-ness’ is un-abstractable from any explication of Jesus identity as the 
counter-logos. Keeping the concept of historical unsubstitutability at the forefront of 
our minds when reading Bonhoeffer means that all his Christology—e.g. Christ-
existing-as-community, the theologia crucis and the Christuswirklichkeit—is read explicitly 
as being about “the man from Nazareth who redeemed men by his helplessness, in 
perfect obedience enacting their good on their behalf … was raised from the dead and 
manifested to be the redeemer.”6 Using unsubstitutability as a gloss on Bonhoeffer’s 
work highlights how Jesus’ transcendence—his being other, out of our grasp, and 
constitutive of our reconciliation with God—is inseparable from that which is worked 
out in the midst of history, i.e. his life, death and resurrection. Only as unsubstitutable 
and particular can Jesus really be said to transcend—otherwise the temptation to 
generalisation reels him into our imaginings and constructs. 
 
I suggested that Yoder’s critique of Bonhoeffer as ‘logological’ to the detriment of 
historical particularity fails to grasp the way Bonhoeffer preserves the transcendence 
of Jesus, but that Frei does not limit Jesus’ particular identity in the way Yoder’s 
approach threatens to. Frei’s approach to historicity, explicitly resisting as it does a 
modernist ‘grasp’ of the historical Jesus, maintains an explicit posture of humility that 
Yoder’s does not.  
 
Furthermore, when unsubstitutability is prioritised, it becomes harder to misread 
Bonhoeffer as if he were collapsing the identity of Christ into the church. Readings of 
Bonhoeffer that verge on reducing theology to the anthropological are mitigated if 
one understands the way in which Frei’s articulation of Jesus’ historical 
unsubstitutability coheres conceptually with Bonhoeffer’s own theological orientation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Frei, Identity, 123. 
6 Frei, Identity, 182. 
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There are, however, two complexities to this observation concerning unsubstitutability 
that merit mentioning—firstly, as observed in the previous chapter, in the only place 
where Frei writes explicitly on Bonhoeffer, the former does not read the latter with this 
emphasis in mind, but rather focusses on Bonhoeffer as a theologian of secular 
humanity at the expense of particular Christology; and secondly, Frei’s own work 
arguably does not fully follow the concept of unsubstitutability through either. On the 
first point, given that we are concerned only with one paragraph by Frei on 
Bonhoeffer, care must be taken not to disproportionately suggest that this is a highly 
significant misreading of Bonhoeffer on Frei’s behalf. Rather, we recognise that 
Bonhoeffer scholarship in the decade prior to Frei’s essay was characterised to a 
significant degree by a limited reading of Bonhoeffer’s work that allied Bonhoeffer 
with the secularisation movement—and that Frei merely seems to reflect that 
consensus. His assessment of Bonhoeffer is indeed a narrow one, but it is likely to be 
more circumstantial than a misinterpretation derived from a close reading. Current 
Bonhoeffer scholarship—from which this thesis benefits—allows for the coherence 
with Frei to be much more apparent than was the case in the 1970s, and so this 
project too reflects its scholarly circumstances. It is quite likely that previous lack of 
engagement between Frei and Bonhoeffer scholarship attests the rather limited scope 
of Bonhoeffer scholarship in Frei’s own time, meaning that this was a less obvious 
move to make then than is the case now. Particularly in the light of the current flurry 
of Bonhoeffer studies, a staged conversation between Frei and Bonhoeffer on the 
transcendence of Jesus is a more obvious project to undertake now than it was during 
Frei’s time.  
 
Regarding the second complexity—whether Frei adequately applies his own concept 
of unsubstitutability—we are concerned with whether Frei’s focus on the passion-
resurrection narratives emphasises Jesus’ unsubstitutability as the crucified and risen 
one to the detriment, say, of his identity as the healing, compassionate, or socially 
subversive one. Admittedly, Frei openly articulates his reasons for concentrating on 
the passion-resurrection—he believes that there the texts identify Jesus in the least 
mythological fashion and thus force the question of unsubstitutability in the strongest 
way—but the logic of committing to Jesus’ unsubstitutability allows for a reading back 
into the other portions of the text, insofar as Jesus’ ministry was undertaken by the 
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particular figure. As David Kelsey reflects in his own multifaceted explanation of 
Christ’s unsubstitutable particularity, Jesus is narratively rendered as Jewish, 
gendered, one who practices “downward economic mobility”, and as a particularly 
“social and public” figure.7 Allowing the concept of unsubstitutability to include the 
narratives of Jesus’ ministry therefore means that Jesus transcends as the 
unsubstitutably compassionate, healing, barrier-breaking, crucified and risen one who 
welcomes people into the love of God. Insofar as Frei’s emphasis upon 
unsubstitutability is developed alongside his refusal of a modernist dichotomy of faith 
and history, this emphasis upon Jesus’ unsubstitutable ministry does not merely write 
a social programme into the heavens, but instead recognises that the one whose 
ministry is thus described remains a slippery, ungraspable figure—present now by 
virtue of his identity as the risen one. 
 
Overall then, Frei’s concept of unsubstitutability serves well to guide a reading of 
Bonhoeffer sympathetic to Bonhoeffer’s own concerns, towards a robust theology of 
the transcendence of Jesus; and furthermore to expand Frei’s own explication of the 
identity of Jesus to take greater account of his ministry. 
 
b) Bonhoeffer: Theology of the cross 
 
As Barker’s very recent study shows, Bonhoeffer’s Christology is profoundly shaped 
by, and consistently points us in the direction of, a Lutheran theologia crucis.8 I have 
suggested that this particular aspect of Bonhoeffer’s work constitutes perhaps the most 
significant addition that Bonhoeffer can make to Frei, furthering greatly Frei’s 
comments about the challenge of discipleship of Jesus who is often encountered 
incognito. Whilst Frei mentions that Kierkegaardian notion—and whilst in Identity he 
points to the crucial coherence between power and powerlessness, and the veiled 
activity of God, in the narrative description of Jesus’ identity—Bonhoeffer provides a 
much more sustained reflection upon the paradox of the cross, adding significantly to 
a theology of Jesus’ transcendence. Modifying Kierkegaard’s own generalised concept 
of Christ’s incognito, Bonhoeffer explicitly conjoins incognito with the σκανδαλον of Christ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7  David H. Kesley, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, vol. 2., (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2009), 627–630.  
8 H. Gaylon Barker, The Cross of Reality: Luther’s Theologia Crucis and Bonhoeffer’s Christology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2015). 
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crucified, to emphasise that at the heart of Jesus’ elusiveness is the scandal of God in 
the likeness of sinful flesh. Luther understood a theologia crucis as referring not just to 
the moment of crucifixion, but pointing towards a fundamental characteristic of 
Christology, and Bonhoeffer too is keen to carry this theme through to reflections 
upon the resurrection—emphasising that the risen Christ remains for us a stumbling 
block by virtue of his being the risen one who was crucified.9 Here the paradoxical 
nature of Christ’s transcendence is most apparent, as the supposed oppositions of sin 
and sinlessness, and hiddenness and revealedness, point towards God’s redemptive 
activity towards the world in Christ. Bonhoeffer’s Christology lectures constitute a 
peak of his exposition of this theologia crucis, but it is present throughout his works, and 
features heavily again towards the end of his life, especially in Ethics, where the 
Christuswirklichkeit refers to reality as constituted by the reconciliation of God and world 
in this crucified and risen one; and Letters and Papers from Prison, where the figure of the 
crucified one, pushed out of the world onto the cross, is the crux of the gospel for the 
world come of age, over against a domesticated deus ex machina.  
 
If a theologia crucis is taken on as a way of paying attention to the scandalous form of 
Jesus unsubstitutability, Bonhoeffer’s explications of Christ’s identity as the crucified 
and risen one significantly modify a theology of the transcendence of Jesus derived 
from Frei. In particular, where Frei insists upon the normativity of the unsubstitutable 
person of Jesus for the sensus literalis of the scriptures, Bonhoeffer reminds us that the 
one who is normative for us is also a scandal for us, and thus out of our grasp. This 
point therefore constitutes something of a conceptual exchange between the two 
theologians: Bonhoeffer scholarship can receive the concept of unsubstitutability from 
Frei scholarship, before handing it back with the addition of a theologia crucis, meaning 
we recognise not only that Jesus’s transcendence as the crucified and risen one must 
be articulated at the level of historical particularity (so that crucifixion and 
resurrection are never generalisations) but also that the historical particularity (in 
particular the offense of the crucifixion) must itself be seen to partially constitute his 
transcendence. In a sense, this can be seen as a reflection of the communicatio 
idiomatum—that the divine transcendence of Jesus is worked out fully through his 
humanity, and therefore his historical particularity. To put it quite bluntly, Bonhoeffer !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 See chapter 6 for a discussion of this point in dialogue with Rachel Muers and Rowan Williams. 
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helps Frei scholarship elucidate the difficulty of Jesus whilst maintaining his 
unsubstitutability. As the transcendent one, Jesus is an unsubstitutable paradox. 
 
Furthermore, Jesus’ transcendence is not merely an abstract element of his identity, as 
if he is firstly who he is, and then transcendent on top of that. Rather, if Bonhoeffer’s 
theologia crucis is allowed to indicate the profoundly scandalous way in which Christ is 
out of our grasp—i.e. as the one crucified and risen for our salvation—then, to use 
Anderson’s term, God’s historical transcendence is understood to be at one with his 
saving work.10  
 
c) Frei: Figural reading 
 
In Eclipse, Frei introduces figural reading as a practice of pre-critical hermeneutics, by 
virtue of which historical characters and events are read as types or figures of God’s 
activity in Christ, without such characters or events losing historical particularity. 
Particularly in his later essays about the sensus literalis of the biblical texts, he further 
explicates the link between this practice and the ‘narrative’ or ‘literal’ reading of the 
gospels advocated in Identity. Without losing their own historical integrity, characters 
and events are understood to find their fulfillment in the transcendent Christ whose 
identity must be articulated in a history-like way. The suggestion here is that this kind 
of figural reading is consistent with the Christological ontology Bonhoeffer develops in 
Ethics, and helps to articulate how the concept of Christuswirklichkeit can see history 
prior to the incarnation as related to God’s activity of reconciliation—outside of which 
Bonhoeffer believes there is no reality or true historicity. In other words, figural 
reading helps to elucidate the place of world-history in Bonhoeffer’s cosmic 
Christology. If, as Bonhoeffer says in Ethics, “only God’s becoming human makes 
possible an action that is genuinely in accord with reality”,11 then the perception that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 This emphasis mitigates what Tanner recognises as a tendency for the pro me of Christ to be 
explicated merely with regard to a modernist theory of revelation rather than with regard to his saving 
work. “The pro me for Luther concerned a dimension of the reality of Christ’s working. That Christ 
accomplished what he did for us is part of the reality of the matter; apprehension of the gospel stories 
that failed to apply them to one’s own life would not, then, be true to reality. Now, however, the pro me 
falls simply on the side of human apprehension; it is simply identified with the process by which human 
subjects make the gospel message their own.” Tanner, ‘Jesus’, 253. 
11 E, 223–224; and again, “[s]ince God became a human being in Christ, all thinking about human 
beings without Christ is unfruitful abstraction.” E, 134. 
! 251 
the particularities of history were able to typologically shadow that reality even before 
the birth of Jesus of Nazareth is a helpful gloss. More critically, where Bonhoeffer says 
that history becomes “thoroughly temporal”12 only with the incarnation, the way Frei 
describes figural reading allows for us to speak of history constituted by Christ, 
without the suggestion that before the incarnation, the world was, in Bonhoeffer’s 
words, merely the “transient bearer of eternal values.”13 Of course, Bonhoeffer has a 
theology of the fall in Adam and redemption in Christ, and so any suggestion that 
reality remains identical prior- and post-incarnation flattens out an ultimate shift in 
reality—that God reconciles an estranged world to Godself. Nevertheless, insofar as 
the Old Testament narrates characters and events in the history of Israel that exist, by 
God’s providential work, in relation to Christ, it seems reasonable to speak of them as 
in accordance with reality in their historical particularity. Bonhoeffer himself does 
practice and describe figural reading, but does so with less attention to maintaining 
the integrity of the historical particularity of the pre-Christological type than Frei 
does. Therefore, with regard to nuancing Bonhoeffer’s forthright insistence that there 
is simply no reality outside of God’s becoming human, Frei’s concept of figural 
reading serves better. What this means for a theology of the transcendence of Jesus is 
that the relation of all history to the unsubstitutable incarnate, crucified and risen one, 
who is beyond us in his historicity, need not utterly dismiss all human history before 
the coming of Christ as ‘sub-reality’.  
 
d) Bonhoeffer: Participatory Ontology 
 
As Tuomo Mannermaa summarises, Luther’s theology has a robust sense of 
participation in the person of Christ by faith,14 and Bonhoeffer’s notion of 
Christuswirklichkeit explicates this participation in cosmic-ethical terms—terms that 
ground the ways in which Ethics in particular evidences Bonhoeffer’s ability to 
negotiate theological extremes. I have suggested that, when applied to Frei’s work, the 
call for human beings to participate in the transcendent person of Christ helps to 
articulate the ontological dimension of the kind of theology Frei believes is ‘hospitable’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 E, 104. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Tuomo Mannermaa, ‘Justification and Theosis in Lutheran-Orthodox Perspective’, in Carl E. 
Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1998), 32. 
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to the sensus literalis.15 This ontological dimension, then, is linked to theology that 
makes for a ‘generous orthodoxy’ and that looks towards a middle way between the 
radically closed or non-descriptively open. Therefore, having just explained the way 
Frei’s concept of figura helps to theologically ‘steady’ Bonhoeffer’s Christuswirklichkeit, 
here we note how the latter concept articulates a more explicitly ontological 
framework for Frei’s theology, and that this ontological framework points towards the 
possibility for Christian theology to inhabit confidence and humility simultaneously.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s rejection of realm-thinking (Raumdenken), of radicalism and compromise, 
and his theology of ultimacy and penultimacy, all belong in this participatory 
framework—geared as they are towards the understanding that the integrity of the 
historical world is grounded in its asymmetrical relationship to God in Christ. Where 
realm-thinking splits off the realm of Christ or the church from the worldly, where 
radicalism explicitly puts Christ in opposition with the world, and where compromise 
deposits the reality of God “completely beyond daily life,”16 Bonhoeffer rejects such 
thinking in favour of a theology of ultimacy and penultimacy, whereby the dichotomy 
is overcome by understanding that God’s transcendent act towards the world in Christ 
gives the world its integrity. Because God has acted in the world and for the world in 
Jesus Christ, the world can exist in freedom given to it by God, grounded in the 
person of Christ.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s notion of ultimacy and penultimacy therefore offers a participatory-
ontological framework in which to understand Frei’s pointers to how theology might 
relate flexibly, humbly and confidently towards external disciplines. The priority of 
high Christology that Frei believes characterises the sensus literalis might be expressed 
as the ‘ultimate’, and this is understood to norm but not devalue those external 
disciplines—philosophy, sociology and suchlike—that we might call ‘penultimate’. 
Frei’s ‘generous orthodoxy’ thus coheres quite naturally with Bonhoeffer’s 
participatory ontology. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Ben Fulford briefly makes a similar point as regards the benefit of a participatory ontology for Frei in 
his suggestion that Frei be fruitfully read with Gregory of Nazianzus. Fulford joins this with another 
brief suggestion that an “incorporative pneumatology” would also substantiate Frei’s work, a question 
to which I attend below in relation to both Frei and Bonhoeffer. Ben Fulford, Divine Eloquence and Human 
Transformation: Rethinking Scripture and History through Gregory of Nazianzus and Hans Frei (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2013), 277. 
16 E, 153.  
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Of course, for both theologians, Christological normativity (Frei) or Christological 
participatory ontology (Bonhoeffer) is explicated always with reference to the 
particular person of Jesus—the crucified and risen one. Here again, this time in a 
more explicitly cosmic sense, we have an instance of Bonhoeffer contributing a 
theologia crucis to Frei, for just as Frei’s sensus literalis always has the unsubstitutable 
identity of Jesus at its heart, Bonhoeffer’s Christological ontology in Ethics cannot be 
abstracted from a theologia crucis. Therefore, using Bonhoeffer’s participatory ontology 
to frame Frei’s ‘type’ of theology once again highlights the complex, mysterious and 
often difficult aspects of Jesus Christ’s historically unsubstitutable identity as the one 
who ‘enacts the good of humanity on their behalf’, and in whose person the world 
finds its reality.  
 
Again, we have a sense of mutual exchange between the two theologians, towards a 
strong understanding of the relationship between the transcendence of Jesus Christ 
and a ‘middle way’ for theology. Given the way in which the Christuswirklichkeit 
grounds aspects of Bonhoeffer’s thought that feature significantly in his identification 
as a ‘middle way’ theologian—i.e. what DeJonge calls his rejection of “oppositional 
thinking”17—it makes sense that this ontological dimension to his Christology be 
brought into conversation with the aspects of Frei’s theology where his desire to 
mediate extremes is most evident. 
 
~ 
 
Frei’s concepts of unsubstitutability and his explication of the praxis of figural reading, 
and Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis and his participatory ontology, allow each theologian 
to add significant theological depth to the other’s work, towards a stronger account of 
a theology of the transcendence of Jesus that in turn grounds a simultaneous 
confidence and humility. Insistence upon the unsubstitutability of Jesus highlights not 
only the coherence of his identity with God in the history-like narratives, but also the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 DeJonge, ‘Between Fundamentalism and Secularism: Bonhoeffer’s Negotiation of Oppositional Pairs 
in Ethics and its Precedent in Act and Being’, in John DeGruchy, Stephen Plant, Christiane Tietz (eds.), 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Theology Today: A Way Between Fundamentalism and Secularism (München: Gütersloher 
Verlaghaus, 2009), 75. 
! 254 
scandal of the humiliation of God in the likeness of sinful flesh, by virtue of which 
Jesus is all the more out of our grasp—i.e. transcendent. This scandalous aspect of his 
transcendence pertains to his identity as the risen one, present now in the church by 
word and sacrament, and in one another. Thus the coherence of historicity and 
transcendence focusses on the scandal of the unsubstitutable one who cannot be 
thought of as not-raised and is present now. It is this person—revealed in 
hiddenness—that Christians understand to norm their reading of the scriptures and of 
their own lives; and indeed this person in whom God reconciles the world to Godself 
that they are called to participate. It is this person who grounds both their confidence 
in the world reconciled to God and their own epistemological incapacity—their 
knowledge that God’s work in Christ is not about having all the answers delivered into 
their hands but is confidently participating in his life-for-others. Awareness of the 
unsubstitutable paradox of the transcendent Christ strengthens the quest for a way 
between closed and wide-open religion. 
 
II 
 
The Holy Spirit: Generosity not Generalisation 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 briefly suggested how a more explicit pneumatology might fill out 
the account of the transcendence of Jesus derived from Frei’s theology. This section 
revisits those suggestions, recognising that such a move is appropriate to Bonhoeffer’s 
theology too. Whilst Bonhoeffer wrote considerably more about the Spirit than Frei, 
the texts of his that I have drawn upon most fully for a theology of Jesus’ 
transcendence are less pneumatologically explicit.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 noted Frei’s lack of attention to the person of the Holy Spirit in the 
gospel narratives, and a lack of attention to the pneumatological dimension of the 
Christian community for whom the unsubstitutable identity of Jesus is normative—
both in terms of the original apostolic community and the contemporary church—
particularly in terms of the nexus between community and text (Fulford labels this 
Frei’s need for an “incorporative pneumatology”).18 Although the recent publication !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Fulford, Divine, 277. 
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of archival texts by Frei makes available a brief essay on pneumatology, ‘Of the Holy 
Ghost’, there Frei concentrates on the gift of the Spirit that directs Christians towards 
a communal life of justice, mercy and humility, and the relationship between the 
Spirit, the Son and the community remains relatively unexplored.19 In articulating 
how the doctrine of the Spirit grounds the outward-looking-ness and compassion of 
the Christian community, Frei is linking the pneumatological to his desire for 
‘generous orthodoxy’,20 but not explicitly highlighting the links between this and the 
aspects of Christology that also make for this characteristic of flexible generosity and 
love. 
 
Chapter 3 suggested that Eugene Rogers’ application of Frei’s methods of identity 
description to a study of the Spirit in her narrated interactions with the Son, 
promisingly highlights the coherence between a personal pneumatology and the 
historical particularity of the unsubstitutable Jesus.21 When this coherence is 
explicated—i.e. when we understand the Spirit through her personal relation and 
narrated interaction with the unsubstitutable person of the Son—we are able to speak 
more confidently about the unsubstitutable Jesus really being present to the 
community of faith by the same Spirit. In other words, where Frei insists that it is 
always the Jesus of the narratives who is present, Rogers (along with others like David 
Kelsey, who also seeks a more Trinitarian reading of Frei’s unsubstitutable 
Christology)22 points us towards saying that it is always the Spirit of the narratives by 
whose work he is present. Pneumatology, therefore, does not point to the 
generalisation of Jesus’ identity—nor, as Kelsey highlights, to a divine “freedom of 
arbitrariness”23—but to the intentional generosity of God the Father who gives the 
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19 Hans W. Frei, ‘Of the Holy Ghost’, in Hans W. Frei, Reading Faithfully (vol. 1) Writings from the Archives: 
Theology and Hermeneutics, edited by Mike Higton and Mark Alan Bowald (Oregon: Cascade: 2015), 191–
195.  
20 Frei, ‘Holy Ghost’, 194–195.   
21 Eugene Rogers, After the Spirit: A Constructive Pneumatology from Resources Outside the Modern West (London: 
SCM, 2006), 7. 
22 E.g. Kelsey, Eccentric, vol. 2., 621. 
23 Kelsey, Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology, vol. 1., (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 
2009), 451. “To say that it is the Spirit ‘with the Son’ who draws humankind to the eschatological 
consummation is to stress that the triune God relates to us in this mode in a particular, concrete way as 
the advent of the fulfillment of an open ended promise by God to all that is not God.” Ibid.  
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Son, who in turn is present in the church by the equally given Spirit, and in whose 
likeness the Spirit fashions the church.24 
 
Chapter 4 highlighted that despite Frei’s brief attention to the centrality of the Holy 
Spirit in Calvin’s doctrine of scripture, he does not really articulate a pneumatological 
dimension to his explication of the sensus literalis of the Biblical text. As Placher says, “a 
sociologist may note that the Bible takes on its character as ‘Scripture’ because of its 
use in the church community, but, Calvin would insist, from a theological perspective 
Christians must claim that the church recognizes Scripture rather than making 
Scripture—and it recognizes thanks to the work of the Holy Spirit.”25 Thus, by 
highlighting more explicitly the intentional role of the Holy Spirit in witnessing to 
Christ through Scripture, the theological dimension of the sensus literalis is better 
explained, insofar as the normativity of the identity of Christ for the community is 
understood to be work of the transcendent Spirit. Jesus’ transcendence is thus better 
preserved, for the appeal to the mysterious and free work of the Spirit prevents a 
collapse of the identity of Christ into a mere community consensus. To join this to the 
above, this means that as well as mitigating any generalisation of the identity of Christ, 
pneumatology also mitigates exclusivity, for the significance of the unsubstitutable 
person of Jesus for the Christian community is again dependent upon the widely 
distributed gift of the Spirit from the Father, not merely upon the hermetically sealed 
practices of the community. Therefore, if the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of 
Jesus and in the Christian community is highlighted to a greater extent than Frei does, 
then an articulation of Jesus’ transcendence in terms of historical particularity is more 
theologically robust, and once more, the community’s self-understanding develops a 
more Trinitarian shape. 
 
Turning to Bonhoeffer, there is considerably more pneumatological material 
available—especially in Sanctorum Communio and Discipleship but also in peripheral 
essays and lectures. However, in the texts where Bonhoeffer’s Christology is most fully 
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24 Kelsey also emphasises how language about the Father’s giving of the Son expresses the wholly 
gratuitous way in which God relates to creation, and draws it towards its eschatological consummation 
in Godself. Kelsey, Eccentric, vol. 1., 447. 
25 William B. Placher, The Triune God: An Essay in Postliberal Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2007), 93. 
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worked out—and especially where the theologia crucis shapes a theology of Jesus’ 
transcendence—sustained reflection upon the Holy Spirit is notably absent. 
 
Positively, Bonhoeffer’s earlier work reflects the New Testament focus upon the 
necessarily communal aspect of pneumatology, and its inextricable link to the person 
of Jesus.26 As Mawson describes, Sanctorum Communio understands the Holy Spirit as 
sanctifying the church community so that its corporate life (or in more Hegelian terms 
its ‘objective spirit’) is a witness to Christ.27 This is not about the potential of people to 
be Christ-like, but about the Holy Spirit actualising God’s revelation.28 Being 
unprepared to think pneumatologically in abstraction from God’s revelation in Christ 
in community (his pneumatology in Sanctorum Communio is inseparable both from the 
church and from Christ)29 Bonhoeffer concentrates on the Holy Spirit’s work in 
actualising the revelation of Christ—i.e. drawing individuals into the community that 
is being shaped as the body Christ.30 Crucially, as Mawson recognises, Bonhoeffer 
does not collapse the objective spirit of a community together with the Holy Spirit, 
but sees the latter as working through the former. Therefore, even in its fallible and 
sinful form, the church is “integral to God’s revelation”, 31 being a community in 
which the Spirit actualises the likeness of Christ through love of neighbour and God.32 
Also, in Life Together Bonhoeffer reflects again upon the community of Christians as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 From the experiences recorded in Acts onwards, “the Spirit now is not simply a mysterious power, 
but a power stamped with the character of Jesus, God’s empowering presence has the face of Jesus 
Christ.” James D. G. Dunn, The Christ and The Spirit, vol. 2: Pneumatology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 
341. 
27 Mawson, Michael, ‘The Spirit and the Community: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology in Jenson, 
Hütter and Bonhoeffer’, International Journal of Systematic Theology (15, 2013), 464. “The objective spirit is 
… an expression of the community that is moved by the Holy Spirit”. SC, 266. 
28 SC, 144. 
29 “As Christ and the new humanity now necessarily belong together, so the Holy Spirit must be 
understood as being at work only in this new humanity. It is evidently a mistake, therefore, to attempt 
to reflect on the objective work of the Holy Spirit independently of the church-community.” SC, 144. 
“Community with God only exists through Christ, but Christ is present only in his church-community, 
and therefore community with God exists only in the church.” SC, 158. Note that Bonhoeffer does not believe 
that persons have no individual relationship with God. On the contrary, he emphasises the work of the 
Spirit in justification as that which occurs in pure isolation. However, the individual is always called 
back in to the community where they encounter God.  
30 As notes from a 1935 lecture on the Holy Spirit at Finkenwalde put it: “The Holy Spirit establishes 
the relationship between the members of the body and the head.” TEF, 456. 
31 Mawson, ‘Spirit’, 464–465. 
32 SC, 168. 
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gift and work of the Spirit, and also upon the Spirit as the “ruler” of the community, 
over against human desires for “power, honour and rule”.33 
 
Therefore, regarding the absence of much reflection by Frei upon the community as 
the work of the Spirit, Bonhoeffer’s theology acts as a useful supplement in recognising 
that the church is the transcendent work of God, with its reality residing not in human 
possibility but in grace. Furthermore, that aspect of Bonhoeffer’s pneumatology that 
Mawson recognises—that the Lutheran doctrine of simul iustus et peccator is reflected 
pneumatologically as the Holy Spirit is ontologically distinguished from the objective 
spirit—lends an important addition to Frei’s scholarship too, insofar as the fallibility of 
the church is theologically articulated. This kind of pneumatological clarification also 
highlights that the generosity and flexibility that Frei wants to associate with theology 
‘hospitable’ to the sensus literalis must be understood as the Spirit’s work and not simply 
identical with the ‘objective spirit’ of a community that thinks and practices in a 
certain way. Bonhoeffer’s distinction between objective spirit and Holy Spirit 
therefore adds a theological nuance to Frei’s cultural linguistic descriptions.  
 
In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer describes the work of the Spirit in the hearts of baptised 
believers. “Jesus Christ remains present with us”, and “we are in communion with 
him” in a way as strong as, if not stronger than, his first disciples.34 Focussing on the 
bodily communion that Christians have with Jesus by virtue of being in his body—the 
church-community—Bonhoeffer tantalizingly links pneumatology with a theologia 
crucis: 
 
Through the Holy Spirit, the crucified and risen Christ exists as the church-
community, as the ‘new human being’. For Christ truly is and eternally 
remains the incarnate one, and the new humanity truly is his body.35 
 
As far as Bonhoeffer is concerned in Discipleship, then, it is the Holy Spirit through 
whom the church-community is the community “of the crucified and transfigured 
body of Jesus Christ”, through whom its members “take part in Christ’s suffering and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 LT, 40. 
34 D, 210.  
35 D, 220. 
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glory.”36 It is not too much of a leap, then, to suggest that the work of the Holy Spirit 
is to make contemporaneous the σκανδαλον of Christ, whose historically particular 
humiliation in the likeness of sinful flesh is the form in which the church-community 
participates.37  
 
Looking back to Bonhoeffer’s student days, a seminar paper written for Karl Holl in 
1926 also explicates the interdependency of Christology, pneumatology and faith in 
Luther’s thought (though here more at the level of the individual than the 
community). Overall, reflecting both the Spirit as Christ’s gift, and Christ as the gift of 
the Spirit, Bonhoeffer summarises Luther’s pneumatology as follows: “faith from the 
Spirit, Christ in faith, Spirit from Christ, and therefore in faith Christ gives the Spirit. 
This is the essential interrelationship.”38 Whilst not evidencing the fully-fledged 
theologia crucis of the lectures, Bonhoeffer recognises, via Luther, that “in faith, which is 
the action of the Holy Spirit, we grasp the pro nobis of [Christ’s] death and resurrection 
… In that we grasp this, we possess Christ as a gift.”39 Therefore, the relation of 
Christians to the crucified and risen one is the ministry of the Holy Spirit.  
 
However, in the lectures, as well as in Ethics and in Letters and Papers, these 
pneumatological implications may be assumed by Bonhoeffer but are not really 
explicated to any significant extent. The role of the Holy Spirit in connecting believers 
to the unsubstitutable σκανδαλον of Jesus is left unarticulated, and the participatory 
ontology of the Christuswirklichkeit lacks a pneumatological edge. Whilst, as shown 
above, one cannot accuse Bonhoeffer of lacking pneumatology altogether, Nowers’ 
description of Bonhoeffer’s pneumatology as “latent” seems appropriate;40 and the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 D, 221. 
37 D, 216. In the interests of a balanced picture, I note that in Discipleship Bonhoeffer’s pneumatology is 
also connected with an ecclesiological exclusivity that sits less than easily alongside the emphases of 
Ethics and Letters and Papers, particularly the former’s denunciation of ‘realm-thinking’—something 
which seems more prevalent in Discipleship, and perhaps reflects an aspect of Bonhoeffer’s later 
discomfort with some of his arguments therein (see LPP, 486). In Discipleship, he says, “[t]he seal of the 
Holy Spirit seals off the church-community from the world … Sanctification through the seal of the 
Holy Spirit always places the church in the midst of struggle … Separation of the world from the 
church, and separation of the church from the world, is the holy struggle of the church for God’s sacred 
realm on the earth.” D, 261–262. 
38YB, 337. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Jeff Nowers, ‘Hegel, Bonhoeffer and Objective Geist’, in Adam C. Clark and Michael Mawson (eds.), 
Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship (Oregon: Pickwick, 2013), 48. 
! 260 
consequence of this latency is a poverty of theological reflection upon the nexus 
between the unsubstitutable scandalous form of Christ and the community in 
relationship to him. If, as Harvey puts it, Bonhoeffer shows that it is “in and through 
the church-community, gathered together in the power of the Holy Spirit, that the 
historical particularity of Christ is universalised and his universality made particular in 
an actual concrete mode of sociality”,41 then according to Bonhoeffer’s own 
Christology, that universalising work of the Spirit must be articulated in relation to a 
theologia crucis.  
 
To begin with, we can use Bonhoeffer’s own pointers in Sanctorum Communio and 
Discipleship as a starting point, and join those with the way Rogers and others connect 
the identity of the Spirit with the particular bodily life of Christ, towards saying the 
following: the Spirit acts in union with and actualises the community of the 
unsubstitutable Christ—the stumbling block, the crucified and risen one, the one who 
transcends by virtue of his hiddenness in revelation, in whom God is towards the 
world reconciling it to himself. The transcendence of Jesus as God towards the world 
in the crucified and risen one is contemporaneous transcendence by virtue of the work 
of the Holy Spirit, who as the one who rested on the body of the Son,42 is the one by 
whom word, sacrament and community are the presence of Christ now. As we 
remarked in relation to Frei, far from being a generalisation of Christ’s identity, 
pneumatology emphasises that it is by the particular person of the Spirit—active in 
the life of Jesus—that the unsubstitutable scandalous Jesus Christ is transcendent 
towards us, pro me, now. His particular identity is generously given for and to us, 
rather than generalised, meaning that particularity is kept from turning into 
exclusivity. The scandalous transcendence of Christ arrives for us in the generous 
pouring out of the Spirit (Rom 5:5). In short, generalisation gives way to generosity—
the inclusion of many into the body of Christ.  
 
Explicating this pneumatological dimension of Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis in fact 
reflects little more than a thorough reading of Paul. The passages that are most 
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41 Barry Harvey, ‘The Narrow Path: Sociality, Ecclesiology, and the Polyphony of Life in the Thought 
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in Jens Zimmerman and Brian Gregor (eds.), Being Human, Becoming Human: 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought (Eugene: Pickwick, 2010), 123. 
42 Rogers, After, 71. 
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central to Bonhoeffer’s Christology (1 Corinthians 1:21–24 and Gal 5:11) belong in 
the context of profoundly pneumatological texts that elucidate the role of the Spirit in 
revelation, the gifts of the Spirit to the community of faith, the life of the Spirit 
opposed to the life of the flesh, and the fruit of the Spirit, to name but a few themes. 
Because a theologia crucis therefore belongs in the context of the life of the church in the 
Spirit, an explication of the transcendence of Jesus focussed upon his unsubstitutability 
as the crucified and risen one who is the σκανδαλον, should not be content with a merely 
latent pneumatology, but should strive to articulate, and give thanks for, the active 
role of the generous Spirit.  
 
Secondly, the participatory ontology of Bonhoeffer’s Ethics can also be 
pneumatologically supplemented towards a theologically fuller account of the relation 
of Christians to the transcendent Christ. Commenting upon the cohesion between the 
“pneumatologically loaded” Eastern theosis traditions and Lutheran ideas of 
participation in Christ (a cohesion, we recall, recovered by Tuomo Mannermma in 
the latter parts of the twentieth century) Kärkkäinen summarises a pneumatological 
gloss on Luther that also supplements Bonhoeffer well: 
 
Pneumatological implications of this new approach to Lutheran scholarship 
are obvious. The main idea, Christ present through faith, can be expressed 
pneumatologically: It is through the Spirit of Christ that salvatory gifts are 
mediated. Participation in God is only possible through the Spirit of Christ, 
the Spirit of adoption.43 
 
Other than a brief and rather round about pointer to the Spirit’s role in realising 
God’s reality in Christ,44 Bonhoeffer’s explication of Christuswirklichkeit in ‘Christ, 
Reality and Good’ does not illuminate this pneumatological dimension. Recalling 
Nowers, we might positively say that Sanctorum Communio’s pneumatology is latent in 
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43 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Pneumatology: The Holy Spirit in Ecumenical, International, and Contextual Perspective 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 86.  
44 “The subject matter of a Christian ethic is God’s reality revealed in Christ becoming real among God’s creatures, just 
as the subject matter of doctrinal theology is the truth of God’s reality revealed in Christ. The place 
that in all other ethics is marked by the antithesis between ought and is, idea and realization, motive 
and work, is occupied in Christian ethics by the relation between reality and becoming real, between 
past and present, between history and event (faith) or, to replace the many concepts with the simple 
name of the thing itself, the relation between Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The question of the good 
becomes the question of participating in God’s reality revealed in Christ.” E, 49–50.  
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Ethics, but again, the fact that Ethics—like the Christology lectures—evidences a depth 
to Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis shaped Christology not present in Sanctorum Communio, 
means that we are lacking an explicit pneumatology at the point at which 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology is most developed.45 He does briefly link the community that 
bears the form of the crucified and risen Christ and with the receipt of the gift of the 
Spirit,46 but overall, the thinness of this kind of reference means that it can seem 
sometimes as if the Spirit gets left behind.  
 
What needs to be made explicit, is that participation in the Christuswirklichkeit—by 
which Christians take the form of Christ in responsible action towards God and 
neighbour—is a ministry of the Holy Spirit. Participation in the scandalous form of 
the crucified and risen one is anything but exemplarism, but results from the 
transcendent gratuitous act of God the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, in relation to 
ultimacy and penultimacy, we can speak of the Spirit directing the penultimate to the 
ultimate. To connect this to Sanctorum Communio, the Spirit who sanctifies the objective 
spirit of the church-community is the Spirit who sanctifies the penultimate, the 
worldly, such that the world can be itself directed toward Christ. The penultimate can 
exist towards the ultimate because of God’s continued gracious sanctifying activity by 
the Holy Spirit.  
 
The same goes for the participatory aspect of Letters and Papers—i.e. participation in 
Christ the man for others, the suffering God pushed out of the world for world’s 
redemption. Illumination of the role of the Holy Spirit in the relationship between the 
transcendent Christ and Christian believers again mitigates any charge of 
exemplarism, or that taking the form of Christ is an action performed only by 
humanity. Supplementing Bonhoeffer’s participatory ontology with pneumatology 
therefore allows for a fuller explanation of the transcendence of Jesus, rather than 
leaving a theological gap when it comes to our contemporary relationship to him. 
This kind of gap is evident, for example, where Barker quite rightly interprets 
Bonhoeffer’s Christology as one of God’s ‘slippery’ otherness and transcendence in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 The editors of Ethics elect to explicate the text by relating Ethics to Sanctorum Communio in order to 
highlight the pneumatological dimension, e.g. E, 7.n.24, 9, 135.n.6.  
46 “Transfigured into the form of the risen one, they bear here only the sign of the cross and judgement. 
In bearing them willingly, they show themselves as those who have received the Holy Spirit and are 
united with Christ in incomparable love and community.” E, 95. 
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Christ, but describes the final ‘knowing’ of Christ without recourse to God’s activity in 
the Spirit.  
 
Bonhoeffer was indeed saying that the real God, rather than our images of 
God, is incarnate and therefore present in Christ … If we think we have 
identified God, therefore, we are sadly mistaken, for to do so would imply that 
we can somehow or other control God. But God always wiggles away, is 
always beyond our grasp … Therefore, if we want to know God, our only 
recourse is to show up where God is present—on the cross.47 
 
Obviously there is merit in exhorting Christians to ‘show up at the cross’—for 
example, by corporate and individual attention to the scriptures, spiritual disciplines, 
in worship, liturgy and observing the church’s seasons—but our ‘knowing’ God in 
Christ is not merely dependent upon our showing up in the right place. As 
Bonhoeffer’s paper on Luther’s pneumatology highlighted so early in his studies, we 
are dependent upon the transcendent gift and act of the Spirit, through whom eyes of 
faith are opened and we are invited into relationship with God in the unsubstitutable 
transcendent Jesus.48  
 
Contrary to Barker’s summary that “the Holy Spirit is a way of talking about the 
presence of God in the world”49 (remember that at points Frei implies this too) we 
recall again Rogers’ emphasis upon the narrative particularity of the Spirit, 
emphasising that like Jesus, the person of the Spirit precedes our Spirit-talk. If 
pneumatology is about a linguistic tool alone, it is emptied of transcendence, and the 
person of the Spirit is generalised into a theme—much like the fate of the Christ of the 
mythophiles in Frei. To join the conceptual dots and employ Placher’s terminology, 
we end up with a domesticated pneumatology.  There is no problem in saying that 
pneumatological language develops as a result of faith—that is wholly appropriate—
but only if, as Bonhoeffer and Frei insist so strongly as regards Christology, the 
identity is understood to precede the presence. The one present in the world, who, as 
John V. Taylor puts it, confronts us with and opens our eyes to the “unique 
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47 Barker, The Cross, 438. 
48 1 Cor 2:10–11; YB, 339; Placher, The Triune God, 90.  
49 Barker, The Cross, 141. My italics. 
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significance” of Jesus, simply is the Holy Spirit.50 If, however, pneumatology proceeds 
from faith in the activity of God, narrated in the gospels (especially Luke) and Acts, 
then we are not speaking in generalisations, but in faith in God’s specific, personal, 
generous work. Again, purposeful generosity must trump generalisation. Therefore, 
the kind of pneumatology that we are claiming as a supplement to a theology of Jesus’ 
transcendence derived from Frei and Bonhoeffer, applies some of their Christological 
insights about the irreducible and undomesticated person of Jesus to the person of the 
Spirit too. A theology of the undomesticated transcendence of Jesus requires the 
undomesticated transcendence of the Spirit. Taylor again: 
 
[T[he only way forward is to repudiate our contemporary ‘flat earthers’—the 
thinkers who reduce every vertical to a horizontal, all language to the literal 
meaning of words, all faith to an intention to behave in a certain way, all 
relation with God to a relation with men. The very conclusion I have reached 
in this study of the Holy Spirit falls to the ground if we will not reaffirm the 
‘beyondness’ of the beyond-in-the-midst.51 
 
As evidenced in the above passage, and in my view quite legitimately, Taylor takes up 
Bonhoeffer’s language about Jesus to point to the Spirit as the ‘beyond in the midst’, 
who like Christ cannot be resolved into a myth or objectified in relation to our own 
understanding (recall Bonhoeffer on Christ the counter-Logos).52 In a way that befits 
Rogers’ emphasis, Taylor articulates this undomesticated pneumatology in relation to 
the particular unsubstitutable life of Jesus as well as to the Spirit’s role in opening our 
eyes to Christ.53 This makes Taylor’s work a good locus for reflection on a 
pneumatology that is complimentary to both Frei and Bonhoeffer. For example, 
especially important for a pnuematological supplement of Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis is 
Taylor’s explicit reflection on the pnuematological dimensions of the historically 
particular humiliation of Christ on the cross, asking “What was the Holy Spirit doing 
at Calvary?”54 The Spirit, he then reflects, is the one mysteriously active in the 
“eternal employ between the Father and the Son”—the paradoxical union of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 John V. Taylor, The Go-Between God: The Holy Spirit and The Christian Mission (London: SCM, 1972), 
103, 20. 
51 Taylor, Go-Between, 224. 
52 Taylor, Go-Between, 5. C.f. LPP, 367; B, 302. 
53 E.g. “Jesus, who was conceived by the Holy Spirit and to whom the Holy Spirit has been directing 
man’s attention ever since.” Taylor, Go-Between, 36. 
54 Taylor, Go-Between, 102. 
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forsakenness and love—and in the recognition of Jesus by the thief on the cross and 
the centurion—a recognition that, “whatever it means, was the start of a turning of 
eyes that has been going on ever since.”55 Furthermore, like Rogers, Taylor is 
attentive to the role of the Spirit in the resurrection, in which Jesus is vindicated and 
witnessed to as Messiah and the second Adam—a vindication and witness that the 
Spirit continues to effect as eyes are opened to Christ, to the glory of the Father.56 
And indeed, for Taylor (in a most ‘Bonhoefferian’ way) the Christ to whom eyes are 
opened is truly undomesticated in his particularity: 
 
For loving him whom we think we know, we are drawn to that Lord Jesus who 
transcends our knowing. But all too often we have lost him amid our 
enthusiasm. What dominates our mind is not the figure of Jesus of Nazareth 
but our New Testament studies, not the living Saviour but the doctrines of 
salvation, not Christ in the neighbour but the civil rights movement. 
 
This is not a plea for pietism but for adoration. The Jesus of history, 
whensoever we discern him, is not a topic of debate but a master and brother 
to be loved and followed.57 
 
What Taylor describes, then, is that by the Spirit, Jesus is present to us in his 
scandalous and transcendent particularity, yet in such a way that this particularity is 
not exclusive per se. The Spirit’s generous and loving witness to Christ opens our eyes, 
and in faith we participate in the reality of God’s reconciliation of the world to 
Godself in Christ.  
 
On this point, Anderson, though not reflecting extensively on the person of the Spirit, 
offers as full a summary as any—reflecting on the work of the Spirit as one with God’s 
act of historical transcendence in Christ, by which the community is formed in the 
likeness of the unsubstitutable Jesus.  
 
It is the transcendence of God which constitutes each person in the kenotic 
community; first of all, through the historical transcendence of the Son of God 
by which the appropriate human response is made from the furthest side of 
human estrangement, so that the weakest of human flesh already possesses a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Ibid. 
56 Taylor, Go-Between, 102–103. 
57 Taylor, Go-Between, 241. 
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place of participation; and then through the Holy Spirit who takes each 
person’s actual life into fellowship with Christ. This life in the Spirit has its 
ground in the historical life of Christ himself, but has concrete expression in 
the life of the community itself—such as it is.58  
 
Pneumatology can therefore be the locus of a theologically deep union of particularity, 
transcendence, and generosity. In witnessing to Christ confidently and yet generously, 
Christians are participating in, yet not resolved into, the work of the Spirit. In 
orienting the community to Christ in whose form it participates, the Spirit “speaks 
from the incapacity of community to complete itself”59 (following Bonhoeffer, we 
might call this the penultimacy of the community) such that witness is always to the 
transcendent Christ, not one who has been resolved into other people. To summarise 
by pneumatologically supplementing Frei’s terminology, generous orthodoxy with the 
transcendence of Jesus at the heart reflects and participates in the ministry of God the 
Holy Spirit. 
 
III 
 
Closing Summaries 
 
Overall, then, what kind of theology of the transcendence of Jesus emerges from 
reading Frei and Bonhoeffer together, and how is this project useful for the question 
of a ‘middle way’ type theology? Below, I present a reading of John 20:19–23, that 
reflects narratively upon the unsubstitutability of Jesus’ transcendence, and also 
figurally upon the way the passage presents helpful images for thinking about the 
particular challenges the transcendence of Jesus presents to post-enlightenment 
thinking and religious praxis. Finally, I reflect upon how a project like this can raise a 
kind of theological and/or ecclesiological ‘self-awareness’ that points towards the need 
for Christological reflection. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Ray S. Anderson, Historical Transcendence and the Reality of God: A Christological Critique (London: Geoffrey 
Chapman, 1975), 235. 
59 Anderson, Historical, 250. 
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i) A reading of John 20:19–23  
 
[19] When it was evening on that day, the first day of the week, and the doors of the house where the 
disciples had met were locked for fear of the Jews, Jesus came and stood among them and said, ‘Peace 
be with you.’ [20] After he had said this, he showed them his hands and his side. Then the disciples 
rejoiced when they saw the Lord. [21] Jesus said to them again, ‘Peace be with you. As the Father 
has sent me, so I send you.’ [22] When he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them, 
‘Receive the Holy Spirit. [23] If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the 
sins of any, they are retained.’ (NRSV) 
 
In the light of the above explorations, this passage reflects back to us some crucial 
elements of the theology of the transcendence of Jesus that have arisen from reading 
Frei and Bonhoeffer together. To be clear, what is involved here is not a suggestion 
that behind the particular narrative in John 20 is a more general meaning concerning 
a deeper or more universal ‘truth’ of the passage. That way, of course, lies all that Frei 
explicitly rejects. Instead, this reading involves something more like figural reading, 
even though we are less concerned with how one thing or person is a type or figure of 
Christ who is the fulfillment, and more how one historical particularity can be thought 
of in relation to Jesus as he appears in another historically particular narrative. In 
other words, we are considering how Jesus’ impact upon the disciples’ situation in the 
narrative, and his impact upon the contemporary epistemological situation of 
domesticated transcendence, cohere in the light of his particular identity as the 
crucified and risen one. The ‘who’ of Jesus allows for the narrative of the disciples’ 
encounter with him in a locked room to be connected meaningfully—not in terms of 
supersession but rather in terms of relationship60—with the narrative of the 
domestication of transcendence. 
 
This passage is not alone amongst post-resurrection narratives in being in a domestic 
scene,61 and insofar as it narrates a negatively boundaried domesticity (locked doors) 
into which Jesus breaks and reorients the order of things, it can help us consider the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 John D. Dawson, Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity (Berkeley: University of California, 2001), 
92. 
61 E.g. Luke 24:28–31; John 21:9–14. 
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relationship of the transcendent Jesus to domesticating epistemological frameworks.62 
In the narrative, the locked doors are specifically attributed to the ‘fear of the Jews’ 
(“who might subject them to hatreds, insult, and death”)63 indicating that the 
reception of Mary Magdalene’s announcement to the disciples that she has seen the 
Lord is still enclosed in—domesticated by—fear.64 Relatedly, proclamation of the 
resurrection can be enclosed or domesticated also by the kind of historical-critical 
anxieties that characterise post-enlightenment epistemology. The locked doors can 
therefore figurally illuminate for us a limiting domestication through which Jesus 
breaks. There is something (in the disciples’ case, fear and locked doors) inside which 
the proclamation of the resurrection is fitted, and is limited, and which the identity of 
Jesus challenges. 
 
The risen Christ comes in, dismantling the fearful domesticity and bringing gladness. 
The locked door is rendered meaningless, for the risen Jesus simply appears despite 
“the limitations that human circumstance might impose”.65 The domestic cannot limit 
nor define Jesus, and we can think of the inability of universal reason to do the same. 
Jesus defies the literal closed-ness of the domestic scene, a closed-ness that we parallel 
with the attempt to rationalise his identity in modernist epistemology. 
 
At this stage, there are two absolutely key points in this narrative as regards this thesis. 
Firstly, that if we are using this passage to reflect upon Jesus’ transcendence, then the 
idea that transcendence is God’s being towards the world in history is narratively 
illuminated in the fact that Jesus comes, rather than departs, through locked doors.  
The transcendence of Jesus is his coming to his disciples. Relatedly, we can remark 
that the risen Christ’s transcendence of epistemological boundaries (particularly post-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 For another brief allusion to this kind of reading of the locked doors, see Alan Torrance, ‘The 
Trinity’, in John Webster (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 73. 
63 Francis J. Moloney S.D.B., The Gospel of John, Sacra Pagina vol. 4 (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 
1998), 530. 
64 John 20:18. Of course, following Bonhoeffer’s own emphases and a contemporary renunciation of 
the implicit theological anti-semitism that has characterised history, ‘fear of the Jews’ must be read 
carefully and not taken to imply a generalised opposition of ‘the Jews’ to Christianity. 
65 Ibid. Raymond Brown highlights that here John is more interested in the fear that caused the doors to 
be locked than he is in the fact that Jesus was able to appear through them. Brown points to 20:26 as 
John’s more explicit reflection upon the ability of Jesus’ body to defy such limits. The boundary itself is 
therefore just as important as the fact that Jesus could pass through it. Raymond E. Brown, S.S., The 
Gospel According to John, XIII–XXI (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1971), 1020. See also Moloney, John, 
534. 
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enlightenment ones) is towards the historically particular, not away from the 
intersection of faith and history. To be sure, what Dodd calls the “quasi-physical” 
form of Jesus’ appearances pushes the boundaries of the historical,66 but as Frei would 
say, these narratives belong wholly—not only partially—in the history-like world, no 
matter how much our understanding of that world is disrupted by them. 
 
Secondly, Jesus comes as the wounded one. Just as will be the case in the narrative of 
Thomas’ encounter with Jesus that follows, here the identification of the risen one is 
via the marks of his own humiliating death. “The risen Jesus is the person they had 
seen lifted up on a cross and whose side had been pierced with a lance”.67 Indeed, 
reflecting John’s theme of the passion-resurrection as the glorification of Jesus, it is the 
marks of woundedness that are the cause of the disciples’ gladness.68 Here the 
narrative reflects back to us that key aspect of Bonhoeffer’s theology that we used to 
supplement Frei—the theologia crucis. If we allow this narrative to guide our reflections 
on Jesus’ transcendence, the transcendent one is always the wounded one. The 
inseparability of the transcendence of Christ from his historical particularity is also the 
inseparability of his transcendence from his woundedness: emphasis upon historical 
particularity comes always with emphasis upon what Paul (and following him, Luther 
and Bonhoeffer) calls the σκανδαλον.69 
 
Having shown his hands and side, Jesus again speaks peace into this situation of fear, 
before sending the disciples as he himself has been sent. Having secured themselves 
inside, the disciples are sent out of the very doors they had locked, to embody the 
gospel of Christ through perfect love that casts out fear.70 As Bonhoeffer knew, this 
being sent as Christ has been sent calls Christians not merely to the gladness of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 C. H. Dodd, The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel (Cambridge: CUP, 1953), 441. Dodd indeed 
understands that such ‘quasi-physicality’ belongs “in this world.” Dodd, Interpretation, 442. 
67 Moloney, John, 531. 
68 Dodd, Interpretation, 441–422. 
69 Though Bonhoeffer’s theologia crucis points to Paul rather than to John, here it is John’s narrative that 
illuminates that which I have aimed to draw out of Bonhoeffer.  Interestingly, the coherence of 
transcendence, unsubstitutability and woundedness in the narrative of John, may be the strongest 
possible example of Frei’s and Bonhoeffer’s strengths. Therefore, given that Bonhoeffer’s Christology 
could be read as mostly Pauline, and Frei concentrates mostly on Luke’s gospel, it is interesting to find a 
theology of Jesus’ transcendence derived from both theologians most aptly expressed in John.  
70 1 John 4:18. The disciples, says Moloney, “are not only to be at peace and rejoice, in the midst of 
their fear, at the physical presence of the risen Lord; they are to be the bearers of the fruits of Jesus’ 
victory to the world beyond the characters and the time of the story of Jesus.” Moloney, John, 531. 
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disciples, but also to a suffering with God in Christ. To allow the identity of Christ to 
expose and dismantle the domesticating tendencies of modernity is not wholly 
comfortable. The freedom to be truly loved and constituted from beyond oneself is 
inseparable from the freedom to be called out of the comfort of defining one’s own 
identity, and called instead to participate in the identity of the one who gives his 
person for all.  
 
Finally, in John’s analogue to Acts 2,71 the glorified (i.e. crucified and risen) Christ 
breathes the Holy Spirit upon the disciples as God breathed life into Adam in 
Genesis.72 Here, says Bauckham, the disciples’ participation in the activity of the 
Father in Christ (“as the Father has sent me”) is enabled by their consecration—being 
made holy by the activity of the Spirit who draws them into unity with the Father and 
the Son.73 All this—the giving of the Spirit, by which the disciples participate in the 
reconciliation of the world to God the Father in Christ, at the heart of which is the 
exposure of and forgiveness of sin—is inseparable from Jesus’ unsubstitutable 
transcendence as the crucified and risen (glorified) one. The pneumatological 
dimension of the theology of the transcendence of Jesus proposed above is thus 
reflected back to us by this passage. It is the Spirit from whom Christians receive, and 
by the Spirit that Christians participate in, the unsubstitutable person of Christ, 
transcendent in his scandalous and ‘slippery’ historical particularity.  
 
This passage therefore provides us with the opportunity to come back to the 
narratives to reflect upon the way Frei and Bonhoeffer help us to think of Jesus’ 
transcendence—i.e. the coming to us of the undomesticated, unsubstitutable wounded 
and risen one, who breaks through the boundaries set up by human beings, ushering 
us beyond them into participation in his life for the world. Furthermore, it is by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 On this narrative as John’s equivalent to Pentecost, see, for example, Dunn, The Christ, 17; Brown, 
John, 1038–1039; Rae, ‘Testimony’, 299–300. 
72 Murray Rae, ‘The Testimony of Works in the Christology of John’s Gospel’, in Richard Bauckham 
and Carl Mosser (eds.), The Gospel of John and Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 
2008), 299.  
73 “[W]hile the Word of God sets the disciples apart for mission (17:17) the Holy Spirit enables that 
fulfillment of that holiness in the carrying out of the mission … If so, all of this gospel’s holiness 
language coalesces around the consecration of Jesus and disciples: The Holy Father consecrates Jesus 
the Holy One, who consecrates himself so that the disciples may also be consecrated, participating in 
the holiness of Jesus and the Father through the Holy Spirit.” Richard Bauckham, The Testimony of the 
Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 269. 
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gift of the Spirit that this life in Jesus Christ becomes possible for those whose locked 
door was transcended by the one in whom God the Father reconciles the world to 
Godself, and us who follow after them. The passage therefore also holds the 
Trinitarian and especially pneumatological dimensions highlighted above. 
 
ii) Towards theological self-awareness 
 
The implication throughout this project has been that thinking about the 
transcendence of Jesus while guided by Frei and Bonhoeffer enables both a robust 
commitment to the centrality of the unsubstitutable person of Jesus—which makes for 
a community’s confidence—on the one hand; and a sense of the impossibility of 
grasping and containing this transcendent person—which makes for an openness and 
flexibility about the Christian community—on the other. According to David Ford’s 
terms, neither wide-open religion (e.g. liberal Culture-Protestantism) nor closed 
religion (e.g. fundamentalism) can deal with the paradox at the heart of this kind of 
Christology—a paradox that calls a Christian community to a fundamental incapacity 
and extrinsic orientation that those two extremes struggle to embody. Indeed, if 
fundamentalism and liberal Culture Protestantism are sides of the same historical 
epistemological coin—operating as they do on the assumptions of notions of 
modernist rationality—then the particular paradox at the heart of this theology of 
Jesus’ transcendence critiques the same aspect in both of them, i.e. the presumed 
sufficiency of a human grasp of Christ. Therefore, if a Christian community is 
concerned to embody a middle way between closed-ness or wide-open-ness, this 
project suggests the importance of attention to the paradoxical transcendence of Jesus 
at the level of historical particularity: through spiritual disciplines, worship and 
liturgical praxis, engagement with the scriptures and discussion with one another. To 
come at it from another angle, where we come across extremes of closed or wide-open 
religion, attention to the Christological assumptions that may lie beneath them can 
give rise to an important set of critical questions aimed at mitigating those extremes. 
The analogy of self-awareness is helpful here, pointing as it does to the way a project 
like this can help a religious community discern important theological issues that can 
have a bearing on its character. To describe Christology in a confessional setting as 
enabling self-awareness is a rich analogy: the church community receives its own ‘self’, 
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its identity and its telos from Christ, the one who is wholly other and yet gives himself 
to the church. 
 
To conclude, in similar and diverse ways, Frei and Bonhoeffer show us that holding 
onto a robust sense of Jesus’ transcendence points us in the direction of the 
unsubstitutable paradox—the person of Jesus Christ, unsubstitutable in his being at 
one with God, revealed in the hiddenness of sinful flesh. They can do this more 
strongly together than separately, and especially when supplemented with a 
pneumatology focussed on the generosity of God, they illuminate the importance of a 
theology of Jesus’ transcendence for the question of the ‘middle way’ on which they 
are both regularly put to use. Where Frei seeks to articulate a ‘generous orthodoxy’, I 
suggest that together Frei and Bonhoeffer enable us to articulate an orthodox 
generosity. 
  
~ 
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